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GILDED 
AGE
According to the Chinese zodiac, 2017 
was the year of the ‘fire rooster’, an 
animal often associated with the mythical 
fenghuang, or ‘August Rooster’ (kunji). 
According to Chinese legend, the fenghuang 
is a magnificently beautiful bird whose 
appearance is an auspicious sign, as it marks 
the beginning of a new era of peaceful 
flourishing—such as in 1368, when the bird 
was allegedly last sighted on the grave of the 
father of the founder of the Ming dynasty. 
This legendary creature represents a 
moment of great hope and potential: it only 
remains during the harmonious reign of a 
righteous ruler, and disappears during times 
of unrest and chaos. It is worth noting that 
the previous year of the fire rooster began in 
1957—a period marked by the unleashing of 
new freedoms and the hope for a new society 
defined by collectivism, followed quickly 
by repression and ultimately resulting in 
tragedy.
Considering the auspicious symbolism 
surrounding the fenghuang, it is fitting that 
on 18 October 2017, President Xi Jinping 
took to the stage of the Nineteenth Party 
Congress to proclaim the beginning of a ‘new 
era’ (xin shidai) for ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ (zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi). 
In his words: 
This new era will be an era of building 
on past successes to further advance our 
cause, and of continuing in a new historical 
context to strive for the success of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics. It will be an 
era of securing a decisive victory in building 
a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects, and of moving on to all-out efforts 
to build a great modern socialist country. It 
will be an era for the Chinese people of all 
ethnic groups to work together and work 
hard to create a better life for themselves 
and ultimately achieve common prosperity 
for everyone. It will be an era for all of us, the 
sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, to 
strive with one heart to realise the Chinese 
Dream of national rejuvenation. It will be an 
era that sees China moving closer to centre 
stage and making greater contributions to 
mankind.
Xi also made a point of reiterating that 
the reverberations of this change would 
go far beyond the boundaries of China, 
insisting that this ‘new era’ presents ‘a new 
option for other countries and nations who 
want to speed up their development while 
preserving their independence; and it offers 
Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to 
solving the problems facing mankind.’
It did not take long to discover that, in 
spite of such ecumenical proclamations, 
not all would be able to partake in this ‘new 
era’ of Chinese socialism. Migrant workers, 
for one, remain disposable. Barely one 
month after Xi’s speech, on 19 November, 
a fire broke out in a popular housing block 
inhabited mostly by migrant workers in 
Beijing’s Daxing district, killing nineteen. 
Citing the need to ensure safety, in a 
matter of days the local authorities forced 
thousands upon thousands of ‘low-end 
people’ (diduan renkou) to abandon their 
dwellings in the suburbs of the Chinese 
capital, showing absolutely no regard for 
their livelihoods. Families who had moved 
from all over China—and had, in some cases, 
lived in Beijing for years—were effectively 
thrown out on the street and left to their 
GILDED AGE
8 MADE IN CHINA - INTRODUCTION
own fate in the freezing northern winter. 
In just a few days they lost everything, a 
cruel reminder of the precarity inherent to 
the life of the Chinese migrant. Lawyers, 
activists, and even ordinary citizens who 
dare to express critical views also hardly 
find a place in Xi’s brave new world. In the 
past year, they have been silenced one after 
another through disappearances, arrests, 
and forced public confessions, as a newly 
revamped public security apparatus gears 
into motion. They have been labelled as 
disturbers of the public order, betrayers of 
the Chinese dream, mere tools in the hands 
of ‘hostile foreign forces’ always eager to 
wreak havoc in an otherwise harmonious 
society. 
It is in this increasingly repressive context 
marked by rapid economic growth, uneven 
wealth creation, and China’s expanding 
global reach, that we have titled this second 
volume of the Made in China Yearbook 
‘Gilded Age’, alluding to the classic novel 
by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner 
that satirises the endemic contradictions 
underpinning the rise of the United States 
of America at the end of the nineteenth 
century. There are many parallels that could 
be noted between that era and the one we 
now find ourselves in. The most relevant for 
our purposes is the fact that in both of these 
ages dramatic economic and technological 
advancements have been underpinned by 
the exploitation of workers, and the violent 
silencing of those who advocate for the 
subjugated and marginalised segments of 
society.
In this Yearbook we trace China’s stark 
new ‘gilded age’ through the articles that 
appeared in our open-access Made in 
China journal in 2017. We have regrouped 
the essays into six thematic sections. The 
first, entitled ‘Balancing Acts’, examines 
different declinations of precarity. We open 
with two chapters that frame precarity in 
general terms—‘A Genealogy of Precarity 
and Its Ambivalence’, in which Francesca 
Coin presents a brief conceptual history of 
precarity, and ‘Work Precarisation and New 
Inequalities’, in which Fabio Perocco looks 
at the vicious circle that links precarity 
and migration. In ‘Making Class and Place 
in Contemporary China’, Roberta Zavoretti 
contends that in China today, the state-
sponsored discursive production of migrant 
labourers as a homogeneous social group 
sustains the promotion of the hegemonic 
social model of an ideally emerging ‘middle 
class’. In ‘Class and Precarity in China’, 
Chris Smith and Pun Ngai question the 
nexus between class and precariousness, 
demonstrating that the boundary between 
regular and non-regular work is far from 
static. In ‘From Dormitory Regime to 
Conciliatory Despotism’, Kaxton Siu 
adopts a long-term view to probe the new 
social, technical, and gendered divisions of 
labour inside Chinese garment factories. 
In ‘The Precarity of Layoffs and State 
Compensation’, Dorothy Solinger looks 
into the policy processes that have led to 
the emergence of urban poverty in China 
and at the prospect of poverty alleviation. 
These pieces are followed by two essays 
that consider the situation of collective 
bargaining in China—first, in ‘Collective 
Bargaining Is Dead: The Situation Is 
Excellent’, Eli Friedman argues that the 
recent decline in discussions about collective 
bargaining in China is not necessarily bad 
news, as it paves the way for public debate 
about other meaningful policies, such as 
universal basic income. This is followed by 
a response from Kevin Lin with ‘Collective 
Bargaining and Universal Basic Income’, in 
which he compares the two strategies in 
relation to the empowerment of Chinese 
workers. Moving on to the realm of worker 
protests, in ‘Counting Contention’, Manfred 
Elfstrom explains why it is so difficult to 
find accurate data about strikes in China. 
To conclude, in ‘Migrants, Mass Arrest, 
and Resistance in Contemporary China’, 
Ma Tian looks into how Chinese migrants 
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are commonly perceived as criminals 
and assesses how this bias is reflected in 
mechanisms of crime control, as well as in 
the judicial and correctional systems. 
Since in today’s globalised and 
interconnected world, Chinese labour 
issues have become much more than 
merely a local matter, we have dedicated 
the second section—‘Chinese Labour 
in Global Perspective’—to a series of 
essays that either frame Chinese labour 
comparatively or examine its transnational 
implications. In ‘Chinese Multinational 
Corporations in Europe’, Zheng Yu and 
Chris Smith challenge the widespread 
perception that Chinese investments are 
undermining labour standards in Europe. 
In ‘Liquid Labourscape’, Antonella Diana 
looks into the governance experimentations 
in a Chinese special economic zone in 
Laos. In ‘Outsourcing Exploitation’, 
Ivan Franceschini compares the wages, 
expectations, and needs of Chinese and 
Cambodian garment workers, examining 
how these factors are likely to impact labour 
activism. In ‘Trade Union Reform in Two 
One-Party States’, Anita Chan assesses the 
prospects for union democracy in China and 
Vietnam. In ‘Prospects for US-China Union 
Relations in the Era of Xi and Trump’, Katie 
Quan reconstructs the bumpy history of 
exchanges between American and Chinese 
unions, and suggests possible ways to foster 
mutual engagement in the current political 
climate. Finally, in ‘#iSlaveat10’, Jenny 
Chan reviews ten years of struggles at the 
infamous Taiwanese-owned Apple supplier, 
Foxconn: a company that transcends all 
national boundaries. To conclude, in the 
spirit of adopting a ‘global’ line of inquiry, 
we include ‘Treating What Ails the Study of 
Chinese Politics’, an essay in which William 
Hurst makes an argument for freeing 
political studies of China from isolation by 
engaging in comparative research.
The year 2017 saw the implementation 
of the Foreign NGOs Law and other 
regulations, which the Party-state has used 
to claim back control over civil society. In 
the past, there has been great eagerness to 
salute every small victory by Chinese NGOs 
and activists over the powerful Party-state 
as evidence that the authoritarian tide was 
finally receding, and that grassroots forces 
were stepping up to take a new role in 
Chinese politics and society. Now, with the 
arrest of yet another activist, the airing of 
yet another public confession, the closure 
of yet another NGO working for the weak 
and disenfranchised, and the passing of yet 
another repressive law, the world has come 
to view Chinese civil society as if it were on 
its deathbed. For sure, the ideal of Chinese 
civil society is ailing. But, if we consider 
the swiftness with which the Party-state 
has tamed these forces (at least for the time 
being), we wonder whether this civil society 
was ever there in first place. Could it be 
possible that we were simply projecting our 
hopes onto a handful of Chinese grassroots 
organisations and activists? Mourning the 
death of an ideal, in the third section—
‘The End of Civil Society?’—we overcome 
our sorrow to look at the momentous 
changes that are currently taking place 
in the realm of Chinese civil society. In 
‘Conceptual Confusion in the Research on 
Chinese Civil Society’, Taru Salmenkari 
highlights the biases and lack of clarity 
that undermines much of the discussion of 
Chinese civil society. In ‘Chinese Grassroots 
Organisations after the Charity Law’, the 
late Karla Simon and Holly Snape consider 
how the new legislation is likely to break 
down the old order and establish a new 
system of governance. In ‘The Rise of 
Foundations’, Jessica Teets examines the 
role of Chinese foundations in providing 
financial assistance to local NGOs now 
that foreign sources of funding are drying 
up. Shifting the focus from the realm of 
legislation to activism, in ‘What Future 
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Is There for Human Rights Lawyering in 
China?’, Fu Hualing analyses the practices 
of Chinese human rights lawyers and 
examines the prospects for their survival in 
Xi Jinping’s new era. In ‘The Mental Health 
Costs of Repression’, Nicola Macbean looks 
at the toll that the latest crackdown is taking 
on the psychological wellbeing of human 
rights lawyers in China. In ‘Snapshots of 
China’s “Uncivil Society”’, Børge Bakken 
describes how the attempt by the Party-state 
to prevent a civil society from organising 
itself has led to the emergence of a rather 
uncivil type of society. Finally, in ‘Slaving 
Away’, Ivan Franceschini looks back at the 
‘black brick kilns scandal’ that took place in 
China ten years ago and attempts to draw 
some lessons from those horrific stories of 
forced labour.
In June 2017, the government of the 
United States announced its intention to 
withdraw from the Paris Accord, severely 
undermining the global effort to contain 
climate change. Since then, China has 
attempted to portray itself as a world leader 
on environmental issues. Considering that 
China is currently the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, this development might 
appear paradoxical. Nevertheless, in recent 
years the Chinese authorities have become 
increasingly concerned with the toll that the 
many environmental catastrophes are taking 
on the health of the country’s citizens, as this 
has the potential to spark unrest that could 
negatively affect governmental legitimacy. 
While global attention has focussed on 
China’s top-down environmental efforts, in 
the fourth section—‘The Good Earth’—we 
consider the engagement of Chinese citizens 
with state policies on the environment, and 
look into their potential for articulating 
workable grassroots alternatives. In 
particular, we examine the management of 
public resources—the so-called ‘commons’. 
In ‘A Chinese Water Commons?’, Andrea Pia 
argues that there are places in rural China 
where water is already being managed as 
a common resource. In ‘Amateurism and 
Our Common Concern for Biodiversity’, 
Timothy McLellan outlines his experience 
with a project aimed at introducing 
biologically diverse agroforestry in a county 
in southwest China, and puts forward a 
critique of professionalisation in the realm 
of international environmental cooperation. 
In ‘Commons and the Right to the City in 
Contemporary China’, Carlo Inverardi-
Ferri tells the story of an urban village on 
the outskirts of Beijing, providing insights 
into the process of land commodification 
in today’s China. In ‘Burning Coal in 
Tangshan’, Edwin Schmitt traces the history 
of coal mining in China, highlighting the 
nexus between the physical characteristics 
of energy resources and the development 
of the rules that govern them. Finally, in 
‘Protecting Sacred Commons’, Brendan 
Galipeau explores how some Tibetan 
communities engaging in viticulture in 
northwest Yunnan province pursue an 
ecologically friendly agenda meant to protect 
‘common’ sacred Buddhist landscapes. In 
this section we also include ‘How China’s 
Environmental Crackdown Is Affecting 
Business Owners and Workers’, an essay 
in which Daniel Fuchs and Edwin Schmitt 
describe the human consequence of China’s 
intensified environmental crackdown in 
Chengdu.
The fifth section—‘Window on Asia’—
offers a series of perspectives on the latest 
developments in the field of labour and civil 
society across Asia. In ‘In the Absence of 
a Peasantry, What, Then, is a Hong Kong 
Farmer?’, Loretta Lou ponders the reasons 
for, and implications of, the absence of a 
discourse about peasantry in the former 
British colony. In ‘Burmese Civil Society 
Challenges China’s Development Assistance 
in Myanmar’, Jennifer Hsu analyses how 
Burmese civil society has reacted to the 
challenges posed by Chinese aid and 
investment in the country. In ‘Boom or Bust in 
China’s Jade Trade with Myanmar?’, Henrik 
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Møller outlines the history of commercial 
exchanges of jade between China and its 
southern neighbour, and gauges the impact 
of the recent anti-corruption drive on this 
market. In ‘Indian Labour Movements under 
Modi’, Tom Barnes looks at the development 
of the worker movement in India under 
the right-wing government of Narendra 
Modi. Finally, ‘In the Shadow of Kem 
Ley’, Astrid Norén-Nilsson considers the 
politicisation of Cambodian civil society and 
the implications of this process in light of 
the latest authoritarian turn in Cambodian 
politics.
We wrap up the volume with a particularly 
rich cultural section titled ‘Work of Arts’. In 
‘Ai Weiwei’s #Refugees’, Giorgio Strafella 
and Daria Berg offer their take on the latest 
endeavours of the Chinese artist. In ‘Bodies 
without Redemption’, Chen Shuxia retraces 
the life of the late photographer Ren Hang, 
who committed suicide earlier in 2017. In 
‘Losing the World’, Christian Sorace reviews 
Gu Tao’s documentary The Last Moose of 
Aoluguya, about the forced relocation of 
the Evenki people in Northern China. In 
‘Datong, Forever in Limbo’, Jonathan Kinkel 
reviews The Chinese Mayor, a documentary 
about a politician and a very ambitious plan. 
In ‘China’s Industrial Heritage without 
History’, Maris Boyd Gillette examines 
the public memory of China’s socialist 
industrial heritage. In ‘Collecting the 
Red Era in Contemporary China’, Emily 
Williams looks into the archival practices 
of Chinese collectors of Maoist memorabilia 
and how they relate to historical memory. 
In ‘Industrial Landscapes of Socialist 
Realism’, Craig Smith surveys the fate of a 
very peculiar form of socialist art in China 
and North Korea. Finally, in ‘Resurrecting 
the Dead’, Ivan Franceschini ponders the 
contemporary relevance of Old Tales Retold, 
Lu Xun’s final oeuvre of fiction.
This volume recaps the second year of our 
Made in China journal. Since the journal’s 
launch in 2016, the publication has grown 
beyond our wildest expectations, and we are 
grateful not only to all the contributors who 
have taken time out of their busy schedules 
to write for us, but also our readers, who 
have read and shared widely. The aim of 
Made in China is to create a bridge between 
academia and a wider audience, to make the 
research and work of our authors accessible 
to everybody, especially to those who might 
make use of their findings and ideas. For this 
reason, we strongly believe in open access. 
As the Chinese authorities step up their 
attempts to censor academic publications 
and to influence global public discourse 
on China—and as commercial academic 
publishers all over the world capitulate 
to the demands coming from Beijing—we 
are convinced that open access publishing 
remains key to academic freedom and 
integrity. Take the profit motive out of the 
equation, and it will be much harder for 
anybody to influence the decision of an 
editor or a publisher regarding what can 
and cannot be published. It will also be truly 
possible to reach out to (almost) everybody, 
not only to the members of a limited elite 
who are still entitled to access now largely 
unaffordable academic publications. It is 
this belief that motivates us to keep Made 
in China going, and it is with this conviction 
that we have now entered our third year 
of activity. We believe that the conformity 
and sycophancy that are increasingly 
underlining the debate in and on China can 
only be fought through critical engagement 
and inclusion. It is from this standpoint that 
we look back on the dramatic events of 2017, 
hoping that they represent an auspicious 
new awareness of our shared challenges, 
and that the fiery August Rooster does not 
end up betraying its promise by burning 
everything to the ground.
Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere
12 February 2018
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Foreign NGOs Law Enforced
On 1 January, the controversial Law on the 
Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities within 
Mainland China came into force. To clarify 
matters in the midst of legal and procedural 
uncertainty—the list of agencies allowed to 
supervise foreign organisations and the areas 
these organisations can work in was only 
released at the end of December—in early 
January the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
published an online manual in Chinese on how 
to register foreign NGOs. Roughly at the same 
time, thirty-six Chinese lawyers formed a legal 
service group to advise foreign NGOs and their 
local partners on matters related to the new 
legislation. Still, in early March only three 
dozen organisations had been able to complete 
the registration process. These included the 
World Economic Forum, Save the Children, the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as 
several chambers of commerce. Many foreign 
NGOs simply adopted an attitude of wait and 
see, suspending their activities in China until 
they could observe how other organisations 
would fare in the registration process. Still, 
according to some observers, this difficult start 
did not warrant excessive pessimism. In the 
words of civil society scholar Shawn Shieh: 
‘In my experience working with Chinese and 
foreign NGOs in China is that both are quite 
creative and persistent and as long as there are 
pressing social needs for their work, they will 
find ways to work through or around the NGO 
Law.’ IF
(Sources: China Development Brief; China 
Law Translate; The Diplomat; NGOs in China; 
South China Morning Post)
JAN/MAR
2017
Further Job Cuts in the Coal 
and Steel Industry Announced
China’s annual economic growth in 2016 reached 
the expected target of 6.7 percent, with the 
creation of more than thirteen million new jobs 
in cities and towns. Still, at the beginning of 2017 
the employment prospects remained worrying, 
as China continued to rein in its overcapacity 
in heavy industries such as steel and coal. In a 
press conference held on 1 March, Yin Weimin, 
the Chinese Minister of Human Resources and 
Social Security, explained that arrangements 
were made in 2016 for 726,000 workers who 
had lost their jobs in the steel and coal industry. 
Moreover, he announced that an extra 500,000 
workers would need similar arrangements in 
2017. To facilitate this process, the authorities 
proposed four approaches: workers whose 
skills are applicable to other positions within 
their factories would be reassigned internally; 
workers with skills incompatible to other roles 
in the same factory would be relocated to other 
places, with the government providing them 
with job training and guidance; workers within 
five years of retirement would be encouraged 
to retire early; finally, a special effort would be 
made to ensure the livelihoods of disadvantaged 
and older workers who did not belong to the 
first three categories. JL
(Sources: Caixin 1; Caixin 2; Renminwang)
Authors can be identified by their initials at the 
end of each brief: Ivan Franceschini (IF), Kevin 
Lin (KL), Jamie Liu (JL), Nicholas Loubere (NL), 
and Elisa Nesossi (EN). The content of the briefs 
is based on news that has been widely reported 
on in various media outlets and on social media. 
Below each brief we list some of the outlets that 
have published on the topic, and in the electronic 
version of the volume we provide links to some of 
the articles.
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Supreme People’s Court Boasts 
about Arrest of Lawyer
Talks about Migrant Workers at 
the Two Sessions
In early March, the annual ‘Two Sessions’ of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Congress (CPPCC) convened in Beijing. On 5 
March, Prime Minister Li Keqiang addressed 
the NPC. In his speech he reiterated once 
again the determination of the government 
to tackle the issue of wage arrears besetting 
migrant workers. The beleaguered situation of 
migrant workers also drew much attention from 
representatives. Some delegates contended that 
inadequate legislation on wage payment, lenient 
punishment for companies violating laws, and 
weak law enforcement are some of the main 
reasons for the persistence of wage arrears in 
China. They thus suggested that the government 
should reinforce its supervision of the labour 
market—for instance by creating a blacklist 
of law-violating companies and imposing stiff 
penalties on them. Wage arrears aside, a special 
personal income tax scheme was proposed, 
which would take into consideration the 
seasonal fluctuations in migrant workers’ wages 
and therefore help increase their disposable 
income. Moreover, it was recommended that the 
government, in cooperation with firms, provide 
more vocational training to migrant workers to 
help them survive in the era of automation. JL
(Sources: Gongren Ribao; Xinhua 1; Xinhua 2; 
Zhonggongwang)
During the ‘Two Sessions’, Zhou Qiang—the 
President of the Supreme People’s Court—
presented his annual report about developments 
in the work of the courts over the past year 
and plans for the year to come. In the very 
first section of the speech—entitled ‘ensuring 
state security, punishing crime, and protecting 
human rights’—Zhou Qiang singled out the 
sentencing, ‘according to the law’, of weiquan 
lawyer Zhou Shifeng to seven years in jail as 
one of the key achievements in the protection 
of state security in 2016. This happened in 
concurrence with media reports about the issue 
of torture in relation to Chinese lawyers caught 
up in the ‘709 incident’—the crackdown against 
the ‘rights protection’ (weiquan) community 
that took place in July 2015. In January, the legal 
team of human rights lawyer Xie Yang, who was 
detained in Hongjiang, Hunan, on 11 July 2015, 
released the transcript of a conversation they 
had with their client to protest the decision 
of the authorities not to release him. In it, 
Xie described the details of the physical and 
mental abuse he had been subjected to while 
in detention. The transcript resonated with 
other similar incidents, particularly human 
rights lawyer Li Chunfu, who emerged from 
nearly seventeen months in police custody on 
21 January in a shattered state, suffering from 
violent bouts of paranoia and with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. In an unprecedented move, 
on 1 March, China’s official media responded 
to Xie’s allegations, claiming that his torture 
was a story fabricated in order to attract 
international attention. State media accused 
disbarred lawyer Jiang Tianyong—himself 
detained since November 2016—of making up 
‘fake news’, and featured interviews with him 
admitting to fabricating Xie’s claims of torture. 
Chinese media reported that an ‘independent’ 
investigation by the authorities found that Xie 
had not been tortured. EN
(Sources: South China Morning Post; The New 
York Times; Global Times; Minnan Network; 
The Independent; Guanchazhe; Xinhua)
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Grisly Murder Brings Back 
Haunting Memories
In March, the Chinese media reported that 
in December 2016 a court in Beijing handed 
a suspended death sentence to two migrant 
workers from a village in Sichuan province, 
while three others were given jail terms ranging 
from fifteen years to life imprisonment for the 
premeditated murder of a colleague in August 
2014. They had killed him on a construction site 
in Shunyi district, Beijing, and then used his 
corpse to stage a fake accident in order to claim 
compensation from the construction company 
by posing as relatives of the victim. Such grisly 
deeds are not unheard of in China. In May 2016, 
prosecutors in Inner Mongolia announced the 
indictment of seventy-four people for the killing 
of seventeen mine workers in order to blackmail 
mine owners running unlicensed operations 
into paying reparations. In 2009, the police 
discovered that several residents of a village in 
Leibo county, Sichuan province, were involved 
in buying or kidnapping people with severe 
mental problems to sell them as slaves or to kill 
them in mines to get compensation by posing 
as relatives. A similar situation was famously 
portrayed few years earlier in Li Yang’s haunting 
movie Blind Shaft.  IF
(Sources: Caixin English; The New York 
Times)
Over the weekend of 25 March, Feng Chongyi, 
a Chinese-born professor who has been 
teaching for over a decade at the University of 
Technology Sydney, was stopped at immigration 
checkpoints in Guangzhou while he was 
attempting to board a flight back to Australia. 
For a week, he was prevented from leaving 
China and remained in a hotel room, subject to 
interrogation by state security agents because of 
his alleged involvement in a threat to national 
security. He was allowed to leave the country on 
1 April. Professor Feng, who is known for having 
repeatedly expressed critical views about the 
Chinese government and its political dealings 
in Australia, was in China to conduct research 
on weiquan lawyers during one of the worst 
crackdowns in years. The ‘incident’ happened 
while Prime Minister Li Keqiang was on an 
official visit in Australia to negotiate several 
trade deals, and when the Australian Parliament 
was on the verge of ratifying an extradition 
treaty long in the making with China. On 28 
March, facing rising public concerns about 
China’s record of abuse of national security 
charges to quash political dissent, Australian 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull called off 
the vote on the extradition treaty. This incident 
followed the disappearance of Lee Ming-cheh, 
a Taiwanese human rights activist, the week 
before. According to friends and relatives, on 19 
March, Lee had boarded a flight from Taipei to 
Macau, but he never emerged from the arrivals 
gate. IF
(Sources: The Guardian; Reuters; The New 
York Times 1; The New York Times 2; The 
New York Times 3)
Chinese-Born Australian 
Scholar Prevented from Leaving 
China
“In 2009, the police discovered that several residents of a 
village in Leibo county, Sichuan 
province, were involved in 
buying or kidnapping people 
with severe mental problems 
to sell them as slaves or to 
kill them in mines to get 
compensation by posing as 
relatives.”
16
MADE IN CHINA - BRIEFS
Amnesty International Releases 
Report on Death Penalty in 
China
In April, Amnesty released a report on the 
death penalty in China entitled ‘China’s 
Deadly Secrets’. In spite of the near absolute 
secrecy over the Chinese death penalty system, 
Amnesty estimated that in 2016 China carried 
out more executions than all other countries 
combined. The Report also objected to the 
unverifiable claims by the Chinese government 
that the country has been ‘killing fewer, killing 
cautiously’ (shaosha shensha). To The Guardian, 
Amnesty International East Asia Director 
Nicholas Bequelin explained that without 
concrete statistics there is no way to verify such 
claims, and demanded that China ‘stop being a 
rogue state in the international community with 
respect to the death penalty and finally allow 
the Chinese people to have a proper, informed 
debate about capital punishment in the country.’ 
Commenting on the Report for The New York 
Times, Professor Susan Trevaskes, an expert 
on the death penalty in China, claimed that the 
number of people executed annually is probably 
in the ‘low thousands’ and that the Chinese 
government has significantly reduced the use 
of capital punishment since the mid-2000s. 
According to the Report on China released 
by Amnesty International, a partial dataset of 
cases shows that farmers and the unemployed 
constitute the majority of people given death 
sentences. EN
(Sources: Amnesty International Global 
Report; Amnesty International China Report; 
The Guardian; Quartz; The New York Times)
Beijing Offers Rewards for 
Reporting Spies
On 10 April, the Beijing State Security Bureau 
released a set of Measures on Rewards for 
Citizens Reporting Leads on Espionage 
Conduct. These regulations promised 
informants who reported on spies rewards 
ranging between 10,000 and 500,000 yuan, 
depending on the relevance and usefulness of 
the information provided. The new regulations 
were accompanied by the online publication of 
a cartoon in which a young boy donning the red 
scarf of a Communist Young Pioneer reports a 
bearded foreigner wearing a bandit’s mask. This 
was not the first sign of an increasing concern 
with matters of national security among the 
Chinese leadership. Back in 2013, President Xi 
Jinping established a new, secretive National 
Security Commission of the Communist Party 
of China in an apparently successful attempt 
to consolidate the political leadership of all 
the components of the country’s fragmented 
security apparatus. In November 2014, the 
Chinese government passed a Counter-
espionage Law, followed a few months later 
by a National Security Law. In November 
2015, Jilin province was the first to introduce 
a hotline for residents to report possible spies. 
Since the passing of the National Security Law, 
the Chinese government has declared 15 April 
‘National Security Education Day’, i.e. a day for 
raising public awareness of national security 
issues. That these concerns remain paramount 
to the Chinese leadership was also highlighted 
by the unusually brief round of discussions 
that preceded the adoption of the new National 
Intelligence Law—which regulates the activities 
of state security bodies—on 27 June. IF
(Sources: China Law Translate 1; China Law 
Translate 2; Reuters; The New York Times 1; 
The New York Times 2; The Paper)
APR/JUN
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Salaries of Executives in State-
Owned Enterprises Linked to 
Party-Building Effort
On 17 April, Premier Li Keqiang told a meeting 
of top state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives 
at the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission in Beijing that 
the government was reconsidering a 2015 
policy capping their pay, and promised more 
competitive rates tied to performance. According 
to a Xinhua report, executives’ pay and other 
rewards or punishments will be linked to how 
well individuals carry out ‘Party building’ work. 
This was part of the government’s attempt to 
reform SOE management in order to restructure, 
modernise, and internationalise the state sector. 
At the time, the news was seen as an effort to 
re-establish the role of the Party in China’s state 
industry, and retain loyal and talented managers. 
Since 2013, President Xi Jinping has been 
pushing for China’s state sector—whose worth 
is estimated at twenty trillion USD—to embrace 
structural reforms while reining in state sector 
managers’ pay. In 2017, China once again pushed 
forward state-enterprise reform, with ten large 
state-owned enterprises started selling stakes in 
their units. However, the pace of the reform has 
remained slow, and concern over unrest by laid-
off state workers has similarly stalled reforms of 
state-owned steel and coal enterprises. KL
(Sources: Bloomberg; Reuters; South China 
Morning Post; Xinhua News)
At the end of April, China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) released its latest annual 
report on Chinese migrant workers. According 
to the NBS, in 2016 there were 281,710,000 
migrants in China—1.5 percent more than the 
previous year. Chinese workers appeared to 
be increasingly reluctant to migrate far away 
from their hometowns. In 2016, 112,370,000 
workers migrated within the boundaries of their 
town (xiangzhen) of permanent residence—3.4 
percent more than the previous year—compared 
to 169,340,000 who moved away, an increase of 
barely 0.3 percent. Significantly, 88.2 percent 
of the new migrant workers did not leave their 
towns of permanent residence. Inter-provincial 
migration was also dropping: 76,660,000 
workers migrated to another province in 2016, 
1 percent less than the previous year. Other 
significant trends included: a) an increase in the 
percentage of female migrants, who constituted 
35.5 percent of the total migrant workforce 
in 2016; b) the progressive aging of migrant 
workers, with the average age in 2016 being 
thirty-nine, 0.4 years older than the previous 
year; and c) an improvement in the educational 
level, with the percentage of migrant workers 
holding a high school diploma—17 percent—
growing by 1.2 percent. Data related to the 
protection of labour rights were mixed. In 
2016, migrants worked an average of 24.9 days 
a month and 8.5 hours a day, with 64.4 percent 
working more than eight hours a day, a decrease 
of 0.4 percent compared to the previous year. 
The contractualisation rate was 35.1 percent—1.1 
percent less than the previous year. 2,369,000 
migrant workers were owed back wages—a drop 
of 14.1 percent compared to 2015. In general, 
salaries were still on the rise. In 2016, migrant 
workers received an average of 3,275 yuan—or 
203 yuan more than the previous year—a growth 
rate of 6.6 percent. However, the growth rate for 
wages slowed by 0.6 percent. IF
(Sources: Caixin; National Bureau of Statistics; 
Sixth Tone) 
National Bureau of Statistics 
Releases Annual Report on 
Migrant Workers
“In 2017, China once again pushed forward state-
enterprise reform... However, 
the pace of the reform has 
remained slow, and concern 
over unrest by laidoff state 
workers has similarly stalled 
reforms of state-owned steel 
and coal enterprises.”
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Fan Yusu Highlights Plight of 
Domestic Workers
In late April, Fan Yusu, a forty-four-year-old 
female migrant worker from Hubei province, 
was propelled to literary stardom when her 
essay entitled ‘I am Fan Yusu’ went viral. 
Fan’s writing recounted a life marked by 
patriarchy, domestic abuse, and raising children 
singlehandedly. She detailed her feelings of 
isolation, and the challenges she faced living as 
a domestic migrant worker in Beijing. Fan also 
reflected on her experiences of exploitation 
at the hands of employers, and the unequal 
treatment she had faced as a migrant due to 
government policies, stressing the need for 
solidarity between marginalised and exploited 
people. In the wake of her success, Fan was 
offered book deals and media appearances, but 
she shunned the spotlight, reportedly leaving 
Beijing and going into hiding until the unwanted 
attention subsided. NL
(Sources: China Digital Times; Los Angeles 
Review of Books; Sixth Tone; The Paper)
Li Heping Is Sentenced, Lee 
Ming-cheh and Lu Yuyu Face 
Trial
At the end of April, the ordeal of Li Heping, a 
prominent lawyer who was caught up in the ‘709 
crackdown’ against the weiquan community that 
took place in July 2015, came to an end. After 
being detained for almost two years, Li, who 
is well known to the international community 
for his overt rights activism, was convicted of 
‘subversion of state power’. In a secret trial, a 
court in Tianjin sentenced him to three years in 
prison with a four-year reprieve, meaning that 
he was to be released but could still be arrested 
again at any time. The court ruled that since 
2008, Li Heping repeatedly used the Internet 
and foreign media interviews to discredit and 
attack China’s state power and the legal system. 
The court also accused Li of accepting foreign 
funding and employing paid defendants. For 
many others the ordeal continued. On 26 May, 
the Chinese authorities formally announced 
that Lee Ming-cheh, the human rights advocate 
from Taiwan who had disappeared on arrival to 
Macao Airport in March, was under arrest on a 
charge of ‘subverting state power’. Finally, on 
23 June former migrant worker and blogger Lu 
Yuyu—who was detained in Yunnan province 
in June 2016 along with his partner Li Tingyu 
for his work of meticulously recording details of 
public protests online (see Manfred Elfstrom’s 
chapter in the present volume)—stood trial for 
‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’, facing 
three to five years in jail. Li Tingyu was tried in 
April and later released without a verdict.  EN
(Sources: BBC; Hong Kong Free Press; The 
Guardian; The New York Times; The Wall 
Street Journal; Weibo)
“My life is a book that’s unbearable to read, and my fate 
has made the binding on that 
book extremely clumsy. I am 
from Xiangyang, Hubei. When I 
was twelve, I started teaching 
at the village school. If I never 
left my hometown, I’d have 
continued, and would have 
become a formal teacher there. 
But I couldn’t bear to stay in 
the countryside viewing the 
sky from the bottom of a well, 
so I went to Beijing. I wanted 
to see the world. I was twenty 
that year.”  
Fan Yusu (translated by China Digital Times)
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On 22 March, a Chinese construction worker 
died from a fall at the Imperial Pacific Casino 
construction site in the American Pacific 
island of Saipan. Soon after, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation agents raided the construction 
site and discovered hundreds of undocumented 
Chinese construction workers employed 
by a company named Suzhou Gold Mantis 
Construction and Decoration. They had been 
brought to Saipan illegally under a tourist visa 
programme, after being enticed by the false 
promises of the labour contractors. In April, 
United States prosecutors filed criminal charges 
against individuals connected to the Chinese 
labour contractors for illegally employing 
these workers, and the construction projects 
soon stalled. Investigators also discovered 
substandard working and living conditions. 
Out of job since early April, the undocumented 
workers fought for unpaid wages, staging public 
protests in front of the casino. On 16 May, over 
ninety unpaid workers received their salaries 
and placement fees, and flew back to China. 
On 1 June, another group of thirty-five Chinese 
workers staged a protest at the construction site 
to demand unpaid wages and reimbursement 
for medical fees for workplace injuries. Again on 
22 June, forty-three unpaid workers protested 
at the same place against unpaid wages. After 
rejecting an offer of five thousand USD each 
from the company, the protesting workers 
insisted that unless all workers are paid the full 
wages owed to them, they will not return to 
China. Only in March 2018, following persistent 
efforts by the workers and as part of the 
investigation of the US Department of Labour, 
four Chinese construction companies agreed to 
pay 13.9 million USD in back wages and damages 
to 2,400 Chinese workers employed for the 
construction of the casino. KL
(Sources: Saipan Tribune 1; Saipan Tribune 2; 
Saipan Tribune 3; The New York Times; The 
Paper)
Undocumented Chinese 
Workers Protest in Saipan
Labour Activists Detained 
While Investigating Ivanka 
Trump’s Manufacturer
In late May, Hua Haifeng, Su Heng, and Li 
Zhao—three labour activists working for the 
New York-based advocacy group China Labor 
Watch (CLW)—were detained by the police in 
Ganzhou, Jiangxi province, while investigating 
labour conditions at factories making designer 
shoes for global brands. In particular, they 
were inspecting a supplier of Ivanka Trump’s 
fashion brand. Earlier in May, CLW had issued 
an interim report that alleged forced overtime 
and a monthly salary of 2,500 yuan in this 
factory. The three investigators were charged 
on suspicion of illegal eavesdropping, and 
given limited access to lawyers. According to 
Li Qiang, the organisation’s Executive Director, 
CLW had been conducting investigations in 
China for seventeen years, but this was the first 
time that its investigators have been detained. 
Ivanka Trump’s brand has sought to distance 
itself from its Chinese supplier. On 5 June, 
Alicia Edwards, a spokeswoman for the US 
State Department, declared that the American 
government was concerned by the arrests, 
and added that the investigations carried out 
by Chinese labour activists help American 
companies to understand conditions in their 
supply chains in order to hold manufacturers 
accountable. In response, on 6 June Hua 
Chunying, spokeswoman for the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the activists 
were being investigated on suspicion of using 
illegal ‘professional surveillance equipment’. 
She added that the case was being dealt with 
according to the law and that no foreign country 
had the authority to interfere in China’s judicial 
process. Relatives of the activists reported being 
harassed by the public security. On 27 June, the 
three investigators were released on bail. KL
(Sources: Associated Press; BBC; Bloomberg; 
The New York Times; The Paper)
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Liu Xiaobo Passes Away and Liu 
Xia Goes Missing
Continuing Repression of 
Human Rights Lawyers and 
Activists
During the summer, the Chinese government 
continued its repression of human rights 
activists and lawyers. During a conference at 
the National Judges College in Beijing at the 
end of August, Minister of Justice Zhang Jun 
called on lawyers to refrain from engaging 
in protests, criticising judges and courts, and 
speaking or acting for personal gain or to boost 
their reputation. A couple of weeks later, the 
Ministry of Justice launched investigations into 
the conduct of several lawyers and law firms 
across China, including the firm of prominent 
human rights lawyer Mo Shaoping. In August, 
human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong and online 
activist ‘Super Vulgar Butcher’ Wu Gan went 
on trial for their crimes of ‘subversion of state 
power’. On 11 September, Taiwanese activist Lee 
Ming-cheh went on trial and pleaded guilty to 
charges of subversion in a televised confession. 
Lawyer Gao Zhisheng, under house arrest since 
2014, was once again reported as missing and 
was believed to be in police custody. Labour 
activists did not fare any better. After initially 
being detained in May 2015, labour activist Liu 
Shaoming was sentenced to four and a half 
years in prison for ‘inciting subversion of state 
power’ in July. Similarly, in August, Lu Yuyu 
was sentenced to four years in prison on charges 
of ‘picking quarrels and provoking trouble’. 
On a more positive note, human rights lawyer 
Xu Zhiyong and labour activist Meng Han 
were both released from prison, after serving 
sentences of four years and twenty-one months 
respectively for ‘gathering crowds to disturb 
public order’.  EN
(Sources: BBC; China Labour Bulletin; Front 
Line Defenders; Human Rights Watch; 
Ministry of Justice; Radio Free Asia 1; Radio 
Free Asia 2; South China Morning Post; The 
Australian; The New York Times)
On 13 July, the activist and Nobel laureate Liu 
Xiaobo passed away at the age of sixty-one in 
the First Hospital of China Medical University 
in Shenyang. Much to the anger of his friends 
and supporters, his ashes were buried at sea, off 
the coast of Dalian. Liu had been imprisoned 
since 2009 for ‘inciting state subversion’, but 
in June was paroled to receive treatment for 
advanced liver cancer. Requests from Liu and 
his family to receive medical treatment outside 
of China were denied. After the funeral, Liu’s 
wife—the artist Liu Xia—went missing for over a 
month, only appearing in a Youtube video to say 
she was mourning her husband’s death outside 
of Beijing. The disappearance of Liu Xia, 
who has been under house arrest since 2010, 
sparked further international condemnation of 
the Chinese government. Chinese authorities 
denied detaining Liu Xia, claiming that she was 
a ‘free citizen’, and suggesting that she had not 
communicated with family or friends due to her 
grief. In early September, Liu Xia was reported 
to have returned to her Beijing home. However, 
her supporters remained concerned about her 
mental health, as she was reportedly suffering 
from depression induced by years of captivity, 
surveillance, and the death of her husband. NL
(Sources: BBC; South China Morning Post 1; 
South China Morning Post 2; The Guardian; 
The Washington Post)
JUL/SEP
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In July, Shenyang Urban Construction 
University offered a public apology to a second-
year student pressured by the university into a 
three-month internship at a Foxconn factory 
in Yantai, Shandong province. The university 
had told her that, had she refused to comply, 
she would not have been able to graduate. To 
deal with rising labour costs, in recent years 
Taiwanese electronics manufacturer Foxconn 
has struck several deals with Chinese secondary 
vocational schools and universities to hire 
students as paid interns in its factories. This 
young workforce has often voiced dissatisfaction 
about cramped accommodations, inadequate 
meals, and a type of work that they consider to 
be unrelated to their studies. Since the apology, 
the Department of Education in Liaoning 
province—the area where the University is 
located—has ordered an investigation and 
halted such internships at public universities. 
Foxconn has also issued a statement, saying 
that the company had fully complied with the 
existing laws and regulations, and that interns 
had been fully informed about the programme 
and had the right to leave at any time. However, 
the company has a history of hiring interns that 
goes back at least a decade (see Jenny Chan’s 
chapter in the present volume). Back in 2012, 
the Taiwanese manufacturer was criticised 
by labour rights groups for exploiting forced 
internship labour, but the company denied all 
allegations of wrongdoing. Only one year later, 
in 2013, as more evidence from investigations 
emerged, Foxconn was forced to admit that 
student interns worked overtime and night 
shifts at its Yantai factory. Even at that time, 
students reported that they had no choice but to 
take part in the factory internship programme if 
they wanted to graduate. KL
(Sources: Financial Times; Ministry of 
Education; South China Morning Post; The 
New York Times; Sina)
University Apologises for 
Forced Internships
Village in Beijing Charges 
Migrant Workers
In July, the rural village of Qiuxian in Beijing’s 
Daxing district announced plans to start charging 
migrant residents 2,000 yuan (about 295 USD) 
per month. The document released by the 
village leadership stated that the fees collected 
would be used to pay for public sanitation, tap 
water, public security, and electricity, but also 
made it clear that the levy would ‘fulfil the 
target of having zero migrants in our village’. 
Those who did not pay would be denied services 
and evicted. As would become evident with the 
mass eviction of migrant workers from Beijing 
later in the year, the village’s decision is best 
understood in the context of the government’s 
policy to place further restrictions on the 
migrant population in the Chinese capital. In 
April, the authorities indicated their intention 
to cap the city’s population—now at twenty-
two million—at twenty-three million ‘long-
term residents’ by 2020. In recent years, the 
capital has also started moving its secondary 
bureaucracies and university campuses to cities 
in neighbouring Hebei province. Moreover, in 
2016 alone, thirty million square metres of small 
shops, restaurants, and fruit stands considered 
to be ‘illegal constructions’ were dismantled, 
with plans to dismantle another forty million 
square metres in 2017. Schools for migrant 
children on the outskirts of Beijing have been 
forced to close, and car-sharing services have 
been restricted to local drivers, thus excluding 
migrants. While China is pursuing migrants’ 
integration and urbanisation as an engine for 
economic growth in the transition away from 
low-end manufacturing, rural migrants are 
encouraged to stay away from mega-cities like 
Beijing and Shanghai, and instead settle in 
second-tier and provincial cities.  KL
(Sources: Caixin Global 1; Caixin Global 2; 
Caixin (Chinese); Financial Times; South 
China Morning Post) 
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Maternal Leave Extended in 
Thirty Provinces
Since the amended Population and Family 
Planning Law in January 2016 universally 
allowed married couples to have a second child, 
in September 2017 thirty provinces and regions 
required employers to extend paid maternity 
leave. In these areas, on top of the nationally 
mandated ninety-eight days, female employees 
are now entitled to an additional leave of 
one to three months. In more prosperous 
municipalities such as Beijing and Shanghai, 
as well as provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, 
female employees are now given 128 days paid 
leave after the birth of a child. A number of 
provinces such as Hebei, Liaoning, Sichuan, and 
Shandong allowed female employees 158 days of 
paid maternity leave. While Henan and Hainan 
provinces saw the largest increase, from ninety-
eight days to 190 days, the longest leave can be 
found in the Tibet Autonomous Region where 
female employees are now given one year of 
paid maternity leave. While this was good news 
for millions of female workers, Beijing News 
reported that many women still face difficulties 
in claiming this right, as many companies have 
adopted internal policies aimed at restricting 
the frequency and timing of pregnancies, and 
have imposed hefty financial penalties for 
violators.  KL
(Sources: Beijing News (Chinese); Los Angeles 
Times; Shanghai Daily; SupChina)
Beijing Attempts to Censor 
Foreign Academic Publications
In mid-August, Cambridge University Press 
(CUP) conceded that it had acted on a request 
from Chinese authorities to block 315 articles 
from the Chinese website of The China 
Quarterly, one of the most prestigious and 
long-running international China Studies 
journals. CUP’s decision prompted outrage in 
the academic community and beyond. After a 
few days of petitions and threats of an academic 
boycott, CUP reversed its decision and agreed 
to make all the censored articles available 
free of charge worldwide. While the scholarly 
community was successful in pressuring CUP, 
this incident exposed the serious challenges 
facing academic publishers operating in the 
lucrative Chinese market. It was subsequently 
revealed that LexisNexis, a provider of 
legal, regulatory, and business information, 
withdrew content in China at the request of the 
authorities. Moreover, in anonymous interviews 
at the Beijing International Book Fair in late 
August, other commercial publishers admitted 
to engaging in self-censorship in order to retain 
access to the Chinese market. Meanwhile, other 
disturbing revelations showed that censors were 
systematically deleting historical articles from 
Chinese journals that did not toe the current 
ideological line. Beijing responded defiantly 
to the international condemnation, inviting 
Western institutions to leave China if they did 
not want to follow Chinese rules, and warning 
that all imported publications ‘must adhere to 
Chinese laws and regulations’. NL
(Sources: Global Times; Reuters 1; Reuters 
2; South China Morning Post 1; The China 
Collection; The Guardian 1; The Guardian 2)
“In anonymous interviews at the Beijing International Book Fair... other commercial publishers admitted to engaging in 
self-censorship in order to retain access to the Chinese market. 
Meanwhile, other disturbing revelations showed that censors were 
systematically deleting historical articles from Chinese journals 
that did not toe the current ideological line.”
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Between 18 and 24 October, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) held its Nineteenth 
National Congress. In his three-hour-long 
Report, General Secretary Xi Jinping heralded 
the dawn of a new era for socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, an age in which 
the contradiction between ‘unbalanced and 
inadequate development and the people’s ever-
growing needs for a better life’ has replaced 
that between ‘the ever-growing material and 
cultural needs of the people and backward 
social production’. While not directly referring 
to workers, the Report went to great lengths to 
highlight the many achievements of the CCP in 
improving people’s livelihoods (minsheng). Xi 
cited as evidence of these improvements the 
fact that government policies have lifted sixty 
million people out of poverty. He also recognised 
that employment is key to people’s livelihoods, 
citing the steady creation of thirteen million 
urban jobs per year. The Report recommended 
policies to facilitate and improve the quality of 
employment, including expanding skills training 
and encouraging entrepreneurship. Since urban 
citizens have seen their incomes increase at 
a faster rate than China’s economic growth, 
with the ‘middle-income’ group continuing to 
expand, the CCP called upon the government 
to play a role in income redistribution to narrow 
income disparity. Furthermore, Xi pointed to the 
success of establishing a better social security 
Chinese Communist Party 
Holds Nineteenth National 
Congress
system, with efforts to expand the coverage of 
healthcare, pensions, unemployment insurance, 
and affordable housing. Xi concluded this 
section of the Report by pointing out that 
because of these efforts, society is stable and 
national security is strengthened as a result. 
Despite the Report’s claim that China is led by 
the working class in alliance with the peasantry, 
references to workers were few and far 
between. In the entire text, ‘migrant workers’ 
(nongmingong) were mentioned only once, in a 
passage that encouraged migrants to maintain 
multiple avenues for finding employment. 
The Report also made no mention of the 
household registration system (hukou or huji), a 
fundamental issue for rural migrants. References 
to ‘workers’ (gongren) were only made to state 
that the country is led by the working class, 
and to call on the CCP to expand membership 
among many groups, including workers. There 
was one further, brief reference to ‘employees’ 
(zhigong) in relation to improving the old-age 
pension system for urban employees. 
The most explicit reference to labour relations 
came in a section on the tripartite collective 
negotiation mechanism. This tripartite system 
has been promoted since the 1990s, but has 
only taken on a sense of urgency in the last 
decade, as more and more workers have 
organised to demand higher pay and better 
conditions. The Report stated that a tripartite 
mechanism in which the government, official 
union (representing workers), and enterprises 
negotiate wages and labour conditions will 
contribute to a more just and orderly income 
distribution, as well as to more harmonious 
industrial relations. However, it must be noted 
that the push for tripartite collective negotiation 
has stalled in recent years and that the Report 
made only one reference to trade unions, where 
it demanded that mass organisations became 
more political, progressive, and mass-based, in 
order to more effectively serve as transmission 
belts between the Party and workers. In sum, it 
appears that even in the new era there will be 
very little that is new for China’s working class. 
KL
(Sources: Party Congress Report in Chinese; 
Party Congress Report in English)
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Human Rights with Chinese 
Characteristics?
On 7 December 2017, about three hundred 
participants from over fifty mostly developing 
countries gathered in Beijing for the ‘South-
South Human Rights Forum’. In his opening 
address, President Xi Jinping reiterated that 
‘human rights must and can only be promoted in 
light of specific national conditions and people’s 
needs.’ The initiative took place after another 
string of harrowing events. In early November, 
the police in Liaoning province formally arrested 
human rights lawyer Li Yuhan for ‘picking 
quarrels and provoking trouble’. On 7 November, 
dissident writer Yang Tongyan, who had been in 
detention since 2006 and had nearly completed 
a twelve-year sentence for subversion, died from 
a brain tumour barely three months after having 
been released on medical parole. Later the 
same month, two more activists—lawyer Jiang 
Tianyong and Taiwanese human rights activist 
Lee Ming-che—were respectively sentenced to 
two and five years imprisonment on subversion 
charges. At that time, there was little reaction 
from the international community. In late 
October, foreign media reported that a human 
rights panel at the United Nations had called 
on China to release and compensate three 
prominent human rights activists—Christian 
church leader Hu Shigen (condemned to 
seven and half years in detention), and lawyers 
Zhou Shifeng (condemned to seven years in 
detention) and Xie Yang. On 10 December, 
international Human Rights Day, the European 
Union Delegation and United States Embassy 
to China both released statements expressing 
concern about ‘China’s ongoing denial of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’. IF 
 
(Sources: China Change; China Digital Times; 
China News Service; EU Delegation to China; 
South China Morning Post 1; South China 
Morning Post 2; The Guardian 1; The Guardian 
2; The New York Times)
The Good Samaritan Law 
Comes into Effect
On 1 October, the General Rules of Civil Law—a 
collection of general principles of Civil Law—
came into effect. Article 184 is generally referred 
to as the ‘Good Samaritan Law’, stating that 
those who attempt to aid others in emergency 
situations will not be liable under any 
circumstances. This clause aims at solving the 
dilemma of people who, after helping an injured 
person, end up falsely accused by the victim of 
having caused the injury in the first place. The 
scope of the article was the subject of numerous 
discussions that have resulted in Chinese 
legislators producing different drafts of the 
rule over the years. The core of the controversy 
concerned the definition of gross negligence in 
the process of rescue, and the general tendency 
of Chinese law to look at anyone connected 
to a loss to share that loss, regardless of their 
level of fault. The provision came in the wake 
of a number of incidents widely reported by 
the Chinese media, in which either bystanders 
showed egregious indifference to suffering, or 
victims who had received assistance sued their 
helpers. One of the most iconic cases took place 
in Nanjing in 2006. That year, a young man 
named Peng Yu helped an old woman to get to 
the hospital after she was injured while getting 
off a bus. In return, he was sued for his troubles. 
In that case, the court decided against him, 
stating that ‘no one would in good conscience 
help someone unless they feel guilty’, causing 
a public furore (although in 2012 it turned out 
that Peng was actually guilty). In 2011, China 
was shocked by the case of Wang Yue, a two-
year-old toddler who passed away after having 
been run over by two vans while being ignored 
by passersby. More recently, in June 2017, a 
video went viral in China, in which a woman 
was hit by a vehicle and was then left unaided 
until a second vehicle killed her. EN
(Sources: BBC; Caixin; China Digital Times; 
National People’s Congress; The China 
Collection; The New York Times; Xinhuanet;)
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China Continues to Extend 
Influence over Foreign 
Publishing and Universities
In the months following the uproar caused by 
the Cambridge University Press censorship 
fiasco, the Chinese government continued to 
exert pressure on foreign publishers operating 
in the country. In late October, it was revealed 
that Springer Nature, one of the largest 
commercial academic publishers in the world, 
had capitulated to the Chinese censors, blocking 
access to at least one thousand ‘politically 
sensitive’ articles on their Chinese website. 
The publisher defended the decision by saying 
that only 1 percent of total content had been 
‘limited’, and claiming that it was necessary 
to comply in order to avoid wider restrictions. 
In mid-November, Australian academic Clive 
Hamilton went public saying that Allen & Unwin 
withdrew his forthcoming book Silent Invasion: 
How China Is Turning Australia into a Puppet 
State, due to fears of defamation litigation. In 
late November, SAGE Publishing warned that 
they might be required to censor content or be 
pushed out of the Chinese market. The increasing 
assertiveness of Chinese censors and their zeal 
to push foreign publishers to self-censor in order 
to access the large Chinese market resulted in 
numerous headlines and petitions. However, 
despite the high-profile coverage, the response 
from the wider academic community outside of 
China-focussed social sciences remained largely 
apathetic. Beijing’s efforts to influence foreign 
academia were not limited to the publishing 
sphere. In mid-November, over two thousand 
foreign-funded joint venture universities in 
China were instructed to set up party units and 
give the new party secretaries a role in decision 
making through seats on institutional boards. 
This decision came at the end of a year filled 
with continuous controversy about Chinese 
influence in higher-education institutions 
abroad. NL
(Sources: BBC; Financial Times 1; Financial 
Times 2; Financial Times 3; Reuters; The New 
York Times)
Beijing Evicts ‘Low-end 
Population’
On 18 November, a fire broke out in the basement 
of an apartment block inhabited mostly by 
migrant workers in Beijing’s Daxing district, 
killing nineteen and injuring eight. Around four 
hundred people lived in cramped conditions in 
the two-story structure. In the aftermath of the 
tragedy, the city authorities launched a forty-
day campaign to inspect and demolish buildings 
that unlawfully mixed residential and industrial 
facilities, as well as overcrowded apartments. 
This led to a wave of evictions that mostly 
affected the migrant population of the Chinese 
capital, with thousands of migrants forced out 
of their residences and left homeless in spite of 
the cold temperatures. As part of the campaign, 
officials also shut down small plants, shops, 
and restaurants, in some cases going as far as 
to cut electricity and water without any notice. 
While state censors were quick to take control 
of the media narrative, for a few days Chinese 
social media was abuzz with discussions and 
denunciations of how the crackdown was 
targeting Beijing’s ‘low-end population’ (diduan 
renkou), a term that first appeared in official 
debates a few years ago referring to those who 
work in low-end service and manufacturing jobs, 
and that more recently has come back in vogue in 
relation to plans to cap the capital’s population 
at twenty-three million by 2020. From the 
beginning of the campaign, the crackdown drew 
widespread condemnation from the Chinese 
public. Some migrant communities took to 
the streets in an attempt to resist, and more 
than one hundred intellectuals signed an open 
letter demanding an end to the evictions. Even 
some state media were unusually critical. On 
27 November, Beijing Communist Party Chief 
Cai Qi declared that the campaign should not 
have been carried out in a simplistic and hasty 
manner, and that those evicted should have been 
given time to move out. IF 
(Sources: BBC; Caixin Global; China Digital 
Times; China Media Project; People’s Daily; 
Quartz; Reuters; South China Morning Post 1; 
South China Morning Post 2)
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Foxconn Entangled in Another 
Scandal
On 21 November, Foxconn came once again 
under the spotlight following a media 
investigation into its forced use of seasonal 
student interns. The Financial Times uncovered 
that three thousand high school students 
from the local Urban Rail Transit School had 
been forced to work eleven-hour shifts at the 
company’s plant in Zhengzhou, Henan province, 
to produce the new iPhone X. While admitting 
the violation of the rules regarding overtime, 
the company insisted that student internships 
were voluntary, a fact that was contradicted 
by the Financial Times investigation. The next 
day, on 22 November, Foxconn announced it 
had taken immediate action to address the 
violations. However, by that time, as the busy 
season from August to December was coming 
to an end, the use of student interns had already 
become unnecessary. Such practices have been 
found across electronics manufacturers. In 
October, the Hong Kong-based labour rights 
group, Students and Scholars Against Corporate 
Misbehaviour (SACOM), reported that 
vocational school students were forced to work 
also at Quanta Computer, which supplies global 
brands such as Apple, Acer, Hewlett-Packard, 
and Sony. Local governments have been 
complicit in allowing such practices to prevent 
businesses from relocating to other regions 
where labour is cheaper and more flexible. KL
(Sources: Financial Times; Sina News; The 
Guardian)
New Implementation Rules for 
the Counter-espionage Law 
Released
On 6 December, the State Council released 
the Implementation Rules for the Counter-
espionage Law that had come into force earlier 
in November 2014. The new Rules significantly 
enhance the powers of the State Security, 
which had already gained significant clout 
under the original legislation. In particular, 
Article 8 grants the State Security the power 
to investigate acts of subversion that are not 
necessarily related to espionage, including 
situations involving ‘fabricating or distorting 
facts, publishing or disseminating text or 
information that endangers national security, 
or creating, transmitting, or publishing a/v 
products or other publications that endanger 
national security’; ‘using religion to carry out 
activities endangering national security’; and 
‘foreign individuals [violating] the relevant 
provisions, not [heeding] discouragement, and, 
without authorisation, [meeting] with mainland 
persons who have conduct endangering national 
security or who are strongly suspected of 
having conduct endangering national security’. 
Article 6 also expands the concept of ‘funding’ 
espionage to include providing funding to those 
who engage in espionage even if the money 
is not used for that aim and the funder is not 
aware of the illegal conduct. This significantly 
reinforces the hand of the State Security in 
dealing with activists and NGOs working in 
politically sensitive areas, and also serves to 
intimidate their foreign donors. IF
(Sources: China Law Translate 1; China Law 
Translate 2; South China Morning Post 1; 
South China Morning Post 2)
“The new Rules significantly enhance the powers of the State Security, which had already gained significant clout under the 
original legislation. In particular, Article 8 grants the State Security 
the power to investigate acts of subversion that are not necessarily 
related to espionage.”
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Class and Precarity in 
Contemporary China
ACTS

Francesca Coin
Focussing on the conceptual evolution of 
precarious labour over the past three decades, 
this essay provides a genealogy of the 
notion of precarity. On the eve of the fourth 
industrial revolution, when precarity has 
become the norm and fears of a jobless society 
have alimented a dystopian imaginary for the 
future, this historical reconstruction seeks 
to identify those elements that have shaped 
the material conditions of workers as well 
as influenced their capacity for endurance in 
times of growing uncertainty.
A Genealogy of 
Precarity and Its 
Ambivalence
My generation—or probably most 
individuals who were born since the late 
1970s—has often perceived precarity as a 
generational curse, and looked at Fordism as 
a time of social and labour stability. On the 
contrary, Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter’s 
article Precarity as a Political Concept, or, 
Fordism as Exception (2008) reminds us that 
for us to understand precarity, we must move 
beyond such approaches to see Fordism as 
an exception and precarity as the norm. 
In fact, the 1960s and 1970s were decades 
of uncertainty. The Federal Reserve’s 
monetarist experiment in 1979 transformed 
labour into an adjustment variable of 
its monetary policy. In this context, the 
de-standardisation of salaries and the 
individualisation of contract relationships 
came with an overall transformation of 
governance and labour management that 
tied income to profit and transformed labour 
into the shock absorber for capital risk. Since 
then, casualisation of employment, insecure 
income, and labour dislocation became the 
defining traits of labour relations (Marrazzi 
2008). Time softens the hard edges in our 
memories, but accounts from those years 
Workers of World Unite! Graffiti by Banksy.
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provide descriptions of a society in turmoil, 
mired by plant foreclosures and rampant job 
losses.
In the United States, the monetarist 
experiment suddenly brought unemployment 
to levels unseen since the Great Depression. 
In several cities, manufacturing plants that 
had been the symbol of industrial growth 
either shut down, introduced severe cuts in 
the workers’ salaries, or started laying off 
employees (Toland 2012). Modernity seemed 
to be going downhill rapidly. In several 
industrial cities, unemployment peaked at 
over 20 percent in the early 1980s, often 
leading people to flee to other places to find 
work. In some instances, manufacturing 
jobs vanished into obsolescence due to 
technological changes; in others, they 
drifted overseas in the search for cheaper 
labour. In retrospect, we know that what was 
happening was a major global restructuring 
of labour relations (Toland 2012). Over the 
past decades, the increase in productivity 
allowed by science and innovation became 
the catalyst for a transformation in labour 
relations characterised by a growing 
distance between emerging clusters of 
high-tech industries and the Global South’s 
dependency on technologically advanced 
multinational corporations. Inequality was 
not limited to macroeconomics but was 
reflected in the growing cleavage between 
a higher rank of high-tech specialists and 
a growing reserve of low-skilled precarious 
workers.
The Experience of the 
Italian Autonomia
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Italian 
leftist movement autonomia turned to 
Marx’s Grundrisse (1973) to define this 
transition. In this work, Marx foresaw that 
innovation and technology would become 
a direct force of production and allow 
employers to become relatively independent 
of the labour force. In other words, capital 
could use ‘the inanimate limbs’ of science 
and technology to restrict necessary labour, 
hence transforming innovation into a curse 
likely to increase unemployment and social 
insecurity. At the same time, the purpose of 
technology would not only be the limited to 
the accumulation of wealth. On the contrary, 
the general intellect could use technology 
to improve the conditions of production 
and liberate time—what Marx defined as 
‘the general reduction of the necessary 
labour of society to a minimum, which then 
corresponds to the artistic, scientific etc. 
development of the individuals in the time 
set free.’ The fact is that the ‘inanimate limbs’ 
of science are not outgrowths of nature, 
Marx warned. ‘They are organs of the human 
brain, created by the human hand,’ and in 
this sense ‘they are the material conditions 
to blow this foundation sky-high’. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, these prophetic 
words became the distinctive tune of a 
generation. The diffuse intellectuality that 
took to the streets turned to the Grundrisse 
to decipher the historical transition they 
were enduring. No longer wanting to be 
constrained within the space and time of 
the plant, Italian autonomia posited itself 
as an embodiment of the ‘general intellect’ 
that felt an urge to liberate society from 
its chains. The simplicity of their slogans 
beautifully explains the complexity of their 
interpretation. 
‘Zero work for income 
Automate all production 
All power to living labor 
All work to dead labor’
‘The revolution is over, 
we’ve won’  
A/traverso, 1977 (Berardi 2009, 25–26) 
Despite the cultural distance that 
separates us from those years, it must be 
said that recent literature has rediscovered 
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those perspectives. From Nick Srnicek and 
Alex Williams’ Inventing the Future: Post-
capitalism and a World without Work (2016) 
to Paul Mason’s Postcapitalism: A Guide 
to Our Future (2015), intellectuals have 
turned to these interpretations in order to 
compensate for today’s social and political 
impasse. Liberation from labour and the 
‘struggle to be human and educated during 
one’s free time’, emerge in Mason’s analysis 
as the vision of a post-capitalist society that 
can grow inside the old one.
From Utopia to the Race 
to the Bottom
The problem in these visions is that they 
never came true, and the enchanting idea 
of a world free from work left room for a 
generalised race to the bottom where labour 
was often not only unfree but unpaid. The 
transition to post-Fordism could be defined 
as a general dismantling of the time and 
space boundaries established by Fordism. 
According to Antonio Negri (1984), the 
mass worker that characterised the years 
of Fordism gave way to the ‘social worker’—
an individual whose life was entirely put 
to work. While industrial capitalism was 
founded on large factories, specialised in 
the production of mass, standardised goods 
and marked by a clear separation between 
the time of production and the time of 
consumption, post-Fordism annihilated 
such divisions (Vercellone 2005). In the 
social factory, the creation of value extended 
beyond the factory walls to embrace the 
whole of society. 
In this context, the question became 
what type of organisational mechanisms of 
control could be used to supervise a labour 
force that was ever more fluid and free to 
move beyond space and time constriction. 
In 1978–1979, Michel Foucault’s course at 
the Collège de France, La naissance de la 
biopolitique (Foucault and Senellart 1978–
79), analysed how the breakup of time 
and space constrictions that was typical 
of a disciplinary society transformed 
governance and management. In a post-
Fordist society, governance became micro-
political and used new techniques to enforce 
discipline. Deleuze spoke of a ‘society of 
control’ characterised by the use of salaries 
to justify the coercion of individuals into a 
new relation of dependence (1992). In this 
context, precarity became ‘the growing 
insecurity brought on by the flexible 
management of the global work force within 
post-Fordist capitalism’ (Brophy 2006, 
622). Today’s Uber drivers or social media 
‘prosumers’, in some instances, embody this 
shift. The notion of the ‘prosumer’ refers 
to the ‘progressive blurring of the line 
that separates producer from consumer’ 
(Toffler 1980, 267), a definition that is often 
used to describe ‘prosumer capitalism’ and 
the management’s attempt to outsource 
informal labour to consumers—a mechanism 
that defines both corporations such as 
Ikea and the political economy of social 
media. The progressive blurring of the 
line that separates leisure and work, as 
well as production and consumption, 
have come to define a type of capitalism 
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Highland Park Ford Plant, the first factory 
in history to assemble cars on a moving 
assembly line. Photo: AutoTraderClassics.com
marked by precarity—as manifested in 
the proliferation of temporary and casual 
labour, delocalisation and subcontracting, 
occasional labour, labour on demand, and 
unpaid work.
The New Dangerous 
Class?
Over the past ten years, the representation 
of precarity has been ambivalent. In his 
widely discussed book, Guy Standing 
describes the precariat as ‘the new 
dangerous class’ and maintains that the 
precariat is not merely a distinctive socio-
economic group but rather a neologism 
that combines an adjective ‘precarious’ and 
a related noun ‘proletariat’, to describe ‘a 
class-in-the-making, if not yet a class-for-
itself, in the Marxian sense of that term’ 
(2011, 19). Standing’s representation of 
precarity refers to the early 2000s. During 
the 2005 May Day protest in Milan, for 
example, over one hundred thousand people 
took to the streets to voice the needs of 
the global precariat. These very assemblies 
and moments of collective action were 
considered pivotal in globalisation politics 
and crucial for the precariat to find its 
own voice. In her genealogy of precarity, 
Maribel Casas-Cortés looks at the activist 
networks that emerged in those years as 
‘a Deleuzian politics of unfixed alliances’ 
that transformed the precariat into a 
political subject capable of intertwining 
identities and demands (2014, 220). In 
this sense, she drafts a set of concepts that 
could agglomerate social groups—from 
immigrants to young, educated locals—and a 
set of demands to be posed to governments. 
Intertwining the struggles of migrants, 
women, and precarious workers, Maribel 
Casas-Cortés argues that precarity seemed 
to represent a strategic political proposal 
intended to use Deleuze’s ‘tool box’ to change 
society, as maintained by a EuroMayDay 
organiser that she interviewed (2014, 221). 
At the same time, it is absolutely evident 
that there is a tremendous distance between 
those empowered accounts of precarity and 
the conditions of social insecurity that have 
continued to afflict labour over the years. 
Today, employment insecurity has evolved 
into conditions even more challenging. The 
widespread use of unpaid labour in the 
‘internship economy’ and the prospects of 
uncertainty accelerated by the gig economy, 
obscures the idea of the precariat as a 
dangerous class and emphasises the raising 
insecurity facing it. As I look at the labour 
market from the rotten heart of Southern 
Europe, I wonder whether the artificial 
description of precarity as a political 
subject did us any good. The bitterness of 
an unfulfilled revolution during the 1970s 
probably found comfort in representations 
of the precariat as a dangerous subject, but 
at the same time such narratives permitted 
a general underestimation of the violent 
forces confronting labour. It is going to 
take a very different sense of urgency and 
determination to reverse the conditions 
of exploitation that have become the new 
normal.
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Fabio Perocco
In the neoliberal era, precarity has become a 
general condition in the life of workers. The 
structural precarisation of labour is a global 
process, which has taken place heterogeneously 
according to national contexts, sectors, 
qualifications, and labour market stratifications. 
This essay looks at precarity from two angles: 
the impact of it on migrant workers and the role 
of migration in the exacerbation and extension 
of it.
Work 
Precarisation and 
New Inequalities 
The Role of Migration
Turning precarity into a general condition 
in the life of workers is one of the most 
important social transformations of the 
neoliberal era. The structural precarisation 
of labour is a global process, which has 
taken place heterogeneously according to 
national contexts, sectors, qualifications, 
and labour market stratifications. Besides 
young people, low-skilled older workers, 
and women, it has mainly affected migrants, 
who have suffered from labour precarity 
combined with the weakness of their 
legal and social status. At the same time, 
immigration is also involuntarily an agent 
of spreading and widening precarisation—
often a testing ground where new forms of 
precarity are trialled before being extended 
to other groups of workers.
In this essay, I look at precarity from two 
angles: the impact of it on migrant workers 
and the role of migration in the exacerbation 
and extension of it. I first analyse the 
process of structural precarisation of labour, 
highlighting how it has become even more 
extreme in recent years. I then examine the 
precarisation of migration in Europe over 
the past two decades and its role in paving 
the way for a wider enlargement of precarity. 
Finally, I consider the Italian context as a 
striking example of this two-fold process. 
This analysis is highly relevant if we wish to 
better understand what has been happening 
in China since the onset of the reform era. 
In fact, while the Chinese context has 
arisen from a specific set of conditions 
(economic, social, political, and cultural), 
it nevertheless presents many similarities 
with the Italian context regarding the social 
transformations, the new inequalities, and 
the conditions of migrant workers.
Precarity 2.0
One of the cornerstones of the great 
social restructuring of the past three 
decades is the widespread and intense 
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Immigrant farmers in the Italian countryside. 
Photo: eunews.it
transformation of the organisation of work 
and of the labour market—a composite yet 
unitary process (Head 2003; Doogan 2009; 
Art 2011; Antunes 2013). The features of 
these transformations may be summed up 
as follows: 1) organisational flexibility, i.e. 
the set of methods—from lean production 
to outsourcing, from just-in-time to new 
management—which have produced 
the fragmentation and acceleration of 
production processes; 2) the systematic 
application of informatics and robotics to 
the production process, which has increased 
the polarisation of work and the de-skilling 
of a number of workers; and 3) the structural 
precarisation of labour. 
As one of the cores of neoliberal policies, 
the precarisation of labour is a prerequisite 
and a carrier of the intensification of labour 
exploitation required by the rules of the 
global economic order in response to the 
constant decrease of accumulation rates 
and recurring economic crisis. The fracture 
in the unity of the labour contract, the 
restructuring of labour law, the introduction 
of a plethora of contract types with different 
conditions and rights, are all part of a 
process which is broader and deeper than a 
mere reduction of guaranteed work spaces. 
Following a few decades in the wake of 
the Second World War, which saw the 
attainment of relatively stable and secure 
jobs, a radical and extreme commodification 
of labour has taken place.
The structural precarisation of labour 
has several consequences—including 
new stratifications, the growth in wage 
inequalities, the impoverishment of 
many groups of workers, the increase in 
the army of reserve workers (with the 
creation of a reserve of the reserve), the 
unconditional adaptation of workers’ lives 
to the organisational needs of private 
companies and public bodies, the alteration 
of social rights which have been readjusted 
for the benefit of companies, and the 
deterioration of psychological and physical 
health as precarity gradually destroys 
people. Atypical contracts, at first applied 
among migrants, have fragmented and 
disconnected the labour force, enabling the 
general devaluation of labour, denying the 
role of workers in the process of production. 
The consequences have been so dire that 
rather than describing this as simply 
commodification of labour, in extreme cases 
we can actually conceptualise it as the 
nullification of labour and of the worker, 
who does not have and does not need to 
have anything guaranteed, who—exactly as 
migrant workers in racist representations—
have zero rights. 
With the recent economic crisis and the 
consequent radicalisation of neoliberal 
policies, labour precarisation has further 
expanded and deepened, going beyond 
precarity as it was known in the recent 
past. Now, precarity 2.0—typified by 
vouchers, meal tickets instead of wages, 
serial internships, volunteering, unpaid 
work, zero-hour contracts, temporary 
work, posted workers, fake cooperatives—
has transcended the original boundaries of 
precarious labour, replacing a segment of 
the ‘first generation’ precarious jobs and 
becoming the norm.
The precarisation of labour, both in its old 
and new versions, has been unleashed on 
workers unevenly. The first, most affected, 
were migrants, young people, low-skilled 
and low-educated female workers with 
children, older workers affected by company 
restructuring, and then other low-skilled 
workers more generally—i.e. those who 
constitute the most vulnerable segment of 
the European working class. These groups, 
which do not constitute an individual class 
of their own, have experienced increased 
impoverishment and marginalisation, and 
their foreign components have also been the 
subjects of racist campaigns (Flecker 2007; 
Art 2011). 
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Precarisation of 
Migration in Europe
Across the majority of mainland Europe, 
the precarisation of labour has markedly 
affected migrants. There are at least three 
primary reasons for this: the migration 
policies of many European countries; the 
role attached to migration in European 
capitalisms and in the operation of the 
labour market; and the rise of anti-migrant 
racism in the 2000s. 
In several European countries, migrant 
workers are subject to a double precarisation, 
both in the work and legal sphere (Morris 
2002; Schierup et al. 2015). With regard to 
the legal sphere in particular, the migration 
policies of many countries subordinate the 
migrants’ right of abode to the existence 
of a work contract, and also tie their 
social rights to their migration status, thus 
stratifying social rights. These principles 
have contributed to the return of the ‘guest 
worker’, which has taken place in a context of 
flexible capitalism with all its fragmentation 
and polarisation. The generalisation of 
the bond between the residence permit 
and the work contract during a period of 
structural economic crisis and casualisation 
puts migrants in a perilous and blackmail 
position, forcing them to accept any work 
conditions. The interaction between these 
two dimensions has produced, compared to 
the previous decades, a larger and deeper 
precarisation of migrants’ conditions. 
These migrants, torn between the rigidity 
determined by migration laws and the 
flexibility produced by labour laws, have 
found themselves as ‘guest workers’ 
attempting to navigate a context of economic 
stagnation, characterised by atypical 
contracts and the general weakening of the 
workers’ movement. Thus, if for the 1960s 
and 1970s we may talk about a relatively 
stable work regime, in the following decades 
the reality is that of a precarisation of the 
very process of work  insertion and, on the 
social part, the enhancement of exclusion or 
segregation factors. 
Historically, migration has been allocated 
the role of a reserve army and social buffer 
against possible crises within European 
capitalisms (Castles 2000; Schierup et al. 
2006). In the last decade, this has intensified, 
so that migrant workers have been the first 
group experimented on with regard to the 
shift to precarious work and to the most 
extreme forms of precarity. In the meantime, 
the operating mechanisms of the labour 
market—selection, concentration, and 
specialisation—have continued to channel a 
good share of migrant workers into the most 
precarious and less paid sectors. This means 
that, in Europe, their working conditions—
from access to work to unemployment, 
from tasks to wages, from classification to 
mobility—still present disparities compared 
to national workers. There are large swaths 
of unemployment, underemployment, ‘over-
education’, and atypical contracts—all of 
which have become higher in percentage 
over time, and which have grown alongside 
crises (OECD 2013 and 2015). 
The rise of institutional racism has 
increased precarisation and reduced social 
rights. The anti-migration offensive has 
supported migration policies characterised 
by a mix of identity and security elements—
aimed at curbing social rooting, and at 
supporting temporary and fluctuating 
migration, following the requests for a 
just-in-time workforce. The return of 
assimilationism, both in policy and rhetoric, 
has required maximum social adaptation by 
migrants to the conditions to which they 
are subjected. Mass media, in creating a 
racialised depiction of society, has served 
to produce a differentiation in the public 
representations of migrants which is 
functional to the differentiated exploitation 
deriving from their stratified precarity. 
Slogans and discourses focussed on a 
necessarily temporary presence, preference 
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for national workers, and on a subordinated 
integration of migrants in the name of social 
inferiority, have paved the way for the 
precarisation affecting a vast majority of 
migrants as a racialised class segment of the 
European working class.  
At the same time, the role of migration as a 
carrier of precarisation must be highlighted. 
The labour market is segmented, but 
the spreading of precarity among 
migrant workers has been a factor of the 
multiplication and enlargement of precarity 
that has affected a remarkable share of 
workers. In this framework, migration 
policies have played an important general 
role in paving the way and anticipating 
comparable labour laws (Basso 2004; Morice 
and Potot 2010). 
The process of downward convergence of 
migration policies—starting slowly in the 
1970s and 1980s, and gaining momentum 
in the 1990s and 2000s—has affected a 
fair share of European states and has seen 
the confluence of the different migration 
policies into one single migration policy, 
which is selective, restrictive, and repressive, 
and which balances new migrant arrivals 
according to the needs of the labour market 
(Basso 2014). Such processes have been 
accompanied by unceasing denigration 
campaigns targeting different groups of 
migrants, which have ended up affecting 
migration as a whole and, subsequently, a 
large share of the world’s labour, dividing it 
along distinct lines of differentiation. 
In this context, where migration 
is encouraged by the market and 
discouraged by institutions—according to 
a role play aimed at the social and political 
exploitation of migrants—the real purpose 
of this downward  migration policy is not 
a complete stop to immigration, but rather 
an unstable, vulnerable immigration, which 
serves as a general devaluation of labour. 
Historically, the use of a migrant labour 
force has been one of the main leverages 
for the devaluation of the labour force as a 
whole. By lowering the cost of labour and 
by offering an ultra-flexible workforce, 
migrants are forced into a subordinated 
position, and are liable to blackmail 
by migration policies and institutional 
discrimination (Potts 1990). Today, this 
specific situation has turned migration 
into a laboratory where the manufacturing 
system has experimented with new forms of 
organising work—conceived of as a means of 
increasing profitability and productivity—
which have led to replacing secure jobs with 
precarious ones.
Migration and labour policies increasingly 
aimed at precarity have gone hand-in-hand. 
The creation of an institutionally weak and 
precarious proletariat, of an underclass of 
temporary workers replacing each other in 
constant rotation and circulation, has not 
only allowed the experimentation with new 
forms of labour exploitation to spread, but 
has also favoured a new global regulation 
of work relations and contracts in the 
name of stable precarity. The production of 
undocumented migrants, for instance, is an 
integral part of the structural precarisation 
of labour.
The Italian Case 
The hectic pace of labour market 
reformation, which has taken place in Italy 
over the past two decades, has legalised 
all forms of precarisation, many of which 
were first trialled on migrant workers. 
From the July 1993 agreement between 
the Government and trade unions, which 
paved the way for fixed-term and temporary 
employment, to the Jobs Act in 2014, which 
has institutionalised precarity by turning it 
into the norm rather than the exception, the 
task of creating a precarious labour market 
has been carried out in a bipartisan fashion 
through the promulgation of a long list of laws 
and provisions that have affected both ‘work 
flexibility’ and ‘employment flexibility’.
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Simultaneously, immigration law has 
gradually established the connection 
between residence permits, work contracts, 
and housing—institutionalising a migrant 
work model based on forced illegality and 
social precarity. Law 40/1998 has explicitly 
legitimised the existing social practices, 
confirming that undocumented migration 
is unavoidable for migrants and that 
regularisation can only happen afterwards 
(with amnesties or specific decrees) 
according to the will of the employers. Law 
189/2002—which dictates that residence is 
strictly subordinated to employment—has 
redefined, restrictively, the prerequisites 
to right of abode with the introduction of 
a ‘stay contract’, thus creating a form of 
immigration that is extremely susceptible to 
blackmail. This has placed the vast majority 
of migrants in a condition of structural, 
legal, and social precarity solidified by 
the labour law itself. The creation of an 
unbreakable bond between employment, 
residence permits, and housing guarantees 
means that migrants’ destinies are, to a large 
extent, in the hands of the employer—the 
only person who may legitimately ask for a 
working permit for migrants and who has 
the subjective right to ask for a residence 
permit. Law 94/2009 has further worsened 
migrant conditions by introducing a point-
based residence permit, articulated in 
credits. As in a game of snakes and ladders, 
during the validity of the residence permit, 
migrants can obtain or lose points that will 
count towards the permit’s renewal. 
The fragmentation of residence permits 
types and the multiple durations of 
residence permits stipulated by immigration 
laws—combined with the different kinds of 
atypical contracts stipulated by labour laws—
have determined a marked stratification of 
the legal and social status of migrants. In 
other words, different types of migrants 
are granted, with several categories with 
different rights and conditions, which 
trigger a hierarchy of precarity within the 
very same migrant populations.
Pedagogy of Precarity 
and New Forms of 
Casualisation
Throughout the 1990s migrants have been 
channelled into the worst jobs, especially 
in labour-intensive sectors, with a high 
rate of irregular work. The shift to the 
industrial sector of the 2000s has entailed 
an improvement in the condition of migrant 
workers, yet they still take up proportionally 
more low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Migrant 
participation in the official labour market 
has increased, but the racial segmentation of 
the labour market has grown, and is matched 
by labour segregation and ethnicisation 
in the manufacturing processes. The 
manufacturing system, characterised by 
small and medium units, drawing on the 
more unstable or marginal segments in the 
labour market, has had a permanent reserve 
of cheap workers with which it could 
support the new forms of organisation of 
work. The working experience of migrants—
with regard to tasks, classification, wages, 
accidents, and social security—presents 
severe disparities in comparison with 
national workers (Centro Studi e Ricerche 
IDOS 2012). Among them, we encounter 
the highest rates of unemployment (16.2 
percent for migrants versus 11.4 percent for 
national workers), underemployment (11.7 
percent versus 4.2 percent), over-education 
(40.9 percent versus 21.6 percent), contract 
precarity, and intermittent work (Centro 
Studi e Ricerche IDOS 2016).
This situation results in mass socialisation 
to precarity. As migrants enter the labour 
force, running the gauntlet of irregular 
work and undocumented migration before 
reaching a minimally stable situation, they 
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often spend a long period experiencing the 
most exploitative labour practices in the 
country. In a sense, this can be considered 
a sort of ‘warming-up’ phase for permanent 
uncertainty and social inferiority. This 
stage, which affects migrants differently 
according to various factors, prepares them 
for a lifetime of precarious work. This is 
the cornerstone of Italy’s labour migration 
regime. This pedagogy of precarity is a 
pillar of the subjugation of migrants that 
began in the 1980s and 1990s, and was 
institutionalised in the 2000s. In terms of 
socialisation, it has enlarged to create a sort 
of halo effect that has affected other groups 
of workers, who at first had witnessed the 
precarisation of migrants thinking it would 
only be limited to them. 
In this context, migrants have been the 
‘guinea pigs’ for new forms of precarisation. 
Work paid with vouchers—used in Italy until 
March 2017 and currently under reform—is 
just one example. This is a remuneration 
arrangement for accessory occasional work 
that entails a remuneration of ten euros per 
hour before tax. Vouchers have no relation 
to a work contract, do not guarantee a day 
off, paid leave, sick leave, unemployment 
benefits, maternity or marriage leave, 
family benefits, nor loss-of-job indemnities. 
At first, in 2003, they were used for a few 
occasional activities carried out by specific 
categories (after-school tutoring, side jobs 
for students, and retired people), but later 
found wide application in sectors featuring 
a high rate of migrant labour—including 
domestic work, care work, and seasonal 
work in agriculture (harvesting). In 2015, 115 
million vouchers were sold, corresponding 
to 1.1 billion euros, a third of which were 
used in the construction sector, and half in 
trade, tourism, and services (Bombelli et al. 
2016). Vouchers then became a ‘universal’ 
tool, across all sectors, used for several jobs 
and for activities that are not necessarily 
occasional, and has partly replaced 
fixed-term precarious contracts. From a 
remuneration arrangement, it transformed 
into an employment arrangement, but in 
such evolution cases, the work relation no 
longer exists, channelling workers into a 
situation of extreme precarity. 
Advocating a Global 
Social Citizenship
There is a close connection between 
work transformations and alteration of 
social rights, between labour precarisation 
and social rights stratification. The effects 
of organisation flexibility and of contract 
precarity are not only visible in the hyper 
segmentation of the labour market and the 
rapid growth of under-employed people, but 
can also be seen in the erosion of labour rights 
and the restriction of social citizenship. In 
the case of migrants, labour precarity entails 
a considerable exclusion or segregation 
factor, as the exercise of social rights is 
often subordinated to the work contract 
or the residence permit. The return of the 
‘guest worker’ and the preference by states 
and markets for temporary migration, have 
favoured—in an era of structural precarity—a 
limited and conditional acquisition of social 
rights, generating new forms of inequality 
and a framework of stratified rights. All of 
this is supported by a strong xenophobia in 
the name of the welfare state (Spire 2013; 
Burnett 2015). The attack on the social 
rights of the citizen has been going on for 
at least two decades as a fully-fledged state 
policy aimed at altering the very structure 
and functions of these rights. Even though 
it started in the migration sphere, it has not 
been confined there, and has expanded to 
other segments of the population. For this 
reason, it is high time to consider the idea 
of a global social citizenship that may curb 
this downward slide into a future defined by 
structural precarity. 
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In the People’s Republic of China 
the media, official state policies, and 
propaganda, as well as the policies of 
market organisations, define rural-to-urban 
migrants (nongmingong) as essentially 
lacking ‘human quality’ (suzhi). They 
are depicted as being poor, uncivilised, 
backwards, and hopelessly bound to their 
rural roots. In China, the nongmingong 
paradigm also evokes the spectre of Maoist 
egalitarianism. This implicitly reminds 
Chinese people that post-Mao inequality 
should be recognised as the motor of 
‘development’, and that it has allowed people 
to get rich or, to paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, 
it has allowed some to ‘get rich first’. 
Western media and academia have largely 
drawn on the paradigm of the rustic, plain, 
and hopelessly marginalised nongmingong, 
identifying them with a specifically Chinese 
‘underclass’ (Fan 2002; Alexander and Chan 
2004; Vermeer 2006; Wu 2006; Day 2008). 
As Michael Stewart has observed in his study 
of the plight of Romany people of Eastern 
Europe, the use of this term, however, may 
Roberta Zavoretti
Rural-to-urban migrants in China are often 
depicted as being poor, uncivilised, and 
having a lower level of ‘human quality’ than 
those with urban household registration. 
Policy-makers carefully strategise in order 
to produce rural-to-urban migrants as a 
homogeneous category. However, the use of 
this term obscures more than it illuminates, 
as it homogenises complex social realities.
Making Class 
and Place in 
Contemporary 
China
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Migrant workers in Guangdong. 
Photo: CNY Hélène (Flickr).
obscure more than it illuminates in terms of 
social exclusion, as it homogenises complex 
social realities (2002, 139).
Displacements of Class 
Meanings
Since the 1990s, ethnographers have 
devoted much attention to the predicament 
of migrant factory workers in South China. 
Pun Ngai (2005), for example, argues that 
this group constitutes a new working class 
whose subordinate position is determined 
by the interplay of ethnicity, gender, and 
residence status. These sensitive and 
influential ethnographies, however, portray 
the specific experiences of life and labour 
in Guangdong-based factories, rather than 
providing a general picture of migrant labour 
in China. General depictions of China’s 
nongmingong as a socially homogeneous 
group are constantly confronted with the 
ever-growing heterogeneity and presence 
of migrants in the labour force. The 
phenomenon of labour migration in China 
involves people who differ by local origin, 
employment sector, income, educational 
level, gender, and age, to mention just a few 
factors (Pieke 1999). 
In present-day China, the state-sponsored 
discursive production of migrant labourers 
as a ‘real’ and homogeneous social group 
sustains the promotion of the egemonic social 
model of an ideally emerging ‘middle class’ 
(Zhou 2005a, 2005b, and 2006; Anagnost 
2008; Guo 2008; Ong and Zhang 2008; Zhang 
2008; ). This trope implies high disposable 
income and home ownership, as well as 
publicly recognised professional status, 
top-level education and the highly valued 
quality of taste. In other words, it embodies 
the ability to compete and to choose as a 
high-quality consumer. Yet the discursive 
opposition between the nongmingong 
paradigm and the trope of middle classness 
must be produced without mentioning 
‘class’ (jieji), a term that China-based policy, 
media, and academic production routinely 
avoid, and replace with the less conflictive 
term ‘social stratum’ (jieceng).  To quote 
Sherry Ortner (1999), the use of the policy 
category of nongmingong contributes to the 
continuous ‘isplacement of class meanings’ 
into other discursive fields, such as gender, 
geographical background, ethnicity, and 
sexuality, in order to produce a class-based 
order without mentioning class. 
Household Registration 
Today
The household registration (hukou) 
system has long allowed administrative 
institutions to identify rural-born city 
dwellers as a group. However, following 
the social and economic changes of the last 
forty years, as well as the various reforms 
of hukou at the local level, a debate has 
emerged about the link between residence 
status and the reproduction of social 
inequality (Solinger 1999a and 1999b; Lei 
2003; Pun 2005; Jacka 2006; Kipnis 2008; 
Whyte 2010). Following the radical Reform-
led changes in urban-based employment and 
social security provision, the hukou system 
is no longer used to stop rural residents 
from moving into the cities. Urban residence 
status is increasingly being commoditised 
through policies linked to the opening up 
of the housing and employment markets 
(Solinger 1999a and 1999b; Wu 2006; Wang 
2010; Whyte 2010). Four decades of market-
oriented policies have brought about a 
profound redefinition of social relations and 
a rapid process of social segmentation in 
the countryside as well as in the city (Zhang 
2001, 2008). 
Some scholars have associated urban 
hukou status with the idea of ‘citizenship’ 
(Solinger 1999a and 1999b; Fong and 
Murphy 2006; Kipnis 2008), thus echoing 
a larger debate on migration, citizenship, 
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and globalisation. This debate illuminates 
the dynamics of state-market relations at a 
global level, while being relevant to China 
as well. Saskia Sassen’s analysis of migrant 
service sector workers in ‘global cities’ 
(1998) distinguishes between a top end of 
high-flying ‘global managers’ and a bottom 
end of low-status service workers whose 
existence is the bedrock of the current 
global economic system. This latter group 
is denied full citizen rights and is therefore, 
by definition, vulnerable to exploitation 
and to specific forms of state policing. 
Notably, the state’s policing role survived 
the rolling back of nation-states prescribed 
by the current neoliberal policy trend. The 
neoliberal state is thus not antagonistic to, 
but rather complicit with global market 
forces and transnational institutions (Sassen 
1998 and 2003; Harvey 2007). This synergy 
between state and market in neoliberal times 
implies an altered idea of the citizen as a 
self-regulating, self-promoting competitor 
and consumer, and thereby a noticeable 
redefinition of the value of citizenship. In 
this view, Sassen ultimately suggest that 
citizenship may gradually lose importance 
in the lives of migrants due to the neoliberal 
restructuring of state-market relations.
Governing Inequalities
  
In post-Mao China the restructuring of 
state-market relations—and accordingly of 
the relationships of both state and market 
with citizens—brought about a specific form 
of governance that reconciles the state’s 
promotion of neoliberal subjectivities with 
the perpetuation of socialist discursive 
practices and political structures (Ong 
and Zhang 2008). The persistence of the 
household registration system allows state 
policy to cast hukou status—rather than 
class, for example—as a proxy for social 
positionality. While residence status still 
plays an important role in the definition 
of social positionality, however, urban 
residence is gradually ceasing to represent 
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Migrant workers in Shanghai. 
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a guarantee of economic and social rights, 
as Solinger anticipated in her study of the 
work unit in the early 1990s (1995). 
Following the gradual dismantlement of 
the work unit, the state has increasingly 
made access to resources and services not 
a matter of residence, but of individual 
responsibility towards the family. According 
to this model of governance, each individual 
should compete to secure jobs and invest 
sensibly in his/her family’s long-term 
security, and also by participating in 
market-mediated insurance schemes. In 
this context, identifying ‘urban residence 
status’ with citizenship-based full civil, 
social and economic rights obscures the 
role that equally important variables play 
in the formation of social inequality, such 
as class, connections, gender, education, etc 
(Wacquant 2008). These assets may be far 
better guarantees in terms of securing social 
and economic rights, including the right to 
be recognised as an ‘urban citizen’. 
Nongmingong as a 
Strategic Discourse
The development of China’s state-led 
capitalism and the dramatic increase of 
inequality witnessed in Chinese society 
has led to the emergence of unprecedented 
forms of social exclusion—even among the 
once protected urban residents. During 
the Maoist era, urban residence status 
guaranteed the provision of a large array of 
services, including employment and housing. 
The main channel for rural to urban mobility 
was supposed to be higher education. Rural 
youngsters, however, faced enormous 
challenges to get a formal education in their 
villages, and only few determined and lucky 
ones were able to access universities. Four 
decades of economic reforms fundamentally 
changed the nature of social inequality and 
the role that residence status plays in it. 
During the pre-reform era, holding urban 
residence enabled citizens to claim housing 
(although often of poor quality) from the 
state; nowadays it is the ability to purchase 
property on the housing market that allows 
many, if not all, to access urban residence. 
Purchasing housing is also a strategy to 
situate oneself in a highly unequal and 
segmented society. 
Local authorities throughout the country 
have been gradually reforming hukou-
related provisions, leading to a de facto 
commoditisation of residence (Wang 2010; 
Whyte 2010). However, the nongmingong 
remain a central category in state policy 
and media discourse. Local policy-makers 
carefully strategise in order to produce 
and maintain the social order. Policies 
that produce rural-to-urban migrants as 
a homogeneous category remind urban 
residents that these ‘outsiders’ may 
constitute a social problem; they also prompt 
both rural and urban residents to see each 
other as competitors rather than as possible 
allies on the basis of overlapping socio-
economic positions. In addition, grouping 
citizens according to the rural/urban binary 
allows the state to deflect attention from 
the increasing complexity and deepening of 
inequality in the city as in the village.
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There is a general trend in capitalist 
societies with regard to the nature of 
employment contracts and relations. 
The old promise of formal or continuous 
employment following a probationary 
period is no longer the norm (Liu and 
Ouyang 2016). It is increasingly harder to 
get into work, with competitive selection 
tournaments and rotating internships; and 
when employed, the length and security 
of contracts are changing, with zero hour 
contracts and agency work growing, and 
direct employment by the firm diminishing 
for new workers. These trends have 
prompted some to argue that a new class 
of precariously employed workers (the 
precariat) is emerging to challenge the 
‘privileges’ of those who are securely 
employed (Standing 2011). This internal 
conflict within the working class has been 
projected as more important than conflicts 
between labour and capital. This essay 
looks at these debates in China, where some 
writers are beginning to apply these ideas to 
argue that there is a structural bi-furcation 
in the Chinese working class.
The Precariat Thesis and 
China
In his conceptualisation of the rise of 
precarious work, Guy Standing (2011) 
suggests that internal divisions within the 
working class, between those in regular/
standard employment, judged as being a 
privileged ‘salariat’, and those excluded 
from standard employment contracts, 
considered as a disadvantaged ‘precariat’, 
forms the main ‘class divide’ in contemporary 
capitalism. However, as Jane Hardy has 
pointed out, the problem with arguing that 
regular workers ‘are a privileged group’ is 
that it ‘completely denies the realities of 
life in the public sector, which has faced 
commodification, marketization and taken 
Chris Smith 
Pun Ngai
The increasing precariousness of labour forces 
globally has prompted some to argue that a 
new ‘precariat’ is emerging to challenge the 
privileges of the securely employed ‘salariat’. 
This divergence within the working class has 
been depicted as more significant than the 
traditional conflict between labour and capital. 
This essay examines these discussions in China, 
where precarity is increasingly being employed 
as a theoretical tool to explain the fragmentation 
of labour in the country. 
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Class and 
Precarity in China 
A Contested Relationship
Heavily-loaded Chinese migrant worker 
starts the journey home for Chinese New 
Year. Photo: @dcmaster, Flickr.
the brunt of austerity’ (2015, 13). Looking 
back at the history of capitalism, well-
defined and comprehensive employment 
security was only enjoyed by labour for a 
relatively short period of time (from the 
1950s to the 1970s) and only in advanced 
economies. In fact, the category of precariat 
is extremely diverse, including students, 
temporary and contract workers, elderly 
workers, migrant and immigrant workforces, 
as well as workers with very different skill 
and educational levels. Thus, members of the 
precariat are defined by their lack of secure 
contracts. The thesis stresses divisions 
between the two groups, or empirical 
examples of collaborations between workers 
on different contracts. Standing provides no 
empirical evidence that people in insecure 
employment identified themselves as part 
of a separate class. This hints at the fact 
that ‘precariat’ is an academic term with 
little traction in people’s lives and self-
identification in class terms.
The employment situation in China follows 
some of these generic trends, but also has 
distinctive characteristics that allow close 
examination of the claim that the precariat 
is a separate new class. According to official 
data, in 2014 China had 772.5 million 
employed persons, 274 million of whom 
were rural ‘migrant workers’ (nongmingong). 
These migrants are excluded from many 
basic social benefits because of the country’s 
restrictive household registration system 
(hukou), which is used by employers to 
segment workers by different contracts, 
even though they generally perform similar 
types of work. 
In the case of China, we find that there 
is a contradictory movement with regard 
to regular and insecure work. On the one 
hand, legislation has increased security for 
regular workers in mass production and 
mass service industries, where more regular 
forms of employment have been recognised 
and protected by law. On the other, the very 
same legislation has also created incentives 
for employers to use agency or dispatched 
workers and bring in non-regular workers 
(Smith and Chan 2015; Chan 2017). 
Additionally, many self-employed rural 
migrants are involved in the informal sector, 
or are employed in the formal sector but 
appear to have informal working conditions. 
Increasingly, urbanised migrant workers 
continue to be denied equal citizenship 
and welfare rights, and hold rural hukou 
in perpetuity. The hukou system ‘makes’ 
workers, but not stable urban working 
class communities. Proletarianisation is 
separated from urbanisation, and working 
class community development, which is 
a typical process in most modernisation 
projects, is highly fractured in China. 
Student Interns, Agency 
Workers, and Formal 
Workers
In a recent attempt to apply the precariat 
concept to China, Chunsen Yu offers a 
more detailed empirical assessment of the 
value of the idea (Yu 2017). While we are 
critical of some of his argument, what his 
work shows is that the boundary between 
regular and non-regular work is often 
crossed. Against a static view of classes of 
employee, the China case is dynamic and the 
inflexible concept of the precariat singularly 
unhelpful. In particular, Yu focuses on 
the objective conditions of insecurity of 
rural migrants and uses three indicators of 
precariat status—non-signing of long-term 
labour contracts, irregular payments of 
wages, and non-provision of social security. 
These conditions are looked at through 
three elements of ‘precariat migrant worker 
class’—student interns, agency workers, and 
regular workers, which are explored in an 
empirical study of these workers in seven 
multinational companies operating in two 
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regions of China: the Liangjiang New Area 
in Chongqing, and the Longhua and Futian 
districts in Shenzhen. 
In Chongqing the local government 
promoted ‘school–enterprise cooperation’ 
but according to Yu’s findings—which 
contradict official data that says formal 
workers are the majority of employees—60 
percent of the assembly line workers 
he interviewed were student interns. 
Reinforcing the findings of others (Smith 
and Chan 2015), student interns in his 
sample performed unskilled regular work 
that bore no relation to their studies. 
They also worked for less pay, facing the 
double burden of factory work and school 
supervision. Yu documents that student 
interns in Chongqing had no choice but 
to comply with their schools’ internship 
arrangements with hi-tech factories and 
other types of manufacturing factories.
Categorising students as part of the 
precariat because of their insecure 
employment means ignoring the major 
element of their status, i.e. the fact that 
they are undergoing vocational training 
and hence work only for the short-
term. Although they often do not receive 
specialist training in their chosen field, 
this does not change the fact that they are 
structurally temporary workers who plan 
to pursue their career elsewhere. This is a 
constrained, transitional labour force. Yu 
bemoans their lack of commitment to work 
and the struggle by this section of the so-
called precariat, but this is largely due to the 
abuse of the internship system by colleges 
and employers, and it is hardly surprising to 
find members of this group wishing to leave 
employment that does not match their area 
of study or their career aspirations. 
Due to this mismatch, student interns 
show a high level of dissatisfaction with 
factories, and are disengaged with both 
labour processes and collective action. 
Yu’s research reveals that the majority of 
his student interns were confused about 
their identities, as they saw themselves as 
students, not full-time workers. At the same 
time, though, they were engaged in hi-tech 
factories and treated as full-time workers 
doing assembly line work.
Agency workers face a different set of 
problems. Working through an agency 
sets up a triangular relationship between 
workers and employers. This can add 
complexity to these relations, as well as 
fraud, as bogus employment agencies can 
easily dupe young migrants, taking fees 
without providing work. Problems can also 
arise in the event of a labour controversy, 
as employers and agencies dispute 
responsibility for health and safety failings. 
In Yu’s research, some companies used a 
limited number of agencies, generally just 
the larger ones, while others had a more 
diverse approach, hiring workers through 
several commercial labour agencies. Some 
companies maintained that they offered a 
temporary-to-permanent pattern of work, 
with workers having the opportunity to 
become formal workers after a probationary 
period, but when Yu spoke to agency 
workers, they disputed this easy transition. 
Instead, for them an ‘agency labour regime’ 
meant little control over work allocation and 
schedules, as well as regular reassignments 
to different types of jobs and easy dismissal. 
Still, this and other accounts that stress 
the negative effects of agencies in forming 
barriers to secure work ignore the fact that 
workers possess labour mobility power and 
they can change agencies if things don’t turn 
out well. Given the large number of agencies 
in China, there is fierce competition 
between them for labour, a situation that 
creates bargaining power for workers. While 
agencies may try to avoid recruiting workers 
who change jobs frequently, the high levels 
of turnover mean this rule is difficult to 
apply. 
Finally, regarding formal workers, while 
they have regular employment, they also 
face specific problems. For instance, they 
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are forced to change their jobs frequently, 
due to factors that include variations in 
production seasons; the practice of loaning 
employees (zhiyuan) to other departments or 
factories; the tradition of changing workers’ 
job specifications and labour relationships 
(fenliu); as well as an abusive labour regime 
that involves the use of ‘constructive 
dismissal’, active pressure to take on 
unwanted tasks, and limited job security. 
Posted workers often lose out financially. 
For example, enrolment at Foxconn was 
effectively compulsory, with formal workers 
being punished with reduced overtime if 
they did not participate. According to Yu, 
factories routinely violate labour contracts 
to change formal workers’ work, content, 
and locations, effectively ‘selling’ labourers 
from the original factories to other factories 
or firms.
Problems with the 
Precariat in China
The idea central to the precariat thesis, 
that there is a class divide in terms of the 
employment conditions of the salariat and 
precariat, falls at the first hurdle. All workers 
are insecure in China, and precariousness 
is not evidence of a separate class, but part 
of the general condition of waged labour in 
the country. Take the issue of high labour 
turnover, seen as indicative of precarity. In 
fact, labour turnover is high for all groups 
and in part expresses the mobility power of 
labour (Ariga et al. 2012)—and, as such, it 
has been a central mechanism for improving 
wages and conditions. Jobs were more 
precarious in the 1980s and the 1990s than 
in the new millennium when precariousness 
acquired structural significance. More 
recent protection, if not standardisation of 
employment relations, due to state labour 
policy and legislation, has coincided with 
more labour resistance and collective 
actions. More importantly, precarity has 
been the fate of two generations of migrant 
workers, but in terms of labour disputes and 
collective actions, we witness much more in 
the new or second generation, as indicated 
by numerous empirical studies (Leung and 
Pun 2009; Pun and Lu 2010a and 2010b). 
For instance, Pringle notes that in the 2010 
dispute at a Honda transmissions factory in 
Foshan, agency workers were a critical part 
of the action (Pringle 2016). 
The official categorisation of peasant 
workers—wage labourers with rural 
household registration—keeps their social 
status and class identities ambiguous. 
Taking a specific path of proletarianisation, 
the new generation of migrant workers 
has gradually become aware of their class 
position and participated in a series of 
collective actions. The migrant workers are 
now experiencing a deeper sense of anger 
and dissatisfaction than that of the first 
generation, accompanied by the realisation 
that the return to their hometowns is more 
problematic (Pun 2016).
To conclude, precariousness as a process 
is a useful concept, ‘precariat’ is not. At 
different times, precariousness is a more or 
less important attribute of being a worker. 
The idea that security is fixed and settled is 
unhelpful as is the idea of a new class called 
the ‘precariat’. The processes of creating 
non-standard forms of employment are 
recognisable across work with different 
forms of status, from unskilled to more 
white collar and professional occupations. 
More importantly, we need to look at 
interactions between workers on different 
contracts in production relations, and not 
invent employment differences that confuse 
employment status and social class. Class is 
about ownership relations, and structural 
class relations between labour and capital.
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China’s manufacturing model has been built 
on the exploitation of migrant workers under 
a despotic labour regime. But is that still the 
case? Based on extensive research in the Chinese 
garment sector, this essay argues that while 
draconian controls persist up to this day, the 
situation of China’s migrants has undergone 
dramatic transformations that encompass 
not only changes in the workers’ demographic 
profile and everyday life practices, but also 
new social, technical, and gendered divisions of 
labour inside factories.
From Dormitory 
System to 
Conciliatory 
Despotism 
Changing Labour 
Regimes in Chinese 
Factories
For the past three decades, China’s 
export-led manufacturing model has been 
built on extensive exploitation of its migrant 
workforce under a despotic labour regime. 
Draconian controls persist, and it is easy 
to view both Chinese migrant workers and 
the ways employers subordinate them as 
static and unchanging. Yet the situation of 
China’s migrants has undergone a dramatic 
transformation—a shift that encompasses 
not only changes in their demographic 
profile and everyday life practices, but 
also new social, technical, and gendered 
divisions of labour inside factories. 
This transformation presents a 
formidable challenge for any conceptual 
understanding of how factory regimes and 
management controls have changed under 
global capitalism. How do managers exert 
control in Chinese factories? What are the 
characteristics of China’s current labour 
regime? To examine these changes, in 2010, 
I lived with several young male migrant 
workers for six months in a small apartment 
near a garment factory in the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD). 
Focussing on labour-intensive, foreign-
owned factories where tens of millions 
of migrant workers have worked since 
the early 1990s, in this essay I trace the 
changes embodied by reform policies and 
practiced by managers and workers. My 
findings reveal that since the mid-2000s 
new modes of domination—crystallised into 
a new labour regime that I call ‘conciliatory 
despotism’—have combined coercive power 
with new workplace tactics and production 
strategies.
Breaks and Continuity
While extant studies have noted how the 
emphases of labour regimes shift in line 
with changing patterns in the capitalist 
economy and society (Sturdy et al. 2010), 
the emerging Chinese labour regime of 
This article draws substantially on the author’s 
forthcoming article ‘Labor and Domination: 
Worker Control in a Chinese Factory,’ in Politics & 
Society, DOI: 10.1177/0032329217714784.
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Dormitory buildings, Shenzhen.
Photo: DcMaster.
‘conciliatory despotism’ has had a unique 
developmental trajectory. On the one hand, 
it incorporates new measures of control 
that allow factory managements to adapt to 
changing global production environments 
and to a domestic economy marred by 
labour shortages. On the other, it inherits a 
series of despotic disciplinary measures that 
were developed during the first exploitative 
wave of capitalist manufacturing in China 
during the 1990s, when foreign companies 
took advantage of the vulnerability of rural 
migrants under an apartheid-like urban 
household registration system that was 
itself a legacy of the Maoist period.     
My research highlights the coexistence 
of institutional continuity and a change 
in the labour-intensive factories of post-
socialist China. While the Chinese state still 
engages in labour law non-enforcement and 
employers still rely on strong disciplinary 
measures to reinforce their managerial 
practices, in the past few years the Chinese 
state has relaxed the major institution that 
determined migrant workers’ lives in urban 
areas in the 1990s: the discriminatory, 
restrictive household registration system 
(hukou). At the same time, real wages have 
risen substantially and, consequently, 
workers are no longer financially desperate 
and vulnerable. For instance, in response to 
workers’ capacity to afford to live outside 
factory dormitories, away from the constant 
control of their employer, local residents 
have constructed apartment buildings 
that enable migrant workers to find 
alternative accommodation outside factory 
compounds. Labour shortages have also 
compelled employers to recruit more young 
male migrants, resulting in new gendered 
divisions of labour and workplace politics 
on the shop floor. As a result of these new 
changes, managers and policy-makers have 
had to devise new mechanisms of ‘soft 
control’ to conciliate workers’ grievances. 
Beyond the Dormitory 
Labour Regime
A great deal of China’s export industry 
is clustered in Guangdong province. Until 
recently, the Chinese authorities tightly 
implemented the hukou system to control 
the mobility of migrant workers in much the 
same way as the South African government 
used the pass system in the days of apartheid 
(Alexander and Chan 2004). By restricting 
peasants to the countryside, the state could 
control not only urban growth but also the 
status and identity of individuals. 
Without an urban registration, rural 
migrants needed a permit to remain away 
from home, and they could only secure 
this if they had an employer. Police in the 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) regularly checked 
their permits on the streets, a situation 
that not only intensified migrants’ fear of 
unemployment but also pushed them to 
get factory jobs at any condition in order 
to become registered ‘workers’ and remain 
in the region. Taking advantage of this 
situation, factory management drew up shop 
floor and dormitory rules alongside physical 
punishments to discipline and penalise 
migrant workers in order to transform them 
into docile and disciplined subjects (Lee 
1998; Chan 2001; Pun 2005). 
Outside factories, in the public sphere, 
the state wielded the power to control the 
inflow of migrant workers; inside, managers 
held sway over their lives. Workers from 
the countryside were normally required by 
their employers to reside inside the factory 
grounds, in crowded dormitories that often 
accommodated eight people in a single 
room. Factory dormitories and production 
lines were interlinked, in what Chris Smith 
and Pun Ngai have defined the ‘dormitory 
labour regime’ (Smith and Pun 2006; Pun 
and Smith 2007; Chan and Pun 2009). The 
dormitory was an extension of the point of 
production, and factory management could 
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flexibly utilise and prolong work hours, thus 
maintaining a great breadth of control over 
the working and non-working time of the 
employees. 
But this despotic dormitory factory regime 
no longer prevails today, as employers have 
lost their monopoly over the housing of the 
workers. In the early 2000s, local villagers 
in the PRD began to demolish their old 
houses to construct cheap, ugly apartment 
buildings. They did so in order to profitably 
rent out rooms to migrants who did not want 
to live in factory dormitories. Still, if workers 
were finally able to escape the dormitories, 
this was only because of major changes in 
their own standing vis-à-vis management 
(Siu 2015).
Labour Famine and 
Worker Empowerment
A fundamental change that occurred is 
that today migrant workers are no longer 
desperate to keep their jobs. As the factories 
in China relentlessly expanded in number 
and size year after year, the stream of young 
rural migrants no longer exceeds the ever-
growing need for workers. Since 2003, 
factory jobs have been readily available, 
and employers have been competing to find 
workers. Facing labour shortages, local 
governments in industrialised districts no 
longer seek to control the movements of the 
workers. Migrant workers today do not need 
to obtain work permits to stay in the PRD 
region, though they still are supposed to 
obtain temporary residence permits, which 
are seldom checked in the streets.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, for most 
types of production work, factory managers 
were willing to employ only young women 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
three, on the ground that they have nimbler 
hands, are more obedient, and easier to 
manage. The factories were not interested 
in older rural women in the belief that by 
the age of twenty-four most of them would 
return to their home village to get married 
and have a child. But the number of young 
rural women in China was not limitless, and 
as the number of factories kept expanding, 
labour shortages of young women became 
evident. For this reason, since around 2003, 
employers could no longer allow themselves 
to be too choosy and had to start employing 
women in their early thirties, as well as 
young men (Chan et al. 2009; Chan and Siu 
2010). 
The competition to recruit workers has 
had at least one other effect: over the past 
12 years, the real wages of migrant workers 
have more than tripled in Shenzhen, China’s 
leading centre for the export industry. By the 
late 2000s, migrant workers in the southern 
metropolis could afford to regularly eat 
meals with vegetables and meat, to snack 
regularly at fast-food outlets, and to eat 
sometimes at small cheap restaurants; they 
could afford smartphones; could afford to 
dress attractively—and could afford to talk 
back or quit work if harassed. This needs to 
be put into context, though. They were still 
very poor, and by urban Chinese standards 
their hourly wages were considered quite 
low. Moreover, urban residents still refused 
to engage in blue-collar work in factories 
where migrants worked. In their shared 
rental apartments, double-decker beds were 
crowded together. When I lived with a group 
of male migrants, my housemates decided to 
save even more money by sharing the same 
mattress with another worker, each sleeping 
in shifts. 
Towards Conciliatory 
Despotism
My study of a garment factory in the PRD 
reveals that all control mechanisms are 
embedded in a wide array of factory rules, 
regulations, practices, customs, production 
hierarchies, divisions of labour, and systems 
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of production. Each of these modes of 
domination assumes different forms, with 
mechanisms ranging from despotic to the 
tactical and strategic. Coercive power 
includes punishment, disciplinary measures, 
and restrictive resignation and leave policies. 
Workplace tactics and strategies include 
affective personal ties and face-giving, 
(collective) bargaining, and encouragement 
of competition among workers. Over time, 
social, technical, and gendered divisions of 
labour and the production hierarchy have 
been altered.
The use of punishment and disciplinary 
tools, affective personal ties, face-giving 
tactics, hidden collective bargaining, 
and competition among workers jointly 
determine the extent to which workers are 
dominated. The ways these mechanisms 
combine and the extent to which each of 
them has been brought into play has changed 
over the past decade. Extracting extra work 
time is one of the major aims of the despotic 
apparatuses, and exploitation is evident 
to workers who are forced, for instance, to 
do unpaid overtime. In a changing labour 
environment, though, a new shop-floor 
culture comprising of new strategies to 
control workers’ emotions, dispositions, and 
rationalities, seemingly speaks against the 
literature in Chinese labour studies from 
an earlier decade which emphasised the 
blatant coercion of a despotic labour regime 
(Chan 2001).
How does all this change our 
understanding of contemporary Chinese 
practices? My research has shown that 
despotic controls alone are no longer able 
to maintain factory order, and that a new 
regime of ‘conciliatory despotism’ has been 
taking shape to replace the older dormitory 
labour regime. ‘Conciliatory’ refers to the 
incorporation of new mechanisms of soft 
control in normative forms of shop-floor 
tactics and production strategies, aimed 
at creating a shop-floor culture which 
mediates direct confrontations, gives 
workers a sense of give-and-take over the 
production process, and boosts individual 
productivity through competition. 
Of particular importance to this 
conciliatory approach is the fact that line 
leaders and supervisors have to invest in 
affective ties with rank-and-file workers, 
and to devise effective interactive tactics 
whenever there are emotional outbursts. 
Different from the situation in the 1990s 
when despotism prevailed and management 
had no interest in appeasing workers, these 
affective ties—though thin, fragile, and still 
based mostly upon cold market relations and 
coercive power—are part of a new stage of 
development in China’s labour-management 
relations. Such ties are strategically activated 
by low-level members of management to 
mediate workers’ discontents in a context 
where coercive power alone is not effective 
enough to control employees. 
Workers today can readily find jobs 
elsewhere and thus are able to respond to 
excessive coercion by leaving the factory. 
Thus, low-level managers, in dealing 
with emotional outbursts, invoke Chinese 
cultural norms through face-giving tactics to 
maintain factory order. Giving workers ‘face’ 
entails temporarily considering workers 
not as subordinate tools for production, 
but as human beings to be respected (at 
least nominally). Unlike the situation in 
the 1990s, where management in Chinese 
factories considered rural migrants to be 
‘uncivilised’ subjects in need of disciplining 
by modern factory rules and practices, 
the unequal power relationship between 
managers and migrants is slowly shifting 
towards a more ‘humanised’ social bond 
through which both rank-and-file workers 
and low-level management are increasingly 
able to influence the outcomes of the labour 
process in China. 
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When discussing the outcomes of China’s 
economic development, the poverty that can still 
be found in Chinese cities is seldom mentioned. 
While the Party-state is indeed making a token 
effort to sustain the victims of this destitution, 
these people and their offspring will never be 
able to escape this manufactured poverty. This 
essay looks at the policy process that led to 
this outcome and at the prospects for poverty 
alleviation in Chinese urban areas.  
The Precarity of 
Layoffs and State 
Compensation 
The Minimum Livelihood 
Guarantee  
When discussing the results of China’s 
‘miracle’ development over the past four 
decades, it is common enough to hear about 
the large numbers of rural Chinese citizens—
especially those residing in designated 
poor counties—who have been ‘lifted out of 
poverty’ by the policies of the government, 
or about the surging numbers of the ‘new 
middle class’, or else, often enough, about 
the infamous urban-rural income divide—
which suggests that all those in urban areas 
are well off if they have the good fortune 
to hold an urban household registration. 
But, by contrast, we hear almost nothing 
about the poverty and attendant precarity 
found in the cities, which the state itself has 
engendered. The state makes a token effort 
to sustain the victims of this destitution, but 
it is clear they will never be able to escape 
this manufactured poverty, nor will their 
offspring. How many of them are there and 
how did this transpire?
‘State of Surrender’, Yunnan. Photo: @mimokhair on Flickr.
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Manufacturing Precarity 
in the State Sector
It is easier to document the regime 
choices and the process that produced this 
outcome, and to describe the programme 
intended to maintain the status quo, than 
to estimate the number of people affected. 
But tens of millions would be a fair guess. 
The choices of the Chinese leadership had 
much to do with China’s aim for a type of 
modernity characterised by participation 
in global competition, spurred on by the 
country’s preparation to enter the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in the late 
1990s. The lot of China’s laid-off workers, 
therefore, rightly fits within the rubric 
of the types of precarity attending the life 
of labourers around the world. This shift 
towards integration into the global economy 
overlapped with an official diagnosis of 
the failure of the planned economy and of 
its unsuitability for participation in the 
modern world market, which was ultimately 
responsible for driving huge numbers of 
state-owned firms into the red by the mid-
1990s.
As a consequence of those glances both 
ahead and into the past, on the eve of China’s 
accession to the WTO the decision makers at 
the helm of the state determined that firms 
losing money were not just a significant 
drain on the state budget, but also—and 
perhaps even more critically—incapable 
of competing in the world market, due to 
their unskilled workforces and obsolete 
technology. For this reason, they had to be 
shut down, with their workers dismissed 
from their jobs in droves. Figures vary, but 
in recent years most observers agree that the 
total of those let go may well have exceeded 
sixty million (Hussain 2003).  
So a project termed ‘enterprise 
restructuring’ (qiye gaizhi) was set into 
motion from 1997 to 1999, following the 
principle of ‘grasping the big and letting go 
the small’ (zhuada fangxiao). This amounted 
to allowing the smaller firms, and those in 
non-strategic sectors, to fail; it also meant 
permitting the more successful enterprises 
to take over anything of value from the 
weaker ones—primarily by way of mergers or 
buyouts. Complex arrangements sometimes 
ensued, but the upshot for my argument 
here is to highlight the emergence of mass 
unemployment for many millions of older—
that is over the age of thirty-five!—state 
workers, whose education was deficient 
because of the closure of schools during 
the Cultural Revolution. Deemed worthless, 
these people were often forced to make do 
on their own. Certainly, a huge increase 
in urban poverty occurred at that time, 
affecting perhaps some 15 to 20 percent of 
the urban population if dependents of the 
laid-off workers are included, and nothing 
serious has been done to remove this blight.
A hastily assembled plan called the ‘Re-
employment Project’ (zaijiuye gongcheng) 
was put into action in 1998. It was supposed 
to be underwritten by enterprises, localities, 
and ‘society’, with the aim of supplying 
training, finding jobs, and distributing ‘basic 
livelihood allowances’ (jiben shenghuofei) 
for the furloughed. But in fact, many workers 
received no funds, and even for those who 
did, the amount they were given was grossly 
inadequate. Moreover, indebted or bankrupt 
firms were not able to contribute to the 
collections, and the rate of re-employment 
even after a few years fell below 20 percent 
(Wu and Huang 2007).
Minimum Livelihood 
Allowance as a 
Tranquiliser
Workers responded by protesting 
vociferously in many cities, causing 
disruptions (Hurst 2009). Central leaders 
understandably became anxious, first about 
the instability itself, and then about what 
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they deemed to be the likely impact on their 
visions of enterprise ‘reform’, and what 
such disorder might spell for discouraging 
foreign investment. The judgment of the 
political elites was that a ‘tranquiliser’, in the 
form of a ‘minimum livelihood allowance’ 
(zuidi shenghuo baozhang, or dibao), was 
to be provided to all urban citizens whose 
families’ average household income fell 
below a locally set poverty line. Thus, the 
leadership expanded a scheme pioneered 
in Shanghai in 1993, decreeing that it was to 
be adopted in every city by the fall of 1999. 
The sums dispensed were trivial, whether 
considered as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP), or as compared with average 
levels of disposable income in the various 
localities.
The programme is means tested, meagre, 
and stigmatising. It entails cash transfers, 
requiring no contributions, but it also sets no 
conditions, such as demanding that mothers 
ensure that their children see doctors and 
go to school (as is the case for other social 
relief plans elsewhere in the world). Thus, 
it seems indifferent as to whether it lays 
out a path to eventual, inter-generational 
departure from penury.
As of the mid-2000s, soon after the 
birth of the programme, about 4 percent 
of the urban populace was being served, 
a percentage that remains pretty much 
the same today nationally. But at that time 
researchers figured that something like 
twice that percentage of the people had net 
incomes below the poverty line in their own 
cities (Lou and Wang 2008). More than that, 
yesterday as today, a frequently bemoaned 
‘preference for friends and relatives’ has 
placed the allotments into hands that do not 
deserve it, overlooking often enough those 
who do need assistance.  
In addition, as the years passed, by the 
end of the decade able-bodied unemployed 
people were advised to find work for 
themselves, even as the labour market was 
decidedly unfriendly to these ‘aged’, under-
educated, and sometimes disabled or ill 
former workers. Many of them were unable 
to leave their homes, as they had no choice 
but to tend to their own sick, infirm, and 
young, since their scant incomes prohibited 
them from hiring any help.
Perspectives from the 
Beneficiaries
How do the recipients of this assistance 
experience their situation? The following 
excerpt reveals how they struggle to get 
along. When asked what they would like 
to see the government do for them, here is 
what a recipient said:
Recipient: First, supply some regular jobs; 
second, when you do a little business, shouldn’t 
the government’s policy tilt to you? If the 
government doesn’t help, we certainly don’t 
have the strength to assist ourselves. 
Interviewer: To help the recipients of dibao 
throw off poverty, are jobs the root cure?
Recipient: Yes. Otherwise, just give more 
money, but it’s not possible, giving us one third 
of the average wage is not possible. If the state’s 
finance really has this ability, why can’t it adjust 
employment policy? I feel that at the present 
stage the state should raise [our allowance] a 
little, price inflation now is so severe! The prices 
of so many things have risen, how can this be 
tolerated? The recipients of dibao are already 
very low on money, you could give them a little 
more. Public officials and government cadres 
don’t care about inflation, if you give them two 
hundred yuan [at the time of the interview, 
that would have been about twenty-five USD], 
or five hundred yuan, it won’t count for much. 
But for the recipients of dibao, if you give them 
ten yuan or twenty yuan it has a function. But 
the state can’t simply give you more money, so 
I say it’s employment. Really getting rid of the 
dibao would be good. Having some stable work 
instead, wouldn’t that be even better?
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The programme often comes under 
suspicion because people assume that it 
enables laziness and a reluctance to work. 
And yet other interview subjects agreed 
with the sentiments of the interviewee 
quoted above. In 2010, a beneficiary of the 
programme in Guangzhou—a man who was 
half-paralysed and had both high blood 
pressure and diabetes—still wished to work. 
In his words: ‘Because I’m too old and sick, 
if you were a boss you wouldn’t look for a 
forty-year-old sick person, it’s this simple.’ 
Similarly, another recipient in the same city 
at the same time declared that: ‘Everything 
requires a high educational background, 
but I only have primary school education, 
so naturally they won’t hire me. Talented 
people are numerous; they won’t take me. 
You say go to sell things, but that needs start-
up money (benqian). Private businesspeople 
won’t hire us, and private bosses have no 
reason to ask a sick, old person to work, 
right?’ 
A Cultural Explanation
Once laid off from enterprises, older 
workers are seen as of no use. So it is felt 
that it is best to keep them barely alive, but 
not as a part of society. It is better to leave 
them unemployed and stuck in their homes, 
out of sight. Do not waste resources, let them 
die off, is the implicit message. So let’s view 
the laid-off, sick, and older urban people as 
metaphors for Mao’s society. It seems that 
those people, along with that society, should 
be obliterated. The market is modern, and 
it cannot absorb them. Modern is middle 
class—a state that is impossible to reach for 
these laid-off workers and their children.
And there has been no real effort to help 
them break out of their impoverishment, 
as an inter-generational cycle of poverty 
gears into motion. True, Party leader Xi 
Jinping promises an end to poverty in the 
near future, but it is only rural poverty to 
which he alludes, which, as noted above, 
can be addressed by targeting funds and 
services to whole areas of the countryside. 
There has been almost no mention of the 
urban poor. Thus, while the future of China 
can be viewed as a beautiful dream, the past 
remains depicted as a nightmare, filled with 
poverty, backwardness, and obsolescence. 
The poor are the antithesis of the dream, of 
the market, of economic growth, of progress, 
and glory. When multitudes of the old 
‘masters’ of society (as state workers were 
labelled in the past) raged in the roads, the 
dibao was established to calm them down. 
But a policy devised mainly for stability 
waned as the beneficiaries went back home, 
out of sight. So as the project achieved its 
political purpose, its funds have diminished, 
relatively speaking. This is a tale of poverty 
and of precarity that never gets told. 
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For many years reform-oriented labour 
activists and scholars working in China have 
seen collective bargaining as the cure for 
the country’s severe labour problems. The 
logic underlying this was often unstated, 
but straightforward: collective bargaining 
was crucial for twentieth century labour 
movements in capitalist countries in 
giving workers a voice and creating a more 
equitable social distribution of wealth. 
With growing levels of labour unrest in 
China over the past twenty years, collective 
bargaining seemed like a logical next step. 
Hopeful reformers—both within the official 
unions as well as labour NGO activists 
and academics—envisioned rationalised, 
legalised bargaining between labour and 
capital as a central pillar in the construction 
of a more just workplace and society. 
The challenges to institutionalising a 
robust collective bargaining system in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) have 
always been profound. Fundamental to 
labour relations theory is that collective 
bargaining rights must be accompanied 
by the right to strike and freedom of 
association—capital has no reason to take 
workers seriously without labour possessing 
some coercive power. But independent 
unions have long been an anathema to the 
Communist Party. From the Lai Ruoyu 
debacle of the 1950s (Franceschini 2015) 
to the crushing of the Beijing Workers 
Autonomous Federation in 1989 (Walder 
and Gong 1993), the Party has made it clear 
time and again that independent worker 
organisations are forbidden. Although 
workers have never enjoyed the right to 
strike in practice, the right was formally 
included in the Chinese constitutions of 
1975 and 1978. It was Deng Xiaoping who 
removed it from the constitution just as 
private capital began pouring into China in 
the early 1980s. 
Nonetheless, with no signs of articulated 
worker movements since 1989, many well-
intentioned people thought it was worth 
Eli Friedman
As the Chinese government under Xi Jinping 
has turned in a markedly anti-worker 
direction, attempts to establish a genuine 
collective bargaining system in China have 
been smothered. If collective bargaining is 
dead, what might Chinese workers and their 
allies advocate? The time might be ripe to shift 
our focus to a demand for a rapid expansion 
of universal social services, not least for a 
universal basic income.
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Construction workers in Changsha.
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trying to advance worker rights within 
the system. Especially from the mid 2000s 
on, academics (myself included) launched 
research projects, NGOs held training 
sessions, and foreign unions engaged 
with the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU). Many assumed that the 
state would eventually decide that worker 
insurgency was exacting too high a cost, and 
that serious labour reforms were therefore 
necessary. And indeed, beginning in the 
late 2000s the ACFTU made collective 
negotiations (xieshang)—rather than the 
more antagonistic sounding ‘bargaining’ 
(tanpan)—a high priority, investing time and 
resources into expanding the coverage of 
collective contracts. 
At its best, collective bargaining in China 
has been woefully inadequate. The state 
and the ACFTU have been very cautious 
about controlling workers’ aspirations, and 
have insisted on the fundamental harmony 
of interests between labour and capital. 
Experiments with bargaining have been 
almost exclusively restricted to single 
enterprises, thereby preventing workers 
from constituting cross-workplace ties. 
The overwhelming majority of collective 
contracts are formulaic: actual bargaining 
rarely occurs, and enforcement is largely non-
existent. The few shining examples where 
employers have made real compromises 
during collective bargaining have followed 
autonomously organised wildcat strikes. 
The best-known case is the 2010 strike from 
a Honda transmission plant in Guangdong 
province, which resulted in major wage 
gains as well as an (ultimately unsuccessful) 
effort to reform the enterprise union. It is 
not coincidental that substantive worker-led 
bargaining is much more likely in Japanese 
or American firms, where the state must be 
cautious not to inflame patriotic sentiments. 
State-sanctioned economic nationalism is 
a shaky foundation for a robust collective 
bargaining system. 
The Death of Collective 
Bargaining under Xi
Even these timid efforts have been 
smothered in recent years, as the central 
government has turned in a markedly anti-
worker direction under Xi Jinping. There 
was a brief moment in 2010 when discussion 
about the right to strike emerged from 
hushed whispers into the public discourse. 
But this opening was ephemeral, and union 
reformers in Guangdong who had pushed 
gentle reforms in the mid-late 2000s were 
replaced with typical Party apparatchiks. 
The country’s pre-eminent centre for 
labour studies at Sun Yat-sen University 
in Guangzhou was shuttered (Wong 2015). 
The academic study of employment has now 
been left almost entirely to business schools, 
as the government has stymied further 
expansion of labour relations programmes. 
Labour NGOs in Guangzhou were subjected 
to a brutal crackdown in December 2015, 
with the government specifically targeting 
those groups that had been helping workers 
to engage in collective negotiations to resolve 
strikes. And the ACFTU has seemingly given 
up on advancing collective negotiations 
altogether. The Chairman of the ACFTU 
Li Jianguo does not even mention the term 
in his speeches anymore. Under the ‘work 
developments’ section of the ACFTU’s 
website, a lonely single report on collective 
contracts for the entirety of 2016—which 
is not even available online anymore—is a 
stark indication that the union has almost 
totally forsaken this agenda. 
Collective bargaining is not dead in the 
sense that it will disappear from China’s 
labour-capital relations. It is almost 
certain that official unions will continue to 
pursue bargaining in its current vacuous, 
bureaucratic, and worker-exclusionary 
form. Collective contracts will continue 
to be signed, tabulated, and then hidden 
from view from workers. Somewhat less 
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pessimistically, workers will continue to 
force management to bargain with the 
collective via wildcat strikes. This latter 
form will still be an important means by 
which workers can attempt to ensure their 
most basic rights, and these efforts are 
absolutely worth supporting. But collective 
bargaining is dead as a political aim. It is 
not going to be the cornerstone of twentieth 
century-style class compromise in China, 
it is not generative of worker power, and 
it certainly does not herald broader social 
transformation. To the extent that legal 
bargaining does develop, it will be as a 
mechanism for the state to deprive workers 
of autonomous power. 
What then might Chinese workers and 
allied intellectuals and activists aim for? At 
the risk of stating the obvious, the working 
class needs more power. The question is, 
how to foster proletarian power in the 
face of a highly competent authoritarian 
state that views organised workers as 
an existential threat? In the absence of 
independent organisations, the only option 
is an intensification of already widespread 
worker insurgency. The more wildcat 
strikes, mass direct action, and worker riots, 
the more the state and capital will be forced 
to take worker grievances seriously. Of 
course such forms of collective action come 
at great risk for workers, and many have 
already paid a high price. In any particular 
case, the risks may certainly outweigh the 
benefits. But in the aggregate, expansive 
unrest is just what the working class needs. 
With the institutions firmly oriented 
towards advancing the inter-related goals 
of state domination and exploitation by 
capital, disruption on a large scale is the 
only chance workers have of forcing change. 
Ungovernability will be the necessary 
prelude to any institutional reform worthy 
of the name. 
The Quest for UBI
Let’s now imagine a scenario—a fantastic 
one, admittedly, but one for which we 
should be prepared: worker unrest hits 
some inflection point, and the state comes 
begging for compromise. If collective 
bargaining is dead on arrival, what might 
Chinese workers and their allies advocate? 
The time has come to shift our focus to a 
demand for a rapid expansion of universal 
social services, not least of which should be 
universal basic income (UBI). 
UBI has been hotly debated in North 
America and Europe in recent years. There 
are numerous excellent accounts of various 
ways of structuring UBI (Van Parijs 2004), 
which I cannot rehash in detail here. But 
the fundamental idea is that all members 
within some given political jurisdiction 
receive a certain income by virtue of their 
citizenship—there are no means tests, 
and everyone receives the same amount 
regardless of employment status or existing 
wealth. 
Perhaps the most frequently cited reason 
for implementing UBI is that technological 
development is increasing productivity 
while undermining the stability of jobs. 
A somewhat more expansive version of 
this argument recognises the diverse 
ways that people contribute to capital 
accumulation outside of wage labour—if 
the traditional wage is an increasingly 
unreliable measure of value production, 
perhaps it should be abandoned altogether. 
Another important point is that UBI would 
have the advantage of freeing up time for 
more socially constructive activities (Weeks 
2011). Liberated from the daily struggle 
for survival, people will have the space to 
do what they will—including engaging in 
politics. In this sense, UBI is not merely an 
end in itself but also a means for developing 
the political energies of the dominated.  
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UBI is by no means a panacea, and at 
worst it could be a Trojan horse for austerity 
(Ikebe 2016). Many conservatives have 
come to embrace UBI, as they see it as an 
efficient replacement for all other social 
programmes. An additional concern is that 
it is unlikely that elites will endow society 
with the right kind of UBI in the absence of 
vigorous, organised demands from below. A 
technocratic approach will likely serve the 
interests of elites, or will be unenforceable. 
A few exceptions notwithstanding (Ding 
2016), UBI has aroused little discussion 
within China. There are a variety of 
reasons for this, not least of which has been 
thirty years of nearly unbroken economic 
development and job growth. Industries 
such as manufacturing and construction 
have absorbed huge volumes of labour, and 
automation has only just begun chipping 
away at this growth in employment. 
Ideologically, UBI has resonances with the 
state socialist ‘iron rice bowl’, and runs 
counter to dominant meritocratic discourses 
that valorise hard work. Advocates of UBI 
would likely encounter repression, as the 
state is constitutionally opposed to any 
politics that could articulate the aspirations 
of a broad constituency. Given all of this, UBI 
has not yet gained widespread currency in 
China, and workers have not put it forward 
as a demand. 
Nonetheless, the moment seems ripe to 
raise the topic for debate. Economic growth 
is slowing, automation is accelerating, and 
greater numbers of people are dependent on 
highly informal, contingent, and irregular 
forms of work to survive. Minimum wages 
increased significantly from 2010 until last 
year, but have more recently been frozen 
in many provinces. The growing informal 
workforce does not enjoy minimum wage 
rights, and even formal workers with a 
labour contract often have to protest just to 
have basic laws enforced. Furthermore, the 
minimum wage has never been a liveable 
wage, particularly for migrant workers 
excluded from state-subsidised health care, 
education, and housing. The contradiction 
between China’s highly uneven economic 
geography and localised system of social 
welfare provision on the one side, and its 
unified national labour market on the other, 
is only likely to intensify. UBI cannot be 
realised without widespread working class 
support and mobilisation—now is the time 
to plant the seed.     
Crucial Questions
There are important details that would 
need to be worked out for UBI to be 
effectively implemented, especially in 
a place as large and complex as China. 
Crucial questions about how to fund such 
a programme, how much citizens would 
receive, and the administrative arrangements 
could determine success or failure. But even 
in advance of having a perfectly worked 
out plan, the demand serves an important 
political purpose: it proposes that all 
humans have a right to subsist, irrespective 
of their utility to capital. Particularly given 
China’s highly fractured welfare regime, the 
demand could serve to unify people across 
region, ethnicity, and hukou status. If linked 
to demands for universalising other forms 
of social protection such as healthcare, 
education, and housing, it could lay the 
foundation for meaningful human autonomy 
from the dictates of the market. 
Is the demand for UBI in China utopian? 
Perhaps. But based on the past two decades 
of experience, we know for a fact that 
collective bargaining is a chimera. As 
China’s wealth and social inequalities yawn 
ever wider, factories relocate to cheaper 
locales, automation expunges workers 
from the labour process, and the old state 
socialist institutions continue to rot in 
irrelevance, it is time to change tack. The 
death of collective bargaining may yet be a 
gift to China’s workers.
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In the previous chapter, Eli Friedman 
analyses the state of the labour movement in 
China, focussing in particular on the failure 
of the institutionalisation of collective 
bargaining. Given the loss of political 
support that collective bargaining seems to 
have experienced in China in recent years, 
Friedman makes an argument for replacing 
it with universal basic income (UBI) as a 
political goal of the labour movement. This 
is not to say that in his opinion collective 
bargaining will disappear or will no longer 
be useful, or that UBI is on the immediate 
horizon; rather, he believes that in the 
current circumstances alternative political 
goals and projects such as UBI should be 
seriously considered, even if they may seem 
utopian for now. 
An Impasse in the 
Chinese Labour 
Movement
Friedman’s essay provides an occasion 
for serious reconsideration of the goal and 
strategy of the Chinese labour movement. 
This is particularly necessary at a time 
when the activism of Chinese workers 
seems to have reached another impasse due 
to the double challenges of political and 
economic tightening. The movement led 
by Chinese migrant workers is autonomous 
in two senses: it is autonomous in relation 
to the official trade union—the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)—and 
it is also autonomous in that workplace-
based industrial actions are independent 
of each other. The result is an independent, 
unco-opted, but also fractured movement. 
The notion of collective bargaining, one of a 
few clearly articulated goals that are widely-
shared by worker-activists, grassroots labour 
organisations, industrial relations scholars, 
the government, and the ACFTU, has 
provided this highly fragmented movement 
with a sense of direction, bringing together 
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The loss of political support for collective 
bargaining has stripped the Chinese labour 
movement of one of its few unifying forces. 
In light of this decline, in a recent essay Eli 
Friedman has argued that collective bargaining 
should be replaced with universal basic income 
(UBI) as a common goal of the movement. But 
would UBI be able to play such a role? What may 
be gained or lost by mobilising around UBI? To 
respond to these questions, this essay compares 
the two strategies with regard to a number of 
crucial aspects.
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the efforts of a diversity of individuals, 
groups, and institutions. 
While there is near consensus on the 
importance of collective bargaining for 
Chinese workers, not everyone is in complete 
agreement about the goals of collective 
bargaining or the forms that it should take. 
Some advocate for it to contain labour 
conflicts, others see it as a convenient tool to 
resolve labour disputes, while some hope to 
empower workers. In other words, collective 
bargaining has always been a contested idea, 
but differences have generally not been 
publicly voiced for strategic reasons. Herein 
lies the continual appeal of this strategy 
in debates on Chinese labour over the last 
decade, whether they are among workers, 
scholars, policy-makers, or activists. In 
this sense, the replacement of collective 
bargaining as a legitimate goal may strip the 
movement of one of the few unifying forces. 
Would UBI be able to play a similar or even 
more strategically sound role? What may be 
gained or lost by mobilising around UBI as 
the goal? To respond to these questions, I 
compare the two strategies with regard to a 
number of crucial aspects. 
Workers 
(Dis)Empowerment 
How to build workers’ power should be 
at the heart of any strategic consideration. 
Is collective bargaining furthering this 
goal? Scholars have identified two forms 
of collective bargaining: ‘collective 
bargaining by riot’ and ‘Party-state-led wage 
bargaining’ (Chan and Hui 2014). These two 
strategies have divergent goals: the former 
emerges only after workers stage collective 
actions and demand direct negotiation 
with management, and it thus contributes 
to building workers’ collective power, 
confidence, and capacity; the latter is an 
effort led by the Party-state to pre-emptively 
institutionalise wage bargaining, primarily 
aimed at containing labour conflict. While 
‘Party-state-led wage bargaining’ seems 
reactive at best, and its institutionalisation 
is rarely successful, ‘collective bargaining 
by riot’, beyond the immediate goal of 
resolving workers’ grievances, is a critical 
practice of workers’ self-organisation and 
self-governance. 
In contrast, the ability of UBI to build 
workers’ power is less direct. As Friedman 
argues, it may require labour unrest leading 
to ungovernability to bring forward UBI 
as a political compromise, but this does 
not necessarily presuppose worker self-
organisation and self-governance, nor does 
it present obvious opportunities to exercise 
collective power. There is no doubt that 
UBI, if designed and administered well, will 
provide employees with economic security 
and more bargaining power to negotiate 
working conditions, as well as with increased 
freedom and capacity to pursue other social 
and political goals outside employment. 
However, such security and freedom will 
still be threatened by the thorny issues of 
freedom of association and assembly, things 
that will not necessarily be brought forward 
by UBI. In fact, it is not impossible that UBI 
may actually preclude these possibilities. 
In terms of empowering workers, collective 
bargaining seems to hold an advantage over 
UBI.
Sources of Support
Any goal, if it is to be accepted by the 
movement, will firstly need to be discussed, 
understood, and broadly supported. 
Collective bargaining was able to gain 
acceptance for a number of reasons. First, 
collective bargaining, in the simplest form of 
negotiating with employers, is often a logical 
demand of workers in collective disputes; 
second, it is seen as an inevitable component 
in the mature industrial relations system 
toward which China should be moving; and 
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finally, it is broad and ambiguous enough as 
a concept and practice to attract the interest 
of different constituencies. However, as 
Friedman has described in his essay, belief 
in the adequacy and plausibility of collective 
bargaining has perceptively declined in 
China. At the same time, due to the lack of 
better alternatives, it has been difficult to 
register opposition to it.
In comparison, UBI, while gaining 
momentum globally, is little known and 
discussed in China. Whereas collective 
bargaining has a long history—both 
positive and negative—in industrialised and 
industrialising countries, UBI does not have 
a lot of historical precedents, nor current 
instances of successful adoption beyond 
early local-level experimentations. A recent 
article looking for any UBI-type programme 
in China, cites the example of the minimum 
income guarantee (dibao) (Green 2017). 
Dibao is a welfare scheme that is extremely 
selective in the target population of disabled 
and elderly people, and which provides only 
a very modest income supplement. It is 
unlikely to be expanded in the near future, 
nor, given these limitations, is it likely to 
serve as a good model for UBI. Proponents 
of UBI may thus have to look for inspiration 
elsewhere. This uncertainty over what form 
a Chinese UBI could take, and what the 
effects and consequences would be, present 
a large hurdle for its advocates. 
However, while China’s social welfare 
system is fragmented and unevenly enforced 
(Carrillo 2017), there has been impetus in 
the last decade and a half to improve and 
expand welfare, in contrast to decades of 
cuts and ideological assault in the West. 
For this reason, an extension of the current 
system to include UBI may encounter less 
resistance in China, and could, in fact, even 
galvanise a movement behind it. However, 
while China should still be able to provide 
a fiscal basis for expanded social welfare—
despite its slowing economy—even a small 
amount per person would be a gigantic 
undertaking for the government, with any 
future debt-crises risking to undermining 
the UBI project altogether. Furthermore, the 
country currently has a low unemployment 
rate and wages have been growing, albeit 
more slowly than in the last decade. Lack 
of employment, which prompts a lot of the 
debate on UBI, is thus arguably not the most 
urgent issue for workers.
Building Momentum
Finally, where would the momentum come 
from? The practice of collective bargaining 
takes place at the workplace, and its 
momentum stems from workers’ collective 
actions within the factories, where the 
pressure is most direct and concentrated. 
Here, workers have the capacity to play a 
direct role in shaping the bargaining process, 
even though the pressure from management 
is enormous. This bottom-up drive is the 
most important reason that ensures the 
legitimacy and longevity of collective 
bargaining as a movement goal. But today, as 
Friedman observes, such momentum seems 
to be slowing down. The manufacturing 
industry is offering less space for industrial 
workers to negotiate wages, and we often see 
workers simply demanding severance pay 
due to factory closure or relocation, without 
getting a chance to negotiate for better 
salaries or labour conditions. The political 
tightening over civil society organisations, 
lawyers, individual labour activists 
(Franceschini 2017b), and even people who 
were merely documenting protests (Ramzy 
2017), constrains the transfer of experience 
and knowledge, undermining the very 
foundation of the support for collective 
bargaining. 
In comparison, UBI is a policy instrument 
that is designed by and negotiated at the 
highest echelons of the Party-state, where 
workers cannot exercise direct power or 
influence. In the past, the ACFTU might have 
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played a role in lobbying for the protective 
Labour Contract Law, and it is still possible 
that under the right circumstances it may 
choose to advocate for better welfare 
policies or even UBI. In these scenarios, 
would workers be able to have any say in a 
UBI initiative, or would they have to rely 
on the official union or other bureaucratic 
actors? Moreover, we are no longer simply 
talking about migrant workers in industrial 
workplaces: UBI will and must necessarily 
be a national debate, encompassing broad 
sections of the population, across sectors, 
regions, and employment categories. It may 
take a social movement broader than only 
workers to advocate for UBI, the building of 
which is a task as exciting as it is challenging.
A Golden Age Remnant
Where does this leave us? Faith in 
collective bargaining is evidently in crisis. 
Enterprise bargaining, if it happens at all, 
is rarely sustained over time. Any attempt 
to move beyond enterprise bargaining, 
toward sectoral or regional wage setting 
and bargaining, has not seen much success 
besides in a few celebrated cases—for 
example in Zhejiang province (Friedman 
2014). Recently, there also has been a 
more radical rethinking of working-
class formation in Asia (Chang 2015). 
It may be argued that the kind of trade 
union movement under which collective 
bargaining is institutionalised is unique 
to the golden age of post-war capitalism 
in the early-industrialised countries. At a 
time when trade unionism and collective 
bargaining have been in serious decline 
for decades in the West, it is reasonable to 
reconsider this strategy.
Still, collective bargaining remains 
relevant. For the foreseeable future, 
industrial workers in China will surely 
continue to demand to bargain collectively 
with management, whatever form these 
negotiations may take. While it should not 
be the only goal, it should still serve as a 
legitimate instrument in industrial relations, 
particularly in order to build collective 
capacity. There is also a distinct possibility 
that interest in collective bargaining will be 
rekindled, with the issue returning to the 
political agenda, in the event of a successful 
bargaining after an unexpected, socially 
significant strike—and almost all prominent 
strikes of the last decade in China have been 
unexpected. 
However, the limit of enterprise bargaining 
is clear, and at best this should only be 
an intermediary goal. It may be useful to 
revisit sectoral and industry-wide collective 
bargaining as an alternative, or as the next 
step in a wider collective action strategy. Or, 
it may be strategic as a movement to combine 
such goals with advocacy for specific 
legal changes, such as strengthening anti-
retaliation measures to protect workers who 
complain about illegal working conditions, 
or imposing criminal sanctions and personal 
liability for employers (Halegua 2017). No 
single goal is likely to be sufficient, nor is it 
likely to gain the approval of all participants 
in the movement. In fact, collective 
bargaining, UBI, and the other approaches 
outlined here may well be complementary 
to one another. At the current impasse, 
critical engagement with a range of goals 
and strategies will better inform the labour 
movement’s strategies, providing it with 
coherence and direction.
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In August 2017, activist Lu Yuyu was 
sentenced by the Dali City People’s Court 
to four years in prison for ‘picking quarrels 
and stirring up trouble’ (xunxin zishi zui). 
Together with his partner Li Tingyu, who 
was detained but then eventually released, 
Lu had collected information on thousands 
of ‘mass incidents’ (qunti shijian). These 
incidents encompassed a broad range of 
Chinese contentious politics, from pitched 
battles between farmers and thugs hired 
by development companies, to taxi drivers 
parking en masse along roadways in protest 
against high fuel prices; and from migrant 
workers threatening to jump from bridges, 
to retirees gathering to condemn pollution. 
Li and Lu posted the information they 
gathered on social media and blogs under 
the name Wickedonna (also known as 
feixinwen, non-news). Their reports usually 
took the form of short, two- or three-
sentence descriptions of confrontations, 
paired with photos or videos. But the 
activists also calculated monthly and yearly 
totals of periods of unrest, accompanied by 
brief analyses. 
It is impossible to know what, exactly, 
triggered the initial detention of the pair 
in June 2016. Drawing data of this sort 
together in one place was clearly unsettling 
for authorities. But what exactly was so 
troubling about it? One possibility is that 
making individual stories of conflict so 
accessible was dangerous. The activist 
Huang Qi was detained half a year earlier 
because of his work curating similar tales 
on his website 64 Tianwang. Most likely, 
though, the sheer number of incidents Lu 
and Li recorded undercut government 
narratives related to the creation of a 
‘harmonious society’ (hexie shehui) and 
bringing about the ‘great revival of the 
Chinese people’ (zhonghua minzu de weida 
fuxing). After all, the government itself used 
to sporadically make public annual incident 
counts, but it stopped doing so in 2005, 
Manfred Elfstrom
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Chinese labour. This essay explores the power 
and limitations of such efforts, detailing the 
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how we collect such data and the questions we 
ask of it.
Counting 
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Mesmerised by Numbers
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presumably because the numbers conveyed 
a negative impression of where the country 
was headed. 
Wickedonna represented a particularly 
dedicated and courageous effort at counting 
Chinese unrest. However, a growing number 
of academics and activists have launched 
similar projects—albeit mostly from the 
safety of universities and non-governmental 
organisations located outside the mainland. 
These projects include an extensive dataset 
covering all types of disturbances put 
together by Chen Chih-Jou of the Academia 
Sinica (2009); my Ash Center colleague 
Li Yao’s dataset of all the mass incidents 
reported in Boxun between 2001 and 2012 
(2017); the ‘China Environmental Protests 
& Accidents’ map covering 2005 to present 
( h t t p s ://c h i n a e nv i ro n m e n t .c rowd m a p.
com); China Labour Bulletin’s (CLB) 
strike map of workplace unrest from mid-
2011 to present (http://maps.clb.org.hk/
strikes/en); my own China Strikes dataset 
covering the Hu–Wen decade (https://
chinastrikes.crowdmap.com); and the 
Global Labour Conflicts collection hosted 
by the International Institute of Social 
History in the Netherlands, which combines 
the maps from CLB and myself for its China 
section (https://datasets.socialhistory.org/
dataverse/labourconflicts). 
In this essay, I will explore the power and 
limits of such efforts with regard to Chinese 
labour issues. I will begin by contrasting 
the practices of digging deep (qualitative 
research) versus counting (quantitative 
research), and posit that both have their 
virtues. Then, I will detail the inevitable 
data problems involved in any quantitative 
approach to documenting protest in China, 
while arguing that these problems, although 
serious, should not deter researchers. 
Finally, I will examine the ethics involved in 
how we collect such data and the questions 
we ask of it.
Digging Deep versus Counting
Research about Chinese labour politics 
to date has tended to involve in-depth 
fieldwork (digging deep). Scholars have 
worked on production lines themselves or 
interviewed strikers in cafes outside factory 
gates. They have also put in less adventurous, 
but sometimes equally demanding, time 
navigating the Chinese bureaucracy to 
buttonhole labour officials and trade union 
leaders. This is as it should be. To a certain 
extent, you have to physically be ‘there’ to 
‘get it’. There are also good reasons to be 
suspicious of statistics in labour studies. 
Quantitative data introduces the temptation, 
often subconsciously, to begin to make 
the sorts of assumptions about rational 
individuals and limited options that have 
led mainstream economics astray. Numbers, 
moreover, necessarily omit the voices of 
workers themselves. No econometric take on 
the industrial revolution, for example, will 
ever have the humanity of E.P. Thompson’s 
exploration of the many forces that ‘made’ 
the English working class (1966). And most 
basically, with regard to China in particular, 
reliable quantitative data is simply not 
available for many aspects of the country’s 
economy and society. 
Nevertheless, counting unrest, where it 
is possible, serves at least two important 
purposes. First and most importantly, it can 
give us a sense of the general trends that 
underlie individual cases and how those 
trends interact—an imperfect sense to be 
sure, but a sense all the same. While a close 
analysis of a single strike at a single factory 
can challenge our ideas of how things ‘work’ 
in China and provide us with important 
clues as to the mechanisms of change at the 
grassroots level, we should not use a single 
case—or five or ten or twenty cases—to make 
claims about how most conflicts play out. 
Labour scholars generally include in their 
qualitative work various asides about limited 
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external validity, but they nonetheless too 
often leave the distinct impression that they 
are really talking about where China as a 
whole is headed, caveats notwithstanding. 
You simply cannot do this with a country so 
big and complex. 
Second, and this is maybe not so obvious, 
the process of counting itself is illuminating. 
Reading strike report after strike report can 
help you develop a rough sense of what the 
norms are for conflicts, something which 
is hard to come by if you are not yourself 
involved in activism on the ground. At the 
very least, you develop a feel for the norms 
of reporting a conflict. Thus, for example, 
I have noticed that coverage of public 
bus strikes in Chinese state media tends 
to take the following form: ‘Today, many 
people waited for their buses for hours but 
none came. This reporter went to the bus 
station to investigate. Drivers were standing 
around. They had several important 
complaints. When asked about the issue, the 
transportation bureau said that they were 
putting together a team to investigate….’ 
Then, when you read something that 
deviates from the expected story arc, it 
makes you take notice. You know that it is an 
outlier—and you wonder what has changed.
Counting contention has yielded useful 
findings in other labour contexts. For 
example, sociologist Beverly Silver’s 
Forces of Labor (2003), which describes 
how worker militancy chases particular 
industries around the globe, continues to 
be a touchstone for many scholars (and 
has been translated into Chinese, winning 
it a new circle of readers there). Edward 
Shorter and Charles Tilly’s examination of 
the size and frequency of strikes in France 
from approximately the mid-nineteenth to 
mid-twentieth centuries draws together 
national politics and shop floor dynamics 
in an illuminating manner (1971). Graeme 
Robertson’s study of Russian labour protests 
under Yeltsin and Putin similarly documents 
fascinating interactions between workers 
and elite actors in a hybrid regime (2010). 
Works like these do not rely on perfect data 
(Silver’s World Labor Group dataset uses 
articles from The New York Times and The 
Times of London to cover unrest the world 
over), but they are nonetheless revealing. 
There is no reason this work should not 
be extended to the world’s second largest 
economy and largest working class. However, 
any quantitative approach to China must be 
balanced by extra close attention to the data 
problems and ethical issues involved in how 
we go about gathering and using numbers. I 
turn to these next. 
Data Problems
If we are to begin counting, we must address 
the problems with the data available to us 
upfront. The most obvious problem is with 
totals. Everyone naturally wants to know 
how often, and in what numbers, workers are 
protesting in China. However, it is unlikely 
that any individual or institution actually 
has this information—not even the Chinese 
government. CLB has tried to be clear that 
their strike map likely only represents 
a small sample of the full ‘population’ 
of unrest occurring. Nonetheless, media 
outlets have repeatedly treated the CLB map 
as a more or less accurate measure of year-
to-year changes in contention. This problem 
has sometimes extended to scholars. At one 
point in a thought-provoking 2016 article 
in the Journal of Asian Studies, Ching Kwan 
Lee contrasts CLB figures with numbers she 
obtained from the Shenzhen City Labour 
Bureau and Ministry of Public Security in 
the 1990s and early 2000s, concluding that 
‘the current period is actually witnessing 
a decline, not a rise, in strikes’ (Lee 2016, 
325). But surely the government sources Lee 
cites, while themselves imperfect, convey a 
more complete picture than CLB. Although 
her broader point stands—there was a lot 
of protest before, too, and academics are 
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overstating today’s conflict—the precise 
comparison made is thus inappropriate.  
Other problems relate to more subtle 
issues of bias. Although a surprising amount 
of information is reported from poorer and 
more remote parts of the country, more 
data will always be available for a place 
like Guangdong than Gansu. Guangdong, in 
particular, is home to a relatively open press 
(especially the Southern Media Group), 
scores of bloggers and social media gadflies, 
and foreign journalists—and it abuts Hong 
Kong. Whether the imbalance in reports 
from different places is wildly out of sync 
with the imbalance in actual instances of 
unrest is a question that is important but 
almost impossible to answer. There are 
also biases in terms of sources. Dissident 
media outlets are unsurprisingly better at 
documenting violence against workers by 
police or thugs, whereas state media makes 
sure to always describe the steps taken by 
officials to resolve a dispute. There may 
also be biases that manifest themselves over 
time, as censorship tightens and slackens, 
and news cycles come and go. Statistically, 
these issues can be dealt with by using only 
one source for all reports (so that the biases 
are predictable), by including fixed effects, 
by zeroing in on dynamics in a particular 
region, or by seeing what happens when 
all observations with more than a certain 
number of incidents are dropped (to ensure 
that the story is not just related to one of the 
hotspots). The main thing, though, is to be 
honest about the data’s limitations. 
The Questions We Ask
Not all the dangers of counting relate to 
issues of samples versus totals or bias in terms 
of sources or cycles of reporting. We should 
also consider the real-world impact of what 
we are trying to learn with quantitative data. 
As with qualitative research, sometimes the 
easiest questions to answer are not the ones 
that matter most. Moreover, focussing on 
certain issues over others means serving 
certain interests over others. Traditional 
studies of strikes by labour economists have 
focussed on the number of incidents, number 
of participants, or the number of workdays 
lost. These figures are tracked by many 
governments (although not China’s) and 
obviously have a big impact on an economy. 
But why not put more energy into rigorously 
documenting the different types of worker 
claims made (Franzosi 1989)? Claims 
may matter more to discussions of class 
consciousness. When you have thousands 
of ‘dots’ representing disputes marked on a 
map—the default of software programs like 
the one I use for my China Strikes map—it is 
natural to wonder why they cluster in some 
places and not in others. However, workers 
and their allies may not need lessons about 
what causes mobilisation. Instead, they 
may be more interested in its consequences: 
which tactics are effective and which are 
not, where in the country breakthroughs are 
possible, etc. In contrast, state authorities 
and businesses have an intense interest 
in understanding the roots of contention: 
they just want to stop protests! As has been 
well-documented in the media, big data is 
now being harnessed to track individuals 
and groups in China in disturbing ways, 
such as via the country’s proposed new 
social credit system. The American military, 
meanwhile, is devoting substantial sums to 
predicting social upheavals with its Minerva 
grants. The protest maps assembled by 
labour researchers are unlikely to be as 
comprehensive as these projects and so 
should not raise the same level of concern. 
But research can always be turned to multiple 
purposes. It is important for scholars to 
ponder what purposes their research most 
easily serves. This sort of awareness is the 
least we owe people like Lu Yuyu and Li 
Tingyu who have sacrificed their freedom to 
document what is happening. 
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In Chinese society today, migrant workers 
are commonly perceived as criminals. This 
can be clearly seen in various mechanisms of 
the crime control regime, with the migrant 
population being stopped and searched 
more frequently than local populations, and 
experiencing a disproportionately high rate 
of police arrests and pre-trial incarceration. 
Migrants are also more likely to receive 
longer sentences, to be denied parole and 
probation, and to receive discriminatory 
treatment in the correctional system.
To address existing biases in the arrest 
rate of migrant suspects, between 2011 and 
2015 more than twenty first-tier cities in 
China initiated legal reforms. Still, when I 
was doing fieldwork in major cities in the 
Yangtze River Delta back in 2015, prosecutors 
explicitly acknowledged that in their daily 
work they simply followed the principle 
of ‘arresting all’ (yilü shiyong jiyaxing 
qiangzhi cuoshi) when it came to migrant 
Ma Tian
In today’s China, migrant workers are 
commonly perceived as criminals. This 
essay examines how this bias is reflected in 
mechanisms of crime control, as well as in 
the judicial and correctional systems. It also 
looks into the strategies adopted by migrants 
to cope with this kind of discrimination by the 
law enforcement bodies. 
Migrants, Mass 
Arrest, and 
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Contemporary 
China
68 MADE IN CHINA - BALANCING ACTS
Prison. Photo: Yi Cheng Sun, Flickr.
suspects. In their opinion, the reforms 
were ‘totally infeasible, contradictory, and 
utterly ridiculous.’ Similarly, policemen I 
interviewed in Ningbo during that period 
affirmed that they had never even heard 
of the new legislation. Apparently, the 
ambitious reform programme outlined in 
official legal documents had essentially come 
to naught. This failed reform highlights how 
hukou status still plays a fundamental role 
in determining how the police and judicial 
bodies in China deal with different types of 
suspects.
Hukou Disparity in Arrest 
Decisions
It is a fact that prosecutors in China are 
more prone to issue or approve an arrest 
warrant for migrant suspects. For instance, 
according to internal documents of the 
local Procuratorate, in Ningbo in 2010, the 
arrest rate for the migrant population was 
368 arrests per 100,000 people—7.36 times 
higher than the rate for local residents. 
In light of this, the police find it easier to 
target migrants, as their arrest is more likely 
to be officially sanctioned. This dynamic of 
mutual reinforcement not only engenders 
discrimination against migrants, but also 
leads to a disproportionate arrest rate 
within this social group—in fact, we can talk 
about this phenomenon as being a form of 
‘mass arrest’.
Far from being simply the result of the 
personal preferences of individual police 
officers, this bias has been systematised, 
rationalised, and legalised. Article 5.6 of the 
Quality Standards for the Examination of 
Arrest Requests by People’s Procuraturates 
provides specific procedural instructions to 
legal professionals, mandating that if ‘the 
criminal suspect has no fixed residence, 
or commits crimes from place to place or 
in different places, and does not possess 
the conditions for bail or residential 
confinement’, he shall be arrested (Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate 2010). One of my 
interviewees, a prosecutor from a district 
procuraturate in Shanghai, confirmed that 
it was this link between the absence of a 
‘fixed residence’ to a ‘non-local hukou’ that 
resulted in the establishment of standardised 
arrest guidelines in China. In this way, the 
creation of a causal link between migration 
and criminality has resulted in a major 
bias in the approval rate of arrest warrants 
targeting migrants. 
Besides being legalised and 
institutionalised, this logic is also enshrined 
in routine everyday practice. Migrants are 
discursively equated with crime, and thus 
with instability and danger. Given the risk 
that migrants could ‘run away’, positive 
arrest decisions targeting this kind of 
suspect are justified as essential to ensure 
the defendant’s return for subsequent 
proceedings. However, this apparent 
necessity is, in actuality, based on an illogical 
assumption formalised through the law.
Coping with Police 
Discrimination
My research shows that the benefits of the 
judicial reforms of the early 2010s have not 
trickled down to migrants. When suspected 
of a crime, they still found themselves 
stuck in the Kafkaesque position of being 
subject to relentless interrogations and 
arrests due to their hukou status rather 
than actual misbehaviour. In such recurring 
circumstances, migrants have no choice but 
to cope with the police strategically. 
Article 10 of the Regulations on Detention 
Centres of the People’s Republic of China 
(State Council 1990) stipulates that criminals 
have to go through a health check prior to 
detention, and lists three medical conditions 
under which they cannot be detained: a) 
Mental illness or acute infectious disease; 
b) Other serious illnesses that may be life-
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threatening while in custody or for which 
they can not take care of themselves (this 
does not apply to those who are extremely 
dangerous to society); and c) Pregnancy 
or breastfeeding of children less than one 
year old. Taking advantage of these legal 
guarantees, many migrants attempt to place 
themselves into these scenarios in order 
to evade arrest and detention. The most 
common coping strategies include putting 
oneself in a life-threatening situation for 
male migrants (Li 2016), and pregnancy or 
simply cuddling a baby for female migrants.
In my interviews, the police continually 
complained about how ‘crafty’ (jiaohua) 
migrant suspects are nowadays. They vividly 
described their encounters with migrants 
who, in order to avoid arrest, swallowed 
blades, coins, keys, zips, screws, nails, nail 
clippers, and even saws. These occurrences 
were regarded as complicated and difficult 
to resolve. A policeman told me a story 
about a migrant ‘thief ’ who used to carry 
nails with him at all times. ‘After we caught 
him, he swallowed the nails instantly. The 
detention centre (kanshousuo) carries out 
X-ray checks for all incoming detainees 
before taking them into custody. If they 
see things like these in their stomach, 
they will not accept them.’ Under these 
circumstances, he continued, ‘We had to let 
him go… After being released, he continued 
to steal. Then he went through prosecution 
and trial. Although the court sentenced him 
to prison, the jail still did not want to take 
him. What can we do? He continues to steal, 
but our hands are tied. There is nothing we 
can do.’ 
This process of ‘othering’ was repeated 
in encounters between the police and 
suspects, enhancing the discursive framing 
of migrants as having violent and irrational 
tendencies. In some cases, this discourse 
overlaps with other narratives and concerns 
related to specific ethnic minorities. For 
instance, Muslims from Xinjiang are often 
marked out for their ‘savageness and 
aggression’. As one police officer told me: 
‘We caught several people from Xinjiang. 
Once he put some blades into his mouth, and 
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then chewed the blades. Lots of bloods came 
out of his mouth, I was frightened to death, 
we just let him go.’ 
Female migrants often use motherhood 
to avoid arrest. In his master’s dissertation, 
Li Weiming (2013) found that in Shanghai 
numerous organised crime groups from 
Hunan province recruit women who are 
pregnant or have a small baby. A woman 
told Li how she came to join the group: ‘My 
townsfolk told me that nowadays pregnant 
women are all doing this. They said: “You 
are pregnant. What a pity if you don’t do 
this!”’ Sometimes, women have abortions 
after months of pregnancy, and then get 
pregnant again just to stay out of jail.  
Blurred Morality and 
Resistance
This essay certainly does not intend 
to glorify migrant coping strategies, or 
suggest that migrant suspects are activists 
leading a non-violent life in a context of 
apartheid. However, their actions cannot 
only be understood as a devious way to avoid 
criminal charges. From feigning illness to 
skipping a class, to soldiers deliberately 
harming themselves in order to escape the 
war; from espionage agents taking a cyanide 
pill to avoid torture, to people grabbing a 
baby at the very last minute to gain a seat 
on a lifeboat, it is never easy to distinguish 
between courageous acts and irresponsible 
cowardice. These examples all demonstrate 
that resistance is a complex set of actions 
that go against an established order. In other 
words, resistance—or the act of saying no—
is, by its very nature, contentious.
Facing the real possibility of arrest and 
pre-trial incarceration, migrant suspects 
look for alternatives for self-redemption. 
There are two layers of ‘resistance’ in the 
coping strategies outlined in this essay. 
The first layer lies within the offender’s 
noncompliant behaviours during his or her 
interactions with the police. In this case, 
rather than being verbally or physically 
aggressive, the resistance is actually non-
violent. It is a tangible, subtle, even silent 
act. The second layer resonates with the 
idea of resistance or rebellion in cultural 
criminology. As Jock Young pointed out in 
The Criminological Imagination, ‘resistance 
is always there’ (2007, 77). Self-harm and 
pregnancy should also be seen as ‘forms of 
resistance’ against discriminative policing. 
At a disadvantage in the criminal justice 
system, migrant suspects change their own 
bodies to resist the asymmetrical power 
relationships between themselves and those 
administering ‘justice’. For these subversive 
migrants, nails in the stomach and foetuses 
in the womb become a type of protection 
from discriminatory incarceration. 
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Chinese Labour in 
Global Perspective
Zheng Yu 
Chris Smith
As the scale and scope of Chinese investment in 
Europe increases, it is important to understand how 
Chinese multinational corporations organise their 
workplaces on the continent, and what this entails 
for their workforce. This essay examines three key 
issues: the level of Chinese investment in comparison 
to investment from other countries; the extent to 
which employment models developed in China are 
transferable to European workplaces; and whether 
or not Chinese firms prefer using home practices to 
manage their workforce in Europe.
Chinese 
Multinational 
Corporations in 
Europe 
Racing to the Bottom?
The arrival of Chinese firms in Europe has 
elicited both excitement and anxiety. New 
investors with funding from the Chinese 
state present a challenge to an open market 
in crisis and to Europe’s faltering welfare 
capitalism model. A typical narrative depicts 
Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) 
as exploiting institutional loopholes, and 
undermining local laws, regulations, and 
norms. In terms of employment relations, a 
widespread concern is that labour standards 
may be lowered by those Chinese MNCs that 
break rules on working hours and health and 
safety; use coercive forms of labour control, 
including withholding wages to inhibit 
mobility, and taking deposits to control 
migrant workers; ignore or suppress trade 
unions; and pay wages below subsistence 
levels, including through the employment 
of prison labour on construction and civil 
engineering projects. A further concern 
is that employment practices adopted by 
Chinese firms will influence the way that 
non-Chinese MNCs and local firms manage 
their workforce, with the fear that Europe 
will see a deterioration in working conditions 
across the board. However, despite such 
negative speculation, we actually know very 
little about what it is like to work in Chinese 
MNCs. As the scale and scope of Chinese 
investment increases, we need to better 
understand how Chinese MNCs organise 
their workplaces in Europe, and what this 
means for labour on the continent. 
To avoid an over-simplistic reading of 
the impact of Chinese investment on work 
and employment in Europe, this essay will 
examine three key questions. First, we 
ask how influential Chinese investment is 
in comparison to investment from other 
countries. Focussing on this question 
allows us to evaluate the ability of firms 
to introduce employment practices from 
their home country to the host society. 
Second, we ask to what extent employment 
models developed in China are transferable 
to the European workplaces. Addressing 
Spiral staircase. Photo: pxhere.com.
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this question will help determine the 
appropriate methods for studying Chinese 
firms overseas. Third, we question whether 
Chinese firms prefer using home practices 
to manage their workforce in Europe. 
Exploring this final issue prompts us to 
consider the various options Chinese firms 
have when it comes to deciding employment 
practices to be adopted in foreign countries. 
Debating Foreign Direct 
Investment
The debates on how foreign direct 
investment (FDI) may reshape employment 
relations in Europe are nothing new. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, there were similar 
speculations over the ‘Americanisation’ 
of European businesses. Likewise, in the 
1980s and early 1990s, when Japanese firms 
challenged American firms in becoming 
the main source of FDI, there was intense 
discussion about the ‘Japanisation’ of the 
manufacturing industry in Europe. In 
both previous waves of FDI, the perceived 
transformation of employment relations 
was at heart of the debates. Although there 
were criticisms of the intensification of 
work pressure, there was also a sense that 
European companies needed to learn from 
the much more celebrated employment 
models that contributed to the American 
and Japanese companies’ success overseas. 
Compared to American and Japanese 
companies, Chinese firms have never been the 
single dominant force of capital expansion. 
According to data by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 
the total stock of Chinese outward foreign 
direct Investment (OFDI) accounts for just 
4.9 percent of the worldwide OFDI stock 
and one fifth of American OFDI stock by end 
of 2016. It is true that the scale of Chinese 
investment overseas has grown rapidly in 
the past ten years, at an average rate of 40 
percent, and that the outward flow of FDI 
from China as a proportion of the total 
OFDI flow worldwide has expanded at a 
steady pace (see Figure 1). Together with 
American OFDI (light blue line) and the 
Japanese OFDI (green line), Chinese OFDI 
(dark blue line) has become one of the major 
sources of capital flow worldwide. Within 
the European Union’s (EU) twenty-eight 
countries, however, China accounted for 
just over 2 percent of the FDI inflow in 2015 
and 1 percent of total FDI stock by the end 
of 2015 (see Figure 2). Given that the scale 
of Chinese investment in Europe remains 
* The calculation German OFDI before 
1990 was based on data from the 
Federal Republic of Germany
** The figure for 2016 is end of year data 
rather than the three-year average 
Figure 1 
Country-based OFDI as a Percentage of World Total OFDI  (flow, three-year average)
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD’s statistical data on global outward FDI.
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relatively small, we would expect Chinese 
firms to exercise control and influence over 
employment practices at workplace level, 
rather than having large scale impact on 
employment relations at national or cross-
national level.    
Differentiated Foreign 
Employment Practices
It must be assumed that any new 
employment practices introduced by 
Chinese firms will be contested by local 
workers and their representatives by 
referring to the local ‘norms’ of employment 
relations (Kostova 1999). Moreover, given 
that China is a less advanced economy with 
a smaller collective force of investors in 
Europe, employment practices exercised 
by rival MNCs from other countries may 
be used by Chinese firms as key references 
to effectively manage the local workforce. 
Therefore, studying the impact of 
Chinese investment on local employment 
relations will need to take into account the 
application of established practices, as well 
as experimentation with emergent practices 
in the new regional spaces of differentiated 
European labour markets. 
This prompts the question of whether there 
is a set of Chinese indigenous employment 
practices that could potentially be used as 
a model for Chinese MNCs moving into the 
European market for the first time. China’s 
move from a socialist to a capitalist state 
has passed through several experimental 
stages, and has embraced a number of 
developmental models. As a result, there are 
significant differences in the way Chinese 
firms manage their workforce. Many state-
owned companies have maintained some 
legacy of the old Chinese socialist personnel 
system, which means that the terms of 
employment are based on a mixture of 
permanent, contractual, and ad hoc labour 
relations. Private companies and foreign 
investment companies have developed 
their employment practices in response 
to transitions in labour markets. For this 
reason, employment practices of Chinese 
MNCs are typically fragmented, adopting 
Figure 2 
Top Ten Countries as Source of FDI into the EU (flow, three-year average)
Source: Compiled from 
Eurostat’s data on FDI in 
Europe.
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elements of modern human resource 
management, continued paternalism, and 
coercive labour control. 
In addition to ownership-based 
differences, geographical differences in 
labour market conditions have facilitated 
sub-national employment models to 
emerge (Peck and Zhang 2013). For 
example, the ‘Guangdong model’ is based 
on manufacturing contractors employing 
mainly migrant workers and supplying 
owners of international brands. Firms 
adopting this model engage in OFDI by 
acquiring supplier or client firms in the 
global production network. In contrast, 
the ‘Wenzhou model’ has relied on small 
family ties and personal networks to 
generate growth and to accumulate funds 
for investing overseas. We cannot really say 
that there is a single or dominant model that 
has been adopted by Chinese MNCs abroad. 
For this reason, a firm-focussed approach 
is more likely to offer insights on why 
certain employment practices were adopted, 
modified, or abandoned.   
The Myth of National 
Models
Whenever a new player enters the 
international space we should avoid 
overemphasising the employment models 
employed by their compatriots and instead 
focus more on the choices made by the 
individual firms themselves. Among Chinese 
firms in Europe, we can see that certain firms 
may be in favour of adopting some of their 
home practices especially those firms that 
are under wage, labour supply, or consumer 
market pressures in China. However, 
it is also true that some Chinese firms’ 
internationalisation is of a more hybrid 
nature, aiming to perpetuate employment 
practices which prevail in China, as well 
as replicating ‘successful’ experiences of 
other firms in the new host territory. In 
particular, when firms are able to secure 
continued access to a pool of inexpensive 
and well-trained Chinese workers, they 
can bring much of their workforce overseas 
through an intra-firm transfer system 
allowed by some European countries’ 
immigration policy. For instance, Huawei, 
a major Chinese telecommunications firm 
and a forerunner in terms of investment 
in Europe, demonstrates the benefits of 
sourcing a young labour force from China. 
Controlled by a performance reward system 
administrated and remunerated by the 
parent firm, the workforce is hardworking, 
motivated, and efficient (Lai 2016). 
However, firms like Huawei are 
exceptional cases, and employing a 
Chinese workforce in Europe may be a 
temporary phase. Changes in labour costs, 
productivity, and other labour market 
conditions in the future will undoubtedly 
trigger reassessment of such employment 
practices. Additionally, pressure from local 
trade unions, the media, and the general 
public has the ability to force Chinese firms 
to rethink their employment policies and 
assess the possibility of targeting alternative 
sources of labour. 
New entrants into a country can also 
operate in a space where employment 
practices can be implemented with less 
local pressure. This is particularly true 
in some special economic zones, where 
exceptions are given by the host country 
as an incentive to attract foreign investors. 
However, employment terms may or may not 
be included in such exceptions and can be 
subject to change, requiring firms to search 
for viable alternatives to the practices they 
are used to. This point can be illustrated 
by the case of China Shipping Group’s 
investment in upgrading two container 
terminals in the Greek port of Piraeus 
(Zheng and Smith 2017). At the beginning 
of the rebuilding project, the firm recruited 
Chinese construction workers. However, the 
local dockworkers union organised several 
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rounds of strikes, demanding the termination 
of any hiring practices that denied local 
workers’ access to work (Reuters 2016). In 
response, the firm withdrew the majority 
of Chinese workers, replacing them not 
with local Greek workers, but instead with 
migrant workers from within the EU hired 
through employment agencies. The aim 
was to maintain a flexible supply of labour 
and to exclude local union members from 
the workforce. This example points to the 
fact that on-going industrial conflict might 
lead to further changes in employment 
practices. Firms operating in a space 
created outside local norms can change 
the ‘rules of the game’ and their ability to 
transcend such norms cannot be overstated. 
In regional labour markets, targeting EU 
migrant workers is a common practice of 
firms in sectors characterised by intense 
cost competition—such as construction, 
logistics, and services. 
It is also possible that some Chinese firms 
invest in Europe in an attempt to move 
away from home-country practices and 
thus develop new ways of working in host 
societies. Especially in more developed 
economies, the incentives for investment 
from Chinese MNCs are often linked to 
upgrading technological and management 
capabilities, seeking novelty in products 
and services, and improving the way work 
is organised. Because of this, they try to 
maintain subsidiary autonomy and some 
stability by focussing on organisation, 
development, and learning. This trend is 
reflected in the composition of Chinese 
MNC investments in Europe, with merger 
and acquisition (M&A) having become in 
recent years a major mode of Chinese MNCs 
entering Europe (see Figure 3 below). 
For instance, Volvo Cars, a Swedish 
automobile manufacturer acquired by Geely, 
is one of the cases where most existing 
employment practices have been maintained 
as the Chinese acquirer attempts to improve 
Figure 3 
Entry Modes of Chinese Investment in the EU
Source: Dreger, Schüler-Zhou, and Schüller, 2017.
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their market position, productivity, and 
management know-how by learning from 
the more developed subsidiary firm (Russo 
et al. 2010). For Chinese MNCs undertaking 
large-scale M&As, it makes sense to 
incorporate existing employment practices, 
at least in the short-term—particularly if 
they see the acquired European subsidiary 
as having the potential to be key contributor 
to future revenue, a source of advanced 
technology, or a model management system. 
Rethinking the ‘China 
Model’ of OFDI
The examples highlighted in this essay 
suggest that it is misleading to depict Chinese 
MNCs as being exporters of lower labour 
standards from China to Europe. In fact, 
Chinese firms in Europe are diverse in the 
way they engage with the local workforce. 
This is because Chinese firms have followed 
multiple routes of developments and their 
motives for internationalisation vary. 
Employment practices that seem to have 
been brought in by the Chinese firms evolve 
and transform in workplaces in Europe. 
Against a background of casualisation of 
employment relations with the resurgence 
of neo-liberalism across European labour 
markets, new entrants (Chinese firms) have 
found more space to negotiate with existing 
institutional players (national states, trade 
unions, employment agents) to develop 
divergent employment practices.  
Research elsewhere shows that Chinese 
firms are extremely pragmatic, adaptive, and 
willing to work with local institutions. For 
example, Chinese firms are found to take a 
practical approach in resolving industrial 
confrontations in some developing 
countries, changing remuneration policies 
in response to local workers’ opposition to 
practices such as continuous overtime and 
flexible working (Cooke 2014; Lee 2014a). 
While Chinese managers are often seen as 
championing ‘job insecurity, hard-work and 
self-sacrifice’ as key to China’s economic 
success, they show strong sensitivity to the 
country conditions as well (Lee 2014a). When 
engaged in engineering and construction 
projects in developing countries, Chinese 
firms tend to emphasise the relevance of 
management practices and applicability of 
past experiences to new situations (Rui et 
al. 2017). 
To understand the complex impact of 
Chinese investment in Europe, future 
research would do well to examine more 
fully the dynamics and diversity in the 
way Chinese firms manage their overseas 
workforces. Much more research is needed 
to see how Chinese MNCs negotiated with 
various institutional players for workforce 
composition, working conditions, and 
employment terms. Ethnographic case 
studies are most likely to enrich our 
understanding on this front. In addition, 
comparative case studies across a range of 
sectors and countries will also be useful 
to allow us to uncover what underpins the 
Chinese firms’ ability to access labour and 
mobilise workers. 
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Antonella Diana
Chinese-established Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) in Laos have been criticised as being 
sites of neoliberal exception, sustained by a 
Chinese logic of self-entrepreneurship and self-
determination—or a soft version of colonial-
era extraterritoriality. This essay argues that 
such areas are, in fact, a frontier space of 
post-socialist ad hoc experimentation, within 
which the Lao state haphazardly tests new 
socioeconomic and governing mechanisms 
under authoritarian rule in order to produce 
revenue and perpetuate its power over Lao 
citizens and territory. 
Liquid 
Labourscape 
Ad Hoc Experimentation 
in a Chinese Special 
Economic Zone in Laos
In the northwest corner of Laos, where 
the confluence of the Ruak and the Mekong 
rivers marks the border with Myanmar and 
Thailand, lies the Golden Triangle Special 
Economic Zone (GTSEZ). This is one of 
twelve special and specific economic zones 
across Laos, all of which are areas where 
Chinese investments feature prominently 
(2017). The GTSEZ was established in 
2007 on a ninety-nine-year land concession 
of three thousand hectares granted by 
the Lao government to Golden Kapok, a 
private Chinese firm owned by Mr. Zhao 
Wei, a casino tycoon from Heilongjiang 
province. Amounting to 700 million USD 
as of 2015, the firm’s investment resulted 
in the construction of a new conurbation 
whose economy revolves around the casino 
business. The Lao government and the 
foreign company jointly rule the area. In 
this essay I will draw on ethnographic 
fieldwork undertaken in 2010 and 2015 in 
order to explore how this new governance 
model has affected labour dynamics in the 
zone, and to shed new light on the alliance 
between Chinese capital and the Upper 
Mekong states. 
A Frontier Space of 
Post-Socialist Ad Hoc 
Experimentation
Chinese-established SEZs in Laos have 
recently been at the centre of media and 
scholarly debate. Two main analyses have 
emerged in academic literature. One, put 
forward by Santasombat (2015), draws on 
Aihwa Ong’s previous work (2006) and 
defines the GTSEZ as a site of neoliberal 
exception, sustained by a Chinese logic 
of self-entrepreneurship and self-
determination. This is coupled with ‘state 
socialism from afar’ (Yos 2015; Li and Ong 
2008), which has caused deprivation and 
disempowerment of Lao people through a 
The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone is 
located in northwest Laos, on the border with 
Myanmar and Thailand. 
Photo: Patrick Truscott, Flickr.
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process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
(Harvey 2005, 116). The other, represented 
by Pál Nyíri (2009), sees the land concessions 
granted to Chinese companies for SEZs 
in Laos as a soft version of colonial-era 
extraterritoriality, and criticise them for 
eroding ‘the boundaries of citizenship’. 
My research suggests that neither 
the neoliberal nor the crypto-colonial 
soft-extraterritoriality view fully 
captures the current political and socio-
economic dynamics of the GTSEZ. The 
former arbitrarily applies a universal 
neoliberal framework to the Lao and 
Chinese authoritarian post-socialist 
contexts; the latter, underestimates that 
shared sovereignty has been an on-going 
governance pattern in the Upper Mekong 
since pre-colonial times. Drawing on 
interviews with different actors within 
the GTSEZ, participant observation of the 
lived labour experiences of residents, and 
an analysis of official documents from the 
Lao government, I argue that the GTSEZ 
is, in fact, a frontier space of post-socialist 
ad hoc experimentation (Diana 2009). In 
it, the Lao state haphazardly tests new 
socioeconomic and governing mechanisms 
under authoritarian rule in order to produce 
revenue, and renew and perpetuate its 
power over Lao citizens and territory. 
Evidence of this post-socialist 
experimental approach is demonstrated 
in the ways in which SEZs are used as 
sites for testing a new modernisation and 
industrialisation mode by attracting both 
domestic and foreign investment with the 
aim of integrating Laos into the regional 
economy. SEZs are subjected to special 
investment promotion policies and have 
autonomous economic, financial, and legal 
systems. In the GTSEZ, the experimental 
policies are implemented by a Management 
Board and an Executive Board, each 
constituted by Lao state officials at different 
levels and representatives from the Chinese 
firm. The boards are charged with jointly 
planning development interventions, 
issuing and enforcing regulations, as well 
as managing the zone on a daily basis. 
However, the zone’s administration and 
management remain under the ultimate 
supervision of the Lao national government 
(DOASLNCSEZ; DOALNCSEZ) . 
However, both a 2012 official report by 
the Lao government (DSSEZb) and later 
indiscretions from employees in the zone’s 
administration during my fieldwork in 2015, 
reveal that the zone’s experimentation 
was dysfunctional and ad hoc when put 
into practice. More than the subjugation 
of Laos to Chinese interests, the operation 
of the GTSEZ was tinged with illiberal and 
authoritarian undertones from the Lao 
state, a situation that belied the ‘neoliberal’ 
and ‘crypto-colonial’ views described above. 
Day-to-day co-ruling unfolded through 
on-going frictions over decision-making 
between the Chinese and Lao counterparts, 
as well as through obstruction by the Lao 
government of the Chinese firm’s plans. It 
was rumoured that high-level Lao officials 
kept Mr. Zhao in check by constantly asking 
for money in return for concessions on 
project advancement. The committees’ lack 
of administrative capacity contributed to 
casual and chaotic governance. This kind of 
ad hoc rule allowed the Lao government to 
secure its sovereignty over the zone.
Liquid Labourscape
The inconsistency between political 
rhetoric and socio-economic reality was 
also manifested in the labour sphere. 
SEZs are intended to create employment 
for zone residents, and in theory the Lao 
Labour Law should guarantee labour rights 
and regulate investor activities. However, 
my empirical research found that in the 
unstable administration of the GTSEZ, 
these legal resolutions were arbitrarily or 
barely enforced. Ad hoc experimentation 
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produced what I call a ‘liquid labourscape’, a 
labour scenario characterised by inequality, 
casualisation, and lack of regulation—
especially on matters concerning rights and 
safety. 
In the GTSEZ’s liquid labourscape, Chinese 
investors’ treatment and remuneration of 
labourers was unequal and informed by 
a discourse of productivity that reflected 
an evolutionary view of socioeconomic 
development, tinged with racism, whereby 
nationals from ‘more developed’ countries 
were framed as more productive and 
therefore more-deserving than nationals 
from ‘less developed’ states (see also 
Nyíri 2016). At the top of the wage-labour 
hierarchy stood the twenty-seven Ukrainians 
and one Russian who worked at the casino 
as VIP room managers, supervisors, and, in 
one case, as a receptionist. By virtue of being 
Europeans—and thus being presumed to 
have a higher level of civilisation and skills—
they received salaries that ranged between 
1,000 to 1,200 USD. Below them were 
around 1,000 to 1,500 mainland Chinese. 
Considered to be the most hard-working, 
rule-abiding, smartest, and civilised among 
the Asian employees, they were employed as 
skilled labourers in the casino, taking care 
of hospitality, recreation, or administration. 
Given their perceived higher ‘quality’ 
(suzhi), they received monthly salaries 
that varied between 600–800 USD. Lower 
in the hierarchy were the Thai employees, 
considered to be rule-abiding and relatively 
civilised, followed by the Lao, who were 
regarded as lazy, uncivilised, and stupid. 
Finally, at the bottom were the Burmese, 
viewed as hard-working and submissive, 
yet coming from a poor country and having 
dark skin. Only 40 Lao, a dozen Thai, and 
a couple of hundred Burmese workers 
were employed at the casino as croupiers, 
receiving wages of about 100 USD a 
month. A dozen of the Lao employees, who 
worked as interpreters, middlemen, or 
clerks in the zone’s administration or in 
the casino, earned between 200–300 USD 
per month. About 400 Burmese performed 
unskilled jobs, such as gardening, cleaning, 
waitressing, and construction, for salaries 
ranging between 70–100 USD a month. 
Although the Lao Labour Law sets the 
daily working time limit to eight hours 
and guarantees one day of rest per week, 
most employees worked for ten to twelve 
hours a day and had only two unpaid days 
of leave per month. With the exception of 
the Europeans, none of the employees in the 
casino or in other service sectors in the zone 
had employment contracts. Most worked 
short-term, without life or health insurance. 
Many interviewees complained about being 
mistreated and forced to work overtime by 
their Chinese employers. Indeed, labour 
conditions within the zone did not differ 
much from those found elsewhere in Laos. 
The Lao state officials’ loose or lack of 
control contributed to reducing the gap 
between the GTSEZ and the rest of the 
country. These dynamics confirm that Laos’ 
SEZs are not zones of neoliberal exception, 
but rather spaces of ‘normalised’ post-
socialist inequality and lack of rule of law.
Resistance, Resilience, 
and Reinvention
Paradoxically, the liquid nature of the 
zone’s labourscape enabled residents to 
devise creative modes of survival. These 
took the form of resistance, resilience, and 
reinvention. Expressions of resistance to the 
Chinese-Lao joint rule came from many Lao 
citizens who resided in or around the Zone. 
One such case can be seen in the actions of 
the residents of Khuam, a village that had 
been relocated in 2008 in order to make 
space for the construction of the Zone’s 
business neighbourhood—a move that left a 
few without land and jobs. In 2014, residents 
gathered on the streets to demonstrate 
against the committees’ proposal to take 
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more land for the construction of an airport. 
Although the Lao Army cracked down on the 
demonstrators, the protest was successful in 
halting the airport plan. The government’s 
backlash notwithstanding, dissent continued 
in a concealed way in virtual and real life. A 
Lao man showed me a Facebook page where 
netizens exchanged satirical pictures and 
posts that contested Chinese investments 
in Laos, and even mentioned an uprising 
being organised by overseas Lao to free Laos 
from the yoke of Chinese investment. In 
general, except for the few Zone employees 
mentioned above, Lao residents refused 
to work for the Chinese due to the long 
working hours and discrimination that this 
involved. 
Additionally, several locals demonstrated 
their resilience to land and labour 
deprivation. Many started to learn Chinese 
language or send their children to study 
in China, in order to accrue a ‘cultural 
capital’ that could help them profit from 
the newcomers (Bourdieu 1985). A few 
established social connections with the 
Chinese, which in some cases resulted in 
love affairs or marriages, and in others 
turned into business collaborations. A few 
other Lao locals ventured into independent 
small business to capitalise on the Chinese 
presence. For instance, Sai, a Lao middle-
aged woman from Khuam village, responded 
to the Chinese taking away her farmland by 
opening a food stall in the market across 
from the casino in 2015, serving both Lao 
and southern Yunnan style noodles for 
employees and visitors. Within a short time 
Sai’s entrepreneurial effort was rewarded 
with a booming business and considerable 
revenue. 
Many Burmese migrant workers found 
social redemption in the Zone by reinventing 
themselves. Some turned to meta-
amphetamine smuggling from across the 
Mekong. This illegal activity allowed them to 
earn five to ten times as much as they would 
have in the more repressive and unequal 
context of Myanmar. A few young Burmese 
were able to save money not only to support 
their families back home, but also to pursue 
their studies at the university in Yangon. 
Some others became businesses owners. 
This was the case of Phon, a young man from 
the Shan States who had worked as a kitchen 
hand in a Chinese restaurant. In two years 
he had learned how to cook Chinese food 
and become fluent in the Chinese language. 
After his employer returned to China, Phon 
took on his former boss’s business with his 
sister, and opened a restaurant across from 
the casino. Marketing his cuisine as Chinese-
Burmese fusion, within a short time Phon’s 
business had become quite profitable. Much 
like for the resilient Lao and other creative 
Burmese, for Phon the Chinese presence 
in the zone had paved the way for upward 
social mobility. 
Winds of Change?
This article has unravelled the political 
and labour contradictions born out 
of the partnership between Chinese 
capital and the Lao state in the GTSEZ. 
It has suggested that rather than being 
a site of neoliberal exception or crypto-
colonial extraterritoriality, the GTSEZ is 
a frontier space of ad hoc experimental 
governance and liquid labour. Paradoxically, 
experimentation and liquidity have allowed 
many Lao and foreign residents to devise a 
new creative SEZ existence. A recent article 
in the Vientiane Times has denounced the 
lack of protection and precarious conditions 
for many Lao workers in sites where foreign 
companies operate (Sengpaseuth 2017). 
There is some hope that, under the rule 
of the allegedly progressive Lao Prime 
Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, elected in 
2016, political rhetoric may be turned into 
an actual upholding of worker’s rights. This 
could be a good opportunity for the Lao 
state to use Chinese capital to construct a 
more equitable SEZ labourscape.
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In recent years, much has been written 
about how increasing labour costs in 
China—among other factors—are pushing 
investors to move labour-intensive 
production to other countries where wages 
are still low. Due to its moderate capital 
requirements, low level of automation, and 
minimal demands in terms of skills, the 
garment industry is one of the sectors in 
which China’s loss of competitiveness is felt 
most acutely—especially as other countries, 
such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar, 
and Cambodia, adopt policy after policy 
to entice foreign investors. But what does 
this shift in global capital trends entail for 
workers? How do the workforces in these 
new outsourcing destinations fare compared 
to their Chinese counterparts? There is no 
easy answer to these questions. Indeed, 
while the past two decades have seen a broad 
theoretical debate about the consequences 
and extent of the global ‘race to the bottom’ 
in labour standards, not much attention 
has yet been paid to the human costs of the 
wave of capital flight that is taking place in 
the wake of China’s industrial upgrade. To 
address this gap, in this essay I will compare 
Ivan Franceschini
In recent years, much has been written about 
how increasing labour costs in China are 
pushing investors to move labour-intensive 
production to other countries where wages 
are still low. But what does this shift in global 
capital trends entail for workers? How do 
the workforces in these new outsourcing 
destinations fare compared to their Chinese 
counterparts? In order to gain a better 
understanding of the human cost of this latest 
capital flight, this essay compares garment 
workers in China and Cambodia, considering 
the wages they receive in relation to the 
context of their expectations and needs.
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Compared
Cambodian garment workers. Photo: @iloasiapacific on Flickr.com.
garment workers in China and Cambodia, 
considering the wages they receive in the 
context of their expectations and needs. 
The choice of these two countries is 
dictated by the fact that the garment industry 
in China and Cambodia is at two different 
stages of development. While China remains 
the undisputed global leader in the industry, 
with its 2015 exports worth approximately 
274 billion USD, there are already signs that 
the Chinese garment sector is unravelling 
due to rising labour costs, as the country 
embarks on an ambitious path of industrial 
upgrading (Van Der Kamp 2016). The 
Cambodian garment industry, on the other 
hand, was only established in the mid-1990s, 
when Cambodia finally emerged from more 
than two decades of chaos, and maintains a 
positive outlook. Having started from barely 
80 million USD of exports in 1996, in 2015, 
the Cambodian garment sector had become a 
6.8 billion USD industry, the ninth largest in 
the world (ILO 2017). Of course, the weight 
of the two industries within their respective 
local economies is very different. While the 
garment industry today plays a relatively 
minor role in China—in 2015 only 12 percent 
of the Chinese merchandise exports were in 
the garment sector—Cambodia’s economic 
growth remains heavily dependent on 
garment production, with about 610,000 
workers employed in the sector in 2016 and 
as much as 80 percent of the country’s total 
merchandise exports in the same year being 
garment and footwear products.
To explore these different contexts, 
during the summer of 2016 I undertook two 
surveys. The first was conducted in June 
and July 2016 at three Hong Kong-owned 
garment factories in Dongguan, Guangdong 
province. These factories employed 2,000, 
1,000, and 800 workers respectively, and I 
was able to collect a total of 250 completed 
questionnaires. The second survey was 
carried out from July to September 2016 in 
three Hong Kong-owned garment factories in 
Phnom Penh, where most of the Cambodian 
garment industry is concentrated. In this 
case, the factories employed 5,700, 2,100, 
and 1,100 workers, and I collected a total of 
291 questionnaires. To avoid interference 
from the management and possible 
biases in the responses of the workers, all 
respondents were approached outside the 
factory without prior knowledge of their 
employer. Most often, the meetings took 
place in the safety of their accommodation 
after their shift had ended or in restaurants 
around the factory during their lunch break. 
The quantitative data were supplemented 
with forty semi-structured interviews with 
garment workers employed in the sampled 
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factories in both countries, plus additional 
interviews with local lawyers specialising in 
labour disputes, union leaders, and labour 
activists.
Basic Guarantees
The two graphs that accompany this 
essay summarise my findings. The first 
aspect to consider when comparing the two 
countries is the level of wages guaranteed 
by law, i.e. the local minimum wage. This is 
depicted in the first column in both graphs. 
According to the Chinese labour legislation, 
local governments in China are allowed to 
decide their own minimum wage through a 
process of tripartite consultation between 
local labour departments, the official 
trade union, and business associations. In 
setting the amount, these actors have to 
consider several factors, including the cost 
of living, the percentage of social security 
contributions paid by the workers, the 
average salary in the area, the unemployment 
rate, and the local level of development. At 
the time of the survey, the minimum wage 
in Dongguan was set at 1,510 RMB (roughly 
229 USD) per month. In Cambodia, in 2016, 
authorities announced their intention to 
pass a Minimum Wage Law that would lay 
the foundations for a ‘universal minimum 
wage’ to be determined every year through 
‘tripartite consultation’ (Bun and Davis 
2016). However, currently only the 
garment and footwear sector is covered 
by a minimum wage, which is the same for 
the whole country. The amount is decided 
every year by the central government on the 
basis of the recommendation coming from 
a tripartite Labour Advisory Committee 
composed of 28 representatives. Of these, 
14 come from the government, 7 from the 
employers associations, and 7 from the 
unions (5 of which are considered pro-
government). At the time of the survey, the 
Cambodian minimum wage was set at 140 
USD per month. 
While in China there are no reported 
strikes related to minimum wage, in 
Cambodia the issue is at the centre of much 
controversy. In early January 2014, massive 
strikes and demonstrations of garment 
workers protesting over the government’s 
refusal to raise the minimum wage ended 
in a bloodbath after the intervention of 
the military police (AMRC 2014). Due 
to the increasing repression of civil 
society and independent unions by the 
Cambodian authorities (see also Norén-
Nilsson’s chapter in the present volume), 
the following years have seen no more 
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mass demonstrations during the minimum 
wage negotiations. Nevertheless, the raises 
that were granted by the government have 
continually fallen short of the expectations 
of independent trade unions and workers—
with the exception of 2017, when the ruling 
party, concerned about its performance at 
the impending national elections, actually 
granted a minimum wage rise in line with 
the demands of the unions, which went into 
effect in January 2018 (Sineat and Baliga 
2017). In 2016, for instance, independent 
unions pushed for a new monthly minimum 
wage of no less than 171 USD, but the 
government settled on a figure of 153 USD, 
far closer to the 147 USD proposed by the 
garment employer association (Baliga and 
Samean 2016). This was far lower than 
the 177 USD that some local and global 
trade unions and advocacy groups had 
been demanding as a ‘living wage’ for 
Cambodian garment workers since 2014 
(Clean Clothes Campaign 2015). In light of 
these controversies, it is unsurprising that 
the draft Minimum Wage Law mentioned 
above introduces severe restrictions on the 
ability of independent unions to negotiate 
for higher minimum wages. One example of 
this is the inclusion of clauses that allow for 
fines of up to 1,250 USD for those ‘creating 
obstacles or putting illegal pressure on 
discussions to determine the minimum 
wage’, or up to 2,500 USD for anyone who 
‘incites activities against the declaration of 
the minimum wage’ (Bun and Davis 2016). 
Why do negotiations about the minimum 
wage elicit such different responses from 
Chinese and Cambodian workers? The 
reason can be found in the second column of 
both graphs, which depicts the basic wage, 
i.e. the monthly amount that the factories 
guarantee to the workers regardless of their 
actual workload. While the Cambodian 
factories offered a basic wage that coincided 
with the minimum wage, in China the 
basic wage was significantly higher (41.1 
percent more) than the legal minimum. 
The explanation for this disparity can 
be found in the cyclical ‘labour famines’ 
(mingonghuang) that have hit coastal areas 
in China, including Guangdong province, 
since the early 2000s (Zhang and Liu 2012). 
With many young Chinese rural women 
deciding to stay home to raise a family or 
to look for a job in townships closer to their 
hometowns, companies in labour-intensive 
sectors such as the garment industry have 
no other choice than to offer salaries higher 
than the legal minimum in order to attract 
workers. This means that while increases 
in the minimum wage in Cambodia have a 
direct impact on the income of the workers, 
in China workers already receive higher 
basic salaries and therefore do not have a 
large stake in the government’s decisions 
on the matter. Most importantly, it shows 
that due to reasons related to demography, 
as much as to local development, Chinese 
workers have much more bargaining power 
than their Cambodian counterparts—a much 
more threatening prospect for investors 
than a difference of a few dozen dollars in 
the minimum wages.
Expectations and 
Perceived Needs
Minimum wages are simply a bottom line 
that is somehow supposed to protect workers 
from extreme exploitation, providing them 
with the guarantee of an income at times 
when production slows down due to the 
paucity of orders. As such, they do not 
reflect the actual level of remuneration 
that the workers receive, which in both 
China and Cambodia largely depends on 
the amount of overtime work. The Chinese 
workers in my sample worked an average of 
10.3 hours a day from Monday to Friday, plus 
an average of 9.9 hours on Saturdays, with 
only Sundays off. This is a clear violation of 
the national labour law, which states that 
workers should work no more than 8 hours a 
87MADE IN CHINA - BORDERLESS
day and 44 hours a week, with a maximum of 
36 hours of overtime a month. In Cambodia, 
the workers worked 9.7 hours a day from 
Monday to Saturday and got only one day off 
every two weeks, another clear violation of 
the national legislation, which allows for 48 
hours a week, with no more than 2 hours of 
overtime a day. 
Due to the large amount of overtime, 
workers in both countries were able to 
earn more than the local minimum wage. 
This can be seen clearly from the fourth 
column of both graphs, which depicts the 
take-home wage, i.e. how much the workers 
were actually paid after taxes and other 
deductions for social security. In absolute 
terms, Chinese garment workers received 
much higher take-home wages compared to 
their Cambodian counterparts. While the 
Chinese workers in my sample were given 
an average take-home wage of 3,001.76 RMB 
(roughly 450.30 USD) a month, Cambodian 
workers were paid only 243.53 USD, a 
gap which would most likely widen if the 
survey also included the costs born by the 
companies for social insurance and other 
welfare-related expenses, burdensome in 
China and almost non-existent in Cambodia. 
In this sense, the assumption that rising 
labour costs underscores industrial 
relocations from China to other countries 
indeed has a strong foundation.
Significantly, both workforces were not 
satisfied with their remuneration levels. 
The third column of both graphs shows the 
desired basic wage, i.e. the response to the 
question ‘in a situation in which you have 
to work only 40 hours a week [48 hours in 
Cambodia] and do not have to work overtime, 
how much do you think a reasonable salary 
would be?’ Comparing the desired basic 
wage with the actual basic wage highlights 
that workers in both countries thought it 
reasonable to receive much higher wages 
for working only ordinary hours, with the 
Chinese workers wanting 53.1 percent more 
and the Cambodian workers wanting 44.1 
percent more. The same frustration emerged 
when the workers were asked about their 
desired take-home wage. The question, 
depicted in the fifth column of both graphs, 
was formulated as such: ‘Considering your 
current workload, how much do you think 
would be a reasonable salary for you?’ While 
Chinese workers considered 4,374.80 RMB 
(roughly 656.20 USD) to be a reasonable 
amount, 34.1 percent more than their take-
home wage, Cambodian workers desired 
304.53 USD, that is ‘only’ 25 percent more 
than what they were currently making. 
Still, the roots of this dissatisfaction 
cannot be understood without considering 
the perceived economic needs of the two 
workforces, which are displayed in the 
sixth column of the graphs. As mentioned 
above, international advocacy groups and 
Cambodian independent unions have been 
campaigning since 2014 for a living wage of 
177 USD per month. An unpublished survey 
undertaken by several unions and NGOs in 
Cambodia in June 2016 found that workers 
in Phnom Penh needed around 142 USD a 
month for their living expenditures. Yet, as 
Dennis Arnold has noted, ‘workers’ politics 
and livelihood concerns [in Cambodia] 
include and extend beyond the (peri-) urban 
factory floor to rural households’ (2017, 26). 
For this reason, in my survey I decided to 
go beyond basic living expenses and ask: 
‘On average, how much do you think you 
need every month to cover the basic living 
expenses of yourself and your immediate 
family (your partner, children, parents, or 
other people whom you have to support)?’ 
The responses were surprising, 
considering that living costs are much 
higher in Dongguan than in Phnom Penh. 
Cambodian workers felt they needed an 
average of 345 USD per month, more than 
the 1,958.80 RMB (roughly 293.80 USD) 
required by the Chinese workers. One initial 
explanation for this counterintuitive finding 
is that most Cambodian workers came from 
extended families—besides their parents, 
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84.2 percent of them had three siblings or 
more—with most family members remaining 
in the countryside to engage in agricultural 
work. A second reason is that while 82.4 
percent of the Chinese workers in my 
sample lived in a dormitory provided by 
the factory—evidence of the persistence of 
the so-called ‘dormitory labour regime’ in 
today’s China (Smith and Pun 2006)—and 
thus paid only a symbolic fee for water, gas, 
and electricity averaging 122 RMB (roughly 
18.30 USD) a month, Cambodian workers 
had to find private accommodation outside 
the factory, paying an average of 34.40 USD 
monthly. Chinese workers also had access 
to much cheaper food, paying 311.57 RMB 
(approximately 46.70 USD) for their meals 
on average, compared to the 71.66 USD 
paid by Cambodian workers. This disparity 
in expenses clearly affected the amount of 
funds sent home. While Chinese workers 
were able to remit 1,724.90 RMB (roughly 
258.70 USD) a month, i.e. 57.5 percent of 
their take-home wage, Cambodian workers 
could only send 67.55 USD, i.e. 22.2 percent 
of their take-home wage.
 
A Matter of Survival
What does this comparison tell us about 
the implications of the decline of the garment 
industry in China? First, it says that labour 
costs—as shown by the data on minimum 
wages and take-home wages— are indeed 
much higher in China than in Cambodia. 
This situation is further compounded if we 
consider the likely impact of the various 
costs related to social security and welfare 
that the companies must bear—costs which 
are substantial in China and almost non-
existent in Cambodia. Even more important, 
in order to face the challenges posed by 
demographic trends and local development, 
garment factories in China today often 
have no other choice than to offer better 
conditions than the legal minimum wage 
in order to attract workers. This is in 
stark contrast to Cambodia, where most 
employers have no incentive whatsoever to 
provide anything more than to what they are 
legally bound. In such a context, although 
China still offers advantages in terms of 
infrastructure and the availability of raw 
materials, investments in labour-intensive 
industry are likely to continue to desert the 
country. 
Second, my survey demonstrates that by 
relocating from China to Cambodia, investors 
perpetuate dynamics of exploitation. This 
emerges clearly from the data regarding 
the expectations and perceived needs of 
the workers in the two countries. While the 
Chinese workers in my sample were finally 
able to earn wages higher than what they felt 
they needed, their Cambodian counterparts 
still earned much less than their perceived 
needs. It was definitely not a coincidence 
that wages were never at the top of the list of 
the workers’ concerns during my interviews 
in China, while they regularly came up in 
my conversations in Cambodia. This does 
not mean that Chinese garment workers 
are happy with their remuneration—on 
the contrary, as we have seen, they still 
deem wages ‘unreasonable’ in light of their 
workload. Still, there is a fundamental 
difference between dissatisfaction due to 
the perceived unfairness of the economic 
treatment experienced in the workplace, 
as I found in China, and a deeper concern 
about the ability to provide a basic level of 
subsistence for oneself and one’s family, as 
I encountered in Cambodia. It is this kind 
of human cost that employers should bear 
in mind when deciding to relocate from one 
country to the next in their unending quest 
for lower costs and higher profits.
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This essay compares the prospects for union 
reform in Vietnam and China. In Vietnam, 
heated debates about how to reform the trade 
union and the industrial relations system 
have been ongoing for more than a year, 
ever since the government signed the now 
defunct Transnational Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. That the debate continues among 
the top leadership and within government 
bureaucracies indicates that there is no 
lack of willingness to reform. In China, on 
the contrary, the Chinese Party-state and 
the official unions are taking the route of 
suppression of labour activism, indicating 
grim prospects for union reform.
Trade Union 
Reform in One-
Party States 
China and Vietnam 
Compared
These two comments embody the current 
concerns over the problems that the 
Vietnam General Confederation of Labour 
(VGCL) and the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) are facing in their 
respective countries. In Vietnam, heated 
debates about how to reform the trade 
union and the industrial relations system 
have been going on for more than a year, 
ever since the government signed the now 
defunct Transnational Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) with the United States 
in February 2016 (USTR 2016). Vietnam’s 
eagerness to become a member of the 
TPP was due to the promising prospect 
of quick economic gains connected to the 
membership. In light of this, there was 
consensus in the government and the VGCL 
on the need to enter into this international 
pact despite the TPP’s Chapter 19, which 
required Vietnam to ensure freedom 
of association. If the TTP had been 
implemented, workers would have been 
permitted to set up their own unions and 
affiliate themselves to union federations 
of their choice. This would have meant a 
fundamental change in Vietnam’s political 
As I understand it, the new President of the 
Vietnam General Confederation of Labour is 
enthusiastic about continuing efforts to ‘renovate’ 
grassroots unions even if the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement does not go forward… In 
addition, I understand that the Ministry of Labour 
has moved forward with creating a new division 
of industrial relations that will administer the 
registration of independent unions.
An ILO Consultant
2 March 2017
From the [Chinese] trade union’s 
standpoint we do not welcome labour 
NGOs. We even feel antagonistic towards 
them. My own feeling is about the same. 
The union has always taken them as a 
serious enemy. 
An informal employee of the Chinese trade union
    4 January 
2017
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Silk Factory, Central Highlands of Vietnam.
Photo: Justin Button.
structure necessitating relevant laws to be 
revised and new institutions created. In 
order to support this complicated process, 
the United States government had already 
earmarked four million USD to fund the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
and the Vietnamese Ministry of Labour, 
Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in 
the development of a plan for the reform of 
industrial relations in the country within 
five years (ILO 2016). 
Sceptics, die-hard critics of one-
party states, and those who would have 
been losers in the new deal—such as the 
American trade unions (AFL-CIO 2016)—
believe that Vietnam signed the TPP for 
purely economic reasons, and that genuine 
freedom of association for Vietnamese 
workers is unlikely to materialise. When 
Donald Trump withdrew from the TPP 
in February 2017, scepticism heightened. 
Indeed it seems that the factions within the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the 
VGCL that have not been so supportive of 
dismantling the monopolistic trade union 
system are now backtracking. At the time of 
writing, freedom of association is still under 
discussion in Vietnam, albeit not as urgently 
as before. Still, as the quote from the ILO 
Consultant indicates, the issue is not yet 
dead and drawing up a programme for trade 
union reform is now seen as the more urgent 
task. Had Vietnam been motivated only by 
economic interests, then these initiatives 
would have been dropped entirely. That the 
debate continues among the top leadership 
and within government bureaucracies 
indicates that the willingness to reform is 
also self-motivated. This essay points to the 
fact that signing the TPP was not a decision 
solely made on the spur of the moment with 
economic gains in mind, but also has deeper 
historical roots.
To strengthen my argument, I will 
compare Vietnam with China. As many 
other scholars, including myself, have 
already discovered, China is an excellent 
comparator for Vietnam (Chan et al. 1999; 
Nguyen 2016; Chan 2015a). Both countries 
are Asian, socialist, one-party states steeped 
in market socialism, and they are both 
often criticised as being authoritarian. The 
countries’ ossified political structures share 
many common characteristics borne from 
their Marxist-Leninist origins, but in as 
much there are varieties of capitalism (Hall 
and Soskice 2001), there are also varieties 
of socialism. Having recognised their 
similarities, identifying their differences and 
tracing the root causes of their divergences 
allows us to understand both systems better.
The second quote at the beginning of 
this essay is taken from an interview with 
a young university graduate hired by a city-
level trade union in Guangdong province. 
Only one year earlier, for the first time 
the local government had launched a 
massive crackdown that saw the arrest and 
interrogation of some twenty labour NGO 
activists (Franceschini 2017b). The quote—as 
well as those arrests—shows that, while the 
Vietnamese are debating how to liberalise 
the trade union system, the Chinese Party-
state and the ACFTU are taking the route 
of suppression. Thus, the prospects for 
trade union reform in the two countries are 
very different. But before analysing these 
prospects, we need to examine the historical 
roots of why these two one-party states are 
not equally authoritarian. 
Historical, Political, and 
Structural Differences
 
While both the Vietnamese and Chinese 
unions have been conceived of as Leninist 
‘transmission belts’ between the higher 
echelons of the Party-state and the masses 
(Franceschini 2015), with an additional 
role as dispensers of social welfare, in many 
respects the ACFTU is much weaker than the 
VGCL. The ACFTU has been in a subservient 
status under Party-state domination since 
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1949, bereft of any élan of resistance. For 
eleven years, from 1967 to 1978, it was 
even disbanded. After Deng Xiaoping came 
back to power in 1978, he re-established 
the ACFTU and gave it some magnitude 
of autonomy, but to this day it remains no 
more than a very weak bureaucracy. The 
VGCL, on the other hand, has a history of 
militancy, first against French colonialism 
and then against American invasion (Tran 
2014). As Gabriel Kolko has written, ‘all 
wars more or less transcend the control of 
those leading them’ (Kolko 1995, 4). Because 
of the war, the union had stronger ties with 
its constituency. In the South, trade unions 
battled against American and Vietnamese 
capitalism (Chan 2011). After the war ended 
in 1975, a legacy of militancy remained, so 
much so that when I interviewed quite a 
high-level trade unionist in the mid-1990s, 
I had the feeling I was talking to a trade 
union official who still possessed some 
revolutionary commitment, unlike those 
Chinese union officials who tended to just 
spout the Party line. South Vietnam had 
never been totally absorbed into the fold 
of the socialist bureaucratic subservient 
structure when doi moi—that is ‘renovation’, 
an expression equivalent to China’s ‘reform 
and opening up’ (gaige kaifang)—began in 
the mid-1980s. 
Both the ACFTU and VGCL tried to 
wrest more power from their respective 
Party-states in the late 1980s. While the 
ACFTU failed to gain anything following 
the suppression of the Tiananmen Uprising 
in 1989 (Franceschini 2015), the VGCL, in 
contrast, achieved some independence a 
year earlier at its 1988 Congress (Chan and 
Norlund 1998). The then secretary general 
of the CPV declared that union cadres might 
voice their ideas independently of the Party 
and management. Thus, when I first began 
doing research on Vietnam I was surprised to 
discover that Lao Dong (Labour), the official 
newspaper of the VGCL, carried articles in 
which the union openly staked positions that 
were different from those of the Party and 
of MOLISA. One consistent public debate 
up to this very day has been the VGCL’s 
argument that the minimum wage is set too 
low for workers’ needs. Never has such kind 
of public discussion appeared in the Chinese 
Workers’ Daily, the ACFTU’s mouthpiece, 
where all Chinese bureaucracies speak with 
one voice—that of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). If there were any internal 
debates on these issues in China, they took 
place behind closed doors. This difference in 
the trade union publications alone indicated 
that in Vietnam there was some room for 
transparency, and that the VGCL had some 
space to act independently. 
One reason why the VGCL could enjoy this 
space is partly related to the trade union’s 
organisational structure. The Chinese and 
Vietnamese administrative systems are 
similar. In both countries, the Party has 
control over the appointment of leading 
union cadres at each level. Leading cadres 
are also subjected to two management 
systems, what the Chinese authorities call 
‘branch dictates’ (tiaotiao zhuanzheng) and 
‘area dictates’ (kuaikuai zhuanzheng), with 
‘branch’ referring to ministerial hierarchical 
chain of commands, and ‘area’ referring 
to a command system under the Party at 
the same hierarchal level (Unger 1987). 
However, while the Chinese bureaucracy 
is dominated by ‘area dictates’, Vietnam is 
more inclined towards ‘branch dictates’. In 
other words, the VGCL’s line of command 
from the top to various lower level unions 
can override the interests of the Party at 
the same levels. This permits the VGCL to 
carry out its assigned mission to represent 
and protect workers’ rights without being 
trumped by the priorities of the local Party-
state for economic development. In China, 
in contrast, local unions are under the 
control of the local Party-state and thus tend 
to collude with employers, a situation that 
makes it difficult for them to help workers 
even if they are so inclined. The difference 
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is further amplified by Vietnam’s traditional 
sectoral trade unions that have a vertical 
line of command (Chan and Norlund 1998). 
In China, sectoral industrial unions do exist 
but they are so weak that they are almost 
irrelevant.
Different Attitudes 
and Ways of Handling 
Strikes
Since the mid-2000s, both countries have 
been plagued by wild-cat strikes, especially 
in the labour-intensive export sector. None 
of these strikes is organised by official 
grassroots trade unions, and they are thus 
‘leaderless’ strikes. China has chosen to 
be silent on the legal status of strikes and, 
without functioning formal channels to 
resolve their grievances, going on strike 
has become the only possible strategy for 
workers to call attention to their plight. 
Vietnam, in contrast, recognises the right 
to strike on condition that workers follow 
a cumbersome application procedure. 
However, the process is so laborious that out 
of the several thousands of strikes that broke 
out in the past two decades not even one can 
be considered legal. This situation may lead 
one to conclude that the concession of a legal 
right to strike is irrelevant in preventing 
strikes from breaking out. 
The difference, therefore, is not in the law 
but in the authorities’ attitude to strikes. 
Since strikes in Vietnam are officially 
recognised as a right of the workers—even 
if they do not comply with the pre-strike 
procedures—when a strike breaks out, the 
local Department of Labour and the local 
trade union immediately arrive on the scene, 
lambast the management for violating the 
laws, and negotiate on behalf of the workers. 
The police too rush to the scene, but they 
just stand by in case the strikes descend into 
violence. Once workers’ demands are met—
usually this happens in a couple of days—
production returns to normal. 
As for China, since the Party-state does 
not recognise strikes as a right of the 
workers, the local authorities’ attitude 
towards strikes is generally hostile. They are 
seen as potentially socially and politically 
destabilising, and thus anathema to capital 
Vietnamese and Chinese Workers’ Attitudes towards Factory Trade Unions
Do you think the trade union in your workplace represents workers’ interests?
Vietnam China
Yes 894 (85%) 100 (10%)
No 58 (6%) 203 (20%)
Don’t know 100 (9%) 672 (67%)
Missing 2 (<1%) 33 (3%)
Total 1054 (100%) 1008 (100%)
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investment and economic development. The 
local union arrives on the strike scene to 
quell the disturbance rather than to act as 
a representative of the workers. The police 
is apt to use force, especially if workers take 
to the streets. In such a context, Chinese 
workers see the union, local government, 
and management as colluding against 
them. In fact, the attitude of Chinese 
workers towards the union is not only one 
of mistrust, but antagonism. Vietnamese 
workers on the other hand see the primary 
union as representative of their rights 
despite its weakness. The table illustrates 
the surprising results of a survey that Wang 
Hongzen and I undertook in 2007 (Siu and 
Chan 2015). 
In other words, though their union is 
weak, the vast majority of Vietnamese 
workers still tend to think of the union as an 
ally rather than an antagonist. 
Different Countries, 
Different Systems
To summarise, though their workplace 
union is weak, the two countries are quite 
different historically, politically, and 
culturally. On the whole Vietnam is more 
pluralistic while China is more monolithic. 
These fundamental preconditions lead to a 
divergence in the formation of the system 
of industrial relations. The situation in 
Vietnam is much more conducive to learning 
from and working with foreign countries 
and organisations. For many years, the 
MOLISA and VGCL have been working 
closely with international organisations, 
the most important of them being the ILO, 
which played an important role in helping 
and advising Vietnam to revise the strike 
regulations included in the 2012 Labour 
Code. They have also been partnering with 
two trade union support and solidarity 
organisations: the German Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES) and the Australian Union Aid 
Abroad (APHEDA). The Australian Public 
Sector Union also helped the VGCL when it 
was setting up its public sector union in the 
early 1990s.
Vietnamese trade unionists, unlike their 
Chinese counterparts, are used to addressing 
foreign trade unionists and labour activists 
as brothers and sisters. It reflects their self-
identity as comrades in the international 
trade union community. The TPP, therefore, 
should not be seen as the root cause, but as 
a trigger of Vietnam’s decision to reform 
its industrial relations system, including 
setting up a system that recognises freedom 
of association. In fact, it was the VGCL 
that proposed to the Party-state to accept 
this demand of the American government. 
The VGCL felt confident enough in its 
own ability to compete for the loyalty of 
Vietnamese workers with emerging new 
trade unions. In mid-2016 during our field 
research, we saw the relevant Vietnamese 
bureaucracy stakeholders, in collaboration 
with the ILO, rolling out programmes of 
social dialogue and collective bargaining 
at various administrative levels. There was 
open discussion that some workers had 
already agitated to set up new independent 
unions and the urge was not to suppress 
them, but to revise the relevant laws to make 
them reflect this new reality. At the behest 
of the ILO, Vietnam is consolidating a peak 
tripartite system. Minimum wage and other 
labour standards are now set at the national 
level after intense debate between the 
three parties—government, employers, and 
unions. The emphasis of the programme is on 
strengthening the trade unions’ power and 
their ability to negotiate at different levels. 
Training on social dialogue techniques 
is aimed at instructing union officials to 
identify themselves as representatives of 
the workers and dissociate themselves 
from management domination. The ILO’s 
tripartite system is beginning to take shape 
in Vietnam. However, it seems that the VGCL 
is on the losing end. After the new minimum 
94 MADE IN CHINA - BORDERLESS
wages for various regions were announced 
in June 2017 (VNA 2017), the VGCL openly 
complained that they were too low to meet 
workers’ needs. 
In the past two years, the ACFTU has also 
been in the midst of reforms. Programmes 
to reform the union in China are not 
unprecedented, but time and again not much 
has changed. Direct elections of workplace 
union committees (Chan 2015b), campaigns 
to establish workplace collective bargaining, 
and the setting up of amalgamated unions 
at the district or village level for scattered 
small workplaces have all failed to effect 
any noticeable changes, except in isolated 
cases. With strikes breaking out unabated, 
particularly in Guangdong province, 
the ACFTU has been blamed for its 
incompetence in keeping the labour peace. 
Meanwhile under Xi Jinping the Chinese 
authorities have intensified their repression 
of labour activism; labour NGOs have been 
harassed and some of their staff have been 
arrested. Foreign contacts are controlled 
and closely monitored. According to 
authoritative internal sources, Xi has 
lambasted the ACFTU, blaming it for having 
alienated itself from the workers. The 
unions are criticised for four types of 
‘ossification’—they are said to have become 
bureaucratised, hedonistic, behaving like 
royalty, and acting like functionaries. A new 
round of reform has been ordered—union 
officials are to be at one with the people, 
with more grassroots and amalgamated 
unions to be set up to provide workers with 
more services. At the same time, the role 
of the CCP at the grassroots is also being 
strengthened, with the Party being cast as 
the overseer of the union reform. 
In January 2017, we had a chance to 
observe how this programme is being 
carried out in an industrial zone in 
Guangdong province. The city union has 
used its own resources to recruit a dozen or 
so young university or college graduates to 
staff one of the zone’s community centres. 
From here they provide social services, run 
social club activities, and disseminate some 
labour law knowledge to the workers in the 
neighbourhood. The office is open until late 
at night, unlike a regular trade union office 
that only opens during normal work hours. 
It is hoped that workers who are active in 
organising social activities will ultimately 
become labour activists. If a strike involving 
more than one hundred workers breaks out 
in the neighbourhood, it is not the task of 
the office staff to intervene. They have to 
wait for the local union and authorities to 
come to resolve the problem by themselves. 
The reason why this type of work cannot be 
taken care of by a regular grassroots trade 
union office, we were told, is because the 
union is held back by its own organisational 
inertia. For all intents and purposes, these 
grassroots union outposts resemble youth 
centres and community centres. It is through 
these services that the city union hopes to 
be able to satisfy the assigned responsibility 
of being at one with the masses. But it is not 
the regular trade union staff who is tasked 
to do this—it is their surrogates. At best, one 
can characterise this programme as social 
work trade unionism. 
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Katie Quan
Under the presidency of Xi Jinping and 
Donald Trump, relations between trade 
unions in the United States and China have 
come to a virtual standstill. To understand 
how we arrived at this point, and what can 
be done to break the impasse, this essay 
briefly reviews the historical development of 
union relations between the two countries. 
In order to achieve this, it draws on voices 
of those labour leaders in the United States 
who have been direct participants in efforts 
to develop early contacts with their Chinese 
counterparts.
Prospects for 
US-China Union 
Relations in the 
Era of Xi and 
Trump
In October 2013, Richard Trumka, President 
of the American Federation of Labour and 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-
CIO), visited the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) to establish formal 
bilateral relations between unions in China 
and the United States (DePillis 2013). This 
visit signalled an historic shift in labour 
policy, from Cold War-style hostility to 
normalisation of relations. Some American 
labour activists hoped that it might further 
lead to collaboration on joint activities, such 
as collective bargaining. That collaboration 
would be a significant step forward in labour 
solidarity and building a global labour 
movement.
However since then progress towards 
building relations has been decidedly slow. 
There have been only a couple of official 
exchanges with the AFL-CIO, and activities 
sponsored by Change To Win (CTW), the 
splinter group of the AFL-CIO that first 
began relations with the ACFTU a decade 
ago, have decreased. Some American 
labour leaders have noted that the ACFTU 
has become less interested in collective 
bargaining since Xi Jinping’s campaign 
against corruption began. Now, given 
Donald Trump’s election as US President 
with his agenda to weaken the American 
labour movement and start a trade war with 
China, it is fair to ask whether there are any 
prospects for progress in relations between 
unions in China and the US, and if so where.
Xi Jinping and Donald Trump during one of their first official meetings. Photo: Businessinsider.com.
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To understand the American perspective 
on the relationship between the US and 
Chinese unions, I will briefly review the 
historical development of relations between 
workers in the two countries. Then, I 
will address more recent union relations 
based on information obtained through 
semi-structured interviews with a dozen 
labour leaders in the US who have been 
direct participants in efforts to develop 
those relations. Finally, I will discuss the 
challenges and opportunities laid out by my 
informants and draw conclusions. 
A Troubled History
The root of American attitudes towards 
Chinese labour have been shaped by race, 
class, and ideology. Since the nineteenth 
century there have been xenophobic fears 
of the ‘Yellow Peril’ represented by Chinese 
workers, as well as arguments that workers 
of European ancestry should cast their 
lot with American business and shut out 
Chinese workers (Tchen and Yeats 2014). 
These fears were compounded in 1949, when 
China became a communist state and an 
ideological enemy, resulting in antipathies 
that linger to this day. 
After World War II, the Cold War set in, 
and the world was divided into two main 
ideological camps: the communist and the 
‘free world’. In 1949, American unions led 
a split in the World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU)—a global union that aspired 
to bring together unions from all over the 
world into a single organisation—to form 
the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), an alliance of free 
world unions. Meanwhile, the WFTU came 
to be known as the federation of communist 
unions, to which the ACFTU was affiliated. 
Back then, divisions in the international 
working class mirrored ideological 
debates among nation-states. The ICFTU 
consistently criticised the ACFTU for not 
being a free and independent trade union, 
and therefore declared that it was not an 
‘authentic’ voice of Chinese workers. 
However, in 1979, when China opened its 
doors to foreign investment and diplomatic 
relations with the US were established, 
the material basis for this divide changed. 
Multinational corporations raced to China 
to take advantage of the low-cost labour. 
Factory conditions were appalling and 
workers were exploited, causing outcry 
among international consumer and human 
rights activists, and drawing criticism of 
the Chinese government and its unions for 
not protecting workers. At a time when 
international labour solidarity might have 
meant American workers reaching out 
to workers in China, American unions 
continued to refuse to have anything to do 
with Chinese unions, repeating the Cold War 
rhetoric that they were neither independent 
nor authentic. Meanwhile, some left-
leaning labour organisers worked quietly 
in the background to coordinate worker-to-
worker exchanges between US and Chinese 
workers, hoping to build solidarity. 
The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 proved 
to be a setback for these budding relations. 
The crackdown on the protests was viewed 
worldwide on cable news in real time, and 
its brutality reinforced what many American 
labour unionists had believed all along—that 
despite capitalist markets and openness 
to meeting foreigners, China was still an 
authoritarian state that did not respect 
human rights. The AFL-CIO response was 
to support a few Chinese labour activists in 
exile, and to continue to boycott relations 
with Chinese unions.
At that time, American unions supported 
campaigns targeting international brands, 
pressuring these companies to accept 
corporate social responsibility in their 
supply chains. The theory was that the brands 
had power to control labour conditions in 
factories that manufactured their products. 
In Latin America, Africa, and Southeast 
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Asia, these cross-border campaigns, mostly 
led not by unions but by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), had modest success 
in supporting worker organising. However, 
with respect to China—where an increasing 
share of the world’s export manufacturing 
was taking place, and where supply chain 
organising strategies might have had an 
impact on the global economy—no NGO ever 
figured out how to get brands to pressure 
the Chinese government to allow workers to 
organise themselves.
Another response of American unions was 
to push for trade sanctions against China. 
Arguing that the low labour standards in 
China undercut American jobs, the AFL-
CIO sought to block China from entering the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and from 
receiving Most Favoured Nations status 
under Permanent Normal Trade Relations 
(PNTR) with the US. Using the race card 
once again, the AFL-CIO’s petition against 
PNTR painted a dehumanised picture of 
Chinese workers as willing slaves who were 
willing to work for practically nothing, thus 
undermining the standards of American 
workers (Wong and Bernard 2000). It 
argued that sanctions would force the 
Chinese government to improve conditions 
for Chinese workers. So at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, racist stereotypes of 
Chinese workers that were common over 
a century before were still being used, and 
policies from the Cold War era that ended 
nearly half a century before still kept 
Chinese and US workers divided.
  
First Engagements
Meanwhile, global labour activists 
continued to organise worker-to-worker 
exchanges. In 2002, Andy Stern, president of 
the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), participated in an exchange that 
was facilitated by Kent Wong for the Asian 
Pacific American Labour Alliance (APALA), 
a constituency group of the AFL-CIO that 
was formed in part to break through racial 
stereotypes of Asian workers. Stern was 
later criticised by AFL-CIO leaders for 
having visited China, but he was firmly 
convinced that China was important to the 
global economy, and he was determined 
to develop relationships with the ACFTU. 
Importantly, he was an activist union leader, 
so he was looking not just to have fraternal 
affiliations, but also to find concrete ways 
to collaborate. One of the issues that SEIU 
continuously raised with the ACFTU was 
its concern about Walmart. In 2005, SEIU 
was heavily involved in the American labour 
campaign against Walmart, and Stern hoped 
that there was a way for US and Chinese 
unions to collaborate (Moberg 2015). 
In 2005, when SEIU and other unions 
broke away from the AFL-CIO to form the 
CTW federation, Andy Stern persuaded 
other CTW leaders to go to China to see 
things for themselves and to propose joint 
action. One of these leaders was James 
Hoffa, president of the Teamsters union, 
and an active opponent of PNTR for China. 
Staffed by veteran international labour 
activist Tim Beaty, Hoffa’s approach to 
relations with Chinese unions was open but 
cautious. As Beaty told me in an interview in 
February 2017: 
I did have an idea that by going to China, 
talking directly to folks, even in formal 
contexts, about leadership elections, how we 
collectively bargain, that maybe there would 
be an opportunity to see an alternative way. 
We might get discussion, contribute to the 
process of change inside the ACFTU, and 
create a different consciousness, broaden 
alternatives and possible reforms. Maybe 
this would legitimise people who had more 
democratic idea of getting workers involved. 
I have no idea that that has happened. Maybe 
I was naïve. 
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Another CTW leader who travelled 
to China, United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) President Joe Hansen, was 
interested in the connections that Chinese 
unions had with the same employers. Early 
on he was concerned about the impact of 
Chinese companies selling pork to the US, 
and later in 2013, he became concerned 
when the Chinese company Shuanghui 
International purchased Smithfield Food, 
an American meat processor where the 
union had won an organising campaign 
after a long and bitter battle. Shuanghui, 
now known as WH Group, recognised the 
union, added 38,000 workers to the payroll, 
and has continued the collective bargaining 
relationship (Bloomberg 2016). 
In other words, from the early 2000s, CTW 
unions stepped into uncharted territories to 
try to get to know the ACFTU and find out 
what kind of relationship and joint action 
was possible. The Teamsters hoped that 
engagement would lead to labour solidarity 
as they practice it with other countries, but 
repeatedly found that the ACFTU side was 
not interested in providing information 
or writing letters of solidarity. UFCW also 
hoped that there could be joint work with 
the ACFTU on mutual employers, but found 
little interest at the regional level, though a 
proposal for a research survey sent ripples 
that were felt worldwide. SEIU built deep 
relationships that made important headway 
in the Walmart campaign, but found that 
unionising China’s Walmart workers did not 
give them a voice. These unions discovered 
that their concepts of solidarity, and goals 
for developing relationships and activities 
were quite different from those of the 
ACFTU.
AFL-CIO and China
In 2011, the ACFTU made a bid for a seat 
on the governing body of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), which 
placed the AFL-CIO in the middle of an 
international debate. Many American and 
international unions opposed the bid on the 
grounds of the old ICFTU arguments that it 
was not independent and not authentically 
representatives of Chinese workers. On 
the other hand, other labour movements 
supported the bid, on the grounds that the 
ACFTU is the official union of China and 
it represents the largest working class in 
the world. In this path-breaking vote, the 
AFL-CIO abstained, paving the way for the 
ascendance of ACFTU to the ILO governing 
body.
The AFL-CIO decision was advanced by 
its International Affairs Director, Cathy 
Feingold, who in an interview I had with her 
in January 2017 rationalised: ‘We thought 
constructive engagement was important, 
but we could not fully endorse, because of 
human rights and other issues.’ In the end, 
the decision paved the way for Feingold to 
begin a process of building relationships 
with ACFTU leaders at the ILO, and making 
plans for AFL-CIO President Richard 
Trumka to visit China. Her efforts bore fruit 
in September 2013, when Trumka and a 
small group of AFL-CIO staff made the first 
official AFL-CIO visit to China (ACFTU 
2013). Though this visit was relatively low-
key, it was nevertheless historic, given the 
hostile relations that had existed between 
US and Chinese workers in the previous 
decades. 
In spite of the goodwill expressed 
during Trumka’s visit, progress in building 
relationships between Chinese and 
American unions has been slow, for both 
AFL-CIO and CTW unions. Both federations 
say that exchanges are cordial, though 
veteran China labour hands like Josie 
Mooney and Kent Wong in interviews I had 
with them in January and February 2017 say 
that frank conversations are more difficult 
since there have been many changes in 
union leadership in both countries, and trust 
relationships have to be rebuilt. According 
to my interviewees, in recent years there 
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have been some tensions, like with the 
Chinese government’s 2014 criticism of the 
AFL-CIO’s decades-long support for the 
Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, 
through its international education arm, the 
American Center for International Labour 
Solidarity. The ACFTU has also voiced 
displeasure with the City University of New 
York’s grant from the US State Department 
to do labour education in China.
One new development involves union 
relations at Chinese firms investing in 
the US (Sheng 2016). In 2016, Chinese 
companies invested nearly 54 billion USD 
in the US in various industries, which was 
up 359 percent from the previous year. 
There is no systematic data on how these 
investments are affecting labour relations, 
but there are at least some cases, like the 
Smithfield Foods case mentioned earlier, 
which appear to indicate that Chinese 
employers are not necessarily anti-union. 
In such a context, once again attempts have 
been made to build relationships between 
Chinese and American unions vis-a-vis a 
common employer. Instead of building the 
relationships by building union-to-union 
ties, this strategy relies on the employer 
as the bridge between the unions, at least 
initially. 
The Larger Picture
Relations between unions in the US 
and China are one aspect of the larger 
picture of global capital and global labour. 
Presumably, if the labour movements in the 
US and China were strong, and relations 
between the two countries were strong, 
they could muster a countervailing force 
against multinational capital. Towards this 
end, some American unions have attempted 
to establish relations with unions in China 
to work on joint campaigns against common 
employers. While in the process they have 
broken through some stereotypes and 
misconceptions about China and Chinese 
workers, in general they have found the 
ACFTU to be welcoming and cordial, but 
perhaps not so interested in joint campaigns 
against common employers aimed at worker 
empowerment. In spite of this, American 
unions remain committed to searching for 
ways to work with Chinese unions. 
Under the current presidencies of Xi 
Jinping and Donald Trump, it is possible 
that these fledgling attempts at building 
relationships will be further set back. Under 
Xi, the Chinese government has cracked 
down on human rights and labour activists, 
and has put NGOs under the administration 
of the Public Security Bureau, its domestic 
security agency. This may make the ACFTU 
less interested in sharing information with 
American unions about activating workers, 
particularly with regard to coordinating 
collective bargaining and strategic 
campaigns. Meanwhile, Trump’s current 
agenda includes a myriad of threats to 
lower labour standards, eliminate collective 
bargaining rights, and substantially weaken 
union influence. American unions are 
currently preparing for major defensive 
battles, and have already announced 
substantial staff layoffs and financial 
cutbacks. Given these challenges to their 
survival, they may have little resources left 
for international solidarity.
One area that might have complex 
consequences is international trade. Donald 
Trump has already announced that the 
US will withdraw from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), decrease its role in the 
World Trade Organisation, and hold China 
accountable for currency manipulation. He 
has even hired Peter Navarro—producer 
of the fervently anti-China film Death by 
China (http://deathbychina.com)—as his 
chief trade adviser and many observers are 
concerned that they intend to start a trade 
war with China. Some US unions, like the 
autoworkers and steelworkers, are cheering 
Trump’s positions on trade (even as they face 
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decimation from Trump’s domestic labour 
policies), because they believe that trade 
barriers will bring back jobs to American 
workers. It is hard to say at this point if 
trade barriers will cause American firms to 
reinvest in the US, without knowing what the 
specific policies and comparative costs will 
be. In any case, it will be important to watch 
out for racial stereotyping that has been 
used to advance support for protectionist 
trade in the past.
Meanwhile, Xi Jinping has stepped into 
the vacuum left by Trump’s retreat from 
global trade, and is proposing that China 
lead the world’s new economic order. 
Among many concerns, this raises the 
question as to whether China would consent 
to a labour clause as a core chapter in these 
international trade agreements, something 
that global labour activists have spent 
many years fighting for, and have actually 
achieved in cases like the TPP. These labour 
clauses have varied in effectiveness, but in 
some cases they have provided the basis for 
workers to advance rights, like freedom of 
association in Vietnam. Given China’s poor 
record on labour standards enforcement 
domestically, it would be a surprise if it 
agreed to a labour clause in international 
trade agreements. Of course, the ACFTU 
would be bound to support Xi’s position 
because it is subordinate to the Chinese 
Communist Party, but this position would 
also be consistent with views that were 
expressed to American trade unionists on 
numerous exchange visits.
In an era when relations between unions 
in the US and China do not progress or even 
regress, what is to be done? According to 
veteran labour activist Apo Leong, whom I 
interviewed in January 2017, ‘Over the years 
we’ve seen political windows open and 
close, and during the closed periods labour 
organisers need to continue foundational 
work that will put them in a better position 
to advance when the political window 
opens.’ For American and Chinese unions, 
this might mean that both sides should 
continue to have official exchanges, while 
understanding that the pace of engagement 
may not accelerate. It also suggests the need 
to evaluate where some gains can be made, 
perhaps in areas of mutual interest other 
than strategic campaigns, like health and 
safety or labour law. Aside from high level 
official exchanges, US and Chinese unions 
might also consider increasing lower level 
dialogues among union members and staff 
aimed at strengthening friendship—such as 
member-to-member visits, staff internship 
exchanges, and technical and research 
exchange. After all, US-China union 
relationships will continue to be critical 
to labour power in the global economy, 
but given the current political climate, 
organisers need to be more strategic than 
before and ensure that the one step forward 
is not undone by two steps backwards.
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Jenny Chan
In January 2017, Apple celebrated the tenth 
anniversary of the launch of the first model 
of the iPhone.  After a decade, has Apple’s 
extraordinary profitability been coupled 
with any greater social responsibility? 
Are the Chinese workers who produce the 
most lucrative product in the electronics 
world seeing improved working and living 
conditions? This essay provides some 
answers by focussing on two issues: freedom 
of association and the situation of student 
interns. 
#iSlaveat10
On 9 January 2017, Apple celebrated the 
tenth anniversary of the iPhone’s debut 
with an event entitled ‘iPhone at Ten: The 
Revolution Continues’. Since its launch 
in 2007, the iPhone has remained the 
company’s flagship product and biggest 
income generator. In 2016, nearly two-thirds 
of Apple’s revenue came from sales of the 
smartphone. The iPhone is supposed to be 
revolutionising not only mobile phones, but 
also corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
In 2015, when Time magazine crowned 
Apple CEO Tim Cook as one of the world’s 
one hundred most influential people, 
writer John Lewis hailed Cook’s ability to 
push Apple to ‘unimaginable profitability—
and greater social responsibility’ (2015). 
What he did not mention was the reality of 
social irresponsibility confronting Chinese 
workers who make Apple products.
When discussing the labour rights abuses 
associated with the production of the 
iPhone, the name that continually resurfaces 
is that of the Taiwanese-owned Foxconn 
Technology Group (hereafter Foxconn). 
Its collaboration with Apple started back 
in 2002, as the company was on its way 
to becoming China’s leading exporter of 
high-tech electronics. Initially, Foxconn 
was contracted to build Macs and iPods. 
Then, in 2007, the contract was extended 
to include the first-generation of iPhones. 
In 2010, when Foxconn was confronted by 
a spate of worker suicides in its factories 
in Shenzhen (Chan 2011), the company 
was the sole maker of iPhones. After this, 
however, Apple—following the common 
practice of pitting suppliers against each 
other to maximise profit—shifted some of its 
production to Pegatron, another Taiwanese-
owned supplier where labour costs are 
allegedly even lower.
Since 22 September 2017, Apple has 
been selling iPhone 8—‘a new generation 
of iPhone’, as they market it—on the 
global markets. Has Apple’s ‘unimaginable 
profitability’ been coupled with any ‘greater 
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Foxconn dormitories in Shenzhen.
Photo: Jordan Pouille.
social responsibility’? Are the Chinese 
workers who produce the most profitable 
product in the electronic world seeing 
improved working and living conditions? 
In this essay, I will attempt to provide some 
answers with a specific focus on two issues: 
freedom of association and the situation of 
‘student interns’. 
Freedom of Association 
Denied
The Apple Supplier Code of Conduct 
explicitly highlights the rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining (Apple 
Inc. 2017). Unfortunately, although codes of 
conduct produced by many multinational 
companies and industry associations pledge 
to honour workers’ rights to form trade 
unions, in China the process is dominated 
by management in the workplace, and is 
ultimately controlled by the state through 
the branches of the only trade union whose 
existence is allowed in the country, the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). 
Foxconn’s resistance to any call for union 
democracy emerged in several instances. 
This was particularly evident in the wake 
of a riot that erupted at a Foxconn plant 
in Taiyuan, Shanxi province, at the end of 
September 2012. In that case, the fury of the 
workers was triggered by their exasperation 
with company policies. In the months leading 
up to the release of the iPhone 5, they had 
only one day off a month. Also contributing 
to their grievances was the militaristic 
security imposed by the company at the male 
workers’ dormitory. When company guards 
beat two workers for failing to show their 
staff IDs, and kicked them until they fell to 
the ground, the workers reached a breaking 
point. To deal with the fallout, Foxconn 
announced ‘a special day off ’ for all eighty 
thousand workers and staff at the facility. 
On the same day that the riot occurred, 
Tim Cook assured the world that retail 
stores would ‘continue to receive iPhone 5 
shipments regularly and customers [would 
be able to] continue to order online and 
receive an estimated delivery date’ (Apple 
Inc. 2012). But as international news media 
published articles with blaring headlines 
like ‘Riot Closes China Foxconn Factory’ (Al 
Jazeera 2012) and ‘Riot Reported at Apple 
Partner Manufacturer Foxconn’s iPhone 
5 Plant’ (Apple Insider 2012), Apple was 
compelled to reassure consumers around the 
world that it was not running sweatshops. 
It was then, amidst the factory-wide riot, 
that a twenty-one-year-old worker wrote 
an open letter to Foxconn’s Chief Executive 
(Drahokoupil et al. 2016). The letter ended 
with the following words: ‘Please remember, 
from now on, to reassess the responsibilities 
of the company union so that genuine 
trade unions can play an appropriate role’. 
Still, even on that occasion, this bottom-
up demand was completely ignored by the 
company management (Chan et al. 2013).
While over the years there have been 
union elections at Foxconn, these initiatives 
have been mostly a formality to demonstrate 
Foxconn’s supposed commitment to Apple’s 
CSR principles. In an interview with a 
Foxconn worker in March 2015, I asked 
about the union election that had taken 
place earlier that year:
Not many workers knew about the 
company union elections. The promotional 
posters were placed in the dark corners in 
the factory. The management did not do it 
for our information. They did it to complete 
the standard process only. 
On several occasions, supervisors 
manipulated the elections by explicitly 
instructing workers to cast their votes 
for designated candidates. Out of fear of 
retaliation, workers followed the managerial 
instructions. As one worker candidly 
admitted to me: 
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We’re asked by our supervisors to check 
the right box. What’s laughable is that all 
the candidates are complete strangers to me. 
Afterwards, I checked the information about 
the winner, and found out that he’s a senior 
manager from the same department [as me]! 
But I’ve never heard of him. I believe that all 
the winners were handpicked by the senior 
management.
In the words of another worker: ‘After 
all, we have no idea who’s running for the 
elections. Perhaps only our boss knows about 
them!’ This does not mean that workers are 
not aspiring to have their own organisations. 
In the course of my multi-year research 
project, Foxconn workers have repeatedly 
made calls for democratising the company 
union. I argue that having a democratic, 
representative trade union, instead of a 
management-dominated one, is critical to 
ensure workers’ rights. 
Student Workers at 
Foxconn
 
Without independent labour 
representation, for years Foxconn has been 
able to get away with using ‘student interns’ 
who are not legally recognised as employees, 
and are often forced by their schools to work 
at the company’s plants. In 2010, following 
China’s economic recovery from the global 
financial crisis, 28,044 student interns from 
over two hundred technical and vocational 
schools all over China were assigned to the 
integrated Digital Product Business Group 
(iDPBG)—a Foxconn business group that 
exclusively serves Apple—to work alongside 
Foxconn employees in Shenzhen. This was a 
six-fold increase from the 4,539 interns who, 
according to Foxconn’s internal magazine, 
had been assigned to Foxconn’s Shenzhen 
plants in 2007 (Chan 2017). During the 
summer of 2010, Foxconn employed 150,000 
student interns nationwide—15 percent of 
its entire million-strong Chinese workforce 
(Foxconn 2010).
In recent years, China’s leaders have 
sought to boost labour productivity through 
expanded investment in vocational training. 
The number of vocational high school 
students doubled from 11.7 million in 2001 
to 22.4 million in 2010, even as regular 
high schools still enrolled a larger number 
of students than vocational high schools 
nationwide. Vocational schools follow a 
work-study model that emphasises the 
integration of education with production, as 
stated in China’s 1996 Vocational Education 
Law (Ministry of Education 1996). They offer 
employment-oriented courses for eligible 
applicants who have completed nine years 
of schooling. The official goal for 2020 is 
to recruit 23.5 million students—50 percent 
of the nation’s senior secondary student 
population—into three-year vocational 
programmes (State Council 2010).
In this, Foxconn saw an opportunity to 
exploit student interns. A 2011 company 
statement claimed: ‘Foxconn cooperates 
with vocational schools to provide students 
with practical skills training that will 
enable them to find employment after they 
graduate from these programmes’ (Foxconn 
2011). But Foxconn has said nothing 
either about the contents of its training 
programmes, nor about its skill evaluation 
methods. Working hand in glove with local 
governments, Foxconn has simply violated 
China’s internship regulations designed to 
protect students and assure that their career 
needs are served (Chan 2015c). 
In the words of a sixteen-year-old Foxconn 
student intern whom I interviewed in 2011:
Come on, what do you think we’ve learned 
standing for more than ten hours a day 
manning machines on the line? What’s an 
internship? There’s no relation to what we 
study in school. Every day is just a repetition 
of one or two simple motions, like a robot.
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To this day, the company not only recruits 
students regardless of their field of study, 
it also routinely recruits them much earlier 
than is legally allowed, while they are still 
in their first or second year, rather than 
their final year of vocational school. Even 
worse, these so-called internships are often 
extended from three months to a full year to 
meet production needs, with scant regard 
for the students’ training needs.
Under mounting pressure, in 2016, the 
central government finally took some 
measures to protect the basic rights of 
student interns. Vocational schools were 
instructed to manage student internships in 
accordance with new regulations that came 
into force on 11 April 2016, superseding the 
2007 Administrative Measures (Ministry of 
Education 2016). Under this new regulatory 
regime, the duration of workplace-based 
internships should not exceed six months. 
Moreover, the regulations not only require 
that student internships provide substantial 
educational content and work-skill training, 
but also mandate comprehensive labour 
protections for student interns, such as 
eight-hour working days, no overtime and 
no night shifts. Above all, no more than 10 
percent of the labour force at ‘any given 
facility’, or no more than 20 percent of the 
workers in ‘any given work position’, should 
consist of student interns at any point in 
time. 
However, in spite of these legal 
improvements, the government has left intact 
incentives for corporations to continue to 
prioritise internship programmes as sources 
of cheap labour. With the passage of the 
2016 Regulations, the statutory minimum 
level for paying interns is clearly specified: 
‘Wages shall be at least 80 percent of that of 
employees during the probationary period’. 
In other words, employers are still permitted 
to give student interns only 80 percent of 
the income offered to full employees on the 
job, whether or not students’ productivity is 
less. 
Ten Years On, the 
Campaign Continues
Global supply chains are not benign 
spaces of transnational trade. While rooted 
in local terrains, proliferating labour 
struggles in China have to simultaneously 
confront forces of global capitalism and the 
Chinese state. Workers are protesting and 
striking, labour rights groups are issuing 
statements demanding that corporations 
accept responsibility for worker abuses, 
and engaged scholars are analysing the 
structures of domination that drive labour 
control and eventually spark resistance. In 
solidarity with Chinese workers and student 
interns, and in an attempt to focus the 
spotlight on the ongoing illegal practices of 
Foxconn, Hong Kong-based advocacy group 
Students and Scholars Against Corporate 
Misbehavior (SACOM) has marked 2017 
as the year of the global anti-sweatshop 
campaign ‘#iSlaveat10—No More iSlave’. 
However, in spite of these transnational 
initiatives, the most important driving force 
for change remains the workers themselves. 
The current protests in localised and 
dispersed sites of resistance across 
China need to develop further through 
intra- and inter-class lines and across the 
urban-rural divide, growing into a more 
broadly based social movement. It is the 
evolving consciousness and praxis of the 
new generation of Chinese workers that 
will shape the future of China and global 
capitalism.
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William Hurst
For almost as long as political science has 
existed as a discipline, the study of Chinese 
politics has been afflicted with a chronic 
disease. Depending on one’s perspective, 
this malady’s manifestations have amounted 
to either neglected isolation or arrogant 
exceptionalism. To treat this illness, it is 
important to set aside any rigid orthodoxy 
and to encourage and celebrate diversity and 
bold experimentation.
Treating What 
Ails the Study of 
Chinese Politics
For almost as long as political science has 
existed as a discipline, the study of Chinese 
politics has been afflicted with a chronic 
disease. Depending on one’s perspective, 
this malady’s manifestations have amounted 
to either neglected isolation or arrogant 
exceptionalism. At root has been a tendency 
of China scholars to recount everything 
they could learn about one village or 
neighbourhood, one leader, or one army 
group, without context or comparison, 
assuming the wider world would care simply 
because their research was about China; 
and then the wider world took little notice. 
Regardless of whom one believes may have 
been to blame, students of Chinese politics 
have been searching for curative remedies 
for at least the past forty-five years.
During the 1970s and 1980s, it was en 
vogue to deploy macro-models of Chinese 
politics, both to compensate for our 
The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp, by Rembrandt van Rijn, 1632.
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field’s relative data paucity and to make 
findings more readily intelligible to non-
area specialists. Even when such models 
had names like ‘Mao in Command’, they 
still represented first attempts to ‘replace 
proper names with variables’. Yet, just as 
the last of these older-style model debates 
was raging (between proponents of ‘civil 
society’ and ‘corporatism’ perspectives), 
a number of scholars sought to introduce 
greater methodological rigor and better 
demonstrate the validity of their findings by 
making use of dramatically more advanced 
survey techniques and quantitative analysis 
than had ever before been common in 
the China field. From about 1990–2005, 
this trend did indeed bring some greater 
visibility to at least some parts of the field, 
though it began to bump up against some 
limits of data availability, research costs, 
and political strictures and risks. Survey 
research remains important, but it proved 
not to be a panacea.
Roughly contemporaneously, from around 
1995–2010, some other scholars (including 
this writer) tried to make the study of 
Chinese politics more systematic, accurate, 
and ultimately generalisable by advocating 
for a new emphasis on subnational 
comparative analysis within China. Whether 
they compared regions, elements of the 
bureaucracy, social groups, or even time 
periods, these colleagues hoped that step-
by-step disaggregation and more careful 
attention to China’s internal diversity might 
refine the specification of hypothesised 
causal processes and mechanisms and 
enable testable claims about their scope of 
Iranian Physician and Patient, Mehdi Mosavarolmolk, 1891.
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generalisability. As with the survey tradition, 
this had the potential to allow concepts and 
theories to travel more readily, not only 
into China from other parts of comparative 
politics but also in the opposite direction. 
Yet, Chinese politics never became anything 
close to a net exporter of theory or concepts 
during this period.
Racing for a Cure
Faced with the ongoing relative otiosity 
of prior therapies, alongside the stress of 
an ever more competitive and vagarious job 
market, a new generation of students has 
gravitated toward a different approach—
one that is predicated on a sea change in 
the China field. Over more or less the past 
decade, Chinese politics has gone from a 
data-poor field to one overflowing with 
all manner of observable phenomena that 
can be examined, counted, aggregated, or 
analysed. In part, this has been driven by a 
technological revolution in both the output 
of content and techniques for ‘scraping’ or 
otherwise ‘mining’ it, allowing the endless 
torrent of terabytes produced by and for 
the Internet to be converted into useful sets 
of ‘big data’. In part, it has also been based 
on other innovations, such as the use of 
field experiments and a greater propensity 
than among most of their predecessors 
for today’s graduate students and junior 
scholars to collaborate closely with leading 
quantitative researchers based in Mainland 
China. The preferred regimen of the new 
generation is thus to play in what could be 
called the discipline’s methods arms race, 
deploying ever more stunning technical 
tools and operations in hopes of impressing 
the discipline as a supreme virtuoso after 
the current fashion (or fad), outshining all 
others, landing a good job, and then making 
one’s mark.
Yet, while the shiny object so many are 
reaching for may be a brass ring, it is no 
silver chalice. Today’s younger scholars 
are certainly landing jobs, but the Holy 
Grail of bringing Chinese politics into the 
core of political science remains elusive 
and the concentration and compression of 
new research into increasingly small-bore 
methodological debates and frameworks 
risks the perverse effect of rendering the 
field even more marginal and less relevant. 
At its worst, scholarship in the new mould 
can amount merely to taking up concepts 
or hypotheses uncritically from American 
politics or haphazard corners of comparative 
politics and testing them out with bigger 
and bigger Chinese datasets and fancier and 
fancier methods. Such research can end up 
asking the wrong questions, cutting itself 
out of the most essential conversations even 
before it has settled on findings. All of the 
current emphasis, for example, on discerning 
through experiments how mayors or other 
local officials in China’s consultative 
authoritarian system respond to claims from 
different social groups has produced some 
impressive, even virtuosic, articles. But all 
such work is predicated on the assumption 
that China’s is indeed a consultative 
authoritarian system. Of course, the really 
important question is whether consultative 
authoritarianism describes China very well 
at all (I do not think it does, but I would 
welcome a healthy debate). The obsessive 
focus on methods occludes the fact that 
a great deal of research can be misguided 
(and thus at best trivial and at worst 
wrong) from the get-go. Unfortunately, if 
such work predominates, Chinese politics 
can appear from the outside as mundane, 
epiphenomenal, or even vapidly irrelevant. 
China specialists are relegated still further 
toward the edges of the discipline, even as 
they loose their area studies moorings, and 
slowly drift toward abject obscurity.
Even at its very best, embracing the 
methods arms race constitutes but one 
candidate sanative treatment. The mad dash 
toward it since about 2010, however, has left 
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other potential contenders neglected. There 
are many other ways we might bring the 
study of China’s rich historical experience, 
internal diversity, unique institutional 
landscape, and dynamic economy and 
society into conversation with the rest 
of political science. It is high time we pay 
attention to one of these: cross-national 
comparative analysis.
Cross-National 
Comparison: A 
Refreshing Therapy
When I speak of cross-national 
comparison, I do not mean the type that was 
popular several decades ago and sometimes 
amounted to throwing hundreds of country-
case (or even worse country-year) scores 
into a statistical package and seeing which 
broad claims might stick (e.g.: democracies 
do not fight, unions strike less under left-
leaning governments, etc.). Rather, I wish 
to advocate for careful paired comparison 
of China with other individual countries 
or small sets of countries. Combining this 
with careful, historically and contextually 
informed, work on China’s domestic 
politics—whether quantitative, qualitative, 
subnationally comparative, or other—has 
the potential to let us export ideas and 
arguments at least as well as brandishing 
the latest technical tools to test others’ 
hypotheses.
Broadly speaking, there are four ways to 
undertake the kind of cross-national work 
I am advocating. I call them: shadows, 
mirrors, partners, and apples. I have listed 
these in increasing order of both their 
risks and difficulty and of their potential 
dividends. Shadow comparisons are the sort 
that one finds in the concluding chapters of 
old books—not only the ones about China, 
but also many with titles like ‘XXX’s Party 
System in Comparative Perspective’. After 
offering the reader a study of politics in a 
single country (e.g. China), authors would 
pad a last chapter full of vignettes about 
how the arguments might be applied to 
another country or set of countries, almost 
always based entirely on a very superficial 
reading of a thin set of secondary sources. 
This is not useless (I have done it), but it 
is of limited utility. Still, it remains all too 
rare in the writing of China specialists. 
Mirror comparisons involve a much more 
nuanced look at one or two countries that 
in some important way reflect China’s 
political reality as analysed or explained in 
the main body of a work. This might involve 
at least a chapter or two, also likely (but not 
necessarily) drawn from secondary sources, 
that delve into considerable detail to examine 
how causal processes and mechanisms 
uncovered in the rest of a book play out 
in a critical case or set of cases for testing 
whether they might travel beyond China’s 
borders. This has become popular in recent 
work on India and other large countries, 
but has remained largely unexploited by 
students of Chinese politics. More common 
in studies of international relations, partner 
comparisons revolve around the study of 
China’s relationships with a particular other 
country or set of countries (e.g. Japan or the 
Soviet Union). Such comparisons usually 
become the main focus of the books based 
on them and often (but not always) can 
require relatively in-depth and extensive, 
though tightly focused, fieldwork and/or 
primary source research in a country other 
than China. Apples comparisons carry by 
far the highest costs and risks, but also the 
greatest potential rewards.
In an apples comparison, a researcher 
endeavours to compare China and some 
other country (or set of countries) side-by-
side as co-equal units; that is, to compare 
‘apples to apples’. Doing so in a way that 
remains faithful to the immense internal 
diversity and complexity of politics in 
China requires nothing short of training up 
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fully in the language, history, and politics 
of another country (or multiple other 
countries), to at least a roughly similar 
level of expertise that the researcher had 
acquired on the China case. This means 
many years of language study, at least a 
small library’s worth of reading, and even 
more time spent on the ground in the field 
in a new country. There is thus little chance 
that any single scholar can cultivate more 
than one or a very small number of apples 
to compare with China during his or her 
career. Apple comparisons can be tricky and 
are often complicated by uneven access to 
data, vastly divergent political strictures or 
economic contexts, or the absence of key 
actors or events in either China or the apple 
comparator; furthermore, not every apple 
will be suitable for comparison with China 
on all possible research questions or areas. 
Nevertheless, investment in developing 
apple comparisons can be incredibly fruitful. 
Such a method enables one to deploy most-
similar and most-different systems designs 
simultaneously (one within each case and 
the other between), for example, to compare 
subnational units or phenomena across 
national boundaries, and to test the limits 
and scope of generalisability not only in 
terms of broad causal arguments but also 
very precisely of specific causal mechanisms. 
Concepts developed to characterise 
elements of Chinese politics can be refined 
in the full light of another case before being 
offered as wares for export to a broader 
comparative politics audience.
Comparing China 
with Southeast Asia: A 
Modest Proposal
When China scholars have attempted 
comparisons—of any of the four types just 
discussed—they have often selected India or 
Russia as comparators. These are certainly 
not bad choices, but they are difficult in 
important ways and lacking in a certain kind 
of comparative advantage. With secondary 
literatures and area studies scholarly 
traditions as vast or even larger than 
those on China, Russia and India require 
an especially large amount of up-front 
investment to get up to speed. Research on 
these countries has also tended to favour 
a similar sort of disaggregation, close-to-
the-ground fieldwork, and a ‘splitting’ 
(as opposed to ‘lumping’) approach to 
that which has classically characterised 
much work on Chinese politics. In this, 
they lack any comparative advantage that 
might be conferred by having strengths 
complementary to the China field’s. Thus, 
adding new innovation or knowledge 
through comparative analysis is particularly 
difficult. Though one could certainly look 
elsewhere (from Mongolia to Mexico) 
with excellent results, I propose that many 
countries of Southeast Asia (Myanmar, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) can 
be especially apt comparator cases for the 
kinds of cross-national work on China I am 
advocating.
The study of politics (as opposed to 
culture, history, or society) in Southeast Asia 
has suffered from an opposite pathology 
to that which has plagued the China field. 
Rather than assuming the wider field 
would care about their findings because 
they were rooted in the study of Southeast 
Asian countries, specialists on that part of 
the world have too often tended to assume 
the field would never care about their 
findings because they were derived from 
the study of Southeast Asia. This has led a 
lot of scholarship to focus tightly on what is 
generalisable or exportable about Southeast 
Asian countries’ experiences or outcomes, 
rather than what is unique; never to miss the 
forest for the trees, but often to emphasise 
the broad shape of the landscape without 
even naming the tree species present. In sum, 
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Southeast Asian politics offers a comparative 
advantage as a comparator area because it 
has focused on exactly the areas the China 
field has neglected or been weak in and has 
tended too often to neglect exactly the areas 
(e.g.: local variation, subnational politics, 
etc.) on which the China field has done well. 
Also, none of the countries of Southeast 
Asia have area studies or secondary 
literatures of similar volume to those 
associated with Russia or India (indeed, 
other than those on Vietnam, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia, secondary 
literatures on Southeast Asian countries’ 
politics and history are comparatively quite 
small). The costs are thus relatively low, 
the comparative advantages obvious, and 
the payoffs potentially very high for using 
Southeast Asian countries as comparison 
cases to bring the study of Chinese politics 
into closer dialogue with the rest of political 
science. I very much hope more students 
and colleagues will heed this call to consider 
delving into these and other country cases 
seriously for this purpose.
All Hands Needed on 
Deck
To conclude, I do not intend this essay to 
be any sort of definitive or final statement. 
Rather, I hope it may spark important 
conversations. I am more than happy to 
be corrected or invited to rethink any and 
all aspects of what I have said here. My 
greatest aspiration is to motivate colleagues 
and students to think more expansively 
and daringly about what is possible and 
desirable in terms of Chinese politics 
research. There is nothing wrong with 
technical sophistication in one’s methods 
and there is absolutely a rightful place for 
research using ‘big data’, experiments, and 
other new tools. But we must prevent the 
stifling homogeneity of the methods arms 
race from becoming completely ensconced 
and crowding out all other work (especially 
by younger or emerging scholars). Diversity 
and bold experimentation must win out over 
any rigid orthodoxy if we have any chance to 
put our patient’s illness fully into remission.
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F A R E 
T H E E 
WELL
The End of Chinese 
Civil Society?

Taru Salmenkari
Chinese civil society research is obsessed with 
finding non-governmental organisations. In 
this search, different types of civil society 
organisations are conflated, and non-
governmentality becomes the sole factor that 
matters. Analytical accuracy is lost when 
too many things are fused under one term, 
especially when more accurate and nuanced 
terminology is available.
Conceptual 
Confusion in 
the Research 
on Chinese Civil 
Society
Research on Chinese civil society is 
consumed with the obsession of finding 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
In this search, non-governmentality 
becomes the sole factor that matters in 
civil society. As a consequence, all civil 
society organisations and functions have 
been lumped together, perhaps with the 
expectation that any organisation that is 
non-governmental will be conducive to 
facilitating all the positives associated with 
civil society. This is evidence of conceptual 
confusion. Analytical accuracy is lost when 
too many things are fused under one term, 
especially when more accurate and nuanced 
terminology is available. In China studies, 
this conceptual bloating concerns both civil 
society organisations and civil society itself.
Making Sense of the 
Diversity in Chinese Civil 
Society
The field of China studies often conflates 
different types of civil society organisations. 
For instance, the term ‘NGO’ is used to 
refer to a wide range of organisations, 
regardless of whether they are political or 
not. Elsewhere, NGO is usually reserved 
for associations engaged in advocacy or 
participating in developmental projects. 
In particular, in the West NGOs constitute 
a self-proclaimed category used for 
advocacy and for demanding inclusion in 
policy-making processes. The category is 
not politically neutral, but mostly comes 
with a liberal or leftist worldview. Some 
other organisations, such as ‘think tanks’, 
often hold more rightist stances but may 
occasionally engage in activities similar 
to what NGOs do. In Japanese parlance, 
the term NGO is used to refer to those 
organisations engaged in developmental aid, 
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while those that work on domestic arenas 
are usually called non-profit organisations 
(NPOs). 
Instead of NGO, a number of other terms 
are available for voluntary organisations 
engaging in societal service production 
and its private funding. Others include 
NPOs, philanthropic organisations, 
charities, aid organisations, foundations, 
cooperatives, social enterprises, and self-
help groups. ‘NPO’, in particular, is a legal 
category employed in relation to specific 
tax regulations reserved for voluntary 
associations. The official Chinese category—
‘citizen-initiated non-enterprise units’ 
(minban feiqiye danwei)—conveys the 
same meaning. Because many civil society 
organisations are actually registered within 
this category, Chinese scholars, correctly, 
use ‘NPO’ at least as often as ‘NGO’. In 
addition to NGOs and NPOs, civil societies 
are populated by other types of organisations 
such as interest groups, professional 
associations, sports clubs, support groups, 
academic societies, syndicates, cooperatives, 
and many others. 
Furthermore, civil society includes more 
fluid and less organised forms of associating. 
Civil societies contain social movements, 
campaign networks, community assemblies, 
voluntary projects, and temporary 
gatherings and forums inspired by public 
issues. These less formal platforms and 
networks are even closer to civil society 
ideals than formal associations are. Besides, 
the fall of communism in Eastern Europe 
and the Arab Spring demonstrated that 
these non-organised or loosely organised 
forms of public activity have more potential 
than registered associations for mobilising 
social pressure for democratisation.  
Conceptual Mistakes
China studies would benefit from 
using more specific terms for different 
types of organisations because different 
organisations do dissimilar things and 
fulfil particular attributes of civil society 
in distinct ways. The use of the term ‘NGO’ 
for many analytically diverse types of 
organisations in society suggests that NGOs 
can do it all just by the virtue of their non-
governmentality. 
‘NGOs’ are expected to defend interests, 
channel developmental aid, give voice 
to society, produce social services for 
the needy, protect rights, empower the 
marginalised, self-regulate industries, offer 
opportunities for popular participation, 
advocate liberal causes, and, eventually, 
demand a democratic political system. This 
list should make it evident that an individual 
NGO can hardly do everything and that 
some kind of division of labour is needed 
to fulfil these promises of civil society. This 
division of labour should be recognised and 
highlighted conceptually.
Conflating too many aspects together 
blurs analytical clarity and results in 
misinterpretations. Because terminology 
makes no distinctions between causes and 
roles in civil society, conclusions based on 
one specific type of civil society organisation 
have been expanded to cover them all. 
Conceptual confusion has contributed to 
consensus that Chinese NGOs are mainly 
service providers. Had service-providing 
organisations been classified as NPOs, 
attention could have been focused on 
political NGO activities as such. In fact, 
China is no exception. Nowhere in the world 
do advocacy NGOs make up the majority of 
civil society organisations. 
Currently, analytical approaches that suit 
one type of civil society organisation are 
expected to suit them all. It makes complete 
sense to analyse as an epistemic community 
a global advocacy network that produces 
and spreads new knowledge and vocabulary 
in order to make violence against women 
a political issue. Chinese feminist NGOs 
campaigning against domestic violence are 
part of this epistemic community (Milwertz 
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and Bu 2007). However, non-profit service 
providers hardly form such an epistemic 
community (Hsu and Hasmath 2017). 
Orally, I have heard my colleagues 
suggest even wilder ideas, such as using the 
One Foundation, a private philanthropic 
foundation, to discuss NGO advocacy, while 
still opining that there is no connection 
between charity and civil society. Using 
the term ‘NGO’ for all privately established 
associations makes it non-transparent 
when they are philanthropic and when they 
engage in more political activities, such as 
policy advocacy and interest promotion.
This type of conceptual confusion has 
caused a major theoretical confusion 
in China studies. Only China studies 
uses the theory of corporatism about 
interest groups for analysing NGOs, as 
if all associations automatically equal 
intermediary organisations and interest 
groups (Zhang 2015). Those who introduced 
the term ‘corporatism’ to Chinese studies 
used it correctly to analyse labour union 
activities and business associations (Lee 
1991). Corporatism is a form of interest 
representation delegating regulatory 
functions to interest groups in civil society. 
Hence, it has been described as a mixed 
mode of policy-making, private interest 
government, and self-regulation (Streeck 
and Schmitter 1985). 
However, NGOs are not the kinds of 
organisations that could participate in 
corporatism. They do not represent any 
sector and cannot make agreements on 
behalf of a sector. Many NGOs have only a few 
members. Thus, they are not intermediary 
organisations able to talk to the state or other 
interest groups in the name of a coherent 
social group. Furthermore, corporatism does 
not contain a comprehensive vision about 
the regulation of civil society as a whole. 
Corporatist compacts regulate only the 
relevant parties, such as relations between 
the labour and the employers, usually under 
the auspices of the state. Apart from these 
interest groups, all corporatist countries 
have voluntary associations not connected 
to this system.
Macro Consequences
Different types of organisations fulfil the 
promise of civil society in different ways. 
NPOs by definition emphasise voluntariness; 
advocacy NGOs monitor the government and 
demand a more inclusive political system; 
the philanthropic sector solicits non-state 
resources for causes determined as being 
important by society; interest groups engage 
in social mediation of interests. All of these 
attributes and functions are characteristics 
or forms of self-organising in society.
Using different terms for various 
organisations in civil society, and even for 
diverse visions of civil society, is advisable 
because these differentiated terms imply 
different relations to the state. Liberals see 
that advocacy NGOs offer policy alternatives 
in the public sphere. In more leftist 
interpretations, NGOs and social movements 
epitomise anti-hegemonic organising 
to demand inclusion and voice for the 
marginalised. Special-interest groups, which 
derive from the theory of pluralism rather 
than of civil society, lobby the government. 
In corporatism, certain intermediary groups 
participate in social mediation of interests 
in civil society, nowadays often through 
tripartite arrangements involving the state. 
Non-profit service production is present 
in most societies, but is theoretically 
emphasised in the neoliberal strategy for 
the state to reduce its social service burden 
by outsourcing services to civil society. 
Communitarianism wants to reclaim face-
to-face social life and cultivate social 
capital in everyday life. For acquiring 
social capital, any form of association that 
brings people together is fine, recreational 
associations and self-help groups included. 
In the communitarian vision, associational 
life is a school for citizenship and political 
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participation. Theoretically speaking, none 
of these relationships equal categorical 
separation from the state.
Civil society itself is a vast container of 
associative activities and ‘occasional’ and 
‘episodic publics’, which together constitute 
public life (Habermas 1996). As a whole, it 
seldom promotes any particular political 
opinion, supports any particular form 
of activity, or holds any united stance in 
regards to the government. In civil society, 
hegemonic groups associate alongside with 
anti-hegemonic forces. 
Due to different contributions to civil 
society by different types of associations, 
just to show that civil society is there tells us 
little about what is happening within civil 
society or the political consequences of what 
is occurring. The developments are neither 
linear nor similar to associations of all 
types. For example, after the crushing of the 
massive protests in Beijing in 1989, the first 
independent aid organisations rocketed to 
fame, according to their own understanding 
because the state media needed positive 
news in gloomy times. Developments in 
different fields and between different 
types of civil society organisations can be 
contradictory. For example, some Chinese 
advocacy NGOs I have interviewed find that 
the opportunities emerging with the growth 
of the third sector contradict activists’ own 
ideals about NGO work.
Using Correct 
Terminology
Conceptual confusion in naming 
organisations leads to a poor understanding 
of civil society itself. The use of more 
accurate terms is not only beneficial for 
semantic clarity, but makes visible the 
unevenness of forces and growth trends 
within civil society. 
Hence, it may be advisable to use more 
confined terms which focus on some aspects 
of civil society only. ‘Associational society’ 
suffices if the purpose is to research formal 
associational activity without complex 
networks and causes that make these 
associations, ideally, contribute to national-
level publics and to a community of citizens. 
Other terms used far too little in China 
studies are ‘third sector’, or its equivalents, 
‘non-profit sector’ and ‘voluntary sector’. 
This omission is particularly surprising 
considering the fast development of this 
sector in China. Not only would analytical 
nuance be gained if third sector service 
production was distinguished from political 
aspects of civil society, but using these 
terms would treat China more equally 
than current civil society research does. 
Although Chinese associations are not 
always fully ‘autonomous’ (whatever that 
means), the existence of three separate 
sectors is evident. China observably has a 
public sector, a private sector, and a third 
sector. 
Conceptual clarity is needed to 
understand what happens in Chinese civil 
society. Consequences are hardly the same if 
the number of political advocacy groups or 
the number of third sector service providers 
grows. These types of organisations answer 
to very different social needs, have different 
relations to the government, and contribute 
differently to politics and democratisation. 
One part of civil society can be growing 
even if others are not or even if its growth 
happens at the expense of another part. 
For gaining a more comprehensive, 
nuanced and meaningful understanding 
about Chinese civil society, researchers 
should do what social sciences have always 
taught them to do: use accurate and exact 
terminology to specify what is being referred 
to and what is expected of the research 
objects.
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The passage of the Charity Law in May 2016 
has made the legal environment for charities 
in China more complex. The new Law does 
represent an initial breakthrough in the 
transformation of the regulatory system for 
social organising and, on a deeper level, in the 
relations between society, government, Party, 
and market. However, it does not equalise the 
rules for all Chinese non-profit organisations 
and, crucially, it does not provide a basic 
social organisation law applicable to all types 
of non-profit entities. Why does this matter?
China’s Social 
Organisations 
after the Charity 
Law
Many commentators have sought to 
simplify the legal environment in China 
after the passage of the Charity Law in May 
2016 (National People’s Congress 2016). But 
in our view that Law has made the legal 
environment more complex. The new Law 
does represent an initial breakthrough in the 
transformation of the regulatory system for 
social organising, and on a deeper level in 
the relations between society, government, 
Party, and market. However, it does not 
equalise the rules for all Chinese non-profit 
organisations (NPOs), and crucially it does 
not provide a basic social organisation law 
applicable to all types of non-profit entities. 
But why does this matter?
What is a Social 
Organisation?
To understand the need for a basic law 
for social organisations, first we need to 
get straight what social organisations are, 
and what charitable organisations are 
not. ‘Social organisation’ (shehui zuzhi) 
Cishan Fa, the new Charity Law passed in May 2016. 
Photo: Canyu.org.
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(hereafter SO) can be understood as a kind 
of blanket term used in official policy for all 
kinds of non-governmental NPOs. It covers 
the three legal forms that Chinese citizens 
are obliged to choose from to establish 
such an organisation: foundations (jijinhui), 
social groups (shehui tuanti), and social 
service organisations (NPC 2017) (shehui 
fuwu jigou). At present, it also covers citizen-
initiated non-enterprise units (widely 
known by their abbreviated Chinese name 
‘minfei’ (minban feiqiye danwei). The latter 
continues to be a legal form even though 
the Charity Law and the newly modified 
General Provisions of Civil Law (GPCL), 
passed by the NPC on 15 March 2017, replace 
it with ‘social service organisations’. There 
are currently over three hundred and twenty 
thousand minfei already with legal status 
that have been placed in limbo since the 
passing of the Charity Law (State Council 
2016). This is partly because the relevant 
administrative regulations are currently 
being revised—the latest draft of the new 
minfei regulations was released publicly in 
May-June 2016 to solicit comments (MCA 
2016), but revisions have been ongoing for 
years and there is uncertainty as to when 
and what revisions will be made. 
The term ‘SO’ also covers a new category—
‘charitable organisation’ (cishan zuzhi)—
created by the Charity Law. While the new 
GPCL makes the watershed adjustment 
of dividing legal persons into ‘non-profit’ 
and ‘for-profit’, charitable organisations 
are not among the four categories of 
organisations referred to as NPOs. 
‘Charitable organisation’ does not represent 
a legal category in its own right. Instead it 
can be thought of as being a hallmark of an 
SO’s ability to adhere to legal requirements 
related to accounting, transparency, and so 
on. To become a charitable organisation, a 
group must register as one of the legal forms 
of non-profit SOs, then apply for charitable 
accreditation. In other words, if we tier 
the new system (‘new’ after the GPCL), the 
GPCL is the threshold system, a basic law on 
SOs would be the second tier (this does not 
yet exist), and the Charity Law would be the 
third tier.
The GPCL treats public service institutions 
(shiye danwei), foundations, social groups, 
and social service organisations as NPOs. 
The first of these, public service institutions, 
differ significantly from the others. They are 
not SOs, although it is intended that some 
will morph into them. Born of the socialist 
system built after the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China, public service 
institutions formed the public service arm 
of the government structure that all but 
subsumed society. With their deep links to 
government and their ability to monopolise 
resources and opportunities, their reform 
is essential to creating a competitive non-
profit market in which diverse and genuinely 
non-governmental organisations can thrive.  
China’s SOs work in education, healthcare, 
culture, science and technology, and sports 
and fitness, which are among the many fields 
covered explicitly in the broad definition of 
charity used in the Charity Law. But they 
also work in a vast range of other areas, on 
labour issues, in advocacy, legal services, 
and so on, none of which are covered by the 
Charity Law. While legislators and scholars 
involved in the legislative process for the 
Charity Law underlined the ‘big’ definition 
of charity as a legislative success and an 
important fundamental feature of the Law, 
many SOs cannot be squeezed into the 
definition of charitable organisations, no 
matter how ‘big’ that definition may be.
In implementation, while the Charity Law 
offers the opportunity to gain charitable 
status through accreditation to SOs that do 
fit its definition, there is already anecdotal 
evidence of SO leaders being reluctant 
to seek this charitable status for their 
organisations (Jin xia shuo shenme da 
shihua 2017). Thus, for myriad SOs, there is 
a gaping legislative hole. 
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Breaking Down the Old 
System of SO Regulation
There is no doubt that the Charity Law is a 
landmark step toward breaking down the old 
system for regulating social organising. That 
system was characterised by a lack of clear 
boundaries between society, state, and the 
market, and the use of administrative powers 
to meddle in and control SOs combined 
with a failure to regulate effectively. At 
the Eighteenth National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, it 
was announced that China was to build ‘an 
SO system in which government and SOs are 
separate, powers and obligations are clear, 
and autonomy is practiced in accordance 
with law’ (Hu 2012, part seven). This is a 
powerful statement of intent, which has 
often been quoted in the Chinese literature 
to suggest that SOs will gain greater 
autonomy and be freed from government 
intervention (see, for example, Wang 2014). 
The Charity Law, if implemented fully, 
is a significant move in this direction, to 
a certain extent delineating boundaries 
and replacing administrative control with 
law-based regulation. In this sense, it is an 
important step in building a new model of 
governance. 
The Charity Law moves toward direct 
registration for some SOs in a step that is 
basically a nationwide adoption of rules 
that had already been put into practice 
in a large number of provinces. It moves 
away from ex ante regulation to a system 
of ex post oversight connected to report 
filing, transparency, and accountability—
placing new demands on organisations in 
these regards. These responsibilities do not 
come accompanied automatically with new 
rights. The Charity Law and its ancillary 
regulations make the right to fundraise from 
the public a possibility for SOs that gain 
charitable organisation status, albeit only 
through a further process of accreditation. 
This is a major step in levelling the playing 
field for some genuinely non-governmental 
organisations to compete in the non-profit 
market. 
The new Law begins to swap opaque 
administrative management for a greater 
reliance on public oversight, and new ways 
of making this possible, such as with analysis 
of big data. There continue, however, to 
be exceptions and strong traces of the 
old way of thinking about how to achieve 
regulation. This is apparent for example 
in the Provisional Regulations on the 
Work of SO Registration and Management 
Bodies Related to Administrative Law 
Enforcement Using Talks (yuetan) released 
days after the passage of the Charity Law. 
Also, interestingly, some of the ancillary 
regulations that followed the passage of the 
Charity Law are actually related to all SOs and 
not just those with charitable organisation 
status, such as the Provisional Measures on 
SO Registration and Management Bodies’ 
Receipt and Handling of Complaints and 
Accusations passed in August 2016, and 
the Guiding Opinion on Strengthening and 
Improving the Management of Pay in SOs 
issued in July of the same year. This shows 
the need to regulate all SOs and not just 
charitable organisations.
Building a New System 
of Governance  
The Charity Law goes further toward 
enabling SOs to provide public services to 
the Chinese people in lieu of government. 
This means that government must delegate 
and outsource service provision through 
instruments set up at the local level (Simon 
2013). Some provinces and municipalities 
will find it more comfortable to do this by 
contracts or grants, while others may wish 
to use vouchers, and other methods (Simon 
and Teets 2014).
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Allowing SOs to provide almost everything 
but the most basic of public services forms 
one part of the transformation of China’s 
system of governance. Back in 2013, the 
Resolution of the Third Plenary Session 
of the Eighteenth Central Committee of 
the CCP announced that the ‘overall aim 
of comprehensively deepening reform is 
to push ahead with the modernisation of 
China’s governance system and capacity 
for governance’ (Central Committee of the 
CCP 2013). But using law as a means to do 
this will only go so far unless the law itself 
goes further. A basic law for charities is not 
enough.    
Two areas of reform given attention in 
Premier Li Keqiang’s 2017 Government 
Work Report illustrate this well (Li 
2017). The first is the ‘profound reform of 
government’ as government steps up efforts 
to transform its own functions and delegate 
roles and powers to others. SOs, not just 
charitable organisations, are a key group 
to ‘receive’ these new roles and powers. A 
crucial top level policy document issued 
jointly in 2016 by the general offices of 
the CCP Central Committee and the State 
Council (2016)—an unprecedentedly high 
level document for the non-profit sector—
links the government’s transformation of 
functions directly to SO development. The 
‘Two-Office Opinion’ (liangban yijian) as 
this document is known in Chinese, tells us 
that government will give priority to SOs in 
purchasing services related to safeguarding 
people’s welfare, social governance, and 
industry regulation, and states the need 
for SOs to make innovations in social 
governance. 
The second, directly related to the first, 
is the continued reform of public service 
institutions, the so-called shiye danwei. 
This reform goes back many years, but was 
underlined early in Xi Jinping’s first term in 
office as an important task in transforming 
the functions of government. Looking back at 
the Resolution of the Third Plenary Session 
of the Eighteenth Central Committee, the 
stated intention was to ‘push publicly run 
public service institutions to clear up their 
relationships with their managing bodies 
and de-governmentalise (qu xingzhenghua)’ 
and ‘push those public service institutions 
in the position to do so to transform into 
enterprises or SOs.’ 
What kind of SOs are these public service 
institutions supposed to transform into? 
Surely they cannot all be transformed into 
charities? And yet there is no basic law 
for SOs. This is not an easy issue as these 
institutions have complicated relationships 
with the state, involving a tangled web of 
different interests. Perhaps an even more 
knotty issue is that of the mass organisations 
(renmin tuanti), such as the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions and the All-
China Women’s Federation. But, these are 
critical reforms. In the market, state-owned 
enterprise reform is needed to level the 
playing field for businesses. In the third 
sector, public service institution reform 
is needed to allow the fair competition 
necessary to develop healthy SOs able to 
take on the roles and responsibilities of a 
transforming and downsizing government.  
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Over the past decade, the not-for-profit 
foundation sector has grown rapidly in China. 
This expansion has occurred as international 
foundations and organisations were 
withdrawing funding from Chinese grassroots 
NGOs, causing many civil society leaders to 
put their hopes into domestic foundations as 
a way to close their deficit of funding. But can 
the rise of foundations in China really replace 
the evaporating foreign grants for domestic 
NGOs?
The Rise of 
Foundations 
Hope for Grassroots Civil 
Society in China?
After the new Regulations on 
Administration of Foundations were 
promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
in 2004, foundations (jijinhui)—that is 
not-for-profit organisations that promote 
public benefit undertakings through 
grants and donations—experienced rapid 
growth in China. In light of this, some 
observers considered private foundations 
to be the hope of China’s third sector 
(China Development Brief 2011). The rapid 
expansion of the foundation sector indeed 
occurred as international foundations and 
organisations were withdrawing funding 
from Chinese grassroots NGOs, and many 
civil society leaders hoped that foundations 
would replace the international funding 
deficit. According to a report by the China 
Development Brief, ‘NGOs cannot rely 
solely on international foundations. In 
the future, international foundations will 
move on to other countries. Even now you 
see international foundations will not use 
the majority of their funding on a country 
like China that is developing so fast’ (2011, 
12). In fact, the Global Fund withdrew 
funding from China in 2013, the Ford 
Foundation changed its funding profile 
so that less than one third of its funding 
went to grassroots NGOs (Spires 2011), and 
the new Foreign NGOs Management Law 
(Left) Jet Li, movie star and President of the One Foundation; (Right) Supporters of the One 
Foundation during a charity event. Photo: Wikimedia Commons; One Foundation.
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passed in 2016 restricts foreign funding 
of domestic social organisations (Hsu and 
Teets 2016; Franceschini and Nesossi 2017). 
In this essay, I explore whether the rise 
of foundations in China could serve as a 
potential funding source to replace foreign 
grants for domestic NGOs.
Despite the promise of the rise of 
Chinese foundations, I find that they 
function differently from their counterparts 
in the United States, in that very few 
foundations make grants to other non-
profit organisations. This might be a 
result of differences in the identity (or 
missions) of Chinese foundations, or 
simply due to their relatively early stage 
of development. Regardless of the reason, 
since foundations mostly finance their 
own projects rather than funding other 
organisations, they often compete with, 
rather than support, NGOs. If this trend 
continues after the implementation of the 
Foreign NGOs Management Law further 
restricts foreign funding, grassroots NGOs 
will depend entirely on private donations 
and government-awarded service contracts 
for funding. Government contracts do not 
help grassroots NGOs build capacity in 
the same way that grants often do, in that 
most contracts prohibit the use of funding 
for salaries or restrict other administrative 
costs to ten percent of the total value of the 
contract. In order to promote a more diverse 
and active civil society sector, foundations in 
China should partner more with grassroots 
NGOs to build civil-society capacity and 
replace lost international funding. For 
example, the Narada Foundation provided 
ten million yuan to NGOs for over sixty-
two projects related to disaster relief and to 
aid reconstruction after the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake (China Development Brief 2011). 
This undoubtedly had a large impact on 
the groups receiving funding, and arguably 
helped them build capacity. 
The Rise of the 
Foundations Sector in 
China
Although the first foundations were 
established in 1981, the rapid expansion of 
this sector did not occur until after the 2004 
Regulations were passed, reducing capital 
barriers to two million yuan. The earliest 
were public foundations, mostly funded and 
managed by the government, and the 2004 
Regulations distinguish between ‘public 
fundraising foundations’ (gongmu jijinhui) 
which are allowed to raise funds publicly, 
and non-public fundraising foundations 
(feigongmu jijinhui), which are not allowed 
to raise funds publicly. Before 2004, over 
eighty percent of all foundations were 
government-initiated public foundations; 
but after 2004, private foundations increased 
to forty percent (China Foundation Center 
2013). Although private citizens started 
some of these private foundations, many 
are established by companies, especially 
those in real estate. In 2010, the number of 
private foundations overtook public ones, 
and by 2013 the total number of foundations 
reached 3,082-1,753 private and 1,329 
public (Feng 2013). At the latest count, 
5,209 foundations were registered in China 
(data from the China Foundation Center). 
Education is their most common focus, 
with fifty-three percent of all foundations 
focusing on education as a key area. By 
2013, there were 422 education foundations, 
with net assets, income and charitable 
spending accounting for nearly half of the 
total spending of private foundations (China 
Foundation Center 2013). 
Why is the emergence of a foundation 
sector so important? According to Joel 
Fleishman (2007), in the United States, 
foundations represent ‘the operational 
secret of America’s civic sector’ by playing 
‘the priming role … in starting new civic–
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sector organisations, they nurture them into 
self-sustainability, and provide a continuous 
supply of social venture capital to the civic 
sector.’ While almost eighty percent of the 
foundations in the United States are grant-
making, private Chinese foundations mostly 
operate their own projects; one study found 
that only 1.6 percent of all public foundations 
and 13.2 percent of all private foundations 
could be categorised as grant-making (Kang 
et al. 2012). Thus, despite the promise of 
private foundations becoming ‘the hope of 
China’s third sector’, very few foundations 
currently make grants to other non-profit 
organisations: 43.5 percent provide some 
grants to grassroots organisations, but 
only nine percent are solely grant-making 
foundations (Feng 2015). As Xu Yongguang, 
the President of the Narada Foundation and 
Emeritus Chairman of the China Foundation 
Center, notes, private foundations that 
fund NGOs are still in the minority (China 
Development Brief 2011). This results in 
insufficient support for grassroots NGOs—a 
situation that will take time to change. 
Despite its growing number of wealthy 
citizens, China has also been criticised for 
having little charitable giving. For example, 
the 2015 ‘World Giving Index’ ranked 
China 144 out of 145. Furthermore, while 
many foundations have been established, 
indicating the potential for an expanded 
charity sector, the China Foundation 
Ranking—a survey of grassroots Chinese 
NGOs that looks at their experiences with 
funders—criticised these organisations for 
not engaging in promoting the development 
of the sector or supporting the work of 
local NGOs. In the words of Chen Yimei, 
the Executive Director of the China 
Development Brief, ‘[the China Foundation 
Ranking] helps to make foundations realize 
that they should treat NGOs with more 
equality in their partnerships, rather than 
just assume a top-down relationship…. It’s 
a critical moment, a time when foundations 
are thinking about their operating model and 
the philanthropy sector is contemplating 
whether we should have more grant-making 
foundations’ (Bannister 2014). 
Sources of Change?
The lack of NGO support on the part of 
Chinese foundations might be due to a number 
of reasons, including legal impediments, 
habits of donors and foundations, or just an 
early stage of development. For example, 
over 85 percent of foundations have been 
registered with low levels of initial capital, 
under eight million yuan (Kang et al. 
2012). As regulations and habits change, 
will we see that more Chinese foundations 
assume a grant-making role, similar to the 
foundations in the United States? Or, as 
these foundations continue to develop, will 
we see persistence along a unique path of 
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(Left) Xu Yongguang, President of the Narada Foundation and Emeritus Chairman of the China 
Foundation Center. (Right) Members of the Narada Foundation during a meeting. 
Photos: Narada Foundation.
development, i.e. ‘foundations with Chinese 
characteristics’?
Regarding legal impediments, there is 
a great deal of change in the regulations 
governing this sector. The 2004 Regulations 
promoted the expansion of the foundation 
sector due to changes in tax laws, as well as 
the formation of private foundations. More 
recently, the 2016 Foreign NGOs Law restricts 
the ability of international foundations to 
fund grassroots NGOs in China. This means 
that Chinese NGOs will need to depend 
more on domestic sources of funding. In 
addition to increasing services contracted 
by local governments, the 2016 Charity Law 
allows any registered charity to apply for 
permission to seek public donations (see 
also the chapter by Simon and Snape in the 
present volume). This major change might 
provide more funding sources for NGOs, in 
addition to funding from foundations which, 
Shawn Shieh notes, is slowly increasing 
through mechanisms like ‘special funds’ and 
‘joint fundraising’ (2014). The regulations 
governing registration and management 
of the three types of ‘social organisations’ 
(shehui zuzhi) are currently under revision, 
and amendments are expected to be 
issued related to the Regulations on the 
Registration and Administration of Social 
Associations (1998); the Interim Regulations 
on the Registration and Administration of 
Civil Non-Enterprise Institutions (1998); 
and the Regulations on the Management 
of Foundations (2004) (Simon and Snape 
2017). 
In addition to legal changes that seem 
to encourage philanthropic giving and the 
expansion of the foundation sector, there 
is also a shift in habits of both donors and 
foundations regarding willingness to fund 
NGOs. This began in 2008 after the Sichuan 
earthquake. In 2016 the top one hundred 
Chinese philanthropists donated 37.9 billion 
yuan, up nearly twenty-five percent from 
the record 30.4 billion yuan given in 2014, 
underscoring the philanthropic potential 
in China (Simon and Snape 2017). Since, 
as Xu Yongguang notes, public foundations 
control most of the public donations in 
China, it may be more important to convince 
these types of foundations to support NGOs, 
as when the Chinese Red Cross offered 
funding to grassroots NGOs for the first time 
in the wake of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake 
(China Development Brief 2011). Xu and 
other foundation leaders are also creating 
initiatives like the China Private Foundation 
Forum and the China Foundation Center 
to encourage greater cooperation between 
foundations and NGOs.
These changes in the laws supporting 
foundations and philanthropy, shifting 
norms around charitable giving, coupled 
with the continued development of 
the foundation sector in China, might 
encourage foundations to take on more of 
a grant-making role similar to foundations 
in the United States. However, becoming a 
grant-maker is not inevitable, and is instead 
a decision that the founder must make. In 
this way, the unique path of development 
for Chinese foundations might influence 
whether foundations choose a grant-
making mission over a project-based one. As 
Shawn Shieh contends: ‘In our interviews, 
a surprising number of foundations who 
did commit to grant-making did so either 
because their founders had participated 
in or were in some way influenced by 
international philanthropic approaches’ 
(Shieh 2014). If the American model of 
grant-making influences the development 
of Chinese foundations, this would provide 
an invaluable source of funding for Chinese 
NGOs, especially as these grants might allow 
for a stronger focus on capacity building, 
unlike government service contracts. 
Although there remain many obstacles, 
the collaboration between an increasingly 
vigorous foundation sector and Chinese 
NGOs would thus end up reinforcing the 
continued development of each.
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Eighteen months after the Chinese 
crackdown on human rights lawyers 
started on 9 July 2015 (the so-called ‘709 
Crackdown’), a debate took place within 
the communities of China’s human rights 
lawyers (weiquan lüshi). It was a brief, yet 
passionate and provocative, discussion 
on some fundamental questions about the 
limits of the law in seeking justice and 
protecting rights in an authoritarian state, 
and on the limited role that lawyers can play 
in this endeavour. A pointed question that 
has been raised is whether the traditional 
case-focused and law-centred strategy of 
legal mobilisation, moderate or aggressive, 
is still a feasible approach to bring 
structural changes to the political system, 
incremental or otherwise. In the aftermath 
of the latest wave of repression, lawyers 
started to reflect on their past successes and 
failures, casting doubts on the potential of 
their own profession in catalysing political 
transformation. They also began to express 
deeply-seated anxiety, frustration, and 
confusion about human rights lawyering. 
Ultimately all the challenging questions boil 
down to this: is there a future for human 
rights lawyering in China as we know it? 
This essay addresses this question by 
analysing the practices of human rights 
lawyering, and by examining in broad 
strokes the process through which human 
rights discourses are translated into 
practices and the circumstances in which 
a socio-legal mobilisation may fail or 
succeed. In particular, the article focuses 
on the collective and sustained endeavours 
in which human rights lawyers and other 
citizen activists advocate the rights of 
specific communities through a relatively 
stable organisational structure. The primary 
concern here is not with the exceptional 
successes, nor with the notable failures in 
rights practices manifested in individual 
cases. Instead, the point is to take a close 
look at institutionalised routines in which 
legal cases are used as entry points to 
Fu Hualing
In the aftermath of the latest wave of 
repression, Chinese human rights lawyers 
have started to reflect on their past successes 
and failures. They also began to express 
anxiety, frustration, and confusion about 
their work. Ultimately all the soul searching 
boils down to one question: is there a future 
for human rights lawyering in China as 
we know it? To answer this question, this 
essay analyses the practices of human rights 
lawyering, and examines the circumstances 
in which socio-legal mobilisation may fail or 
succeed.
What Future is 
there for Human 
Rights Lawyering 
in China?
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Free the Rights Defense Lawyers, by 
Badiucao courtesy of China Digital Times.
mobilise support from popular opinion, and 
bring those pressures to bear on decision-
makers.    
  
Human Rights Ideas as 
an External Shock
To change a stagnant system, an external 
shock through the challenge of fresh and 
even ‘subversive’ ideas is necessary. Most 
of the human rights ideas, as practiced in 
China, originated outside of China and were 
then appropriated by Chinese reformers. 
Given that China is a late-comer in the 
construction of its legal system, importation 
and appropriation of foreign ideas has 
proved crucial for the seeding, incubation, 
and growth of rights discourses and 
practices. 
Since legal activism is guided by a moral 
vision of social change for the better, ideas 
that are appropriated are often regarded 
as progressive with some liberating and 
emancipatory impact. As such, they 
serve multiple functions. Ideas have an 
enlightening power: they educate, raise 
awareness, allow people to look at their 
world in alternative ways, and, in general, 
they lift up people’s spirit. Ideas also have 
the instrumental value of empowering 
people to re-frame their grievances and 
claims, enabling them to articulate and 
assert their positions in more effective and 
forceful ways. 
The appropriation of human rights 
discourses has always been a contentious 
issue. Some concepts have been quickly 
accepted and entered the mainstream. 
Others remain lofty ideas at a philosophic 
level, but have not been meaningfully put 
into practice. Yet others have been rejected 
firmly at an ideological level. In general, 
to become part of the mainstream, a rights 
discourse has to be politically acceptable or 
at least tolerated. In addition, we can say 
that if a discourse is merely property of the 
elites or vanguards, and the masses cannot 
claim ownership and make use of it in their 
daily life, it will not be effective. 
Legal activism is a top-down process in 
which elite members of a community—and 
those with visions, resources, and leadership 
ability—can, in the right circumstances, 
translate rights discourse into practices that 
will eventually catalyse a rights movement. 
China is not short of heroes or heroines in the 
legal field who have the courage and wisdom 
to fight alone. But what makes China’s rights 
practice enduring is the alliance making in 
the rights complex, capacity building in 
the NGO sectors, and the development of a 
critical citizenship among stakeholders and 
constituents.  
No Leaders, No Rights 
Movements
China’s rights movement is closely 
associated with a small group of individuals 
who often single-handedly trigger and then 
lead rights mobilisation in their respective 
fields. Few would deny the significant 
contributions that a limited number of 
individuals have made in organising and 
leading China’s rights practices. No leaders, 
no rights movements. 
Leaders in China’s rights movement 
share many core characteristics. A key 
quality of an effective rights leader is their 
credibility among the constituents they 
seek to represent. Leaders are not only 
embedded in the communities they work 
with, but are also able to develop common 
interests through their advocacy. An idea 
may be foreign, but organisation must be 
indigenous, and activism that is resilient 
and effective must be bottom up and inside 
out. In that sense, successful leaders are 
insiders. What is crucial, in the end, is 
the common identity, developed through 
frequent interpersonal connections, that 
binds leaders and constituents. Leaders who 
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are embedded in, part of, and supported 
by the respective physical and cultural 
communities are able to make their ideas 
enter the mainstream, empower and 
energise communities, and translate their 
ideas into practice. A shared identity, such 
as that of gender, sex orientation, disability, 
or social status, generates a strong sense of 
internal solidarity which, in turn, motivates 
members to strive for a collective endeavour. 
There exist different strategies based on 
different positioning of the leaders and the 
demands of their constituents. There are 
also significant fault lines, which divide 
rights movements in various subfields. 
First of all, there is a divide based on 
agenda setting and prioritisation of issues 
between elitists who aim at policy change 
and political impact, and grassroots 
campaigners who are principally concerned 
with welfare and short-term interests. 
Second, there is a fault line between those 
who focus on individual cases and those 
who prioritise institutional and structural 
changes. The main question in this case 
is whether the limited resources should 
be spent on addressing some immediate 
concerns or on raising more structural 
issues targeting a root cause. Finally, there 
is differentiation between those who work 
for and within the system, and those who 
challenge it. Traditional human rights 
lawyering is suspicious of legal institutions, 
and treats courts as adversaries rather than 
partners to work with and rely on. However, 
many lawyers insistently rely on the system 
to achieve larger policy objectives. Instead 
of challenging or bypassing the courts, there 
is now a more critical engagement between 
judges and lawyers in the courtroom, as well 
as in the court of public opinion. 
For instance, the celebrated Mr Lu Jun, 
a key leader in China’s civil society, argues 
persistently and forcefully that organisation 
matters the most in socio-legal activism. 
By organisation, Lu means coordinated and 
sustained socio-legal mobilisation that is 
case-focused and rights-based. This requires 
the active participation of lawyers, NGOs, and 
media, aiming simultaneously at influencing 
the immediate legal decision, shaping 
public opinion, and lobbying institutions 
for certain legal and policy changes. Under 
Lu Jun’s leadership, the NGO Yirenping 
excelled in public interest advocacy, but this 
was prior to the tightening of space for legal 
mobilisation and, indeed, Lu himself has 
become a victim of the crackdown (Fu 2012; 
Chin 2015). Can this style of public interest 
lawyering continue in these new and visibly 
more hostile circumstances?   
Lingering Spaces for 
Socio-Legal Mobilisation
While the world’s attention is directed 
to the persecution of lawyers and activists 
in the wake of the 709 Crackdown, there 
remains in China a resilient form of socio-
legal mobilisation with a sharp focus on 
equality rights. Yes, there is much less 
political space for activism and street action, 
but while this new hostile environment 
has halted the flash mob type of street 
action, a court-centric mobilisation is still 
feasible. This is a familiar story in which 
human rights lawyers work closely with the 
respective NGOs and use litigation as an 
entry point to shape and influence public 
opinion with the ultimate goal of achieving 
certain legal or policy changes. 
A key difficulty in launching public 
interest litigation today is the absence 
of plaintiffs. Suffering and grievances 
abound, but victims who are willing to 
step up to confront their bullies are a rare 
occurrence. Once a plaintiff is identified 
and prepped, a campaign has to be designed 
and implemented. A suitable team of public 
interest lawyers is retained, law professors 
in the respective fields are consulted, and 
journalists are notified. Once a case is in 
court, the event is widely publicised and 
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circulated in the media—including in official 
media—whose involvement may have been 
reduced but has not been prohibited. In 
these cases, all the parties in the rights arena 
have a common goal, that is to make the case 
educational for the general public and a 
deterrent for offending parties. The media 
landscape remains a significant battleground 
for public interest cases. Through a strategy 
of combining legal action through social 
media mobilisation and civil society capacity 
building, underpinned by continuous legal 
reform to strengthen professionalism, 
lawyers are able to move forward—inch by 
inch—knowing the potential setbacks and 
risks that lie ahead.  
Without a meaningful political process, 
legal mobilisation that is case-focused and 
court-centric is bound to be ‘petty’—soft 
in the approaches taken, incremental in 
objectives to achieve, and negligible in 
challenges to pose. Ten years ago, lawyers 
went to court to challenge discriminatory 
rules and practices; now the same lawyers 
have to restart, literally from scratch, 
similar litigation. Now, however, they have 
less political space while continuing to 
experience a similar degree of ignorance, 
insensitivity, and hostility. Even if they win, 
as they occasionally do, their actions do 
little to moderate political power or to hold 
the repressive arm of the state accountable. 
Two Answers to the 
Challenges Ahead
Activist lawyers have offered two answers 
to the challenges. A ‘weak’ answer relies on 
remedial justice. That is, while well aware of 
the structural constraints placed on socio-
legal activism, lawyers can still choose to 
do whatever they are allowed to do in order 
to make a contribution. As long as there is 
space—no matter how limited this space 
is—and as long as there are cases—no matter 
how petty they are—lawyers will continue.
A ‘strong’ answer points to the fact that 
public interest law survives a brutal political 
repression thanks to the resilience and strength 
of a rebellious sector in the legal profession 
and in civil society. Public interest litigation is 
not mainly about winning a case, but is about 
persuading power holders and educating the 
general public. Education and persuasion 
are necessarily slow paced and incremental 
in their processes. In addition, cases and the 
battles surrounding them serve as boosters 
for all stakeholders in the rights complex as, 
one by one, they strengthen the resolve of 
the forces of civil society and enhance their 
capacity in their on-going negotiations with 
the Party-state.  
More specifically and pointedly, 
individual cases do trigger systemic 
or structural changes. There are many 
examples of case-driven changes that have 
happened in the past. While one can argue 
that legal advocacy in authoritarian states 
cannot lead to transformative political 
change—and that, as some human rights 
lawyers insist, legal battles in court rooms 
do not have a democratisation potential—
one can argue with equal force that, as long 
as the regime embraces a degree of legality 
and promulgates laws to protect a range 
of legal rights, those rights-friendly laws 
can be enforced more or less effectively, 
and rights can be protected more or less 
rigorously. Legal and political opportunities 
are there, and it depends on civic leaders, 
professionals, and civil society at large to 
seize the opportunities to empower their 
human agency and to maximise their rights 
and freedoms through socio-legal action.      
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Early in the morning of Thursday 9 July 
2015 police hammered on the door of Wang 
Yu’s apartment in Beijing and took her away. 
Within days, hundreds of Chinese lawyers 
were called in for questioning by the police 
or the local lawyers’ association. While the 
majority of lawyers were released within 
hours, many were detained for days, months 
and, for some, now years. The ‘709’ incident, 
as it became known, is the most high profile 
systematic hounding and prosecution of 
Chinese human rights defenders in recent 
years. 
For over a decade, feminists, democracy 
activists, workers’ representatives, human 
rights lawyers (weiquan lüshi) lawyers 
and NGO staff have endured the threat 
of crackdowns and imprisonment as a 
deterrent to their activism. The authorities 
also deploy less high-profile measures to 
intimidate, harass, and punish activists: 
parents are bullied, old boyfriends 
approached, children are prevented from 
attending school, landlords are pressured 
into rescinding rental contracts, and high 
Nicola Macbean
Chinese civil society activists and human rights 
lawyers are experiencing unprecedented levels 
of repression. The relentless pressure, as well 
as the acts of police violence and torture, has 
made many fearful of the consequences of their 
work. This is, inevitably, taking a toll on the 
mental health of activists. While psychological 
counselling services in China have expanded 
in recent years, most counsellors are reluctant 
to work with politically sensitive clients. This 
essay examines the need for the human rights 
community in China to develop the skills 
to address the mental health challenges of 
activism.
The Mental 
Health Costs of 
Repression
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profile activists are not allowed to travel 
overseas (Franceschini 2017a). The police 
periodically step up the pressure on human 
rights defenders with unscheduled visits 
to offices and homes, monitoring meetings, 
photographing visitors or installing 
surveillance cameras. Almost anyone 
working in the civil rights field has been 
invited by the police ‘to drink tea’ (he cha), 
a euphemism for an interview or a rebuke. 
More insidious is the unseen surveillance: 
the monitoring of social media and the 
hacking of email and private messaging. 
The Psychological Toll of 
State Repression
Disappearances and the fear they induce 
have long been a governance tool of the 
Chinese Communist Party. Yet, the current 
level of repression appears unprecedented. 
The authorities seem to hope that relentless 
pressure will deter activists while the new 
Overseas NGO Management Law cuts off 
the main source of funds to civil society 
(Franceschini and Nesossi 2017). As 
domestic NGOs disband or are closed down, 
activism and the continued defence of 
human rights increasingly takes place on an 
individual or small scale. While this seems to 
offer some protection, working from home 
cuts off individuals from the conviviality 
and support of colleagues. Although social 
media partially offsets the physical isolation 
and need for social interaction, the constant 
stream of news detailing incidents and 
related calls for support can themselves be 
a source of stress. 
Human rights defenders share many of 
the same concerns as other over-burdened 
families in China: unsafe food and air 
pollution, school and job insecurity, and the 
costs of medical care. On top of this they 
must deal with shifting Party attitudes to 
their work. Considerable time and effort are 
dedicated to analysing the local and national 
situation to determine whether a particular 
case, report or activity will cross an invisible 
red line bringing a knock on the door late at 
night. 
For the human rights community, increased 
levels of repression pose three significant 
mental health challenges: managing day-to-
day anxieties; anticipating and preparing for 
the possibility of detention; and responding 
to the use of torture and ill treatment. 
Individuals face varied levels of risk and 
will also react differently to the impact 
of pressure by the authorities. Human 
rights defenders can learn to improve their 
personal security and build their confidence 
in handling police harassment and abuses. 
Courage and preparation, however, will 
not be enough. To sustain the work of the 
human rights community, the mental health 
costs of activism should be understood and 
addressed.  
Access to Psychological 
Support
A number of NGO staff have turned to 
China’s growing ranks of psychological 
counsellors for help in addressing feelings of 
stress and anxiety. For some the experience 
has been unsatisfactory. In the words of one 
young woman, the counsellor was unable 
to understand her fear of the police. To 
the counsellor such a fear was not only 
outside her realm of experience, but seemed 
irrational. Some counsellors are unwilling 
to help human rights defenders, seemingly 
worried that ‘political sensitivity’ may be 
contagious. There is equally a lack of trust 
on the part of many human rights defenders 
towards mainstream psychologists. 
Moreover, as a service to the wealthier 
middle classes, counselling in China does 
not come cheap. On an NGO salary it would 
be difficult to afford regular sessions.
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In recent years small peer support groups 
have started to meet. These gatherings 
provide participants with a psychologically 
safe space to share and work through their 
feelings and experiences. Peer support 
groups are a cost-effective response to the 
need for counselling. They have the added 
benefit of building stronger relationships 
within the human rights community. 
Although peer support groups lack 
expertise, by bringing people together who 
have shared experiences, they provide an 
opportunity for participants to learn from 
each other. Several groups now integrate 
attention to mental wellbeing into their 
broader human rights work. 
Experience suggests that peer support 
groups are most effective when group 
facilitators have the chance to continue 
developing their own skills. These include 
not only logistical skills to arrange meetings 
in the current climate, but also how best to 
respond to the varied needs of the group 
and individual members. A simple, but very 
valuable, skill is helping participants learn 
relaxation techniques to help manage stress, 
including deep breathing and visualisation. 
Some activists need to learn to take time 
off and introduce small pleasures into their 
weekly routines.
Many human rights defenders have tried 
to keep their activism separate from family 
life. They believe this will stop spouses or 
parents from worrying and protect their 
family from police pressure. Several years 
ago, the wife of a prominent imprisoned 
activist described a young woman she had 
met who had no knowledge of her husband’s 
activism. When he was detained she was 
completely unprepared. She knew none 
of his friends, had not met any weiquan 
lawyers and had no idea what to do. Peer 
support groups have encouraged human 
rights defenders to become more open with 
their families and seek their understanding, 
even if they cannot always enjoy their full 
support.
The ‘709’ wives have shown immense 
courage demanding accountability from 
the authorities for the detention of their 
husbands (BBC Beijing Bureau 2016). 
Together with the Feminist Five (Fincher 
2016), these wives have challenged gender 
stereotypes among activists and opened 
up new opportunities for the participation 
of family members. Strong and open 
relationships among close friends and 
family are needed to sustain activism for 
the long haul. They are also important when 
the frustration experienced by frontline 
human rights defenders may be expressed 
in anger or violence in the home. Support 
group leaders also need to recognise when 
professional help is needed. 
Observation suggests that fostering active 
listening is one of the most important skills 
for facilitators. While activists routinely use 
social media to report threats, beatings or 
other abuses, there are few opportunities to 
talk about the experience and how they felt 
being treated in this way. The development 
of active listening skills has helped survivors 
of police brutality to be able to tell their 
stories in their own words and at their own 
pace. Reflecting on one such conversation, 
a lawyer shared the relief he felt describing 
in detail, for the first time, his experience of 
being detained and beaten by the police: ‘No 
one asked me before how I felt.’ 
Surviving Torture and 
Violence
Active listening skills are not only 
important in peer support groups, but also 
among those lawyers whose clients have 
been tortured or subject to other forms of ill 
treatment. Working within the constraints 
of a brief meeting in the detention centre, 
lawyers are often quick to interrupt a 
conversation and offer their opinion. A 
former detained activist, while grateful for 
several visits from lawyers during his thirty-
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day detention, nevertheless complained that 
the lawyers never really listened to him. 
Improved communication skills among 
lawyers are essential where traumatised 
clients have difficulty recounting their 
experience in the logical manner that the 
law expects. As human rights lawyers have 
become targets of police abuse, forging 
increased mental health awareness is helpful 
on both a professional and personal level. 
Engaging with survivors of torture is a 
particular challenge for support groups. Many 
released prisoners and other human rights 
defenders have been subjected to torture, but 
there are no specialist rehabilitation services 
in China. Many survivors are also prevented, 
by public security, from travelling abroad 
to meet with psychologists based outside 
mainland China. Members of peer support 
groups can, therefore, be at the forefront in 
engaging with survivors. Sensitisation training 
on the impact of torture, the symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and the risk of 
re-traumatisation is starting to help lawyers 
and other human rights defenders develop 
more psychologically aware communication 
skills. Survivors require sufficient time to heal 
and process their traumatic experience before 
they are encouraged to speak out. 
Human rights lawyers have helped to raise 
awareness of the use of torture (Buckley 
2017). The apparent increase in the use of 
‘clean’, particularly psychological, torture is 
a direct response to growing public disquiet 
at police violence. New legal measures, 
such as the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence (Xinhua 2017a), are of little use if 
procurators and judges ignore allegations 
that unbearable psychological pressure was 
applied to secure a confession. Increased 
understanding of the impact of torture will 
help challenge the impunity with which 
interrogators use violence and threats to 
secure the cooperation of detainees.
Overcoming the Divided 
Self
Increased mental health awareness, 
and better skills to handle stress and fear, 
enhance the resilience of human rights 
communities to endure unprecedented 
repression. Recognising the toll on mental 
health experienced by many human rights 
defenders does not ‘pathologise’ dissent. 
Nor is fear of the police in China irrational. 
And greater psychological resilience to 
withstand repression does not normalise 
police brutality. On the contrary, it helps 
ensure that human rights defenders have 
the inner strength to continue challenging 
police abuse and illegality by the authorities. 
Many ordinary citizens in China display 
a divided self in which politically sensitive 
opinions are repressed to allow the 
individual to get on with their life. With their 
commitment to universal values, human 
rights defenders challenge this tension 
between the true self and a public persona 
that supports an increasingly repressive 
Party. Attention to mental wellbeing has 
encouraged greater emotional honesty 
among human rights defenders, and their 
friends and family. It is helping strengthen 
the human rights community through 
building stronger interpersonal networks. 
Talking about feelings helps human rights 
defenders articulate a language of optimism 
and human values in the face of a destructive 
repression. It is the belief in the rightness 
of their cause that helps sustain their work. 
Those of us outside China should ensure 
that they can continue to develop these 
essential skills and support each other at a 
difficult time. 
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Børge Bakken
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the 
Chinese Communist Party has reinvigorated 
attempts to eradicate detrimental ‘Western 
ideas’, resulting in the assertion that civil 
society is nothing more than a concept, if not 
a trap set by the West. In practice, however, 
these attempts by the Chinese government to 
prevent a civil society from organising itself 
has led to the emergence of a very different—
uncivil—type of society.
Snapshots of 
China’s ‘Uncivil 
Society’
It has now been thirty years since former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
gave voice to her famous and equally 
senseless idea that: ‘There is no such thing as 
society.’ In the Chinese Communist Party’s 
quest to eradicate ‘Western ideas’ from the 
realm of discourse in China through the 
‘seven prohibitions’ (qi bu jiang), Xi Jinping 
is likewise denying the existence of a society, 
by arguing that a civil society is nothing but 
a mere concept, and even a trap set by the 
West. Thatcher and Xi’s ideas are equally 
senseless and equally ideological in their 
quest to deny the obvious. While the denial 
of the very existence of a civil society is not 
new in China, and Xi Jinping is not the first 
to have devised this type of propaganda 
(it was already referred to as a ‘trap’ by 
the former Hu Jintao administration), 
the ‘trap theory’ today is closely linked to 
the propaganda surrounding the ‘Chinese 
Dream’ (zhongguo meng). 
Dreams of Exclusion
In the myth of the American Dream, it was 
once said that: ‘What is good for General 
Motors is good for America and good for 
you.’ In February 2013, the People’s Daily 
made a direct reference to the American 
Dream when stating that the Chinese Dream 
promotes the idea that what is good for 
the nation will also be beneficial for the 
individual. While holding to the assumption 
that the Chinese Dream diverges from 
its American counterpart, the Party-state 
basically promoted the same myth about the 
dream’s alleged benefits for ‘the people’. 
Ideological references to ‘individualism’ 
and ‘collectivism’ aside, the respective 
‘Dreams’ are, of course, the dreams of the 
rich and the beautiful. Like in America, 
many Chinese fall outside the dream with no 
chance to ‘get rich first’, as was the original 
slogan put forward by Deng Xiaoping. 
The present propaganda texts emphasise 
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Criminal poster wall in Guangzhou. 
Photo: Børge Bakken.
that the Chinese Dream is the dream of all 
Chinese, in particular the ‘Dream of the 
laobaixing’—the ‘old one hundred surnames’, 
or the people themselves. Of course it is all 
basically an emperor’s dream, and very much 
as is the case in America, the people who fall 
outside the grand dream tend to organise 
themselves in ways outside the legal rules 
and accepted norms in an attempt to reach 
the overarching cultural norm of prosperity 
that ultimately underpins the dream in the 
first place. In many such cases we are not 
even speaking of getting rich, but merely of 
getting by. 
The sociologist Robert Merton wrote 
about those excluded by the American 
Dream as far back as the late 1930s (1968). 
One of his main findings was precisely that 
people who could not achieve the dream 
of personal prosperity by the restricted 
avenues of legal means and norms would 
simply try to achieve that aim by illegal 
means. And why shouldn’t this be the case 
in a China that has moved from one of the 
most equal to one of the most unequal 
societies in the world in just a few decades? 
According to recent World Bank statistics, 
China has seen the Gini coefficient—the 
statistical estimate of relative equality and 
inequality—moving up from an equal 0.21 
in 1978 to an estimated highly unequal 0.61 
(AFP 2016). The Chinese people and their 
ways of organising themselves in the face 
of this reality is tangible and no imagined 
theoretical ‘trap’. 
Underworld Countryside
The paradox of trying to prevent a civil 
society from organising itself from the 
grassroots in any legal manner has seen 
the unintended consequence of a rather 
uncivil type of society emerging from the 
bottom of contemporary Chinese society. 
The examples of such phenomena are too 
many to describe here, but let me take just 
a couple of examples from my new book 
Crime and the Chinese Dream (Hong Kong 
University Press 2018). 
In the countryside, we see the emergence 
of a virtual criminal economy among the 
excluded. Earning money by illegal means 
has become common as the only way to ‘get 
rich’ or even just get by, and many parts of 
the countryside have come to be described 
as an ‘underworld countryside’. So-called 
‘criminal villages’ (fanzui cun) and criminal 
towns have emerged as people on the 
margins are struggling to fulfil the dream of 
relative prosperity in the only way available 
to them (Wu 2014). In Fang Village in the 
south-east, so-called ‘cake-uncles’ (bingshu) 
are running grand scams by carrying 
out sales with falsified account books—
extending their fraudulent activities across 
China and making the village prosperous. 
The new mansions in the village are all built 
and owned by the fraudsters. The village 
girls all want to marry a ‘cake-uncle’ instead 
of a toiling peasant. The story is one where 
the village struggled with all kinds of legal 
means to gain prosperity before they found 
their criminal and profitable trade. Fang 
Village is not alone. 
A map of criminal villages in China shows 
a diversity of criminal activities from fraud, 
organised large-scale shoplifting, car theft, 
and burglary. In one much publicised 
example, a robbery village in Guangxi 
specialised in hand-cutting as a means of 
creating chaos and then utilised that chaos 
to rob people in the panic after their blood-
letting attacks. The village robbers typically 
attacked crowded places like train stations 
or other locations where many people 
had gathered. The culprits then robbed 
and fled in the mayhem created by the 
incident. Other examples we can read about 
include drug-producing villages where 
the whole local economy is based on drug 
production and transportation, typically in 
poor provinces like Yunnan and Guangxi in 
the south-western drug belt areas. There 
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are also weapon-making villages trading 
in illegal firearms. The list of criminal 
entrepreneurialism is diverse and wide 
ranging. 
I have recently been involved in a project 
that looks at child kidnapping. The project 
has identified villages that base their local 
economy on the kidnapping of children 
for profit. We found that the children are 
typically under three years of age, and that 
there is a clear ‘division of labour’ among 
traffickers. The last link in the on-the-spot 
act of kidnapping is often an old woman 
who may look like the grandmother of the 
screaming kidnapped child, not creating any 
suspicion about the crime being committed. 
After the kidnapping, other perpetrators 
stand for the storage, transport, and final sale 
of the kids. The entire process is extremely 
well organised, with the police involved 
occupied looking in other directions. In this 
example it is worth noting that impunity 
is the rule for the kidnappers, and that 
the civil society occupied with organising 
and petitioning activities among parents is 
cracked down upon far more readily and 
effectively than the ‘uncivil’ organisations 
and networks in the criminal villages. The 
few solved child-kidnapping cases are 
shown on a special national TV show as 
‘proof ’ of the effectiveness of the police. 
Parents, however, are not able to have the 
TV station run any unsolved cases, as the 
show only allows happy stories to be aired.
Criminal Advertisement
A snapshot from the ‘uncivil’ reality of 
the cities can be illustrated by a short stroll 
over a narrow footbridge in Guangzhou. 
I counted no less than two hundred and 
fifty illegal posters and stickers offering 
everything from false documents and stolen 
goods, to sexual scams and job ads for 
prostitutes. This is typical for many public 
spaces in the city—in the outlaying rural 
areas, the suburbs, and the central business 
districts. All posters, stickers and painted 
messages come with a mobile phone number 
that is impossible to trace by the police, and 
the high-ranking policemen I spoke with 
said they do nothing about this unless there 
is a genuine complaint from the public, and 
even then is there is not much that can be 
done. The regular police even blame the 
urban management teams (chengguan) for 
being responsible for the criminal posters 
problem. The chengguan on their side 
believe that it is the duty of the police to 
take down the posters, so they simply let 
it pass and refuse to do anything about the 
problem. The uncivil society, thus, has free 
advertisement walls all over the city and 
with a nearly one hundred percent chance 
of impunity. 
If the Cultural Revolution had its ‘big 
character posters’ (dazibao), and the late 
1970s and early 1980s had their ‘democracy 
walls’ (minzhu qiang), the Chinese Dream era 
has its own criminal poster walls (as well as 
bridges and all kinds of public spaces) with 
free ads for criminal activity. Such posters 
more or less dominate many cities in China 
today, and this kind of ‘uncivil society’ is 
allowed to spread. The walls are typically 
plastered with private commercial posters, 
job ads, and all kinds of announcements, 
legal and illegal alike. On many walls, 
recruitment posters for the army and the 
brothels stand side by side. The picture 
that accompanies this article shows several 
typical criminal posters, like the frequently 
displayed big red poster ads for recruiting 
male money boys and female prostitutes 
(concealed with inventive ‘job descriptions’ 
such as ‘secretary’, ‘PR-consultant’, 
‘service worker’, ‘housemaid’ etc.). The 
job categories are easily recognised by the 
people in question as describing different 
forms of prostitution with promised 
earnings of up to sixty thousand yuan per 
month. 
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Another poster at the bottom left of the 
photo pictures a beautiful twenty-nine-
year-old woman accompanied by a scam 
story of an unhappy marriage and a rich 
husband’s accident leading to the couple 
not being able to have a child. Half a million 
yuan (!) is promised to the person who can 
make her pregnant (after paying a ‘small fee’ 
of one thousand and two hundred yuan to 
the couple’s alleged lawyer). My colleague 
who speaks Cantonese with a northern 
accent phoned the number, met a woman on 
the line, and set up an appointment to meet 
her alleged lawyer at a hotel lobby the next 
day. He never went, but the scam became 
clear to us. The ‘lawyer’ would disappear as 
soon as the fee was paid. I asked a policeman 
if people really buy this scam, and he 
confirmed that many do, and that they never 
receive any complaints because the betrayed 
‘inseminator’ never dares come to the police 
with his foolish mistake. This type of scam 
has almost no chance of being targeted by 
the police, and this is well known among the 
perpetrators.
Uncivil Society Out of 
Control
Capitalism has come to China in the grand 
package of a Chinese Dream, and the crimes 
that follow are covered up by massively 
falsified crime statistics. According to 
data gathered a couple of years ago, in 
Guangzhou alone the real numbers of crime 
known to the police are falsified down to 2.5 
percent in the official statistics, while 97.5 
percent is concealed to the public (Xu 2017). 
The falsification of numbers concerns petty 
crime as well as serious violent crime. The 
government is no longer fully in control of 
crime and ‘uncivil’ entrepreneurialism, but 
they care more about controlling the alleged 
‘trap’ of civil society. In short, petitioning is 
more important to control than kidnapping. 
This situation recalls what Marx and 
Engels wrote in their Communist Manifesto 
about bourgeois society—that it is ‘like the 
sorcerer who is no longer able to control 
the powers of the nether world whom he 
has called up by his spells’ (2004, 51). Both 
economies and norms change in this spiral 
of capitalist economic development (with 
Chinese characteristics), giving rise to 
‘uncivil’ forms of entrepreneurialism. In 
such a whirlwind, the ‘nether world’ in Marx 
and Engels’ account may well translate into 
the ‘uncivil society’ shown in the criminal 
villages in the countryside and the criminal 
posters on the city walls. 
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3,653 days, 3,653 posts. Day after day for ten 
years, one solitary blogger has been keeping 
track of the time that has passed since 28 
March 2007, when fifteen-year-old Yuan 
Xueyu disappeared from a construction site 
in the centre of Zhengzhou, Henan province. 
Every morning, Dou Jiangming—who in 
his ‘ordinary’ life is a prominent media 
personality in China—posts exactly the same 
message on his Weibo account (https://www.
weibo.com/doujiangming): ‘Today it is day x 
in the search of Yuan Xueyu. Public Security 
Bureau of Zhengzhou, could you please 
tell us what progress has been made in his 
case? The missing workers in the incident 
of the black brick kilns in Shanxi province 
remain missing. Netizens have donated 
four thousand yuan as a reward for any 
relevant clue. The Public Security Bureau of 
Zhengzhou opened the case related to Yuan 
Xueyu’s disappearance back in 2007.’ 
Yuan Xueyu had arrived in Zhengzhou a 
couple of weeks before his disappearance 
to be an apprentice to a fellow villager—a 
worker specialising in setting up window 
Ivan Franceschini
In the spring and summer of 2007, bands 
of aggrieved parents roamed the Chinese 
countryside looking for their missing children, 
whom they learned had been kidnapped 
and sold as slaves to illegal kilns. Thanks 
to the involvement of Chinese media and 
civil society, the so-called ‘black brick kilns 
incident’ became one of the most remarkable 
stories of popular mobilisation and resistance 
in contemporary China. Now that ten years 
have passed, are there any lessons that we can 
draw from this moment in history?
Slaving Away
The ‘Black Brick Kilns 
Scandal’ Ten Years On
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Pictures of missing children.
Photo: Daniele Dainelli, Contrasto.
frames. Like many of his childhood friends, 
he had been unable to resist the call of the 
big city, which resounded particularly strong 
in his remote rural village, and against the 
wishes of his father had dropped out of 
middle school. When he heard that his son 
was nowhere to be found, Yuan Cheng did 
not waste any time. He immediately went 
to Zhengzhou and took up a job in the same 
construction site. He posted leaflets with 
the photo of his son everywhere, but the only 
result was that strangers started to call him 
pretending to know the boy. Saying that his 
son had been in an accident, they asked him 
to wire some money and then disappeared. 
It was only after encountering other parents 
whose children had disappeared in similar 
circumstances, that Yuan Cheng finally 
found some hope. Listening to their stories, 
he realised that there was a good chance 
that his son had been kidnapped and sold 
into slavery in a brick kiln somewhere in 
the countryside. The prospects were still 
dim, but at least now he had an idea where 
to look.
In the spring and summer of 2007—in 
what came to be known as the ‘black brick 
kilns incident’ (heizhuanyao shijian)—
these bands of aggrieved parents roaming 
the Chinese countryside looking for their 
missing children made for one of the most 
remarkable stories of popular mobilisation 
and resistance in contemporary China. 
It was a saga of unendurable pain and 
unprecedented camaraderie—of friendship 
as well as betrayal. It was a story that 
deserved to be told and it quickly piqued my 
interest and sparked my imagination. I wrote 
both my first book (Franceschini 2009) and 
one of my earliest media reports on the 
incident (Fang 2008). Instead of focusing 
on the dark side of slavery and exploitation, 
I decided to emphasise on the positive side 
of the mobilisation of Chinese civil society 
in support of these aggrieved parents. It 
was indeed an amazing display of solidarity, 
something that remains awe-inspiring even 
today. Now that ten years have passed, are 
there any lessons that we can still draw from 
this story?
A Mother’s 
Determination
The chain of events that led to the 
explosion of interest in the kilns scandal 
began in March 2007 with Yang Aizhi, a 
mother whose sixteen-year old son had 
recently gone missing in Zhengzhou (Zhu 
2007a). After covering the city with posters, 
Yang was contacted by another parent who 
told her that his two sons had just escaped 
from slavery in a kiln in Shanxi province. 
Convinced that her son had to be in a similar 
place, Yang immediately left for the area. 
There, she visited no less than one hundred 
kilns, finding many young slaves, some of 
them still wearing school uniforms. After 
going back to Henan, she got in touch with 
five other parents in the same situation 
through the missing people announcements 
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Yuan Cheng on the road searching for his son.
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published on the pages of a local newspaper. 
Together, they established what the Chinese 
media later termed the ‘League of the 
Search for Children’ (xunzi lianmeng). In 
just a couple of months they rescued more 
than forty children from slavery.
Realising that their task far outweighed 
their strength, they decided to seek help 
from the media. As it turned out, their stories 
were so difficult to believe that only one 
journalist, Fu Zhenzhong of the City Channel 
(dushi pindao), a local TV station in Henan, 
accepted to follow them in their search. He 
made the right choice. When, on the evening 
of 19 May 2007, the footage of young boys 
wearing rags and doing heavy works in kilns 
in Shanxi that Fu had shot with a hidden 
camera was aired on television, there was 
an uproar. As Fu later recalled, ‘in the three 
days after the airing of the feature about the 
kilns, about one thousand parents came to 
the TV station looking for help’ (Fu 2007). On 
that day, mothers and fathers that until that 
moment had not known where to look for 
their children discovered the existence of the 
kilns and realised that they were not alone in 
their plight. It was then that these parents 
started organising themselves in small teams 
to scour the Shanxi countryside. 
Then, on 6 June, the aunt of a child 
recently rescued by the League expressed 
her gratitude in a tearful post on a local 
web portal in Henan province (Zhu 2007b). 
This post, which was shared by more than 
three hundred thousand people all over 
the country, finally managed to attract the 
attention of the national media. From that 
moment on, ‘black brick kilns’ became a 
term of common use throughout China.
The Hidden Rules of the 
Kilns
For the whole summer of 2007, the 
coverage of the scandal on the Chinese 
media was impressive, with journalists and 
media outlets competing with each other 
to describe the reality of the kilns in the 
smallest detail. Even the Party struggled to 
keep up with this avalanche of information. 
It came out that the slaves in the kilns were 
not only teenagers who had been deceived 
with the illusion of a well-paid job or 
abducted with violence, but also adults 
with mental problems and children, a docile 
workforce that never raised any demands. 
Among the lesser-known survivor stories 
was that of Hao Dingpo, a fifteen-year-old 
boy who had spent two and a half years 
in the kilns after being kidnapped from 
Zhengzhou in March 2005. According to his 
mother, whom I interviewed back in May 
2008, when he finally managed to escape 
in the summer of 2007, he had waist-long 
hair and a number on his wrist. According 
to his testimony, names were never used 
in the kiln, only numbers. They had a daily 
production quota of ten thousands bricks 
and, when they were not able to fulfil it, 
they were savagely beaten. When a fugitive 
was caught attempting to escape, he was 
beaten to death by the guards and the body 
was left in the open to rot as a warning to 
others. Hao Dingpo claimed to have seen six 
people dying this way, but there was no way 
to verify his claim as he was never able to 
indicate the exact location of the kiln.
The conditions in the kilns had a dramatic 
impact not only on the body of the slaves, 
but also on their mental well-being. When 
I met Zhang Shanlin in May 2008, one year 
after the police had rescued his son from a 
kiln, he was worried because the boy, who 
once had been lively and cheerful, had lost 
any interest in anything, including in his 
dream of becoming a chef. The teenager 
refused to leave his house and avoided any 
human contact. He not only felt ashamed 
about what had happened to him, but he also 
kept dreaming about his life in the kiln and 
woke up screaming almost every night.
The media were relentless in eviscerating 
the local dynamics behind the existence of 
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the kilns. It was evident that the regime 
of the kilns could exist only because many 
people benefitted from it. A Nanfang 
Zhoumo report quoted a former slave as 
saying: ‘[The life in the kiln] was like the 
food chain in the animal realm… This chain 
had six rings: the owner of the kiln > the 
baogongtou [i.e. a subcontractor in charge 
of all matters related to the workers] > 
the guards > the older workers > the new 
workers > the retards’ (Chen 2007). While 
the owner was always a local person, the 
baogongtou generally came from somewhere 
else—usually the place where he found his 
victims. 
The relationship between the black 
kilns and the local communities was also 
very important. Although many accounts 
described the geographical seclusion of 
these places, local people were well aware 
of these realities. The reason they accepted 
them is that the economy of the kilns had its 
advantages for the local community, since 
they stimulated local development and 
created new opportunities to get rich (Zhu 
2007c). Support from the local community 
was also one of the reasons why escaping 
from the kilns was so hard. Since local 
workers were too expensive and almost 
impossible to exploit due to the protection 
coming from their familial networks, slaves 
were inevitably ‘outsiders’ (waidiren). 
Sometimes local people themselves 
contributed by supplying the kilns with 
the workforce they needed. This is what 
happened to Shen Haijun, a thirty-eight-
year-old man from Jiangsu province, who 
ended up as a slave in a kiln while looking 
for his mother, a sixty-year-old widow who 
had been sold as a wife to an old bachelor 
in Shanxi by a relative (Liu 2007). Shen told 
the journalists that, once he had arrived in 
the village where his mother had been sold, 
he had asked an old lady for directions. 
Under the pretence of helping him find a 
well-paid job, she sold him to the local kiln 
owner. 
The higher echelons of the Party-state did 
not fare any better in the media. Reports 
not only highlighted that the middle-level 
bureaucracy in Shanxi province was fully 
aware of the existence of the kilns, but 
that some officials were even complicit 
in perpetuating slavery. One of the most 
unbelievable stories of all was that of Zhu 
Guanghui, a young boy from Henan (Zhu 
2007d). Rescued by the police from a kiln on 
27 April 2007, he was immediately sold back 
to another kiln by a local labour inspector, 
who even deducted an ‘intermediation fee’ 
(zhongjiefei) of three hundred yuan from 
the back salary of the boy. Zhu was rescued 
again during another police operation at the 
end of May. In the following days, a local TV 
station managed to record a confrontation 
between him and the labour inspector who 
had sold him. Nobody could have imagined 
that on that same afternoon the labour 
inspector would deceive the boy once again, 
selling him to yet another kiln. Finally, on 
18 June 2007, Zhu Guanghui was rescued for 
a third time and managed to get back home 
safely. 
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Yuan Cheng holds the photo of his missing 
son in his hand. 
Photo: Daniele Dainelli, Contrasto.
The Response of the 
Authorities
The stories told by families of the missing 
children were filled with desperation and 
highlighted the indifference of the local 
authorities. Back in May 2008, Wang Xiaoli, 
the mother of a boy who had gone missing 
in 2006 in Gongyi county, Henan province, 
told me: ‘When I went to the police to report 
that my son was missing, they declined to 
even open the case. They said that such 
situations are too common to be taken 
into consideration.’ At the moment of his 
disappearance, her seventeen-year-old son 
was studying for the university admissions 
exam (gaokao). He was one of the best 
students in his school and had a very good 
chance to be accepted to a top university—a 
remarkable achievement for a boy from a 
poor rural area. Yet, on 26 October 2006, 
he went missing without a trace: he was 
supposed to spend a few days at a friend’s 
house, but somehow disappeared before 
reaching his destination.
The media storm triggered by the aggrieved 
parents changed everything, at least for a few 
weeks. In June 2007, the central authorities 
reacted launching a provincial investigation 
into the Shanxi kilns. The numbers involved 
were impressive, the outcome less so. 
According to official data, the police checked 
86,395 employers, discovering that 36,286 
(forty-two percent) of them were operating 
without any formal permission; 4,861 brick 
and tile kilns were inspected, among which 
3,186 (63.3 percent) were found to be lacking 
any registration; in total, the workers in the 
kilns numbered eighty-one thousand, but 
only seventeen kilns were found to have 
severe problems (Xinhua 2007). Among 
them, thirteen had incidents of child labour. 
On the whole, 359 workers were rescued, 
including 121 mentally disabled adults and 
fifteen children. In the meantime, the top 
echelons of the Party launched a campaign 
to ‘sweep’ the ranks of the local bureaucracy, 
with ninety-five officials being punished for 
malfeasance and dereliction of duty, while 
President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao raised their voices asking for further 
investigations to reveal cases of corruption 
related to the kilns (Zhang 2007a). 
At the same time, the Chinese leadership 
could not miss the opportunity to ride the 
publicity wave of the scandal to promote its 
political agenda. In particular, the media 
coverage of the kilns was used to accelerate 
the troubled legislative process that led to 
the passage of the Labour Contract Law, 
then stranded due to the emergence of a 
heated public debate about the advisability 
of introducing new guarantees for workers’ 
rights at a stage in which economic 
development was still fuelled by low labour 
costs (Gallagher and Dong 2011). After more 
than three years of top-level discussions 
and more than a dozen blueprints, the 
kilns scandal was an essential factor that 
facilitated the ultimate approval of the 
Law, which was passed at the end of June 
right in the middle of the media storm. Xie 
Liangming, then Deputy Director of the 
Department of Legal Affairs of the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, declared: ‘[If 
the kilns scandal had not happened] I think 
that the debate would have continued. Since 
the scandal deeply moved the legislative 
bodies, including many committee members 
who felt that such situations could not be 
understood and that it was necessary to be 
more severe, the Law was pushed through’ 
(Wang 2007). 
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Migrant workers in Zhengzhou.
Photo: Daniele Dainelli, Contrasto.
The Kilns After the Kilns
Ten years later, the kilns might not be as 
widespread as before, but all the signs point 
to their continued existence. In May 2009, 
Chinese media reported that in Jieshou city, 
Anhui province, the police rescued thirty-
two mentally disabled workers enslaved 
in two different kilns (Cheng 2009a). 
According to the available accounts, these 
people were deceived by a human trafficker, 
in this case a taxi driver, who earned two to 
three hundred yuan for every person that he 
‘introduced’ to the kilns. Closely guarded 
by thugs who did not hesitate to resort to 
violence, these slaves, whose age varied from 
twenty-five to forty-five, lived locked in a 
courtyard and were forced to work ten hours 
a day without receiving any wage besides a 
few yuan for their personal expenses. The 
police then arrested ten people, including 
the baogongtou and the owners.
In June 2010, Chinese media reported 
that the police in Shilin county, Yunnan 
province, had rescued about twenty slaves 
from a local kiln (Huang 2010). One of the 
slaves, a man from Chongqing, described to 
the journalists the brutality of his guards 
who, in order to make him work seventeen 
hours a day, beat him with steel bars and 
leather belts. Similarly, in December 2010, 
a story of human trafficking of  individuals 
with disabilities based in Qu county, 
Sichuan province, was widely reported in 
the Chinese media (Ran 2010). In that case, 
everything was happening with the open 
connivance of the local authorities, under 
the cover of a public shelter for disabled 
people. In another remarkable story, in 
September 2011 Cui Songwang, a reporter 
for a Zhengzhou television station, hung 
around a train station posing as a disabled 
man for two days, until he was kidnapped 
and sold to a kiln manager for five hundred 
yuan (Cui 2011). Cui said he was forced to 
work for three hours, beaten and deprived 
of water before he managed to escape and 
report the case to police. More recent media 
reports tell the story of slaves who managed 
to escape from the kilns, such as forty-three-
year old Xu Shuhe, who was a slave in black 
brick kilns in Guangzhou for twenty-four 
years (Zou 2017b); thirty-three-year old Fan 
Debao, who spent eleven years in slavery (Li 
2016); and thirty-five-year old Qi Zhaojun, 
who was deprived of his liberty for twenty-
one years in a number of kilns in Shanxi 
province (Gao and Zhang 2015). 
Yuan Xueyu is still missing, another victim 
of what Børge Bakken has called China’s 
‘uncivil society’ (see the previous chapter). 
His father Yuan Cheng is still looking for him 
and in his search has, thus far, been able to 
save more than one hundred children (Zhang 
2013). In all this, is there any lesson that can 
be drawn from what happened ten years 
ago? Looking at the latest developments 
in Xi Jinping’s China—the taming of the 
critical voices in traditional and new media, 
the arrests and disappearances of those who 
speak for the weak and disenfranchised, 
the systematic intimidation of those 
who challenge the message of ‘harmony’ 
espoused by the Chinese Communist Party—
one cannot but wonder whether a display of 
solidarity like the one that took place during 
that hot summer of ten years ago would still 
be possible today. However, the solitary 
blogger’s daily post is a reminder that not 
everything is lost, that not everybody has 
forgotten. In the end, as they say, no matter 
how hard you try, paper cannot wrap up 
embers.
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T H E 
G O O D 
EARTH
Chinese 
Environment and 
the Commons
Andrea E. Pia
The debate over China’s environmental issues 
has given scant consideration to already 
existing popular alternatives to the top-
down, growth-compatible governance of 
the country’s natural resources. Forty years 
of Party-sanctified insistence on pursuing 
relentless economic development has 
seemingly suppressed alternative discourses 
in natural resource management. However, if 
we take closer look, we will find that at the 
grassroots there is no lack of alternatives. For 
instance, in contemporary rural China there 
are places where water is being managed as 
a commons.
A Water 
Commons in 
China?
As a one-time campaigner for the 2011 
Italian Referendum against the privatisation 
of the country’s domestic water services 
(Mattei 2013), I was excited to discover 
during fieldwork in Yunnan province that 
when briefed and asked about their views 
on the referendum proposals, most of my 
informants in the water sector were in 
fact sympathetic to them. They similarly 
hoped to protect water from marketisation 
and demanded the democratisation of its 
management. 
As I write this essay, an ethnographic 
scene comes to mind. One day in 2012, I 
took part in negotiations between a village 
committee and a public-private enterprise 
regarding a water conservancy project 
that would have required the relocation 
of several of the village’s households. 
The Committee pointed out that the 
proposed project mainly benefited the 
enterprise, which would gain access to state 
subsidies regardless of the efficacy of their 
infrastructure. The enterprise was legally 
required to win the Committee’s assent to 
the project. To do so, they eventually had to 
accede to the local Party Secretary’s request 
that the enterprise build a number of free-
of-charge water dispensers for the newly 
relocated households at its own expense. 
Cases of political strong-arming for the 
sake of public access to water such as this 
had also been typical of Italian campaigners 
in the run-up to the referendum (Carrozza 
and Fantini 2016). But such similarities begs 
the question: if Chinese people involved in 
everyday water politics were thinking along 
similar lines to Italian water activists, what 
was pre-empting the emergence of a similar 
movement in China? Obviously, the two 
countries are characterised by divergent 
political traditions and conceptions of social 
and environmental justice (Brandtstadter 
and Steinmuller 2017)—for instance, a 
referendum is a not an option in China. 
A water delivery initiative in northwest Yunnan. 
Famers receive barrels of drinking water from 
the government while fresh water from local 
springs is impounded and diverted elsewhere.
Photo: Andrea E. Pia.
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However, in this essay I will explore 
whether the answer may have something 
to do with the thus far poorly theorised 
question of the commons in China.
In what follows I will argue that in 
contemporary rural China there are places 
where water is already being managed as a 
commons. Making fresh water a commonly 
held resource entails breaking with global 
practices of water management in three 
ways. First, water has to lose its status as a 
commodity and be re-defined as a flowing 
component of the environment. When 
water is reconceptualised as a commons, 
the continuous local availability of its 
nurturing flow gains prominence over the 
market-mediated relationship between its 
supply and demand (Helfrich and Bollier 
2015). Second, from the point of view of 
its management, water services cease to be 
run for profit, return on capital invested 
in water infrastructure lowers to zero, 
and ownership is reframed as a shared 
obligation to universal and sustainable 
provision. Finally, water services are opened 
up to public participation with a view to 
preserving the life-nurturing qualities of the 
water flow over generations.  
Techno-Political Frames
So far the debate about China’s current 
environmental issues has given little 
consideration to already existing popular 
alternatives to the top-down, growth-
compatible governance of the country’s 
endangered natural resources. Forty years 
of Party-sanctified insistence on pursuing 
relentless economic development has 
seemingly muffled the few dissenting voices 
and suppressed alternative discourses in 
natural resource management—such as 
those concerned with stewardship, care, 
maintenance, or even rejuvenation of the 
Chinese environment (He 2015). 
Instead, the language of techno-politics is 
holding sway. This is a mix of legal tweaks 
and engineering innovations—for instance, 
those behind the introduction of tradable 
water permits and huge water diversion 
schemes (Ray 2013; Walker 2014b)—which, 
by preaching the appealing fantasy of the 
harmonious coexistence of China’s present 
capitalist mode of development with nature, 
have slowly won over many of China’s most 
belligerent environmentalists (Ma 2017). 
Surprisingly, the case for the coexistence 
of continuous growth and sustainability 
has arguably found a favourable, if unlikely, 
currency for its propagation in the political 
doctrine of ‘Ecological Civilisation’ (shengtai 
wenming). While proposing a re-orientation 
of China’s current model of growth—hailed 
by a felicitous start and some early success 
stories (Geall 2015; Xinhua 2017b)—in the 
sanitised version currently peddled by the 
Chinese government, Ecological Civilisation 
actually seems to be working to reinforce a 
chauvinistic and system-preserving distrust 
in local people’s ability to redress the 
imbalance between efficiency in resource 
use and equity in allocation. What gets 
de-emphasised in the institutionalisation 
of Ecological Civilisation is the potential 
offered by empowering communities to 
democratically take environmentally 
sensitive decisions for themselves (Gare 
2012).
Distributing the 
Sensible
The dominance of the techno-politics of 
sustainability in China renders local people 
incapable of articulating and implementing 
alternatives. That does not mean to say 
that local people have no interest in 
developing alternative ways of dealing with 
environmental crises. Indeed, a good deal of 
empirical work has recently suggested that 
concrete local alternatives to business-as-
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usual are, if anything, in very high-demand, 
especially for those at the periphery of 
contemporary Chinese society. Citizens at 
the losing end of economic development—
including rural resettlers, ethnic minorities, 
and others—are all aware that environmental 
degradation is impacting them first. For 
instance, those who have to figure out 
how to fetch their clean water everyday 
usually seek out workable alternatives 
more pressingly than environmentally-
blind urbanites. The analytical problem is, 
therefore, one of recognising the political 
agency of those who are elaborating viable 
counter-practices.
While the people directly engaged with 
the governance of natural resources may 
themselves ignore the extent to which 
the alternatives they put to work can be 
identified as sustainable or even counter-
paradigmatic within China’s institutional 
architecture, the problem at stake here is 
one of visibility—or as Rancière would put 
it, one of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ 
(Rancière 2006). Rancière suggests that 
political fault lines are perceivable only to 
the groups who are sitting by them—in our 
case disenfranchised farmers living in water 
dispossessed communities—while their 
capacity to effectively overcome common 
predicaments in any political consequential 
way is publicly denied to them by their 
very proximity to such fault lines. Thus, 
counter-practices and counter-enunciation 
are rendered unintelligible to anyone, their 
supporters included.
Up until now, the multifarious 
sustainability proposals championed by the 
Chinese government have taken the lion’s 
share of the public debate on sustainability 
in the country, so much so that the very 
people who are concretely engaging with 
political practices of responsible, equitable, 
and un-marketed stewardship of common 
resources in contemporary China are not 
able to call them for what they are. Even 
worse, they struggle to see them as being 
in discontinuity from the demonstrably 
short-term solutions ushered in by those 
who consider the environmental question 
a technical problem requiring nothing 
more than the tools available within the 
imaginative horizon of capitalism. 
Canal Managers of 
Erstwhile
Between 2011 and 2013, I spent eighteen 
months working with water bureaucrats and 
farmers as they went about implementing 
changes in the provision of irrigation and 
drinking water in their county. During this 
time, the price of drinking water doubled 
and the two local water agencies in charge 
of tax collection, infrastructure upkeep, 
and water development were transferred 
to hard budget accounts. Meanwhile, state 
and private funds were being diverted 
towards nearby cities. Farmers were also 
asked to reinvent themselves as members 
of Water Users’ Associations (WUAs), alien 
organisations handed down to villagers 
by Mandarin-speaking university-trained 
officials aimed at making the service 
more responsive to local needs and, 
most importantly, cheaper. Farmers were 
suddenly told to become familiar with the 
new norms that regulated the use, control, 
and exchange rights over water. They were 
warned that the government would hold 
them responsible for mismanaging the 
service they were now instructed to provide. 
During inaugural WUA meetings, the 
language of techno-politics was extensively 
used. While most of what was said would 
make direct reference to the science of the 
commons, the farmers understood that they 
would now have to work for free as canal 
managers (guanzhang).
Prior to the advent of WUAs, being a 
canal manager had, in fact, been something 
everyone in this part of Yunnan was quite 
familiar with. It was a democratic and 
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collectively financed position to which 
farmers were appointed on a rotating basis, 
according to a broader system of rules 
on local water management (Pia 2016b). 
Farmers appointed canal managers on every 
single portion of a canal adjoining a field 
or a house. They entrusted neighbouring 
members of this infrastructural community 
with reporting any misdelivery of water 
nearby. If managers were found guilty of 
mismanagement, a democratically appointed 
middleman—backed by the local village 
committee—would identify a different 
manager for that portion of the canal until 
the next incident. A similar system of 
distributed responsibility and participation 
in monitoring existed for a network of 
privately-built, but collectively-used, water 
wells widely accessible throughout the 
community. In essence, people from this 
area of Yunnan were managing the local 
water supply as a common resource and 
were doing it effectively. This system was 
run as a service to the community and not 
for profit. Rules to punish overdrawing 
had also been in force at some point, but 
were later abandoned as state officials took 
charge over environmental issues.
Activating Ineluctability
What is most surprising is not that 
local people had extensive experience of 
cooperating on water management, but 
rather that local farmers were willing to 
accept the co-optation of their distributed 
and equitable mechanism of organised 
water delivery. This, at the hands of a system 
that promised nothing except increased 
levels of corruption, higher overall running 
costs, and dwindling state support (Pia 
2016b).Indeed, the language of techno-
politics is successful because it activates 
a particular explanatory framework that 
resonates among the people—that of the 
moral superiority of scientific management. 
Farmers would assert that countryside life 
was bound to disappear in China and that 
rural dwellers had to adjust to a different 
lifestyle or migrate elsewhere. In their 
opinion, the previous system was backward 
and not keeping pace with more scientific 
forms of management represented by the 
WUAs. While a few younger informants held 
the view that locals should collectively resist 
the government or businesses whenever 
water was taken away or polluted, in 
general the water sector reformers had been 
quite successful in framing the problem of 
sustainability exclusively as one of science 
and supervision. The idea of governing 
water ‘the old way’ (laoguiju) was thereby 
made redundant—a survival component 
of an important, but now technically 
disposable, condition of pre-scientific 
Chinese water management. As mentioned 
above, one key idea of the notion of the 
commons is that of inclusive participation in 
the decision-making process concerning the 
management of natural resources. As this 
power seemingly fades away from north-east 
Yunnanese communities, so is the sense of 
meaningfully being part of one’s community 
and the capacity to care for it. The 
Rancierian gesture I resorted to here was to 
acknowledge the unrecognised capacity of 
local Chinese people to challenge the tacit 
ordering and distribution of the things we 
have in common in counter-paradigmatic 
ways. As one Italian water referendum 
campaigner used to say during activists’ 
assemblies: ‘They want to convince us we 
don’t care about how water gets delivered.’ 
My ethnography shows that it is about time 
we start to re-convince ourselves of the 
contrary.
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Timothy McLellan
Treating the environment as a common 
resource often implies not only local, but 
also supra-local, even global, collectives of 
concerned stakeholders. While engaging with 
local actors, these stakeholders frequently 
insist on the need for a ‘professional’ approach. 
Examining an international project aimed at 
introducing biologically diverse agroforestry 
in a county in southwest China, this essay 
describes a more ‘amateur’ approach adopted 
by one international organisation. It argues 
that this amateurism demonstrates that, even 
within global professional organisations, there 
is an appetite for a new, more spontaneous, 
approach that values local knowledge and 
practices.
Amateurism and 
Our Common 
Concern for 
Biodiversity
Treating the environment as a common 
resource often implies not only local, but 
also supra-local, even global collectives of 
concerned stakeholders. The Convention 
on Biological Diversity, for example, asserts 
that ‘the conservation of biological diversity 
is a common concern of humankind’. An 
agroforestry project in Qingshan township, 
Yunnan province, was one such effort to 
establish the environment and biodiversity 
as a common concern for a global community 
of actors.  
A Western cosmetics company, Metelli, 
sponsored the project. Launched about 
a decade ago, the project’s goal was to 
introduce ecologically complex, biologically 
diverse agroforestry to Qingshan. According 
to a Metelli corporate social responsibility 
officer, since the company’s products 
depend on nature for their ingredients, 
Metelli has a responsibility to give back to 
the environment. Here, Metelli sees itself 
as a responsible stakeholder alongside local 
communities, and attempts to insert itself 
as a collaborator in the management of 
Qingshan’s environmental commons. 
This article is based on two years’ 
participant observation at the Institute for 
Farms and Forests (IFF), an international 
agricultural research organisation who 
participated in the project. Inspired by 
critiques of academic professionalisation, 
and associated explorations of the virtues 
of amateurism, I describe the amateur 
engagement that IFF attempted to bring to 
this project. I argue that this amateurism 
Reforestation on the Way Back to Lijiang. Photo: Vincent Liu.
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demonstrates that, even within global 
professional organisations like IFF, there 
is an appetite for what Anna Tsing calls 
‘creat[ing] scenes that exceed or escape 
professionalization.’  
Pursuing Amateurism
To implement Metelli’s vision for 
Qingshan, several organisations were 
recruited. First, a Western NGO with 
experience in agroforestry, Arboreus, and 
a local NGO called Shehui. Several years 
into the project, Metelli and Arboreus 
had become concerned by Shehui’s lack 
of agri-environmental expertise. IFF was 
therefore recruited to the project, bringing 
with it its experience in agroforestry and 
soil management. In contrast to the other 
project partners, IFF’s involvement was 
rather informal. IFF had a lucrative contract 
with Metelli to facilitate laboratory research 
on local medicinal plants with the potential 
for use in cosmetics. As such, when they 
offered assistance to Metelli’s Qingshan 
project, IFF asked only for funds to cover 
travel expenses. The resulting absence of the 
kind of formal deliverables that ordinarily 
tie IFF’s funding promised IFF scientists an 
unusual degree of latitude. 
Having provisionally devised soil 
management practices for Qingshan, 
and established participatory principles 
according to which these ideas should be 
communicated, the IFF team (of which I was a 
member) ran several workshops in Qingshan. 
While IFF’s enthusiasm for ‘participation’ 
embraced a central tenant of contemporary 
development professionalism, IFF’s designs 
for the project were out of sync with certain 
contemporary trends. First, Qingshan 
workshops were each designed from 
scratch and as unique events. Workshops 
did not adhere to a previously established 
protocol, nor did IFF staff imagine their 
workshops to be replicable on a wider scale. 
This contrasted with certain other projects 
where IFF employed protocols or ‘toolkits’ 
that had been designed to be transferable 
across time and space. 
Second, IFF scientists envisioned the 
process of learning from Qingshan farmers 
and getting to know the landscape over 
which they sought to establish a common 
concern as a slow and gradual process. 
Workshops were organised sporadically, 
and in response to the project as it unfolded. 
Each visit was approached as a further 
opportunity to learn. This contrasts with 
certain iterations of participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA) delivered as rapid, one-off 
workshops. In such versions of PRA, Terry 
Rambo suggests, development professionals 
‘claim to understand everything important 
by sponsoring a three-or-four-day rapid 
rural appraisal exercise’ (2015, 795). Here, 
participation is co-opted by the very forms 
of professional ‘arrogance’ Robert Chambers 
intended for it to address. 
In the Qingshan case, far from the 
‘understanding [of ] everything’ promised 
by certain PRA toolkits, IFF scientists’ ad 
hoc workshops created a degree of anxiety. 
Whereas transferable toolkits often imply 
a certainty in what should be done, the 
IFF team were at each stage anxious as 
to whether their ad hoc activities would 
perform as hoped: Had we really generated 
a space for dialogue, or were farmers simply 
telling us what we wanted to hear? Would the 
proposed soil management strategies really 
benefit Qingshan? In this respect, whereas 
scientists are often accused of adopting 
‘technologies of hubris’, the anxieties 
generated by IFF’s ad hoc approach suggest 
the seeds of what Sheila Jasanoff calls 
‘technologies of humility’ (2013).
If contemporary research and development 
professionalism is characterised by 
replicability, scalability, transferability, 
rapidness, and self-confidence; I am going 
to describe the ad hoc, single-site, one-off, 
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slow, anxiety-inducing, and often deeply 
personal engagement that IFF pursued as a 
form of amateurism. 
The Project Falls Apart
A soil management plan developed at an 
early workshop was for winter cover crops 
to be planted in-between the rows of not-
yet-harvested primary crops. Susanna, an 
IFF soil scientist, had proposed this early 
planting strategy as a solution to the farmers’ 
experience that cover crops did not survive 
Qingshan’s dry winters. When it came to 
the appropriate time to sow cover crops, 
however, we discovered via Shehui’s local 
project manager, Xuejian, that the farmers 
had decided to delay planting until after 
harvest. According to Xuejian, since the 
rains in Qingshan had begun very late that 
year, farmers expected that rains would also 
finish later than usual. As such, the farmers 
reasoned, they could afford to postpone 
cover crop planting until after harvest.
When this message was relayed to 
Susanna she was dismayed. She feared that 
the rains might not continue late, and having 
persuaded Qingshan farmers to give cover 
crops another try, she did not want them to 
fail. Susanna and her colleagues, moreover, 
were frustrated that Shehui had taken 
several weeks to inform IFF of the farmers’ 
new approach. In this respect, IFF’s attempt 
to situate itself within a larger collective 
was challenged by the fact of its exclusion 
from a significant decision-making process. 
In a sense, this exclusion denied IFF’s 
implicit claim on Qingshan’s biodiversity as 
an object of common concern.
IFF’s response was to organise a further 
workshop in Qingshan. The difficulties in 
making this workshop happen, however, 
came from beyond Qingshan. IFF had 
initially arranged a workshop directly 
with a community leader in Qingshan, 
but Xuejian contacted IFF to cancel the 
workshop. Shortly thereafter, we received 
a communication from Arboreus explaining 
that all IFF activities in Qingshan must be 
pre-approved by both Shehui and Arboreus. 
The workshop did eventually go ahead, 
but following the workshop, wrangling 
continued amongst Shehui, Arboreus, and 
IFF. Whereas IFF scientists had anticipated 
and embraced the practical and ethical 
challenges of establishing relations with 
Qingshan farmers, the unexpected labour 
of maintaining relationships with extra-
local partners emerged as an impossible 
headache. 
Some IFF colleagues attributed the 
project’s failure to the incompetence of 
their project partners. In one instance, 
Xuejian explained to IFF scientists that 
Arboreus’s training in Qingshan had 
attempted to impress upon farmers the 
importance of three metre spacing between 
trees—a guideline, Xuejian told us, that took 
no account of tree species or location. For 
IFF scientists, this absurdly global approach 
to tree propagation confirmed Arboreus’s 
ignorance. The failure of the collaboration, 
however, can also be attributed to an 
incongruity between the approaches of IFF 
and its project partners. As well as their 
incompetence, Arboreus’s tree-spacing 
guidance showed their professionalism: 
it reflected their understanding of 
environmental sustainability as a global, 
scalable process.  
Embracing development professionalism, 
Arboreus were constantly contemplating 
how their activities might be replicated 
across ever-larger scales. Indeed, this was 
part of the reason they wanted not only 
prior notification of IFF’s activities, but also 
written reports after each visit to Qingshan. 
On one occasion, impressed by a soil 
management booklet Susanna had produced 
specifically for Qingshan farmers, Arboreus 
asked whether IFF might create a similar set 
of booklets for them to use globally.
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IFF, by contrast, approached the project 
much more narrowly: as a project in 
Qingshan. We were seldom distracted 
by the question of how to replicate or 
upscale activities in Qingshan. This is not 
to say that IFF is not ordinarily subjected 
to such imperatives. At a recent regional 
planning meeting, for example, an IFF 
communications officer described how the 
organisation must learn from marketing 
professionals and build a global brand 
for itself. Many IFF staff members were 
uncomfortable with such demands. Indeed, 
part of the Qingshan project’s appeal to 
IFF staff was perhaps that it presented an 
opportunity to work outside of this global 
scale and the accompanying imperatives of 
professional research for development. In 
this sense, the Qingshan project promised 
the chance to play the amateur.
By drawing attention to IFF’s amateurism 
I do not mean to imply that, unimpeded 
by their supra-local partners, IFF would 
inevitably have made the project a resounding 
success, or that amateurism escapes the 
contradictions and tensions inherent in 
efforts to make biodiversity a common 
concern in a world that is fundamentally 
unequal. Nevertheless, like China Scherz’s 
account of a Catholic charity’s refusal to 
adopt the logic of development donors, 
IFF’s all too brief flirtation with what I have 
called amateurism shows that, even within 
a prominent international organisation like 
IFF, there are seeds of activities that ‘exceed 
or escape “professionalization”’ (Tsing 
2015, 285).
A Victory for 
Professionalism
In this Qingshan case, however, Arboreus’s 
professionalism won through. Shortly after 
the shambles of IFF’s negotiations to run 
a workshop, Arboreus commissioned an 
audit of the project. One outcome of the 
audit was for Metelli to belatedly act upon 
an IFF suggestion to establish experimental 
agroforestry plots in Qingshan. IFF 
responded with a detailed proposal for the 
plots, but some at IFF half hoped Metelli 
would decline to fund the proposal, and 
thereby give IFF an excuse to leave the 
project. The headache of collaboration with 
supra-local partners had led to a loss of 
faith in the project ever running smoothly. 
Moreover, the professional imperatives to 
formalise project plans and project goals, 
as well as to undergo audits and manage 
budgets, robbed the project of the amateur 
quality that had initially sparked IFF staff ’s 
now fading commitment to, and hope in, the 
project.
Transferring on a flight back to the United 
Kingdom after completing fieldwork, I 
spotted photos of farmers planting trees 
in Qingshan displayed at a Metelli airport 
concession. As an example of Metelli’s 
corporate social responsibility, the display 
invited consumers to share in Metelli’s 
concern for global biodiversity. In effect, 
the invitation to purchase Metelli cosmetics 
was also an invitation to join the collective 
the company had established with Qingshan 
farmers, and to thereby participate in the 
sustainable management of environmental 
commons. Of course, from the point of view 
of IFF scientists, this collective and its 
management of Qingshan’s biodiversity had 
been no great success. Metelli’s marketing 
strategy, however, may serve as a reminder 
that just as challenging as it can be to 
establish meaningful collaborations around 
environmental commons, constructing the 
façade of a global collective can be rather 
easy. Indeed, in an era where organisations 
like IFF are turning to marketing in their 
efforts to professionalise, we should perhaps 
wonder if environmental commons would 
be better off in the hands of amateurs.
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This short essay tells the story of 
Dongxiaokou, an urban village in the 
northern outskirt of Beijing, infamously 
known in the press as the ‘waste village’ 
(feipincun). Until urban redevelopment 
projects accelerated its demolition in 
recent years, this informal settlement had 
been one of the biggest in the metropolis. 
Situated between the fifth and sixth ring 
road, around ten kilometres from the city 
centre, it hosted a massive population of 
migrant workers, who had made this place 
their home and used it as a base to enter the 
Chinese capital’s labour market.
The story of Dongxiaokou provides 
interesting insights into the process of 
commodification of land in contemporary 
China. The article engages with this issue 
and highlights, in particular, the tension 
between land used as a common resource by 
migrant workers and land utilised as a way 
to produce economic profits for real estate 
development. There are at least two good 
reasons why this story is worth telling—
one related to the status of land use rights 
in China; the other to the nexus between 
labour and migration in the country. This 
Carlo Inverardi-Ferri
This essay outlines the development of 
Dongxiaokou, an urban village on the outskirts 
of Beijing. Until urban redevelopment 
projects accelerated its demolition in recent 
years, this informal settlement was home to a 
massive population of migrant workers, who 
had made this place their base for entering 
the capital’s labour market. The story of 
Dongxiaokou provides interesting insights 
into the process of commodification of land 
in contemporary China. In particular, it 
highlights the tension between land used as 
a common resource by migrants, and land 
utilised as a way to produce economic profits 
for real estate development.
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Commons 
and the Right 
to the City in 
Contemporary 
China
Urbanisation on the outskirts of Beijing. Dongxiaokou, late 2014. Photo: Carlo Inverardi-Ferri.
account of Dongxiaokou reasserts the 
centrality of an old question (Harvey 2008): 
in a geography where capitalism brings 
about a growing commodification of space, 
who owns the right to the city? In other 
words, if we consider the urban space as a 
common resource, who has the right to use 
it and under what conditions?
Land Rights and Migrant 
Labour
Surprisingly enough, while in the last 
decades China has undergone a number 
of subsequent shifts towards economic 
liberalism, land somehow remains a 
conundrum for the country’s ‘socialist 
market economy’. While land has certainly 
been subjected to the effect of the 
marketisation of the economy, it has also 
remained strictly tied to the Party-state. 
Today there are two main types of land 
property rights in China. While urban 
land is formally owned by the state, rural 
residents exercise collective ownership in 
the countryside. In theory, rigid regulations 
control the use of this resource; in practice, 
however, ambiguity in the legislation has 
resulted in an empowered Party-state, which 
has ended up holding sway on land-related 
decisions in both cities and countryside (Lin 
2015).
A common practice in many rural villages 
involves the development of collectively-
owned land into urban and commercial 
functions as a way for local administrations 
to create new streams of revenue. While 
some localities have been more successful 
than others, this phenomenon has appeared 
almost everywhere in the country. In 
particular, these practices have multiplied 
in border areas between the city and the 
countryside, where many rural villages 
have been completely transformed in their 
geographies. This rural-urban friction has 
also led to another phenomenon driven by 
the increasing marketisation of the economy 
and the process of commodification of land. 
The sprawling of metropolises into suburban 
areas has resulted in the recurrent inclusion 
of rural villages into urban districts. Rural 
land is thus subjected to a two-fold process 
of commodification. First, it is informally 
developed into urban and commercial 
functions as a means to make a profit for 
rural areas. Second, these hybrid spaces are 
again subsumed by urban redevelopments.
The story of Dongxiaokou, a small rural 
village that in a few years became one of the 
largest informal settlements in the Chinese 
capital, is particularly revealing of both 
dynamics. In the early 2000s, the village 
rented most of its land to migrant workers 
coming from outside the municipality of 
Beijing. Its proximity to the city centre made 
it a convenient place to settle down and find 
work opportunities in the metropolis. When 
the first migrants arrived, local cadres 
welcomed them and accommodated the 
newcomers in uncultivated fields, which 
were rented out as a way to drive new 
revenues into the village.
Wealthy migrants rented big plots of 
land that they then divided and sublet 
to less well-off migrants, who in turn 
established their dwellings and economic 
activities in Dongxiaokou. Very quickly 
the village population grew from little 
less than two thousand people into an 
agglomeration, according to some sources, 
of almost thirty thousand inhabitants (Ye 
2015). Interestingly, Dongxiaokou quickly 
became a local hub for waste recycling 
activities growing in scale and scope. As 
one of my informants claimed in a personal 
communication, in few years Dongxiaokou 
was transformed into ‘one of the biggest 
scrap distribution centres (feipin jisandi) in 
the entire country.’
A complex network of buyers and suppliers 
for all sort of waste materials developed in 
the village. During the day, local recyclers 
roamed the wealthy neighbourhoods of 
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Beijing in search of valuable products, such 
as used mobile phones or old compressors. 
In the evenings, they came back to 
Dongxiaokou to resell their products to 
middlemen who, in turn, resold them 
to manufacturing companies in nearby 
regions. A large number of complementary 
businesses, such as mechanic workshops, 
logistics firms, groceries, and restaurants, 
also quickly flourished in the village. 
Hundreds of family-owned enterprises 
dominated the landscape. They all looked 
more or less the same. Behind a metallic 
gate was a rectangular courtyard where old 
newspapers, waste wood, plastic bottles, 
used electronics, or anything else with a 
commercial value was stored. In one of the 
corners of the yard there was always a small 
building, usually composed of two rooms, 
where an entire family lived. Sometimes a 
dog was chained to one of the walls to guard 
the yard.
A New Generation of 
Petty Capitalists
Interestingly, while academia and the 
media have paid much attention to different 
generations of migrant workers in their role 
as wage-labourers (Lee 2016), the rise of 
Dongxiaokou paints a less familiar picture. 
It tells the story of small family-owned 
firms and self-employed entrepreneurs, 
or in other words, petty capitalists. It is a 
story of what some define as the informal 
economy: a heterogeneous sector that 
crosses many different industries, and 
employs a large proportion of the population 
in contemporary China. It is not my goal 
to romanticise this phenomenon, which 
raises serious questions of occupational 
health and safety, as well as issues of local 
citizenship and environmental justice, but 
rather to underline what I believe to be 
one of its most peculiar characteristics. 
Migrants in Dongxiaokou—at least a good 
portion of them—enjoyed a relatively high 
level of freedom and mutual support, being 
part of a local society that conceived of their 
resources—labour and land—as means of 
common subsistence.
Dongxiaokou was not an isolated case. A 
report by the United Nations published in 
2013 estimated that the informal recycling 
sector in China comprised twenty million 
people, and that it was organised in a myriad 
of informal settlements scattered all over the 
country (Wang et al. 2013). While numbers 
certainly cannot give an accurate account 
of the great variety of businesses that this 
industry creates, they are nevertheless 
useful to provide a general idea of the 
magnitude and impact that these activities 
had, and continue to have, on Chinese 
metropolises. This involves the creation of 
employment opportunities on the one side, 
and the production of physical landscapes 
on the other side.
Dongxiaokou was not a new phenomenon 
either. In their work on the ‘Henan village’ 
(1999), Jean-Philippe Béja and colleagues 
documented the emergence of these urban 
and economic spaces as far back as the 
1990s. The authors analysed a settlement 
not too far from Peking University—now 
long demolished—in many ways similar to 
Dongxiaokou. They did so through the notion 
of desakota (desa meaning ‘village’ and kota 
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A workshop in Dongxiaokou, late 2014.
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‘urban’ in Bahasa), a concept that was first 
employed in studies on the urbanisation 
of Southeast Asian countries (McGee and 
Wang 1992). In Indonesia, the metropolitan 
sprawl had produced a peculiar combination 
of rural and non-rural activities, where areas 
dedicated to the production of rice were 
mixed with the urban landscape. Drawing 
a parallel with the Indonesian context, the 
authors described the Henan village as a 
peculiar Chinese desakota.
The fate of Dongxiaokou was decided 
in the 2000s (Tao et al. 2014). This space 
on the urban periphery, which had been 
transformed through the agency of a group 
of migrant workers, and which provided 
a fundamental service to the city—waste 
recycling (Inverardi-Ferri 2017)—did 
not resonate with the conceptions of 
modernity that official planners held for 
Beijing. When urbanisation reached the 
borders of Dongxiaokou, space had to be 
made for the new real estate projects. As 
a result, demolitions of the ‘waste village’ 
of Dongxiaokou accelerated in 2015. 
The place that previously buzzed with 
economic activity was again geographically 
transformed. Workshops that were filled 
with all sort of valuable products became 
empty fields, as their occupants had to 
relocate to other parts of the city. Roads 
were silent, except for the sounds coming 
from the new infrastructural works planned 
by the municipality. Having lost their usual 
clientele, shops closed down, and most 
dwellings were levelled.
A Social Community
As the story of Dongxiaokou suggests, 
two different levels of urbanisation exist in 
contemporary China (McGee et al. 2008). 
The first is a process mediated by the state 
that operates inside the administrative 
boundaries of the city; the second is an 
unofficial one, which goes beyond these 
boundaries and occurs at the margins of 
the metropolis or in the countryside. Here, 
migrant workers, attracted by the possibility 
of improving their material lives, enter 
Chinese metropolises and create particular 
urban economic landscapes, while suburban 
villages benefit economically from their 
presence. Yet, official planning recurrently 
subsumes these spaces.
These different modes of urbanisation 
also mirror contrasting ways of creating and 
living in the city. Enclaves of informality—
and the specific use of land operated 
in urban villages—reflect the way less-
privileged groups make a livelihood, rather 
than a strategy to produce profits from land 
development. While they come from poorer 
rural regions and moving into metropolises, 
friendship and kinship networks support 
the adventures of these migrants who 
lack any basic formal right to the city. As 
a dweller in Dongxiaokou clearly pointed 
out, the social community that inhabited 
Dongxiakou provided important support to 
migrants. In his words: ‘Being here is like 
being back home… Like this, it is easier to do 
our business.’
As this quote suggests, urban villages are 
microcosms of people and relations that 
represents a social community and not 
only economic outcomes. Here the physical 
and social dimensions of land are strictly 
intertwined with the everyday livelihoods of 
the people that inhabit these spaces. Their 
redevelopment is thus a process that brings 
about a destruction of these communal 
spaces, highlighting once more the need to 
ask an old—but urgent—question: who has 
the right to the city in contemporary China?
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Edwin Schmitt
The extraction and use of energy resources 
to drive modernisation has been one of the 
key concerns of the Chinese Communist 
Party. By tracing the history of coal mining 
in China, this essay argues that the physical 
characteristics of coal as a common pool 
resource have shaped the ways in which coal 
has been harvested and used, as well as the 
political and institutional structures that 
have developed around its governance.
Burning Coal in 
Tangshan 
Energy Resources as 
Commons
While it is not always well recognised, 
energy reserves are by far the most 
abundant and yet most conflict-ridden 
common resource. In this essay, I will look 
at the common pool of energy resources 
in China, specifically coal mining and 
coal-fired power plants. Perhaps the most 
famous description of the commons comes 
from Garrett Hardin’s deceptively simple 
rendition (1968): in order to prevent the 
ruin of common resources, society requires 
a set of rules for harvesting those resources 
so that they can be put to use. Originally the 
debate was about whether the most optimal 
rules could be found through a free market 
or a planned economy, the latter of which is 
the direction that China took. Elinor Ostrom 
provided a third insight into the debate, 
arguing that the form these rules could take 
was not that important as long as they were 
embedded into the everyday practices of a 
society (Ostrom et al. 1999). 
Although he does not couch his argument 
in terms of the commons, Timothy 
Mitchell (2009) has recently argued that 
the physical characteristics of an energy 
resource has a strong relationship with 
the way these rules might develop and 
become socially embedded. According 
to Mitchell, democratic politics initially 
became entrenched in Europe during the 
Industrial Revolution as a result of the 
need for coal miners to collaborate together 
while deep underground to safely remove 
this energy resource from the earth. These 
strong collaborative relationships became 
essential when coal miners, as well as those 
responsible for transporting the coal from 
mine to factory, went on strike. The dense 
physical characteristics of coal allowed 
striking workers to ensure that the flow of 
energy, and therefore the flow of economic 
development, would grind to a standstill. 
This collaborative nature that emerged 
in the mines was a natural pairing with 
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Kailuan National Mine Park in Tangshan.
Photo: Baidu.
democratic politics when workers began to 
unionise and demand better conditions and 
pay from the capitalist owners of the mines.
The Early Democracy of 
Chinese Miners: Anyuan 
vs. Kaiping
Mitchell’s history of coal begs the 
question: why did similar democratic 
principles not emerge among coal miners 
in China? In some ways they did, at first. 
One of the most famous examples comes 
from the Anyuan Mines, Jiangxi province 
during the 1920s where the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) planted the seeds 
of the Communist Revolution (Perry 2012). 
It was the collaborative nature of the miners 
that allowed the Party to develop Anyuan 
into a kind of ‘worker’s university’ for 
disseminating strategies for unionising and 
calling worker strikes around China. Many 
of the principles practiced at Anyuan were 
rooted in democratic principles of equality 
while, of course, also being embedded 
within a Marxist-Leninist ideological call 
for class struggle. After attacks by the 
Kuomintang, the workers were forced to 
abandon the mine but ended up forming 
the First Red Army of China. As we will 
see, this militarisation of the workers had 
consequences for why China’s coal miners 
eventually organised in a manner that does 
not fit Mitchell’s narrative. 
While the miners in Anyuan were initially 
democratic, workers at the Kaiping Mines in 
Tangshan, located in Hebei province, were 
suppressed by a capitalist and colonialist 
system of exploitation (Carlson 1971). Most 
of China’s early industrial labour force was 
recruited from rural populations far from 
industrial centres. It was up to a group of 
labour contractors (batou) to bring workers 
and owners together, but this created an 
effective barrier that often prevented 
the British owners of the mine from ever 
hearing the needs of their workforce. A 
strict hierarchy at Kaiping ensured that the 
rules and decisions made for governing the 
mining of coal received little or no input 
from those labouring to remove the energy 
source from the earth (Wang 1947). 
In late 1948, Tangshan was ‘liberated’ 
from the rule of the Kuomintang by an 
elite unit of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA). As a first order of business, two 
high-ranking officers, Li Chenglong and 
Yan Dakai, respectively took control of the 
Tangshan Electric Plant and the Kailuan 
Coal Mine (the new name for the Kaiping 
mines). At that stage, it was imperative for 
the PLA to quickly revive the productive 
forces that would ensure a stable supply of 
weaponry to the military. Tangshan was not 
only a centre of energy production, but it 
also produced military vehicles needed to 
keep the PLA mobile as the CCP cemented 
its power across China. Since there were 
no CCP members at the power plant, Li 
Chenglong spent the first two years focussed 
on indoctrinating the plant workers into a 
socialist mode of production. While workers 
were considered equal ‘owners’ of the plant, 
Li installed a new hierarchy for organising 
decision-making, by establishing worker’s 
brigades that had to answer to their brigade 
leaders, who in turn had to answer to the 
plant leader. This institutional hierarchy, 
mimicked that found within the PLA. 
Moreover, scientific and engineering 
brigades were established, so that educated 
elites were integrated into the decision-
making process of the plant. Regarding 
energy production, the plant leader took 
the input of scientists and engineers quite 
seriously. While the plant leader oversaw 
day-to-day decision-making, the amount 
of energy produced and supplied to the 
electrical grid was a decision made by the 
Tangshan Electrical Bureau in consultation 
with the goals established by the Ministry 
of Water Conservancy and Electric Power of 
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Hebei province and the Central Government. 
While this was certainly a new hierarchy, 
the fact that decisions on these matters 
were being made far away from the plant 
was nothing new to the workers. Similar 
processes were taking place at the Kailuan 
mine as well.
The Rise of Chinese 
Unions
One major difference with the hierarchy 
found in the older batou system was the 
establishment of the worker’s unions. 
Although it was a country-wide union in 
name, the official All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), was hardly 
a monolithic entity across China 
(Franceschini 2015). At the grassroots level, 
both the Kailuan Coal Mines and Tangshan 
Electric Plant established unions that 
represented the workers of their respective 
facilities. These unions allowed the voice 
of the workers to be heard within the Party 
and could be considered an outgrowth of 
the ideas that developed during the Party’s 
time at Anyuan. Throughout the first thirty 
years of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), the unions created a certain level 
of antagonism that required the military 
hierarchy described above to cooperate 
with the workers through their union 
leaders. Moreover, the transmission of Party 
ideology was dependent on the unions and 
in some cases this would result in situations 
beyond the control of the plant leader. For 
instance, during the second Anti-Rightist 
Campaign of 1959, the workers forced 
Plant Leader Li Bin to resign and heavily 
criticised him for his supposed rightist 
positions regarding electricity production. 
It was not until 1962 that he was forgiven, 
eventually becoming the plant leader for 
the duration of the Cultural Revolution. 
However, there were also times throughout 
the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) and 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1969) when 
ideological shifts provided the plant leader 
with exceptional power and forced the 
workers to commit to dangerous production 
quotas leading to multiple accidents. 
In other words, while a new hierarchy was 
put into place that still provided a degree 
of separation between the workers and 
decisions for harvesting and utilising energy 
resources, there was always a struggle 
between a group of decision-making experts 
and the workers. Perhaps the potential for 
a more democratic power structure did 
exist in early PRC history. However, we 
should also keep in mind that the workers’ 
unions were isolated within their work 
unit. The union at Kailuan Coal Mine was 
strictly focussed on providing a voice for the 
miners and had no control over where the 
coal mined from Kailuan would end up. The 
only real connection between the Kailuan 
Coal Mine and the Tangshan Electric Plant 
unions would be when the chairperson of 
the union or a few worker representatives 
might meet at the Hebei Provincial Worker’s 
Union Annual Conference. 
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Chairman Mao goes to Anyuan. 
Liu Chunhua (1968).
Multiple unions never collaborated, 
which is why the idea of a sector-wide strike 
preventing the flow of energy resources 
was unthinkable. In some ways, we might 
even argue that the ability of the state to 
ensure the flow of energy from the common 
pool of resources into the economy was at 
least as effective in this socialist military 
hierarchy as it ever was within the capitalist 
economies of Europe. Perhaps we could say 
that the institutionalisation of a military 
hierarchy for organising energy resource 
management that included the ability of the 
union to provide workers with a voice was 
somewhat similar to the nested institutions 
described by Ostrom (Ostrom et al. 1999). 
A Model for Energy 
Management
Over the years, Tangshan’s energy 
production was presented as an institutional 
model to the rest of the country, not 
unlike the more (in)famous Daqing Oil 
Fields (Taylor 2014, 70–87). Books were 
distributed to coal-fired power plants 
around the country with titles like ‘The 
Situation of Tangshan Electric Plant Cadres 
Participating in Labour’. Both the Tangshan 
Electric Plant and the Kailuan Coal Mine 
regularly graced the pages of the People’s 
Daily, with the latter being praised for 
its success at implementing cutting-edge 
technology in removing coal from the earth. 
More recently, the messages have begun to 
shift after a plan to expand the plant was 
accused of violating environmental policies 
in 2007. Today, both the Kailuan Mine and 
the Tangshan Electric Plant have been 
shut down and turned into parks, similar 
to those discussed by Maris Gillette in her 
contribution to this volume. Just a year ago, 
the People’s Daily even published a detailed 
article about the successful remediation 
process taking place at Kailuan Coal Mine 
(Xu and Li 2016). Even in ‘death’, the mine 
and the power plant are being used as 
examples to follow as China enters the new 
historical phase of ‘Ecological Civilisation’ 
(shengtai wenming).
Naturally, the top-down nature of 
Ecological Civilisation that ensured the 
decision to close the plant and mine 
had little to do with what the workers 
themselves wanted. What is ironic about 
this story is that the top-down hierarchical 
political structure from which the 
Ecological Civilisation ideology emerged 
originated with the need to ensure that 
the Chinese military had access to highly 
polluting energy resources, such as coal. 
Regarding the commons, we can see that a 
top-down method can be used to prevent 
access to common energy resources just as it 
can organise the harvest of them. My focus 
here has not been on the effectiveness of 
this hierarchical structure to manage those 
resources over the long term—others have 
already argued that it did a very poor job 
(Smil 2003). Instead, I have been trying to 
show how a certain kind of social structure 
and political decision-making emerged 
from the hierarchical rules for governing 
common-pool energy resources in China. 
While some aspects of democratic decision-
making did find their way to China’s coal 
fields, the bonds between coal miners that 
Mitchell described in the European context 
were prevented from developing into a true 
political force because of the institutional 
structure of the CCP. In other words, the 
material aspects of the environment are not 
ineffectual when it comes to the rules we 
devise for governing the commons, but nor 
do they solely determine the structure of 
those rules or the political power needed to 
enforce them.
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This essay explores a particular kind of 
local viticulture in Tibetan communities 
in northwest Yunnan province. While 
mainstream wineries emphasise modernity 
at any cost without much concern for 
the environment, the rural Tibetan grape 
growers examined in this article pursue an 
ecologically-friendly agenda meant to protect 
‘common’ sacred landscapes. Reasons for 
this choice include observations of chemical 
degradation of the land, Buddhist ethics, and 
new conceptions of how ethnic representation 
can be exemplified by more ecologically-
friendly forms of commodity production.
Protecting 
Sacred Commons 
Balancing Commodity 
Viticulture Economies 
with Ecological Health in 
Shangri-La
This essay explores a particular kind of 
local viticulture in Tibetan communities in 
China, which is different from mainstream 
wine industries within the larger Shangri-La 
area in northwest Yunnan province. While 
mainstream wineries are based on historical 
recreations of past missionary work and 
regional identities, and adopt narratives that 
emphasise modernity at any cost without 
much concern for the environment, the rural 
Tibetan grape growers whom I examine in 
this article pursue an ecologically friendly 
agenda meant to protect ‘common’ sacred 
landscapes. Reasons for this choice include 
observations of chemical degradation 
of the land, Buddhist ethics, and new 
conceptions of how ethnic representation 
can be exemplified by more ecologically 
friendly forms of commodity production. 
Recognition of these problems is meant 
to create what some villagers call a ‘real 
Shangri-La or Shambala’, that is a place of 
divine serenity in Tibetan Buddhism. 
While government incentives aimed at 
supporting an emerging wine industry 
in Shangri-La through the promotion of 
new forms of agriculture and commodity 
schemes for growing grapes have tended 
Wine village in Deqin, Yunnan.
Photo: South China Morning Post.
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to overlook ecological health and 
sustainability, awareness of such issues can 
be found among villagers. In some cases, 
these new state-based schemes are altered 
and challenged at the grassroots to promote 
ecologically sound practices and healthy 
living meant to protect common landscapes 
and resources. In Deqin county, the area 
where I carried out my research, some 
individuals interested in sustainability and 
ecological health further adapted viticulture 
and wine to indigenous cosmologies to 
protect common sacred lands, which they 
view as belonging to everyone and worthy of 
preservation.
Though wine from Deqin county has 
been marketed as ‘natural’, ‘green’, and 
‘ecological’, the emergence of this industry 
has actually led to widespread use of 
agricultural chemicals introduced by 
wine companies and government officials, 
the effects of which are not lost on local 
communities. To understand how villagers 
perceive these changes, in what follows I 
will analyse how they have developed their 
own understandings of concepts such as 
‘organic’ and ‘ecological’, and how these 
have been influenced by their Buddhist 
beliefs and their interest in preserving 
common sacred space. 
I will tell this story through the eyes of 
Ani Dom, one individual in Deqin county 
who has become recognised locally and 
even nationally for his environmental and 
community work. Given both its local and 
transnational environmental and religious 
significance as the home of Khawa Karpo, 
one of the most sacred mountains in Tibetan 
Buddhism, Deqin has produced many 
local environmental activists interested in 
preserving local cultures and ecosystems. 
Among them, Ani Dom from Bu Village, 
the site of a major winery, has dedicated 
particular attention to viticulture. Over my 
two years in the field between 2014 and 
2016, I visited him and lived in his village on 
multiple occasions. 
Of Sacred Mountains, 
Buddhism, and 
Chemicals
I first met Ani Dom in 2014, shortly after 
arriving in Bu village. I planned to remain in 
the village for an extended period of time as 
it was the site of a large winery and a base for 
the production of sweet ice wine. On the day 
of my arrival, after my field assistant and I 
had made ourselves comfortable in a village 
home and were chatting with our host there, 
Ani Dom, an extremely talkative elderly 
man in a wide-brim hat with a beautiful 
stand of Tibetan prayer beads (mala) in his 
hand, appeared and explained that he had 
heard that a foreign visitor had arrived in 
the village. At that time and during many 
subsequent visits, I would listen to him 
talk about the region, the sacred mountain 
Khawa Karpo, Buddhism, the forest, his 
previous life as a hunter, and the horrible 
pollution that was occurring due to the 
chemicals used in viticulture. 
In my days in Bu Village, Ani Dom spent 
much time telling me about local Buddhist 
practices and the cosmologies surrounding 
Khawa Karpo, which is the name of both 
the mountain and the god after which 
the place is named. As a Buddhist with a 
deep reverence for life, the mountain, and 
the local environment and culture, Ani 
Dom regularly shared his strong feelings 
about viticulture and what he perceived as 
excessive agricultural pollution that was 
killing the mountain, its spirit, and the 
surrounding sacred landscape. However, 
Ani had not always been a Buddhist: it took a 
near-death and highly spiritual experience to 
turn him into a believer. Before 1986, he was 
known throughout Deqin as a great hunter, 
perhaps the region’s most famous according 
to his daughter Zhouma. That year, during 
a twenty-five-day sleepless trance brought 
on by a heart attack, he dreamed that the 
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spirits of all the animals that he had killed 
had come back to exact revenge on him. In 
that vision, the god Khawa Karpo came to 
his rescue, and he then decided to devote 
the rest of his life to the preservation of the 
area. The god told him to throw his hunting 
dog in the river—which he did—and he also 
turned in his gun to the police. 
Today Ani Dom’s life is quite different, 
a matter of unending concern for his own 
family members and many other villagers 
in Bu, including the village leaders, who 
find him a nuisance for interfering in their 
economic activities in the wine industry. As 
the village chief explained to me, he really 
does not get along with Ani Dom due to his 
resistance against wine companies and their 
chemicals. As leader of the community, the 
chief is primarily concerned with income 
and livelihood, so he does not see anything 
wrong with the current practices of the 
wine industry.
A Mini-Environmental 
Movement in the 
Making
Today Ani Dom devotes all of his time 
to working with both international and 
domestic NGOs to preserve Khawa Karpo 
and the village environment. He is perhaps 
best known for his work protecting a sacred 
old juniper grove in the village, where he 
has also built a small temple dedicated to 
the god Khawa Karpo. He was able to do this 
mostly thanks to funding that he personally 
collected through donations from NGOs and 
Buddhist monasteries, but the village as a 
community also contributed a significant 
amount to the enterprise. Much of Ani 
Dom’s daily routine involves morning and 
evening walks to the temple to pray and 
perform circumbulations around it. These 
were the times when I would typically join 
him to discuss his ideas about Buddhist 
philosophy, conservation, and the changes 
brought to Deqin by viticulture and other 
forms of ‘modernity’. He had many stories 
about his work with various environmental 
and cultural NGOs and his Buddhist 
teachings, and every day he had something 
new to share. 
During my very first discussion with Ani 
Dom, he talked extensively about his various 
projects. He had recently set up a seniors’ 
association to protect both the environment 
and the grape plantations—the Khawa Karpo 
Traditional Knowledge and Ecological 
Conservation Association. One of the goals 
of the group was to teach villagers to plant 
grapes more organically and sustainably. A 
Hong Kong NGO sent an expert to help Ani 
Dom set up the organisation and provided 
some training on sustainable methods to 
grow grapes. As Ani Dom explained to me, 
the excessive use of pesticides for the grapes 
is very bad for walnuts and other fruit trees, 
and the soil has progressively degraded 
for many years. This is the reason why he 
is advocating for organic wine, against the 
wishes of his fellow villagers. In his own 
words:
Pesticides are harmful for the air, 
earth, soil, water, and all other forms of 
life beyond just humans. To care about 
these things is what traditional Buddhist 
philosophies teach us; all life is sacred. 
Before we planted grapes, our fruit 
and walnut trees were much healthier 
and now people even get skin diseases 
because they don’t know how to properly 
use the pesticides.
When I asked him what he thought about 
Shangri-La Wine and other local wines that 
were promoted and marketed as natural and 
as part of the Tibetan culture, he replied:
Grapes and wine are not part of the 
traditional Tibetan culture. This culture 
has been lost to the chemicals and waste 
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that come with grapes. Grapes and wine 
are from foreigners. The grape production 
here in Bu village is low, but our quality is 
good. Buddhism promotes no-killing, so 
we are working to pilot grapes with no 
pesticides for people to enjoy.  
As for the future of the link between grapes 
and Tibetan identity in Deqin, he said: ‘If 
the usage of pesticides continues, things 
will be bad and the soil will be destroyed. I 
don’t think the grape industry is promising 
for Deqin’s future.’  
Ani Dom’s story is illustrative of a mini-
environmental movement that grapes and 
viticulture have contributed to in Deqin. 
Some local people fear that most villagers 
in the region have fallen out of touch with 
Buddhism and local ecology in their pursuit 
of economic prosperity through chemically-
intensified grape production. Motivated 
by this overall concern for ecological 
health and Buddhist ethics, Ani Dom and 
a few others like him have launched their 
campaign against agrichemical use in 
viniculture. Indeed, in recent years they 
have worked quite actively with the Hong 
Kong NGO mentioned above to organise 
special training sessions on organic methods 
for grape vine care and pest management. To 
its credit, the NGO in its work with Ani Dom 
has done extensive research, even bringing 
experts familiar with organic methods used 
in Bordeaux to teach to villagers. 
Appeasing the Wrath of 
the Gods
Ani Dom regularly portends that the 
pollution coming from viticulture makes the 
god Khawa Karpo very unhappy. Evidence of 
his wrath includes the retreat of the Minyong 
Glacier, the mountain’s largest. While photo 
documentation shows that the glacier has 
been retreating for over eighty years, the 
rate of retreat continues to increase, which 
for Ani Dom is certain proof that the god 
is being harmed by both pollution and 
lack of devotion. Another example given 
by villagers of the dramatic consequences 
of failing to appease the god is a doomed 
attempt by Chinese and Japanese climbers 
to reach the summit of the mountain in 1991. 
Back then, an avalanche killed the entire 
expedition, a tragedy which was interpreted 
by local villagers as the response of the god 
Khawa Karpo to people trying to conquer 
his sacred domain.
Today, the quality of life and standard 
of living in Deqin are heavily driven by 
economic gains, more specifically by success 
in producing grapes. Major shifts have also 
taken place in the cultivation of crops such 
as wheat and barley, traditionally grown for 
subsistence and for religious and cultural 
practices. These are now being abandoned 
in exchange for more lucrative agricultural 
products. What is quite clear throughout 
Deqin, though, is that engagement with 
outside markets through agriculture and 
forest products is coming to redefine local 
perceptions of, and connections to, the 
Khawa Karpo landscape. In this context, 
the practices of Ani Dom and a few other 
villagers represent a form of resistance 
to these changes, an attempt to maintain 
a balance with Khawa Karpo and its spirit 
world to protect these sacred commons. 
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The recent Party Congress has seen an 
outpouring of support for strengthening 
environmental protections. This has 
come amid an intensified environmental 
crackdown that has seen surprise inspections 
of mostly smaller and older factories across 
the country. While these activities have 
received some attention in the Chinese media, 
at present very few reports can be found in 
English. To fill this gap, this essay explores 
the implications of the campaign for workers 
and business in Chengdu.
The Nineteenth Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has seen an 
outpouring of support for strengthening 
environmental protections—a theme 
which was central to Xi Jinping’s opening 
speech (Huangping Aihaozhe Wang 2017). 
This event comes amid an intensified 
1st Round: 12 July–19 August 2016. 
2nd Round: 24 November–30 December 2016. 
3rd Round: 24 April–28 May 2017. 
4th Round: 7 August–10 September 2017.
Map of China’s Central Environmental 
Inspections.
China’s 
Environmental 
Crackdown 
The Case of Chengdu
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environmental crackdown across the 
country. Beginning in July, drawing on the 
vivid metaphor of ‘cutting with a single knife’ 
(yi dao qie), the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP) began a surprise round 
of environmental inspections of factories 
in the Jing-Jin-Ji region, the area that 
encompasses Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei 
province. The focus was primarily on smaller 
and older factories, which are recurring 
violators of environmental regulations. 
These inspections quickly expanded to all 
the provinces, with the MEP publishing 
notices in the People’s Daily explaining that 
this protracted period of strict observation 
will become the ‘new normal’ (Liu 2017). 
While these activities have received some 
attention in the Chinese media, at present 
very few reports can be found in English 
(Schmitz 2017). In this essay we focus on 
the implications of this latest campaign in 
Chengdu. However, it is clear that this is a 
nationwide shift in policy implementation 
with implications for all of Chinese society. 
A Play in Four Acts
While the past three months have seen 
the implementation of stricter controls, a 
four-stage series of routine environmental 
investigations began in July 2016 (Gan 
2017). The real crackdown began during 
the third-stage, with an especially damning 
report of Tianjin officials on 29 July 2017 
(Zhuang 2017). The critique of the typically 
powerful Tianjin officials resulted in 
an unprecedented number of follow-up 
environmental inspections orchestrated by 
local Environmental Protection Bureaus 
across the country. As a consequence, 
an increased number of factory closures 
occurred in provinces that had been visited 
by the central inspection teams over the 
previous months. These recent closures 
have already begun to impact China’s export 
business (Knowler 2017). On 13 September, 
while one of us was interviewing a logistics 
manager for a vehicle manufacturer in 
the United States, the manager asked us 
for information about the recent factory 
closures in China. He had received multiple 
emails from suppliers in China explaining 
that deliveries would be delayed and prices 
would be increased due to the environmental 
inspections. Additionally, suppliers in China 
informed the manager that these price hikes 
would be permanent, as the environmental 
policies now in place were intended to 
be enforced indefinitely. Similar reports 
have been published on cargo shipping 
blogs (Vineyard 2017). Bloomberg has 
also recently noted that with thousands 
of factories suddenly closing there will be 
major logistical disruptions as the peak 
consumerist period in the US and Europe 
arrives before Christmas (Standaert 2017). 
However, as of yet very little information 
about what is actually happening on the 
ground in China has been reported.
Since we have both conducted research in 
Chengdu, we will draw from recent concrete 
examples found in that city. As we will show 
below, some factories were closed even before 
the completion of the fourth and final stage 
of the central environmental inspections, 
which began on 7 August 2017 and included 
Sichuan, with a heavy focus on Chengdu 
(Zhang and Gu 2017). The local authorities 
issued an urgent call for all government 
agencies to collaborate with the inspectors, 
but insisted that factories were not to be 
shut down without proof that the law had 
been broken (Shi 2017). Any violators were 
to be fined heavily and potentially forced to 
close. In total, the inspection team ended 
up disciplining 1,023 officials. According to 
one of our informants within the Sichuan 
Environmental Protection Bureau, there is 
a great deal of fatigue within the various 
local environmental protection agencies. 
This is due to the fact that these offices are 
forced to continually implement follow-up 
inspections with the same number of people 
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and same limited resources that they had 
before the central inspection teams arrived. 
Regardless of this, as of the time of writing, 
the local inspections continue with no 
apparent end in sight. 
Naturally, the business community has 
greeted this pressure with mixed feelings. 
This was evident in the circulation of many 
fake news reports of damages to China’s 
economy due to the delays and price 
increases caused by the inspection teams. 
One informant who spread such information 
admitted the inspections had no impact on 
their own business, but simply felt it was 
important to support other business owners 
in China by reposting calls for the removal of 
the strict policies. There have also been false 
reports that the MEP reversed these policies 
in response to the outcry from business 
owners. One report—which is not available 
online any longer—construed the purpose 
of an MEP press conference to claim that 
the central authorities had never required 
local governments to use a ‘cutting with a 
single knife’ style in the implementation of 
the new policies and that factories could 
now return to normal operation. In fact, the 
conference made no mention of allowing 
factories to restart operations, but stressed 
that the crackdown would not tolerate the 
closure of entire economic sectors without 
proper evidence. As mentioned above, from 
the very beginning the provincial authorities 
in Sichuan province issued a warning to 
inspectors not to close factories without 
proof of a law violation. When the business 
community started complaining about 
‘unfair’ practices during the inspections, 
China Environmental News sent a reporter 
to provide in-depth coverage of the impact 
of the policies on different industries (Huo 
2017). The reporter claimed that not all 
factories or businesses of a given industry 
or service were being closed, but rather that 
environmental bureaus in Chengdu were 
specifically going after those companies that 
were in violation of the law. However, none 
of this reporting has paid any attention to 
the impact of the crackdown on the workers 
within the factories or businesses that have 
been closed.
Evidence from the 
Footwear Industry
To gain a better understanding of the 
impact these environmental inspections 
have had on local businesses and workers, 
we will now take a closer look at Chengdu’s 
footwear industry. The local footwear sector 
experienced a period of successful economic 
development in the first decade of the 2000s. 
Industrial relocation from China’s coastal 
provinces and a large, relatively cheap, 
skilled workforce have enabled Chengdu—
together with Chongqing—to become the 
fourth largest footwear production base in 
China, behind the traditional and primary 
production centres in Zhejiang, Guangdong, 
and Fujian provinces. Footwear companies 
in Chengdu focus on the production of 
medium to low-end quality women’s 
leather shoes. In particular, the industry 
cluster in Wuhou district has been officially 
labelled ‘China’s Capital of Women’s Shoes’ 
(zhongguo nüxie zhi du). The structure 
of the industry—consisting mainly of 
small and medium enterprises, and many 
unregulated or unregistered workshops—as 
well as its proximity to the city centre, has 
unsurprisingly made this footwear cluster a 
major target for environmental inspections. 
According to official media reports, by 
30 June 2017, 7,600 ‘scattered, polluting 
enterprises’ (sanluanwu qiye) in Chengdu 
had been ‘temporarily’ closed because of 
environmental inspections (Zou 2017). By 
the end of October 2017, this number should 
reach a total of 9,400 firms. While we do 
not have access to independently verifiable 
figures with regards to the footwear 
industry, several online accounts point to a 
massive wave of closures. By mid-August, 
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more than 90 percent of the estimated 
3,000 footwear companies in Chengdu’s 
Wuhou and Shuangliu districts had been 
ordered to halt production. In addition, the 
few remaining firms that had been allowed 
to stay in business were confronted with 
difficulties in doing so, as most of their 
supplier factories were also affected by 
production stoppages.
It is important to note that ‘temporary’ 
closures of footwear firms are in line 
with environmental policy, but also with 
broader urban planning objectives and local 
industrial development strategies. Since 
2007, with the adoption of the so-called 
‘one capital, two parks’ (yi du liang yuan) 
guideline, it has been official policy to focus 
on the establishment of an R&D base as well 
as a trade, information, and service center 
for the footwear industry in Wuhou District 
(Huang and Hu 2008). Manufacturing 
facilities were encouraged to undergo 
industrial upgrading and/or to relocate to 
footwear industry parks in the peri-urban 
counties of Chongzhou and Jintang. This 
policy of upgrading and relocating has since 
then intensified with the establishment of 
industrial parks in rural parts of Sichuan 
province (for example, Anyue, Lezhi, and 
Santai) and the urban planning objective 
of transforming Wuhou District into a 
development hub for creative industries 
(Wuhou District Media Office 2017). Seen 
from this perspective, the recent rounds of 
environmental inspections highly increased 
the pressure on business owners who have, 
thus far, been reluctant to either invest 
in upgrading, or to move further away 
from Chengdu. This pressure weighs more 
heavily now that even the MEP has explicitly 
linked the environmental inspections to 
the broader national objective of industrial 
upgrading (Xiakedao 2017). 
Collective Resistance
Confronted with forced production halts, 
business owners have organised themselves 
under the guidance of the so-called 
‘Chengdu Footwear Business Association’ 
(chengdu xieye tongye gonghui), a platform 
for local footwear producers and suppliers 
established in 1998. The Business Association 
undertook an investigation across the local 
industry, and on 21 August sent a detailed 
report to the municipal authorities urging 
them to pay attention to the extent of the 
closures, the number of workers driven 
into unemployment, and the economic 
losses generated by the environmental 
inspections (Operational Centre of the 
Capital of Women’s Shoes 2017a). Over the 
‘Stand firm! Shoe factories, we are 
with you’. This picture was circulated 
during the environmental crackdown 
by the footwear supplier company and 
B2B platform Zhao Mi Dou, which is 
operating in Chengdu.
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following weeks, several meetings between 
business and government representatives 
took place (Chengdu Footwear Business 
Association 2017a). While acknowledging 
the unavoidability of large-scale relocations 
out of Wuhou and Shuangliu districts, the 
Business Association demanded more time 
to prepare for the relocations and was 
granted permission to resume production in 
the meantime (Chengdu Footwear Business 
Association 2017b; Operational Centre of the 
Capital of Women’s Shoes 2017b). Arguably, 
one of the most interesting aspects of this 
collective effort by business owners was 
how they tried to advance their position by 
pointing to the danger of social instability. 
In another report delivered on 21 August, 
the Business Association warned that the 
current situation of tens of thousands of 
unemployed shoe factory workers might 
lead to ‘mass incidents’ (qunti shijian) 
(Operational Centre of the Capital of 
Women’s Shoes 2017a).
In fact, collective protests by workers 
pushed into unemployment due to recent 
environmental inspections have been 
documented in Tianjin, as well as Shandong, 
Hunan, and Hebei provinces (Zhang 2017). 
However, similar public protests could not 
be verified in Chengdu’s footwear industry. 
Since the beginning of August, workers 
in several factories where we conducted 
research started to express their anger at 
the closure of their workplaces and the 
ensuing uncertainty they faced. One way 
of expressing their frustration was to share 
videos of protests by unemployed workers 
elsewhere. They would also share unverified 
accounts and rumours about physical 
clashes between inspection teams and 
workers in the area. The most widespread 
form of articulating dissent on social media 
was to write and share cynical comments 
and poems (See the example above) directly 
criticising central state policy and the 
‘specialists’ sent to enforce environmental 
protection at the expense of the livelihood 
of the workers. 
Besides expressing their frustration on 
social media, the immediate reaction of many 
shoe factory workers was to go back to their 
rural homes and wait there until work in 
Chengdu could be taken up again. Many are 
rural migrant workers who can easily reach 
their villages within hours. This has been a 
common strategy for local shoe production 
workers in recent years when there is no work 
available due to reduced production orders. 
Towards the end of August, as it became 
clear that most of the small- and medium-
sized factories in Wuhou district would not 
resume production, an increasing number of 
A frequently shared comment found in WeChat groups discussing recent factory closures.
Translation: Thanks to the hard work of the government, in the name of environmental 
protection, chemical plants, plastic factories, brick factories, gravel pits, steel foundries, 
construction sites, mines, lumber yards, and the livestock industry have all been shut down. 
The price of all kinds of goods have increased, sources of goods have dried up, trucks have 
stopped deliveries, workers have all been laid off, even business owners are about to close 
shop. This year’s air quality in the city and the countryside has reached a ‘safe to eat’ level of 
cleanliness so everyone can relax and ‘drink up’ that Northwest Wind! If you like this, share it.
感谢政府的努力뼷以环保之名뼷化工厂停了, 塑料厂停了, 砖瓦厂停了뼷沙石场停了뼷
铸造厂停了뼷楼也停了뼷矿也停了뼷木板厂也停了뼷养殖业也停了뼷各种货物价也涨
了뼷货源还断了뼷货车也停了뼷工人也都停工了뼷做生意的也快关门了뼷今年成立乡
里的空气质量达到了可食用级别了뼷大家可以放心喝西北风了쨗被点赞转发下去.
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workers began to move on to new footwear 
industrial parks further way from Chengdu. 
Whether these relocation processes succeed 
remains to be seen. Fieldwork conducted 
prior to the environmental crackdown 
suggested that the majority of rural migrant 
workers employed in the footwear industry 
were determined to stay in the urban area, 
while the younger generation (under the age 
of thirty) is particularly reluctant to take up 
these precarious factory jobs. 
It should also be stressed, however, 
that the local government(s) in Chengdu 
deployed a broad range of measures to 
ease tensions and aid unemployed workers. 
According to official media reports (Zou 
2017a), by the first week of August, the 
municipal authorities had already organised 
forty-nine job fairs in the districts that were 
most severely affected by company closures 
and successfully provided six thousand new 
job opportunities. In addition to job fairs, a 
special government hotline that promised 
to help workers find re-employment within 
forty-eight hours was set up. Finally, every 
company that agreed to employ workers 
affected by the recent closures has been 
promised subsidies of five thousand yuan 
per job/year over a period of three years, 
with the government paying the employer’s 
share of social security contributions for the 
newly employed workforce.
Beyond Formalism
The recent environmental crackdown will 
likely have real, long-term consequences for 
both China’s business owners and workers. 
While it may take some time to know for 
sure, we do not expect that factories will 
be allowed to return to business-as-usual 
once they restart production or move to a 
new peri-urban location. Reports that were 
issued during the central inspections in 
Sichuan show that while Chengdu was the 
initial focus of the crackdown, ultimately 
the whole province was strictly scrutinised 
(Sichuan Provincial Government 2017). The 
Sichuan Provincial MEP continues to collect 
complaints from the public and strictly 
enforce the law by punishing violators 
with fines and litigation. Moreover, all of 
these activities are continuously being 
updated online with a remarkable degree of 
transparency, including what appear to be 
full formal complaints made to local MEPs 
across the province, along with explanations 
of how the agencies have responded. Against 
this background, available media reports 
suggest that environmental inspections 
(including factory closures) have also taken 
place in the more recently established 
footwear industry parks (Sun and Zhu 2017). 
This is also referred to by a representative 
of the new industry park in Anyue who was 
quoted in the Sichuan Daily as saying: ‘In 
the admission process [of firms intending to 
relocate to the park], we are also demanding 
that company owners upgrade with regard to 
production and environmental protection’ 
(Jiang and Shi 2017).
In other words, this does not appear to 
be an example of local officials engaging 
in ‘formalism’ by requiring factories to 
close while investigators from the central 
government are in town. Instead, the local 
government appears to recognise that 
environmental closures are tied to larger 
calls for upgrading manufacturing systems 
and reforming economic production. 
While it will undoubtedly not be a perfect 
transition, the state is clearly attempting 
to pair re-employment services with strict 
enforcement of environmental regulations. 
Perhaps this is a prelude to the kind of 
governing strategies to expect from both 
the central and local governments now that 
the Nineteenth Congress of the CCP has 
concluded. In the near term, we will all need 
to pay closer attention to this intersection 
between environmental protection and 
industrial transformation. 
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Hong Kong farmers working in the field. Photo by Loretta I. T. Lou.
174 MADE IN CHINA - WINDOW ON ASIA
Loretta Ieng Tak Lou
Given the social and political significance of 
‘the peasant’ (nongmin) in modern Chinese 
history, it is surprising that the term 
(nongmin) is largely absent in Hong Kong, 
where discourses about individual farmers 
(nongfu) are far more prevalent. In tracing 
the modern etymology of Chinese peasants 
and the history of Hong Kong agriculture, 
this essay argues that the lack of ‘class’ 
consciousness makes Hong Kong farmers 
even more vulnerable to the unceasing wave 
of urban sprawl.
In the Absence 
of a Peasantry, 
What, Then, Is 
a Hong Kong 
Farmer?
Given the significance of ‘peasants’ 
(nongmin) in recent Chinese history, I was 
surprised to find that the term nongmin is 
pretty much absent in Hong Kong, where I 
have been researching the local green living 
movement since 2012. In China, nongmin 
is an expression of social and political 
importance. Since the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949, the term nongmin not only refers 
to people whose livelihoods depend on 
agriculture, but is also incorporated into 
China’s administrative classification, along 
with other status groups such as workers 
(gongren) and urban residents (jumin) 
(Cohen 1993). In her article ‘What, Then, Is 
a Chinese Peasant?’, Mindi Schneider (2015) 
demonstrates that nongmin is a complex 
and multi-layered concept of multifarious 
meanings. For example, when it is a legal 
and administrative category, nongmin 
reflects the rigid separation between rural 
and urban hukou. As a cultural signifier, 
the term connotes ‘low quality’ and 
‘backwardness’. Indeed, Chinese peasants 
have been increasingly made the scapegoat 
for China’s food security and food safety 
problems (Schneider 2015). As such, 
although the peasantry is an indispensable 
part of the political discourse and economic 
development in the PRC, they remain one 
of the most socially marginalised groups in 
China today. 
In Search of a Hong 
Kong Peasantry
Although the term nongmin can be found 
sporadically in writing, I have never heard 
people in Hong Kong, including those 
who actually engage in farming, use it in 
conversation. Instead, local people use 
‘farmer’ (nongfu) to refer to individuals 
who plant vegetables and fruit. Depending 
on where, how, and why they farm, those 
engaging in agricultural activities in Hong 
Kong can be further differentiated into 
urban farmers (dushi nongfu), organic 
farmers (youji nongfu), and leisure farmers 
(jiari nongfu), as well as others (Cheng 
2009b). 
Obviously, the vastly different historical 
trajectories of China and Hong Kong 
contribute to the lack of nongmin discourses 
in the former British colony. One reason 
that the expression is not more prevalent 
in Hong Kong has to do with how the term 
was constructed and loaded with its current 
meanings in mainland China during the 
twentieth century. According to Myron 
Cohen (1993), nongmin was one of the 
many loanwords from Japan that entered 
China during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Like other similar 
linguistic imports that were borrowed to 
express the flood of new ideas and new 
social phenomena at that time (Chen 
2014), nongmin was a ‘modern word’ that 
was readily available for cultural and 
political elites to assign new meanings 
to it (Cohen 1993). Before then, the word 
was nowhere to be found even in the most 
authoritative Chinese-English dictionaries. 
Indeed, individuals who worked in the 
farm were more commonly referred to as 
nongfu, nongding, nongjia, and nongren 
(translated into English as farmers, 
labourers, agriculturalists, etc.). As the rural 
population came to be known as nongmin in 
the mid-twentieth century, the term was 
constructed as a major obstacle to national 
development. However, under the influence 
of Marxism, nongmin uprisings had come 
to represent a major revolutionary force 
that had the potential to overthrow the old 
feudal society. 
Due to Hong Kong’s colonial past, local 
farmers (nongfu) were not subjected to this 
radical ‘nongmin project’. It could be said 
that Hong Kong farmers’ identities more 
closely resembled Chinese farmers before 
the mid-twentieth century, in that they 
were primarily tied to agricultural work 
and the household without the class and 
revolutionary referent (Schneider 2015). 
Indeed, archival records suggest that during 
the 1920s and 1930s, Hong Kong farmers’ 
household economy, housing arrangements, 
and social practices differed little from 
their counterparts in Guangdong before the 
advent of the Communist’s ‘nongmin project’ 
(Hayes 2006, 13). Although many traditional 
Chinese customs had begun to fade away in 
urban Hong Kong and in mainland China, 
especially after the Communist revolution 
of 1949, peasant practices were preserved 
in rural New Territories well into the 1970s 
(Carroll 2007, 71).
Trials and Tribulations
Up until the 1960s, farming provided 
a means of livelihood for the majority of 
the indigenous inhabitants, as well as the 
thousands of mainland Chinese refugees 
who settled in the New Territories as 
rice, vegetable, and livestock farmers in 
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the aftermath of World War II and the 
Chinese Civil War (Kadoorie Agricultural 
Aid Association 1982). After the wars, 
subsistence agriculture was actively 
promoted by the colonial government and 
the Kadoorie Agricultural Aid Association 
(KAAA), a charity founded in 1951 by 
Lawrence and Horace Kadoorie to alleviate 
poverty and create social stability. Working 
with the Agricultural and Fisheries 
Department, KAAA provided money and 
introduced various assistance programmes 
to Chinese refugees, such as setting them 
up as pig farmers and offering them 
interest-free or low-interest short-term 
loans. The Kadoorie brothers believed that 
philanthropy alone was not enough, so the 
goal of their organisation was to help the 
new arrivals to stand on their own feet and 
become self-sufficient farmers. And they 
succeeded. As the Chinese refugees settled 
in their new home and farms in the New 
Territories, they supplied an ever-growing 
percentage of the colony’s food (Hayes 2006, 
29). At one point during the leftist riots 
in 1967, the self-sufficiency rate of locally 
grown vegetables peaked at 48.8 percent 
after the PRC curtailed food supplies to 
Hong Kong, forcing the colonial government 
to rely heavily on local produce (Lau 2013, 1 
and 58).
Beginning in the late 1950s, Hong Kong’s 
subsistence agriculture came to an end when 
paddy rice farming went into a sharp decline 
(Hayes 2006, 75–79). What is interesting, 
though, is that following the demise of paddy 
rice farming, there then came what Hoi 
Lung Lau describes as ‘the most prosperous 
period of Hong Kong agriculture’ in the early 
1970s and early 1980s (2013, 65). In addition 
to the growing demand for fresh vegetables 
and flowers from the urban middle class, 
Lau believes that the superior quality of 
Hong Kong vegetables accounted for the 
agricultural boom. As his interviewee vividly 
recalled: ‘As Chairman Mao made them put 
all the effort into growing grains, farmers in 
the mainland had gotten out of practice of 
growing tasty vegetables!’ (2013, 69).
Unfortunately, this golden era of 
agriculture did not last long. At first, farms 
were hit by labour shortages as villagers 
in the New Territories sought higher 
paid manufacturing and office jobs in 
the city. Later, when China opened up its 
market in 1978, manufacturing factories 
were relocated to China while Hong Kong 
repositioned itself as Asia’s financial 
hub with a thriving real estate market. 
Consequently, many farms were lost to 
urban sprawl and the total area of arable 
land continued to decrease. Meanwhile, 
the increased import of food from China 
caused Hong Kong’s food self-sufficiency 
rate to plummet dramatically, driving local 
agriculture to the brink of extinction. By the 
1980s, Hong Kong no longer produced rice. 
Although fresh vegetables are still grown in 
the New Territories, the total proportion of 
local vegetables declined from 40 percent in 
the 1960s to 2.3 percent in 2013 (Lau 2013, 1; 
Cheung 2014, 1019). Today, 90 percent of the 
food supply in Hong Kong is imported, with 
the majority of it from the PRC. 
The Emergence of a New 
Kind of Farmer
As incidents of food scandals soar in 
China, Hong Kong people have become 
increasingly concerned about their heavy 
dependence on China for their food 
supply. While other factors, such as the 
rise of local consciousness (Hung 2014), 
are also responsible for the Agricultural 
Revitalisation Movement (fugeng yundong), 
food safety is no doubt a major catalyst. With 
help from land activists, environmentalists, 
and local food consumers, Hong Kong 
farmers have joined in the movement against 
unbridled urbanisation and unchecked 
developmentalism. Even though the farmers 
usually prefer to take a back seat and let the 
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activists do the actual organising, during the 
process of mobilisation, farmers in Hong 
Kong have learned to redefine their social 
and cultural identity by emphasising their 
contribution to sustainability and their role 
as defenders of Hong Kong’s remaining 
farms. 
In contrast to the nongmin in China, who 
continue to suffer from all kinds of stigma 
and discrimination, nongfu in Hong Kong 
seem to have overcome the bias that farming 
is an inferior occupation (Lau 2013, 72). 
Since the first mobilisation against land-
grabbing in 2008 (also known as the ‘Choi 
Yuen Village Incident’, see Chang 2010), 
Hong Kong farmers have assumed a more 
dignified image. Today, farmers in Hong 
Kong no longer consider agriculture as an 
obstacle to Hong Kong’s socioeconomic 
development—a metanarrative that has held 
strong until very recently. Rather, they have 
come to see agriculture as an indispensable 
element of the city, an idea that was clearly 
articulated during the first Hong Kong 
Agricultural Forum in 2013.
Farmers without Class 
Consciousness
Despite their new cultural identity, 
Hong Kong nongfu do not wield any more 
political power than the nongmin in the 
PRC. In a way, Hong Kong farmers could 
face extinction even sooner because they 
lack the class consciousness that unifies 
the peasantry in China. After all, it is much 
easier to eliminate some 4,600 farmers, 
most of which are tenants without land 
ownership, than to eliminate an entire 
peasant ‘class’ without causing some 
social unrest. Moreover, despite their 
close affinity with land activists, in reality 
Hong Kong farmers lack political power 
to influence agricultural policies. For one, 
their ‘professional representative’ in the 
Legislative Council is elected by a small 
group of elite members, who are ardent 
partisans of the government’s pro-growth 
developmental strategies. 
To pacify farmers and to show 
governmental commitment to supporting 
local agriculture, the government 
inaugurated a Hydroponic Centre in 2013 to 
promote the benefits of growing vegetables 
in a controlled environment. While vertical 
hydroponics appears to support local 
agriculture and responds to Hong Kong 
people’s increasing demand for ‘clean 
vegetables’, the practice is highly unpopular 
among farmers in the New Territories, who 
see it as a plot to uproot them from their 
land, allowing the government to continue 
to push forward its urbanisation agenda. 
Speaking at the Hong Kong Agricultural 
Forum in 2013, TV, a farmer at the Ma Po 
Po Community Farm, made an analogy 
between farmers and vegetables on a plate 
of barbecued pork rice (char siu faan): 
‘Unorganised farmers are like the two pieces 
of side vegetables on the plate. Finance and 
real estate are the barbecued pork and we all 
want more of that. However, we also know 
that eating too much meat is no good for our 
health, so we add two pieces of vegetables 
on the side. The side vegetables are like our 
farmers and our local agriculture. They are 
good on display, but they are dispensable.’ 
Indeed, Hong Kong farmers may have 
escaped the stigma and discrimination 
associated with their nongmin counterparts 
in the PRC, but in a city where an inch of 
land is worth an ounce of gold, they might 
not be able to escape being devoured by 
the unceasing wave of urban sprawl that is 
bound to happen over the next fifteen years.
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China and Myanmar have been economic 
partners and allies for a long time. But 
this partnership is now being challenged 
by Myanmar’s democratisation process. 
Although nascent, Burmese civil society 
has shown it is ready to actively contest the 
legitimacy of China’s various development 
and commercial interests in this new 
democracy.
Burmese 
Civil Society 
Challenges 
China’s 
Development 
Assistance in 
Myanmar
The development landscape is shifting. 
China’s emergence as a non-traditional 
development donor is challenging 
traditional donor countries that are part 
of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Development Cooperation (OECD), such 
as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. After many years 
of ambivalence, Beijing is renewing its 
engagement with its Southeast Asian 
neighbours in trade and development 
cooperation, a shift predicated not only 
upon the need for China to secure its 
energy supplies as the Chinese economy 
continues to expand (Renwick 2014), but 
also on the potential economic growth of 
these neighbouring countries, with their 
cheap labour and growing middle classes. 
Southeast Asia represents a market of six 
hundred million people for Chinese goods 
and services—a potentially significant boon 
for the slowing Chinese economy. Among 
these countries, since its transition to a 
civil government, Myanmar has had one 
of the highest growth rates in the region, 
exceeding seven percent per annum, a 
development that has been heavily driven by 
foreign direct investment. 
From a developmental perspective, 
Chinese aid and development assistance 
are nothing new, but over the years these 
instruments have shifted from being driven 
by ideology, as during the Maoist era, to a 
much more flexible and pragmatic approach. 
According to a recent report by the Asia 
Foundation (2015), Chinese development 
assistance currently focuses on non-
interference, mutual benefit, infrastructure-
led growth, and demand-driven cooperation. 
In Southeast Asia, China has provided a full 
range of assistance, including soft loans, 
debt cancellation, and the extension of lines 
of traditional credit. Moreover, the Chinese 
state has actively assisted and invested 
in the infrastructure of Southeast Asian 
nations. In the case of Myanmar, China has 
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Protest against the Myitsone Dam in 
Myanmar. Photo: AK Rockefeller (Flickr).
been a long-term economic partner and ally, 
but this partnership is now being challenged 
by Myanmar’s democratisation process 
(Toshihiro 2014). Based on fieldwork 
observations conducted in Myanmar in 
the summer of 2016, in this article I first 
examine the role of Chinese development 
assistance and investments in the country’s 
transition, I then move on to consider how 
this role is perceived and challenged by an 
emerging but active Burmese civil society. 
While nascent, Burmese civil society has 
indeed shown that it is ready to actively 
contest the legitimacy of China’s various 
development and commercial interests in 
this new democracy. 
China and Myanmar: A 
Strained Relationship
China is Myanmar’s most significant and 
largest investor to date. China’s relationship 
with Myanmar is primarily driven by 
Beijing’s need to secure resources for its 
own development, as the country offers 
China a wealth of natural resources and is 
strategically located. Gas and oil routed 
through the Indian Ocean into Myanmar 
and on to China reduce Chinese dependence 
on the Middle East and on the unsafe 
passage through the Malacca Strait. While 
the expansion of the Chinese economy has 
slowed considerably, the desire to sustain 
growth demands that China secure not 
only resources, but also a market for its 
goods. The Burmese economy is forecast 
to grow at 8.6 percent in 2016, with similar 
projections for 2017, presenting a significant 
opportunity for Chinese manufacturers 
(Asian Development Bank 2017). 
For this reason, much of China’s 
development assistance remains framed 
as economic cooperation, a situation that 
has failed to win the support of Burmese 
society. Large-scale projects such as the 
Myitisone Dam, the Letpadaung Copper 
Mine, and the Kyaukphyu Gas Pipeline 
have drawn the attention and opposition 
of civil society representatives. Chinese 
companies, such as the China Power 
Investment (CPI) have been accused of 
not providing enough safeguards against 
environmental damage, nor appropriate 
compensation to affected communities. 
The Irrawaddy River, where the dam was 
to be located, is seen as the birthplace of 
the nation. Given the Irrawaddy’s cultural 
and historical significance, the lack of 
consultation prior to the initiation of the 
dam project further strengthened the claims 
against CPI. In addition, accusations of land 
grabs and contracts that favour the Chinese 
have increased anti-Chinese sentiments in 
Myanmar (Walker 2014a). 
The Chinese are seeking to make amends. 
The Chinese Embassy in Yangon has 
instructed all state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) operating in Myanmar to undertake 
corporate social responsibility training. The 
China National Petroleum Corporation, 
the SOE responsible for the Kyaukphyu 
pipeline, has established a Pipeline 
Friendship Association in Myanmar to 
address local grievances that pertain to 
the pipeline. These types of actions have 
proved insufficient to address continuing 
concerns and the demands of Burmese civil 
society. For instance, a 2016 delegation from 
CPI that was accompanied by the Chinese 
Ambassador Hong Liang to Myitkyina 
township, Kachin state, to meet with local 
officials and residents attracted protests 
(Ye 2016); while the restarting of the 
Letpadaung mine elicited outcry and further 
protests in May 2016 (Chan and Khin 2016). 
The inability of the Chinese to win over 
Burmese support is an indication of not 
only a failure to address the asymmetry in 
its engagement with Myanmar, but also its 
failure to recognise the importance of the 
country’s increasingly active civil society.
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The Resistance of Local 
Actors
As a long-standing partner of Myanmar 
during its years of international isolation, 
China’s engagement with the country 
has reached a critical juncture. Now 
more than ever, Beijing needs to re-frame 
its partnership to incorporate a new 
development component, one that seeks to 
address the existing asymmetry and provides 
opportunities for all stakeholders to be part 
of the development, notably civil society 
groups and communities that are affected 
by Chinese economic interests. Indeed, 
Chinese involvement in Myanmar must be 
seen in the context of the country’s political 
transition, which is providing new space 
and opportunities for local civil society. 
Burmese civil society stakeholders have 
pushed their country’s new democratic 
government for accountability and 
transparency in its deals with the Chinese, 
particularly considering that the Chinese 
authorities have in the past supported 
the military dictatorship. Moreover, 
while the Chinese government, NGOs, 
and investors have the capacity to deliver 
sustainable development and to be effective 
development partners with the Burmese, the 
asymmetrical nature of the Sino-Burmese 
partnership—firmly tilted in favour of 
China’s economic, political, and strategic 
interests—is starting to change. In re-
engaging with the world and re-establishing 
its international connections, Myanmar is 
diversifying its sources of economic, social, 
and political support, thereby reducing its 
dependency on China. In addition, China’s 
own democratic deficits are significant 
impediments to its overseas development 
assistance policies, especially considering 
the fact that the Chinese authorities prefer 
government-to-government development 
cooperation. This form of partnership often 
illuminates China’s democratic deficiencies 
rather than hiding them and is, therefore, 
hardly acceptable to local Burmese civil 
society. 
As mentioned above, the activism of 
Myanmar’s emerging civil society has 
already had an impact on Chinese economic 
interests in the country. The Thein Sein 
government’s decision to shelve the China-
backed Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy 
River in late 2011 is generally attributed to 
opposition from Burmese civil society, based 
on worries about irreversible environmental 
damage and displacement of communities 
(International Rivers 2011; Kirchherr et 
al. 2017). Fieldwork interviews in 2016 
with Burmese civil society representatives 
engaged across a number of fields—from 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) to 
political transition—suggest that there is 
a tendency to look towards the West, in 
particular the United States, for development 
assistance. This is principally out of concern 
for China’s top-down approach to economic 
development cooperation. Interviews with 
people working in the Burmese NGO sector 
suggest that the Chinese state—in its various 
guises—is perceived as lacking the know-
how and skills to effectively engage with 
Burmese civil society, a perception that is 
also jeopardising China’s legitimacy and 
its status as an economic and development 
partner. According to an NGO representative 
working in Myanmar’s CSR sector, 
campaigns to improve the Chinese image 
and attempts to engage with Burmese civil 
society in the wake of large-scale protests 
against a number of Chinese-backed projects 
have, thus far, proved weak and ineffectual. 
For example, despite providing public 
access to its Environment Management Plan 
for the Letpadaung Copper Mine, Wanbao, 
the Chinese mining company that owns the 
site, was not able to quell protests from local 
villagers claiming environmental damage 
and inadequate compensation (Hammond 
2016).
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Finally, another factor that should not 
be discounted in the relationship between 
the two countries is that Chinese economic 
interests in Myanmar are threatened by 
the ethnic conflicts taking place across 
the Yunnan border. For example, the 
conflict between the ethnic Kachin and the 
Burmese army threatens not only Chinese 
internal security—with some sixty thousand 
displaced people entering Yunnan since 
conflict intensified in early 2015 (Agence 
France-Presse 2015)—but also China’s 
strategic oil and gas supply pipelines.
Looking Forward
China’s political culture has always 
shaped the manner in which Beijing has 
engaged with other nations. This has 
entailed a strong preference for state-to-
state relationships. Myanmar’s reforms 
have opened up new space for local civil 
society actors and the media, all of which 
have become roadblocks for furthering 
Chinese interests in the country. China 
was slow to recognise the influence of civil 
society on domestic politics and Burmese 
development, and Burmese civil society 
representatives have grown increasingly 
sceptical regarding Chinese claims of mutual 
benefit and South-South cooperation. Still, 
although it has little to offer in terms of 
values associated with development, such 
as good governance and accountability, 
China does have a significant development 
experience to share, having lifted over seven 
hundred million people out of poverty in 
just two decades. And yet, in spite of this, 
both domestic and international civil society 
activists working in Myanmar question the 
extent to which the Chinese state and its 
various stakeholders will be of assistance 
to their country. Extrapolating further, 
we can also speculate that, if and when 
Chinese civil society stakeholders begin to 
play a bigger role in delivering development 
assistance to Myanmar, questions will surely 
abound as to the autonomy of Chinese civil 
society organisations from the Party-state 
(Hsu 2016). All of this is likely to continue to 
restrain Chinese economic and development 
cooperation in Myanmar. 
Nevertheless, China has started to 
acknowledge the importance of engaging 
civil society actors to deepen cooperation 
with its neighbours. As a mechanism for 
building trust and cooperation at the 
regional level, China and the Association 
for Southeast Asian Nations established 
a high-level, people-to-people dialogue, 
involving civil society representatives 
from across the region. The first meeting 
was held in 2013 in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region, and was organised by 
the China NGO Network for International 
Exchange (CNIE), an umbrella organisation 
for China’s leading non-profit social 
organisations (Lee and Fachir 2013). The 
second meeting, held in 2015 in Nusa Dua, 
Bali, paved the way for the establishment of 
an NGO network responsible for organising 
future rotating dialogues. Moreover, the 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, 
one of China’s largest NGOs, opened its 
second international office in Yangon in 
August 2016. Such measures suggest that a 
possible re-framing of Chinese development 
efforts is underway. This, in the future, may 
open up greater space for both Chinese and 
Burmese NGOs to cooperate on development 
projects and, thus, build trust and goodwill 
between the two countries.
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Since 2014, declining economic growth and 
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign have 
led to decreasing demand in certain markets 
for jadeite—the highest valued type of jade 
in China. But while institutional factors 
may explain these short-term fluctuations, 
historical continuity and cultural 
imaginations underpinning Chinese demand 
suggest that the jadeite market boom in China 
is not quite over yet. 
Boom or Bust 
in China’s Jade 
Trade with 
Myanmar?
A trader sells small pieces of jadeite from Myanmar’s Kachin State in the jade bazaar in Ruili, a 
border town in China’s Yunnan province. Photo: Henrik K. Møller.
In November 2015, I was seated at a tea 
table with a group of jade traders in an 
alleyway shop in Shanghai. The traders 
were discussing risks and opportunities of 
different types of investments. This was after 
the crash that saw the Shanghai Composite 
Index (SCI) fall by more than 20 percent 
for two consecutive months from July to 
August 2015, causing Chinese investors to 
lose about five trillion euros (Bendini 2015) 
The owner of the jade shop was convinced 
that with time his stocks would gain value. 
His daughter, on the other hand, had not 
invested in the stock market, because she 
felt that it was akin to gambling. ‘It is much 
safer to invest in jade,’ she said, ‘Jade will 
always keep its value.’ 
As an object of economic value, jadeite 
(feicui)—the highest valued type of jade in 
China—seems subject to boom and bust 
cycles in China’s current economy, not 
unlike stocks, real estate (Ulfstjerne 2015), 
or gold (Wu 2017). While jadeite has seen 
spectacular price rises in the past three 
decades, parts of the industry took a blow 
in 2014, which Chinese traders generally 
ascribe to two factors: declining economic 
growth and Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
campaign (Magnier et al. 2015; Liu 2016) 
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However, institutional factors are not 
sufficient to understand the long-term 
trajectories of the markets for jadeite in 
the Chinese context. Jadeite is considered a 
sub-type of jade (yu), which in the form of 
nephrite has been valued in China for at least 
eight thousand years (Ming 2009). Over this 
long history, jade has assumed culturally 
specific connotations and properties 
that make it highly desirable for Chinese 
customers—a situation that may suggest that 
its markets are not likely to disappear. 
Jadeite Trade in the 
China–Myanmar 
Borderlands: A History
Jadeite has reportedly trickled into China 
from mines in Myanmar’s Kachin State 
since the thirteenth century (Walker 1991). 
Legend has it that the material was first 
imported into China’s Yunnan province 
along one of the ancient caravan trade routes 
that linked Yunnan with Myanmar and 
India. Supposedly, a Yunnanese muleteer 
picked up a stone in Kachin state and put 
it in his saddlebag as a counterweight to 
his cargo. Back in Yunnan, the stone fell to 
the ground and broke into pieces, revealing 
a green interior (Hughes and Ward 1997). 
But jadeite did not leave a strong impression 
in China until the Qing emperor Qianlong 
(1735–1796)—who was obsessed with jade 
(Levy and Scott-Clark 2001)—started to 
demand large-scale imports of the stone as 
tribute from the Burmese King Bodawpaya 
in 1788. Emerald-green jadeite with high 
transparency and translucency was then 
called ‘Imperial Jade’ (diwang yu). Today 
these Qing-era criteria still function as a 
standard to evaluate the quality of jadeite 
types (Dekker 2016). 
In 1860, during the Second Opium War, 
French and British armies sacked the 
Summer Palace in Beijing. On that occasion, 
many jade artefacts—including Burmese 
jadeite—were looted and brought to Paris 
and London. In 1863, French mineralogist 
A. Damour determined the chemical 
properties of this ‘new’ jade, and named it 
jadeite. Jadeite is chemically distinct from 
the more common nephrite jade, which is 
mined especially around Hetian, in China’s 
Xinjiang province, but both materials are 
considered to be jade due to their similar 
observable properties (LaPorte 2004). 
After the communist takeover in 1949, 
the Myanmar-China cross-border trade 
withered, and the bulk of the jadeite trade 
was diverted to other routes. One route went 
through Myanmar’s Shan State to markets in 
the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai, which 
catered specifically to buyers from Taiwan 
and Hong Kong (Zhang 2006). Alongside 
local ethnic groups, remnants of Chiang Kai-
Shek’s nationalist troops in Myanmar’s Shan 
State also transported the stones, which 
were locally taxed by different ethnic armies 
(Chang 2014). Another route saw jadeite 
brought to Rangoon, and then shipped to 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Different Kachin 
tribes have taxed jadeite in the Kachin State 
for centuries (Hughes 1999). The Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA), which was 
established in 1961, and has since fought 
the Burmese military for greater autonomy 
for ethnic Kachin in the Kachin State, took 
control of the mines in 1963, and centralised 
taxation.
With the opening of border crossings 
between China and Myanmar for trade in the 
early 1990s, increasing Chinese involvement 
in natural resource extraction in Myanmar, 
and a gradual shift in demand towards 
mainland China, jadeite transport shifted 
towards routes that run overland from the 
Kachin State into China (Walker 1991). The 
main point of entry became the border town 
of Ruili in Yunnan province, which since 
1990 has seen the establishment of a Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) for border trade, as 
well as upgraded infrastructure in the form 
of highways and a projected railway line.
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Following a ceasefire agreement between 
the KIA and the Myanmar military in 1994, 
the Myanmar military government gradually 
took over the most profitable jadeite 
mines in Kachin State, and leased mining 
concessions to their cronies and to Chinese 
investors. By 2002, the Myanmar military 
government had offered up to nearly one-
fifth of the area of Kachin state for private 
mining concessions, and by the mid-2000s, 
the government required all gemstones 
produced by joint ventures to be sold at 
annual government-organised auctions in 
Yangon and later Naypyidaw, as this was the 
easiest way to tax all sales (Woods 2016). 
Total taxes in Myanmar amount to around 
30 percent of the estimated sales value of a 
stone, and a similar import tax is officially 
levied at the Chinese border in Ruili. In 
practice, both taxes are often lowered or 
avoided by bribing officials, valuators, and 
border guards, or by smuggling the stones 
across the border—it is estimated that up 
to 80 percent of the stones that are brought 
to China enter the country illegally (Global 
Witness 2015). A report by Global Witness 
(2015) estimated that the value of official 
jade production in Myanmar in 2014 was 31 
billion USD, a figure equal to 48 percent of 
Myanmar’s official gross domestic product 
and 46 times the government expenditure on 
health for that year. The bulk of that jadeite 
goes to China. Meanwhile, the native Kachin 
people have lost crucial revenues from the 
jadeite mines, while facing rampant heroin 
addiction, HIV infection, environmental 
degradation, and dangerous working 
conditions in the mines (Beech 2017). In 
June 2011, the ceasefire between the KIA 
and the central government collapsed, and 
the ensuing violence resulted in the death of 
thousands of people and the displacement 
of around 100,000 civilians in the state 
(Project MAJE 2011). 
Ethnic Stratification in 
Ruili’s Jadeite Trade
In 2013 and 2014, I conducted fieldwork 
among jadeite traders and carvers in Ruili. 
The city’s registered population was 187,000 
as of 2012, comprising Han Chinese (57 
percent), Dai (30 percent) Jingpo (7 percent), 
as well as a host of other minority groups. 
There are also around 35,000 unregistered 
Burmese, including some 15,000 Rohingya in 
Ruili. Around 60 percent of the Han Chinese 
are locals, while the rest are immigrants 
from cities in eastern Chinese provinces 
with long traditions in jade carving and 
trading—such as Henan, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Jiangsu, and Guangdong. A local government 
official I interviewed in 2013 estimated that 
at least 50,000 people in Ruili are directly 
involved in the formal jadeite trade, a figure 
that does not include freelancers. The city 
hosts six major jadeite markets and around 
8,000 shops. Many traders are organised in 
jade trade associations based on ethnic or 
regional affiliation. 
Thanks to their broader access to 
investment capital and buyers in coastal 
China, Han Chinese control the largest 
companies. Some traders buy jadeite 
boulders at the government-organised 
auctions in Naypyidaw; others purchase 
stones in Mandalay, which are later brought 
into Ruili by professional transporters who 
take advantage of personal connections at 
government checkpoints. A subset of traders 
have stones smuggled in directly from the 
mines in Kachin state. People of Kachin/
Jingpo ethnicity mainly work as suppliers, 
while Shan/Dai peoples operate as shop 
owners, and the Rohingya and Bamar as 
cutters, polishers, and street vendors. Some 
Rohingya and Bamar act as middlemen, 
selling stones for others. Depending on 
profits, they usually receive 10 to 15 percent 
of the sales price. Others catch customers in 
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the street and bring them to shops, where 
they receive 20 to 30 percent of the profit on 
deals they facilitate. Some purchase jadeite 
for themselves and sell it in the street. 
Traders say it takes around 10,000 yuan in 
start-up capital to set up a small business as 
a mobile vendor. However, the real profits 
are in the trade of high-quality stones, 
which is much more capital intensive. In the 
Han trader community, operational capital 
usually comes in the form of informal credit 
between traders—often with jadeite used 
as security—as banks do not provide loans 
for this activity. As a general rule, you can 
borrow 50 to 70 percent of the estimated 
value of the jadeite you deposit with the 
creditor at a monthly interest rate of 3 to 5 
percent. 
What Is the Future of 
China’s Jadeite Trade?
In 2013, Ruili’s jadeite trade was booming. 
Caravans of buses arrived daily, delivering 
tour groups to the doorsteps of jadeite 
companies, which paid a percentage of their 
profits to the tour guides. Some traders said 
that jadeite prices had been rising up to 
300 percent annually since 2009, and most 
believed prices would continue to rise, not 
least because supply was diminishing due to 
the conflict in Kachin state, and because the 
mines were allegedly depleting. However, 
when I arrived in Ruili again in 2014, the 
tour buses were gone, trade was slow, and 
many smaller shops had closed down. 
Traders ascribed the market implosion to 
the slowdown of the Chinese economy and 
to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. 
Jadeite is a favoured form of gift and 
payment for illicit favours in China. As 
economist Thomas Naylor, who has studied 
illicit trade in gemstones, points out: ‘In 
their role as financial assets, gemstones 
have particularly desirable characteristics. 
High in value relative to bulk, they are easy 
to hide and to smuggle; they are universal 
and very liquid; and they can be sold via 
marketing networks whose members share 
an affinity for “discretion”’ (2010, 132). In 
the anti-corruption era, few people dared to 
engage in illicit transactions using jadeite as 
a currency. 
However, jadeite traders with enough 
capital to sit out the market slowdown 
or to divert their investments were still 
optimistic. While demand for medium-
priced jewellery had taken a blow, prices 
for high-grade jadeite were still rising. In 
2013, the owner of a large jadeite company 
where I did parts of my fieldwork used 
to specialise in selling medium-priced 
jewellery to tourists. The following year, 
he closed down that company and started a 
new one with a Chinese man from Myanmar, 
who had acquired mining licenses in the 
Kachin state. A stone excavated from one of 
these mines weighed more than six tonnes 
and was sold to a Shanghai investor for 
600 million yuan, roughly 90 million USD. 
Echoing other traders, the company owner 
said that there would always be a demand 
for jade in China. 
This has to do with traditional Chinese 
beliefs regarding the function of jade in 
the corporeal and spiritual lives of people 
(Møller  2017). Jade is believed to have at least 
six functions: stimulate good life energy (qi), 
absorb bad life energy, and condition blood 
pressure; protect people from accidents; 
bring good luck; transmit spirit (ling) and 
karma (ye) between people, for example as 
gifts and inheritance objects from mother 
to daughter; help people contemplate the 
universe and their place in it; and make 
people feel at peace. While institutional 
factors may explain the slowdown in the 
Chinese market for medium-priced jadeite 
jewelry since 2014, the persistence of these 
beliefs suggests that China’s jadeite market 
boom may not be over yet. 
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Indian Labour 
Movements 
under Modi
Indian labour politics today faces a historic 
paradox. On the one hand, in response to 
regressive changes to labour laws, India’s 
trade unions have continued to organise 
what is, after China, the world’s largest 
working-age population; on the other, 
massive labour protests have failed to make 
a dent in the political popularity of Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi and his right-wing 
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. 
To make sense of this apparent contradiction, 
this essay will outline the role of the Indian 
government in the formation of new labour 
law regulations since 2014, and the response 
of India’s trade unions to this new challenge.
Indian labour politics today faces a 
historic paradox. On the one hand, India’s 
vast labour movements have continued to 
organise what is, after China, the world’s 
largest working-age population and to 
mobilise record numbers of workers in 
national street protests in response to 
regressive changes to labour laws. On the 
other hand, several massive labour protests 
have failed to make a dent in the political 
popularity of Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi and his right-wing Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since 2014, 
the BJP has dominated government at the 
national level and at the local level in 13 
states, including strategically-important 
and populous states like Uttar Pradesh and 
Maharashtra, as well as Rajasthan, Gujarat, 
and Haryana. 
To explain this paradox, we need to look 
at the historical legacy of India’s trade 
unions as well as the rise of the BJP, as part 
of a wider ‘family of organisations’ (Sangh 
Parivar), since the 1980s. Historically, the 
backbone of India’s labour movement has 
been in the public sector and organised 
sector, which refers to all non-agricultural 
enterprises with ten or more employees. 
Despite the appearance of political strength, 
India’s system of industrial relations never 
gave unions the right to collectively bargain 
with employers, and public sector wages 
and conditions were effectively fixed by 
the state. Unions were divided between 
competing federations—known as Central 
Trade Union Organisations (CTUOs)—each 
with different political party affiliations and 
most heavily reliant on political patronage. 
Therefore, when India’s economy 
stagnated and industrial conflict began 
to rise in the 1970s, the movement as a 
whole was poorly prepared to advance the 
interests of workers independently of state 
institutions or regional political classes. 
From that point onwards, the organised 
sector has declined as a proportion of total 
employment. The vast majority of new 
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Indian workers on strike, september 2016.  
Photo: Karo4Greatness.
jobs created in the 1980s and 1990s were 
in small firms in the unorganised sector, 
which refers to enterprises with fewer 
than ten workers. Even when organised 
sector employment began to grow again in 
the 2000s, recruitment was increasingly 
dominated by the precariously employed, 
such as workers hired by labour contractors.
 Despite the enormity of this challenge, 
the union movement grew significantly 
during the ‘neoliberal’ era of the 1990s 
and 2000s. Union membership doubled in 
India from 1989 to 2002, which is the last 
year the national government verified trade 
union numbers based on complete records 
from all states (John 2007; Government of 
India 2008). Although unverified by the 
state, the most recent data released by the 
12 officially-recognised CTUOs in 2012 and 
2013 suggest that total membership may 
have increased by three or even four times 
since 2002 (Menon 2012). Much of this 
increase has come from informal workers. 
It is on such a background that this essay 
will outline the role of BJP-led Governments 
at both national and regional levels in the 
formation of new labour law regulation since 
2014, and the response of India’s CTUOs to 
this new challenge.
Modi’s Labour Agenda
Labour law reform is a major part 
of Narendra Modi’s economic reform 
agenda, which is framed by the ‘Make 
in India’ initiative. This aims at making 
India the destination of choice for global 
manufacturing investment by continuing 
with previous governments’ generous 
subsidies for large corporations and 
promises to cut governmental ‘red tape’. 
Industrial conflict and union rights stand 
in the way of this dramatically ambitious 
agenda to challenge China’s domination of 
global manufacturing. 
Modi has expressed sympathy for 
reforms enacted by several BJP-led 
state governments in the areas of labour 
contractors and hire-and-fire flexibility. For 
example, the Governments of Rajasthan, 
Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh have made 
it easier for employers in organised sector 
firms to sack workers. This has been done 
by changing the rules established under the 
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (IDA), making it 
possible for firms which employ 300 workers 
or more to make large-scale layoffs without 
state permission (previously the threshold 
was 100 workers). This change will be 
applied nationally if the Modi Government 
is able to pass its Labour Code, which aims 
to consolidate three central labour laws, 
including the IDA, into one simplified law. 
Although this code was introduced in April 
2015, its passage has been delayed by the 
slow pace of the Indian legislature and by 
opposition party control of the Rajya Sabha 
(upper house).
If passed, this Code would also extend 
the IDA’s restrictions on strike action. 
Currently, public sector employees must 
give two weeks advance notice for any 
strike. The proposed change would extend 
this restriction to all workers and impose 
fines of 20,000 to 50,000 rupees (about 300 
to 780 USD) and potential imprisonment 
for ‘illegal’ strike action (Gopalakrishnan 
and Sundar 2015). The Modi Government 
has also proposed changes to the Minimum 
Wage Act and the Apprenticeship Act, which 
would allow inter-state migrant workers to 
be hired as apprentices and sets their wages 
as a ‘stipend’ of 70 to 90 percent of the 
minimum wage, with no medical insurance.
While popular among industrialists, much 
of this mainstream labour law debate has 
focused on the small minority of regular 
workers employed in organised sector firms 
and does nothing to address the interests and 
rights of the majority of informal workers. 
Arguably, a more significant shift for 
informal workers involves proposed changes 
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to social security. The Modi Government 
has already dramatically wound back the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee, 
which, since its inception in 2005, was 
supposed to provide 100 days of manual 
waged work (albeit at sub-minimum wages) 
for rural households. Now the government 
is proposing to collapse all existing social 
security provisions into the new unified 
Labour Code. If implemented, this reform 
would consolidate 15 separate laws into a 
single labour law (Gopalakrishnan 2017).
This would have a potentially dramatic 
impact on the rights of millions of poor 
informal workers. For example, labour 
activists have made major breakthroughs in 
some regions by organising workers to access 
entitlements through tripartite (employer-
union-state) welfare boards. Many workers 
in informalised sectors, like construction or 
cigarette rolling, have benefited from death 
and accident insurance, maternity leave, 
education scholarships for their children, 
and funding for marriages. The new labour 
code threatens to undermine these hard-
won rights by severely undermining these 
welfare boards. 
’Bharat Bandh’
Since Modi’s election in 2014, unions—
led by the core of India’s CTUOs—have 
periodically mobilised in large numbers to 
oppose the government’s labour agenda. In 
September 2016, a massive nationwide strike 
caused major disruption to the economy. 
Some unions have claimed this was the 
largest general strike in history, with up 
to 150 million workers involved and costs 
to business of around 2.7 billion USD (Safi 
2016). While these figures are impossible to 
verify, the strike was highly significant with 
virtually all public sector units, banks, and 
electricity power stations closed, in addition 
to insurance companies and, in many 
regions, trains, bus services, and schools 
(Jagannathan 2016). Additionally, tens of 
thousands of coal miners joined the strike, 
along with university and college teachers 
(Live Mint 2016a; Reddy 2016). Many large 
private sector firms were also closed down 
or substantially affected. 
This Bharat Bandh—literally ‘India 
closed’ in Hindi/Sanskrit—was the result 
of coordinated action by ten CTUOs who 
promoted a 12-point charter of demands on 
the Modi government (Live Mint 2016b). 
These demands include calls to expand 
subsidised food schemes, enforce existing 
labour laws (including minimum wages), 
implement universal social security, end the 
privatisation of public sector units, and ban 
foreign investment in railways and defence 
(Industriall Global Union 2016). The same 
CTUOs had organised another national 
strike in September 2015, which attracted 
a similar number of participants (Australia 
Asia Worker Links 2015). In February 2013, 
tens of millions had also joined a national 
strike (Australia Asia Worker Links 2013). 
The scale of these successive protests 
demonstrates not only the sheer size of the 
Indian working class—the official labour 
force count is around 500 million, although 
the true figure is probably much larger—but 
also that CTUOs have been growing steadily 
in recent years. Still, in spite of these 
numbers and despite the BJP facing a new 
test in the Gujarat State elections at the time 
of writing, these protests have made little 
difference to Modi’s sustained popularity as 
a politician and to the success of the BJP in 
state elections. 
Explaining the Paradox
What explains the apparent contradiction 
between massive labour protests and a 
failure to change the direction of Indian 
politics? One reason is that India’s polity and 
civil society is extremely diverse and ‘labour 
politics’ represent just one relatively minor 
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part of it. Another is that labour politics 
tends to be squeezed outside mainstream 
debate by the country’s political and media 
elite, who are largely hostile to unions. 
A more fundamental reason relates to 
the BJP’s historical success in appealing 
to a range of classes and castes, which fall 
between India’s minority of industrialists 
and organised sector workers. As India’s 
economy liberalised in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the BJP often succeeded in appealing 
to the interests of these ‘intermediate 
classes’ within a populist framework, 
while continuing to support and facilitate 
neoliberal economic policies (McCartney 
2009). The BJP also appealed to the 
minority of salaried ‘middle class’ Indians in 
large cities—the well-educated, upwardly-
mobile sons and daughters of public 
sector employees and professionals who 
underpinned new markets for automobiles, 
electronic goods, and other trappings of 
consumer society. 
This electoral appeal intersected with 
the rise of an immense anti-corruption 
movement in 2011 and 2012, which related to 
Indians’ experience of everyday corruption. 
At the time, the movement severely 
undermined the Indian National Congress-
led national government. This confluence of 
factors meant that Modi, who cultivated an 
image as a ‘clean’, no-nonsense technocrat, 
was well positioned to take power in 2014, 
winning in a landslide. 
Beyond the Set-Piece
Interestingly, many of the most significant 
social struggles since 2014 have occurred 
outside the set-piece events orchestrated 
by CTUOs. In the auto industry, a strike by 
3,000 Honda workers in Tapukara in early 
2016, 100 kilometres southwest of New 
Delhi, was heavily repressed by the state 
BJP government (Workers Solidarity Centre 
2016). Over 1,000 workers were arrested, 
136 workers fired, and dozens jailed. This 
came after the most serious conflict in the 
auto industry to-date, at Maruti Suzuki 
India Limited (MSIL) in the nearby town 
of Manesar. This conflict in 2011 and 2012 
resulted in thousands of sackings, the tragic 
death of a human resources manager, and 
the imprisonment of dozens of workers. 
Another important strike in 2016 took 
place in Bengaluru (Bangalore) where up 
to 400,000 workers emptied the city’s 
garments factories and flooded the streets 
in response to government changes to state 
pensions (Bageshree and Bharadwaj 2016). 
Key features of this strike included its 
primarily ‘wildcat’ character—local CTUOs 
were taken by surprise, despite having 
organised their own, much smaller response 
to the changes—and that the strikers were 
overwhelmingly women. This massive 
protest succeeded in deferring the Modi 
government’s plans (Aanchal Magazine 
2016).
Given that women tend to work outside 
the male-dominated structures of most 
trade unions, another highly significant 
development occurred in the tea plantations 
of Munnar in Kerala in September 2015, 
when female plantation workers established 
a new women migrant-led union—Pembila 
Urumai (‘Unity of Women’ in Tamil)—to 
break with male-dominated unions (Banerji 
2016). 
While some of these workers may have 
participated in the CTUO-organised 
general strikes, the real challenges to the 
current polity have occurred in between 
these set-piece events, in a society in which 
the labour laws and social protections 
that have provoked such ferocious debate 
among industrialists, union federations, and 
political classes are so rarely applied. The 
Modi Government has signalled the intention 
to plough ahead with its controversial 
labour reform agenda, so further points of 
contention are likely to emerge.
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Kem Ley’s funeral procession in July, 2016. Photo: Rappler.com.
Astrid Norén-Nilsson
The assassination of political analyst Kem 
Ley in Phnom Penh in July 2016 suggests 
that civil society touches a nerve of great 
sensibility in today’s Cambodia. Cambodian 
democracy is currently experiencing its 
tensest period in two decades. If civil 
society plays a role in this context, it is not 
primarily within the traditional confines of 
the associational realm. Rather, in looking 
for a civil society challenge to party politics, 
we will have to shift our attention away from 
NGOs to the tentative emergence of social 
movements and to the fledgling grassroots 
democracy movement which Kem Ley himself 
spearheaded.
In the Shadow of 
Kem Ley 
Is Civil Society the 
Solution to Cambodia’s 
Woes?
On 10 July 2016, independent political 
analyst and grassroots organiser Kem Ley 
was shot dead while having his morning 
coffee at a Caltex petrol station in central 
Phnom Penh (Ouch and Narim 2016). Two 
weeks later, an estimated two million people 
took to the streets to join in his funeral 
procession (Radio Free Asia 2016). This 
was the first mass social mobilisation to 
take place in Cambodia after the early 2014 
crackdown, which had reined in the largest 
anti-government protests in at least fifteen 
years (Dara and Meyn 2013; Dara and Doyle 
2014). 
In 2016, Cambodian civil society played 
a very different role in the making of 
the mass mobilisations compared to 
previous demonstrations. In 2013, the 
unprecedented fearlessness with which 
ordinary Cambodians took to the streets 
seemed to be evidence that civil society was 
entering a new era. Though protesters were 
motivated by a diverse list of grievances, 
at that time Cambodia was marked by a 
sharp polarisation between the incumbent 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the 
opposition, the Cambodia National Rescue 
Party (CNRP), with the latter claiming the 
right to interpret and represent demands for 
‘change’. On the contrary, in 2016, people 
came out to pay their respects to a civil 
society veteran who had sought to radically 
transform Cambodian politics by reforming 
both political parties according to civil 
society principles. 
Kem Ley’s assassination and subsequent 
martyrdom suggest that civil society—as an 
untapped potential—touches a nerve of great 
sensibility in today’s Cambodia. Cambodian 
democracy is currently experiencing its 
tensest period in two decades: since the 
CNRP came within reach of an electoral 
victory over the CPP in 2013, the two main 
parties have been locked in a life and death 
struggle. If civil society plays a role in 
this context, it is not primarily within the 
traditional confines of the associational 
realm. Rather, in looking for a civil society 
challenge to party politics, we will have to 
shift our attention away from NGOs, to the 
tentative emergence of social movements 
and to the fledgling grassroots democracy 
movement that Kem Ley spearheaded 
(Henke 2011). 
The Limitations 
and Possibilities of 
Cambodian Civil Society 
Ever since their appearance in the early 
1990s, Cambodian NGOs have taken on a 
large share of the functions that typically 
belong to the state. Still, they have always 
had to face serious limitations in their 
work. While recognising the value of the 
resources and services provided by NGOs 
for national development, the CPP has 
circumscribed and undermined NGOs 
that focus on governance and human 
rights issues, as well as independent youth 
organisations and trade unions. Most often, 
the relationship between the Cambodian 
state and civil society is understood to be 
competitive, with the CPP government 
shaping and restricting the environment 
in which associational activity can emerge 
(Feuer et al. 2014; Ly 2014). Others argue 
instead that the relationship is mutual, with 
NGOs and other civil society organisations 
(CSOs) confined to pursuing their objectives 
through manoeuvrings within the space 
provided by the state (Waibel et al. 2014). 
Accompanying a gradual decline in 
foreign aid, the Cambodian state is now 
attempting to restrict the space available 
to a growing civil society. In August 2015, 
a highly controversial Law on NGOs and 
Associations was passed, restricting civil 
society’s right to freedom of association and 
expression, and enabling the government 
to shut down organisations that criticise 
it (HRW 2015). Less than one year later, 
in April 2016, the Trade Union Law was 
passed, which provides protection and 
support to government-backed unions 
while undermining independent unions 
(Arbitration Council 2016). 
In October 2014, within this stifling overall 
context, a number of civil society veterans, 
with Kem Ley at the centre, initiated the 
‘Khmer for Khmer’ advocacy group—a 
network of civil society leaders and activists 
who pledged to promote democratic 
party politics by engaging citizens in the 
political process. The ambition of the 
Khmer for Khmer network was to achieve 
the democratising potential of civil society, 
not from inside the shrinking space allowed 
by the state, but by exporting civil society 
actors and principles to party politics. Their 
aspiration to bring forward political change 
via grassroots empowerment represented 
an extension of the international NGO 
discourse on empowerment (Calvès 2009).
Kem Ley and his associates reckoned 
that two decades of the burgeoning NGO 
sector had produced a huge potential for 
grassroots leadership—a force that had 
not yet been felt by the political system. 
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Cambodian democratisation, they reasoned, 
would benefit from inserting civil society 
leaders into the Cambodian political 
system. It was with this aim in mind that in 
August 2015, the founders of the Khmer for 
Khmer network launched the Grassroots 
Democracy Party (GDP). The Party was 
meant to provide an avenue for ordinary 
Cambodians with good leadership skills—
typically civil society leaders—to enter the 
political field. Significantly, it was not only 
the initiators and leaders of the GDP who 
had long-term experience working with 
NGOs and other CSOs, but also most party 
rank-and-file activists.
‘Grassrootism’ as Party 
Politics?
The movement for grassroots democracy 
not only reflects disillusionment with the 
limitations circumscribing traditional civil 
society work in Cambodia, but it is also an 
attempt to break down these constraints 
by entering the all-important arena of 
party politics. In this sense, it points to 
the absolute primacy of party politics for 
effecting change in Cambodia today. On top 
of the Khmer for Khmer network’s agenda 
was the creation of microparties around 
the country—local development parties set 
up to empower those at the grassroots to 
become policy-makers. Though these have 
been slow to take off, the GDP was intended 
as an umbrella party for one hundred micro-
parties that were to be established. 
This suggests that the reintroduction 
of multi-party politics in Cambodia in 
1993 has been a success, to the extent that 
there is a widespread belief in the country 
that hope for political change resides 
in political parties. Still, the grassroots 
agenda relates uneasily to party politics. 
Early on, the Khmer for Khmer network 
denied speculations that it would create 
its own party, claiming that its mission was 
only to build and strengthen grassroots 
political leadership. The group then subtly 
changed its course with the establishment 
of the GDP, which was set up to function 
as an incubator for the practice of ‘intra-
party democracy’. The aim was to nurture 
democratic leaders within the political 
party to work as a team, rather than rely on 
top leaders. In this sense, ‘grassrootism’ is 
a principle that could be emulated by other 
political parties. Indeed, in my interviews 
with GDP activists, many have stated that 
they envisage grassroots mobilisation being 
taken up by all Cambodian political parties 
in the future.
Yet, this all-encompassing ambition, 
which involved the transformation of all 
political parties, underscores a fundamental 
ambiguity in the creation of a particular 
political party vehicle for the grassroots 
agenda. Upon the creation of the GDP, Kem 
Ley distanced himself from the new party, 
only taking on an advisory role similar to 
the one he maintained for the CNRP. My 
interviews with his associates suggest 
that Kem Ley dissociated himself from the 
GDP precisely because he maintained an 
aspiration to change the Cambodian political 
landscape without participating in a specific 
political party. Kem Ley primarily aspired to 
be a coordinator among actors: his idea was 
to connect himself with different groups 
in society so as to be a focal point for the 
organisation of change. 
Kem Ley aspired to be a charismatic leader 
who could reach out to, and be accepted by, 
all different societal groups. This would set 
him apart from other charismatic political 
leaders, such as the CNRP’s Sam Rainsy 
and Kem Sokha, who took a partisan, 
oppositional stance. The ambition to 
apolitically or consensually represent all of 
society is a vestige of civil society thinking, 
and one that eclipses the party political 
avenue. 
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 Roads Ahead
Civil society as an animating idea that 
transcends the confines of associational life 
is an important force in today’s Cambodia, 
but one that has not quite found its place. 
The politicisation of civil society by civil 
society activists themselves is an attempt to 
find an outlet for these grassroots energies. 
A grassroots model of democracy could 
disrupt the unequal relationships between 
ordinary citizens and local-level authorities 
that has been fundamental to the CPP’s hold 
on power, particularly in this context where 
the existing pattern of local-level politics is 
already being undermined by demographic 
change (Hughes 2015). A civil society model 
of citizenship may be more explosive than 
that of political opposition. 
Yet, ironically, the potential for bottom-up 
grassroots democracy is so intimately tied to 
the charismatic leader championing it—Kem 
Ley—that his assassination has eclipsed its 
prospects, at least for the time being. Whilst 
two million Cambodians turned out for Kem 
Ley’s funeral in 2016, the GDP won merely 
five seats out of more than eleven thousand 
in the commune elections that took place 
in 2017. This is not the first time that a 
massive turnout of Cambodian citizens at 
the funeral of a beloved, charismatic leader 
fails to translate into political momentum. 
At Norodom Sihanouk’s funeral procession 
in February 2013, about one million people 
poured into the streets to mourn the King-
Father (Voice of America Khmer 2013). 
Yet, in national elections the same year, the 
royalist party FUNCINPEC for the first time 
failed to win a single seat, and the party has 
since all but disintegrated. The lesson is that 
in Cambodia today charisma is a powerful 
political force, but political opportunity 
does not outlive charismatic individuals. 
The CPP is acutely aware of the potential 
for charismatic leadership to undermine 
the party’s authority. Since February 2017, 
five leaders of CNRP have been deposed—
three of whom were arrested (Handley 
2017). Amendments to the Law on Political 
Parties in July 2017 have criminalised 
interaction between parties and convicts, 
with the aim of erasing individual leaders 
from the political scene. This has been a 
largely successful strategy in that it has 
rendered long-time opposition leader Sam 
Rainsy less visible on all-important social 
media, with CNRP activists now afraid to 
interact with Rainsy’s page (Nachemson 
and Dara 2017). A mere two months later, 
in September, his substitute Kem Sokha 
was arrested on charges of treason and now 
languishes in jail (Zsombor 2017). For what 
concerns the GDP, the unassuming profiles 
of its current top troika—Yang Saing Khoma, 
Sam Inn, and Yeng Virak—put definite limits 
on the prospects of the fledgling grassroots 
movement they now lead. Still, civil society 
sensibilities are evidently close to today’s 
popular aspirations. In such a fragile and 
tense context dominated by political parties, 
the dilemma for civil society leaders will 
be how to rebuild a bridge of intensely 
felt popular ambitions in the absence of a 
charismatic leader. 
Cambodian opposition leader Kem Sokha was 
arrested in September 2017. 
Photo: Yahoo News.
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No doubt the world 
will end amid the 
general applause 
of these laughter-
loving people who 
take everything as a 
joke.”
Lu Xun
“
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Ai Weiwei’s 
#Refugees 
A Transcultural and 
Transmedia Journey
Giorgio Strafella
Daria Berg 
At least 5,079 people died in the 
Mediterranean Sea during 2016 while 
attempting to reach Europe’s shores 
(International Organisation for Migration 
2017). While many Europeans have 
responded to the struggle of the refugees 
and other migrants from the Middle East 
and Africa with either fear or indifference 
(Poushter 2016; Dearden 2017), a Chinese 
artiste engagé based in Berlin has employed 
installations, documentary filmmaking, as 
well as a sizeable social media presence to 
try and sensitise the West to this on-going 
tragedy (Sierzputowski 2016). Ai Weiwei 
represents one of the most influential figures 
in the global art scene and his exhibitions 
attract hundreds of thousands of visitors 
around the world (Royal Academy of Arts 
2015)—since 2015 even in China, although 
his recent shows in Beijing do not feature 
his most explicitly ‘political’ artworks. His 
stature as an artist notwithstanding, it was 
Ai Weiwei’s advocacy of human and civil 
rights in China—and the price he paid for 
his outspokenness, including eighty-one 
days in jail and a brain haemorrhage (Grube 
2009b; Branigan 2011)—that established 
him as a celebrity dissident in the West at 
the end of the past decade. Ai Weiwei’s most 
critical art and activism now address the 
condition of refugees, rather than Chinese 
society, putting European governments 
rather than the Chinese state ‘on trial’ while 
adding a ‘transcultural’ dimension to his 
work (Welsch 1999; Ai 2013). Nevertheless, 
as we shall argue in this essay, Ai Weiwei’s 
most recent work stems from the same 
philosophy he has espoused throughout his 
career.
Ai Weiwei’s Laundromat (2016) as currently exhibited at the National Gallery in Prague (Trade 
Fair Palace). Photo: Giorgio Strafella, 14 April 2017.
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Clarity and Awakening
Ai Weiwei states that ‘freedom of speech, 
human rights are related to my early struggle, 
or my family’s or the whole generation’s 
struggle, in fighting for those basic rights’ 
(Bloomberg 2017). As every Chinese person 
who has ever heard of Ai Weiwei knows, he 
is the son of Ai Qing (1910–1996), a famous 
poet imprisoned by the Kuomintang in the 
1930s for his leftist activism (Gao 2012). 
Despite the mutual admiration between 
Mao Zedong and Ai Qing, the Communist 
Party persecuted him between 1957 and 
1978, exiling his whole family from Beijing 
to the western provinces. At the onset of 
the Reform and Opening era in 1978–1979, 
Ai Weiwei joined an experimental artistic 
movement known as the Stars Group 
(xingxing). After the authorities shut down 
the Stars Group exhibition in Beijing on 1 
October 1979, artists, poets, and intellectuals 
staged street protests demanding freedom of 
expression and fusing artistic creativity with 
political activism (Lu 2014). Ai Weiwei’s 
early encounter with Western society also 
contributed to shaping his political and 
artistic sensibilities. While living in New 
York between 1981 and 1993, Ai Weiwei 
studied the works of artists who still greatly 
influence his art to this day—such as Warhol, 
Beuys, Duchamp, and Kosuth. During this 
time, he also witnessed the limits of, and 
the struggle for, civil rights in a Western 
democracy (Mao et al. 2012). 
Ai Weiwei’s theoretical writings on art 
published since the mid-1990s reveal the 
roots of the disposition and method that 
one finds in his on-going exploration of the 
refugee crisis as well as in his earlier works. 
In a 1997 artistic manifesto entitled ‘Making 
Choices’ (zuochu xuanze), the artist wrote 
that art ought to embody a critical reflection 
of the human condition and the ‘awakened’ 
artist’s ‘vigilance on society and the crisis 
of humanity’ (Ai 1997). Here Ai Weiwei 
envisages a new modernist movement 
founded on the liberation of humanity and 
the victory of the ‘humanitarian spirit’ 
(rendaozhuyi jingshen), coupling a critique 
of traditional definitions of art with a 
reflection on the existential condition that 
should lead to doubt, befuddlement, and 
finally ‘awakening’ (juewu). Awakened 
artists, he hopes, will in turn awaken the rest 
of society by exposing reality ‘unpolished 
and unvarnished’ and its intrinsic ‘terror, 
emptiness, and boredom.’ Rather than 
leading to cynicism and inaction, this stance 
is closely linked to Ai Weiwei’s activism in 
that he believes artists who do so become 
a ‘virus’ of change by priming society to 
imagine and desire change (Ai and Zeng 
1995). As Ai Weiwei wrote in 2013, first ‘you 
need people to recognize they need change. 
Then, you need them to recognize how to 
make change. Finally, change will come’ (Ai 
2013). Echoing the wider intellectual debate 
of those years, in the 1990s (Strafella 2017), 
Ai Weiwei already rejected both emulation 
of the West and nativism as inadequate 
standpoints, advocating instead civic 
engagement, creative independence, and the 
courage to affirm the value of human life. 
Centred around the values of ‘clarity’ 
and ‘awakening’, the approach described 
above represents what we have termed 
‘communication activism’ and permeates 
Ai Weiwei’s art as well as his social media 
communication (e.g. blogging, tweeting, 
etc.) (Sorace 2014). Ai Weiwei designs 
both so that instances of oppression and 
injustice hit the audience with maximum 
brutality and effectiveness, delivering a 
clear message and eliciting compassion. 
His art documenting and mourning the 
death of schoolchildren in the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake reflects this methodology (e.g. 
Remembering, 2009) (Grube 2009a), as do 
his recent installations in Amsterdam (# 
SafePassage, 2016), Berlin (2016), Florence 
(Reframe, 2016), New York (Laundromat, 
2016) Vienna (F Lotus, 2016), Copenhagen 
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(Soleil Levant, 2017), and Prague (Law of the 
Journey and Laundromat, 2017), all related 
to the refugee crisis.
Denouncing European 
Indifference
In 2015, the Chinese government returned 
Ai Weiwei’s confiscated passport. It is 
hard to speculate under what conditions 
his passport was returned, except that he 
promised to inform the Chinese authorities 
of any upcoming exhibition (Bloomberg 
2017). Even though Ai Weiwei appeared 
to make relatively benign statements 
regarding the Chinese legal system to the 
German press (Sorace 2015), he continues to 
denounce censorship in China (Hantzschel 
2015a; Han 2017). It is worth remembering 
that Ai Weiwei has been long critical of 
US and European authorities, criticising 
civil rights abuses in the United States and 
showing support for Chelsea Manning, 
Edward Snowden, and even Julian Assange 
on social media. 
Shortly after Ai Weiwei relocated to Berlin 
looking for ‘a normal life’ (Hantzschel 
2015b), he left on a journey around the 
Mediterranean Sea to document the 
conditions of refugees and migrants in the 
region. Ai Weiwei’s portrayal of their lives, 
their odyssey, and their clashes with the 
European authorities have reached a global 
audience through various artistic mediums, 
a constant stream of Instagram and Twitter 
posts, and now also a documentary film 
entitled Human Flow. Furthermore, news 
media and online art magazines have 
conveyed images of that art to an audience 
much larger than the number of people who 
could see it in person (PBS 2016). It is worth 
noting that during the years when Ai Weiwei 
aimed his activism mainly at the Chinese 
Party-state (i.e. 2008–2014), news outlets 
such as The New York Times, The Guardian, 
and CNN played a key role in establishing 
his celebrity status. As Chloe Preece wrote 
in 2015, they framed Ai Weiwei as ‘a political 
hero/martyr’ who fought for freedom of 
expression against a repressive regime—a 
narrative that provided ‘reassurance of the 
West’s ideological superiority’ and thus 
contributed to his popularity among their 
audience/readership. Ai Weiwei’s art and 
activism with regard to the plight of Middle 
Eastern and African refugees—a plight 
exacerbated by the policies of European 
countries, which he accuses of culpable 
indifference—undermines that narrative 
and partially recasts his media persona from 
one extolling the virtues of Western political 
systems, to one lambasting the moral paucity 
of their current leaders.
On the other hand, the portrayal of 
refugees in Ai Weiwei’s photographs—and 
occasionally even in his artworks—tends to 
decontextualise its subject. Similar criticism 
was raised against his appropriation of the 
image of Alan Kurdi, a child who drowned in 
the Mediterranean Sea while trying to reach 
Greece, and his recent documentary film 
Human Flow (Mortensen 2017). Ai Weiwei’s 
Mediterranean journey mainly reached us 
via a stream of snippets and images usually 
provided with little background information 
or references. In particular, portraits 
of refugees on Ai Weiwei’s Instagram 
commonly lack details with regard to where 
they were taken, by whom, or the identity 
of those portrayed: Who are the men and 
women appearing next to Ai Weiwei in 
his selfies? The same questions could be 
asked of the photographic wallpapers 
in Laundromat and Law of the Journey. 
Moreover, on social media Ai Weiwei 
intertwines refugee-related fragments—
photos, headlines, data, etc.—with equally 
fragmentary peeks into his professional 
and private life, including selfies and 
images of exhibitions, famous friends, press 
photographers, his son, and so on. Images of 
life in refugee camps alternate seamlessly 
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with snapshots from the glamorous life of a 
celebrity artist. Some of the latter could be 
read as portraits of the artist as a celebrity, 
à la Warhol, the difference being that Andy 
Warhol posed as politically neutral while Ai 
Weiwei as hyper-political. When one looks 
at Ai Weiwei’s photo-blogging as a whole, 
it appears to translate his preference for 
clarity and transparency into a one-man 
reality show. Drawing on Preece’s analysis 
(2015), one may view this as the artist’s 
‘celebritised selves’ constructing and 
managing authenticity as a pillar of the Ai 
Weiwei brand.   
Not unlike Ai Weiwei’s work on the 
Sichuan earthquake, his artistic endeavours 
on the refugee crisis develop a narrative that 
‘unfolds across multiple media platforms, 
with each new text making a distinct and 
valuable contribution to the whole’ and 
where ‘each medium does what it does best’ 
(Jenkins 2010). Ai Weiwei’s ‘transmedia’ 
narrative on the refugee crisis unfolds 
beyond the artwork across platforms, such 
as: Instagram, where one can pore over a 
first-person documentation-cum-spectacle 
of the journey that brought about the works 
of art (Debord 1983); Twitter, where one can 
peruse the artist’s own selection of news 
articles on the issue and thereby appreciate 
its importance; interviews in newspapers 
and magazines in which the artist expounds 
his vision; YouTube videos; a documentary 
film; etc. 
A Lost Battle?
One would expect the sophisticated web 
of content offered by such a ‘transmedia 
storytelling system’ to multiply the power 
of Ai Weiwei’s communication activism 
(Scott 2010). But Ai Weiwei himself appears 
to have identified a crack in this mode 
of activism (Benney and Marolt 2015). 
The centrepiece in one of his most recent 
installations, Law of the Journey, consists of 
a seventy-metre long overcrowded lifeboat. 
Currently displayed in Prague, the lifeboat 
is suspended in the hall of the Trade Fair 
Palace, which Nazi Germany utilised during 
the Second World War as an assembly point 
for Jewish prisoners before deporting them 
to the concentration camp of Terezín. The 
visitor enters the hall from the short side 
facing the front of the lifeboat. A series of 
quotes are arranged on the floor across the 
entire room in a way that forces the reader 
to walk backwards towards the opposite 
side, where the exit is located. One of the 
last quotes, right behind the stern of the 
lifeboat, is an extract from Letters to Olga 
(1988) by Vaclav Havel and it reads: ‘The 
tragedy of modern man is not that he knows 
less and less about the meaning of his own 
life, but that it bothers him less and less.’ 
When addressing the scandal of the 
children who died when poorly built schools 
collapsed in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, 
Ai Weiwei’s adversary was a Party-state that 
regarded even the number of said children as 
a sensitive piece of information. The simple 
yet brave act of researching their identities 
through a collective effort and then hanging 
the list of the children’s names on a wall 
as a piece of art—as Ai Weiwei did in the 
Sichuan Earthquake Names Project (Grube 
2009a)—sends a clear and shocking message 
that compels the viewer to demand more 
transparency and accountability from the 
Chinese government. With his work on the 
refugee crisis, Ai Weiwei brings a method 
designed and honed under that regime to a 
continent where most citizens have access 
to exhaustive data and reportage on the 
issue, but few demand their governments to 
respond to it by saving as many human lives 
as possible. As Ai Weiwei may have realised 
when he added that quote on the floor of the 
Trade Fair Palace, European indifference 
and prejudice may be at least as stubborn 
and difficult to defeat as the Chinese Party-
state.
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Ren Hang 
Bodies Without 
Redemption
Chen Shuxia
On 24 February 2017, photographer Ren Hang 
leapt to his death from a twenty-eight-floor 
building in Beijing. He had not yet turned 
thirty, but his work had already attracted 
considerable international attention. 
This essay retraces the path of Ren’s 
life, contextualising it within the rapidly 
developing field of Chinese photography. 
Beginning with the emergence of ‘private 
photography’ in China in the early 2000s, 
the article describes how a cultural industry 
made up of independent-publishing and photo 
fairs has blossomed in contemporary China.
All photos in these pages are taken from 
Ren Hang personal website and social media.
Mostly naked, friends and models of Ren 
Hang appear on a rooftop with skyscrapers 
as the backdrop, in a forest of tall trees, in a 
field invaded by wild grass, in a pond with 
budding lotuses, on a lonely rock hit by 
waves, or in a bathtub amongst swimming 
goldfish. Their naked bodies and limbs 
are neatly arranged as if they did not own 
them—an effect compounded by the deadpan 
expression on their young, pale faces. 
Labelled as ‘eroticism’, Ren’s photography 
could be considered sexual, since the sexual 
organs of these young men and women are 
either subtly hidden by odd props or directly 
confront viewers, but Ren saw it differently. 
In a 2012 interview, he said: ‘I don’t need to 
try to make it classy by calling it erotica. I 
don’t think there’s anything wrong with low 
class’ (Bernhardsson 2012).
Ren capitalised on a ‘low class’ approach 
in his early photography. Dressed in cheap 
bras, fish net stockings, dyed hair, and 
bloody red lips, his female prototypes could 
have just as easily been found in Yang Yong’s 
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early works on Shenzhen prostitutes, such 
as his series ‘Fancy in Tunnel’ (2001–2003) 
(Yang 2014). However, compared to Yang’s 
seriousness in questioning the lost identity 
of these female migrants when facing rapid 
urbanisation in south China, Ren’s ‘low 
class’ seemed indifferent.
Abandoning all clothes and dyed hair, 
Ren’s natural bodies spoke for themselves. 
‘We were born nude… I just photograph 
things in their most natural condition,’ Ren 
explained (Bernhardsson 2012). He said 
that he took up photography in 2007, out of 
boredom, when he was studying advertising 
at a university in Beijing. With a Minolta 
point-and-shoot 35mm film camera, Ren 
photographed everything around him. 
Dorm-mates walking around undressed in 
the heat of Beijing’s summer became one of 
his early subjects. 
The Emergence of 
‘Private Photography’ in 
China
The trend of casually photographing 
the everyday life of friends started with 
the emergence of the so-called ‘private 
photography’ (si sheying) movement in China 
at the turn of the millennium. Influenced 
by pioneers of ‘private photography’ in 
the United States and Japan—such as Nan 
Goldin and Nobuyoshi Araki—young Chinese 
photographers, led by Lin Zhipeng (also 
known as No. 223) in Guangzhou, embraced 
the unique tone of film at the exact moment 
when the world was celebrating digital 
technology. They decided to capture the 
spontaneity of fleeting moments all around 
them, which they used to express their 
indifference to the rest of the world.
Ren picked up on the trend of ‘private 
photography’ a few years later. Like Lin, 
he declined the responsibility of social 
concern, but at the same time he also 
rejected both Yang and Lin’s technique 
of casual composition of a photo. Ren’s 
snapshots were carefully choreographed 
and framed. Mostly positioned in the middle 
of the image, the bodies in his photographs 
were always shown in uncanny twists and 
bends. By displaying the meaningless non-
functioning bodies as props for a shot, Ren 
seemed to give them an alternative life. 
These naked young men and women looked 
as if they were playing hide-and-seek by 
climbing on trees. Pinching the skin of a 
neck or penis seemed childishly funny. Yet 
the flash from the point-and-shoot camera 
flattened these young faces and cast a 
layer of stark pallor on them. Influenced 
by the Japanese poet, film director, and 
photographer Shūji Terayama, Ren created 
slightly strange and ghostly atmospheres 
(British Journal of Photography 2017). The 
fact that he suffered from depression, which 
led him to have suicidal thoughts (Ren 2017), 
might also explain the absurdity and the tint 
of death that seeped from his images. 
However, the absurd tone of his images 
is just right. The slender nude bodies, the 
young and fair faces, the out-of-context yet 
beautiful props form a fantasy that induces 
voyeuristic desire. The red lips and nails 
betray the ‘naturalness’ that Ren claimed, 
and hint at a formula common in fashion 
photography, reflecting his advertising 
background. If taking photographs 
saved him from the boredom of studying 
advertising, advertising came back to him 
in his final years. Fashion brands such as 
Maison Kitsuné and Gucci, as well as fashion 
magazines such as Purple and Libertin Dune, 
commissioned Ren to photograph their 
new collections. His stark flashed images 
perfectly blended ‘private photography’ 
with more staged fashion photography, 
giving it a brand new arty look.
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Photo Books and 
Independent Publishing
The nudity in Ren’s photos did cause some 
controversy. His website and exhibitions 
were shut down; once he was arrested 
while shooting outdoors. It sounds like 
a precarious existence, but it wasn’t. In 
China, this is a well-trodden path. He was 
no rebel willing to test the bottom line of 
the government or the extent of acceptance 
of a conservative society. Indeed, at the 
margins of contemporary China’s controlled 
and moralised society, there remain many 
grey areas where legality is not enforced. 
While the police are intent to catch and 
suppress ‘dissidents’ aiming to mobilise 
disaffected populations, Ren was not one of 
them. He was just a self-made photographer. 
He publicised his photos on his website 
and social media accounts. He also self-
published photo books. From 2011 until his 
death, he produced sixteen books, some of 
them with a print run of up to five hundred 
copies. People could buy them in art 
bookstores and online. 
There are risks involved in this kind of 
self-publishing in China. All books are 
supposed to have a formal publisher who 
gets an ISSN number and goes through the 
censorship process. Due to the fact that the 
censors would have probably characterised 
Ren’s photos as obscene, most official 
publishers in China would have never 
accepted his books. They belong to an 
alternative world that is teeming with life 
and creativity, and is often enmeshed with 
the new economy in ways that do not make it 
entirely incompatible with legality.
The cultural industry occupies a prominent 
position within this new economy. Listed 
for the first time as one of the main pillar 
industries by the State Council in 2009, the 
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Ministry of Finance earmarked 4.42 billion 
yuan of special funds for its development 
in 2016 (Ministry of Culture 2016). This 
has benefited first-tier cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen. For example, 
Shenzhen has become an important base 
for China’s cultural exports, with the value 
of its cultural and creative industry in 2016 
estimated at 194.97 billion yuan and an 
annual growth rate of 11 percent (Lin 2017). 
The Shenzhen municipal government is 
also the main supporter of alternative art 
festivals, such as the Fringe Festival and 
Here is Zine, Here is Shenzhen. 
Zines, short for ‘magazine’ or ‘fanzine’, 
are a small-run self-published medium, 
motivated by the need for self-expression 
rather than profit. Today’s zines all around 
the world have put on a new professional 
and fashionable look, and have gradually 
attracted numerous young fans even in 
China. Just as Su Fei and Guan Wei, owners 
of the first Chinese zine store BananaFish 
(http://a-perfect-book-for-bananafish.com), 
explained: ‘[What we do] expresses a normal 
state and expectation of young people in 
China today... The idea of independent 
publishing’s “speaking out for oneself ”’ 
touches us.’ 
The photographs, poems, and diaries about 
his depression that Ren Hang published on 
his website perfectly espouse the unique 
spirit of zines. The fact that they come out in 
limited editions also gives zines some aura of 
hipness. ‘Their freewill, extraordinariness, 
the feeling of sensibly fashionable exude 
some charm,’ said Eriko Obayashi (2017), 
owner of POP Tame, a zine bookstore and 
art gallery in Tokyo.  In recent years, self-
publishing photo-books has become part 
of this zine frenzy in China. In a time 
when every urban youth has a phone and 
is obsessed with sharing pictures of his or 
her life online, photography is possibly the 
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most accessible and appropriate medium for 
zines. Photo-books now can be found online, 
in book stores, and especially in exhibitions, 
photo festivals, and photo fairs. 
From Shenzhen to the 
World
Ren Hang caught the wave of this rising 
hipness. While traditional publishing venues 
shut their doors, independent publishers at 
home and abroad welcomed his new brand 
of talent. Self-publishing enabled him to 
have a specific public, more control over 
the printing process, and complete freedom 
in the selection of content. Beginning 
in Shenzhen, this trend of independent 
publishing has gradually spread to the rest 
of China. It seems ironic that the not-so-
legal self-publishing is a growing part of 
the new economy that is being promoted by 
the Chinese authorities. However, in today’s 
China there exists more flexibility and 
freedom to meet new consumer demands in 
the cultural industry. Most importantly, by 
promoting relatively niche industries, as the 
Shenzhen government is doing, the Chinese 
authorities are able to project an open and 
inclusive image on the international stage, 
thus promoting Chinese soft power across 
the world.    
If Shenzhen leads the way with fringe 
festivals and zine fairs in China, Shanghai 
is on the frontline of photography. Besides 
the establishment of the Shanghai Centre 
of Photography in 2015, Shanghai held its 
third Photofairs Shanghai in September 
2016, welcoming twenty-seven thousand 
visitors. More and more Chinese collectors 
are turning to photography due to the 
accessible price of works in limited-edition. 
‘The market in China has greatly matured,’ 
said Alexander Montague-Sparey (2016), 
the Artistic Director of Photofairs Shanghai, 
‘and this has enabled us to present exciting, 
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emerging artists from China and across the 
Asia-Pacific region.’ Ren Hang was exactly 
this type of exciting new artist. Although 
there is no report of his photos being sold 
at the fair in Shanghai, his works are highly 
prized among young photographers in China. 
Having been shown in more than twenty solo 
and seventy group exhibitions around the 
world, Ren’s art moved from gallery walls to 
museum walls—his two latest solos ‘Naked/
Nude’ and ‘HUMAN LOVE’ were launched 
earlier this year at the FOAM Museum in 
Amsterdam and Fotografiska Museum in 
Stockholm, two of the most important photo 
museums in Europe.  
More and more young talents like Ren 
Hang have emerged in the last decade in 
China. A lot of these emerging photographers 
were educated in America or Europe, and 
are accustomed to a jetsetter lifestyle, 
flying between international cities for their 
life and work. Meanwhile, thanks to the 
growing domestic interest in photography, 
international photography festivals are 
mushrooming across China—such as the 
Pingyao International Photography Festival, 
the Lianzhou International Photo Festival, 
the China Lishui International Festival, 
Photo Beijing, the Caochangdi PhotoSpring, 
the Jimei x Arles International Photo 
Festival, etc.—each one of them attracting 
thousands of photo enthusiasts from home 
and abroad.  
Ren Hang’s works have attracted more 
attention overseas than in his home country. 
In February this year, Taschen published 
Ren Hang’s first and only international 
collection, which covers the work of his 
entire career (Hanson 2017). ‘The images are 
fresh, but also empty and superficial. They 
contain a deep sadness within,’ commented 
Ai Weiwei (Genova 2017). Producing these 
superficial yet beautiful images with 
objectified young bodies might have slightly 
alleviated Ren’s deep internal sadness. In 
various interviews, he remarked about the 
pleasure he found while taking photographs, 
saying that it gave him a strong sense of 
existence (Mocamomo 2012). Ren actively 
fought his depression, but his condition 
made him full of despair. In one of his final 
posts on Weibo on 27 January 2017—on 
the eve of the Chinese New Year—he said: 
‘Every year my wish is always the same: to 
die earlier.’ On 24 February 2017, Ren leapt 
off a twenty-eight-floor building in Beijing, 
leaving behind his photos, his depression, a 
roaring fame, and the limelight of China’s 
buzzing creative industry. He had not yet 
turned thirty.
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Sometimes the plans to improve people’s lives 
end up destroying them. When the Chinese 
government moved the nomadic Evenki 
people from the forests into urban settlements 
and confiscated their hunting rifles, they took 
away their livelihood. Gu Tao’s film The Last 
Moose of Aoluguya documents how people 
survive, or slowly destroy themselves, after 
the catastrophe of losing their world. 
Losing the World
After the Moose Have 
Gone Away
Christian Sorace
Man is the being through whom 
nothingness comes to the world 
Jean-Paul Sartre
Gu Tao’s documentary The Last Moose 
of Aoluguya (an da han) (2013) follows the 
life of Weijia, an Evenki hunter, artist, and 
alcoholic who Gu Tao described as ‘the 
most lonely person in the forest’ (Cunliffe 
2015). Traditionally, the Evenki, also 
known as Tungus in Russia, are a culture of 
nomadic hunters that span the trans-Baikal 
region, Siberian taiga, Mongolia, and the 
forests of northern China. Although mainly 
concentrated in Russia, in the People’s 
Republic of China there were 30,875 
Evenkis as of the 2010 population census. 
In the forests of China’s Great Xing’an ling 
Mountains (daxing anling), the lives of the 
Evenki have revolved around moose hunting 
and reindeer herding. 
In 2003, the Chinese government 
relocated the Evenki from the forest into 
new settlements in nearby townships as 
part of a broader campaign of ‘ecological 
migration’ (shengtai yimin). The relocation 
policy hoped to accomplish the interrelated 
goals of protecting nature, while providing 
indigenous people with new apartments 
and urban amenities, folded into a larger 
plan of accelerating regional economic 
development. As part of the urbanisation 
process, the government confiscated the 
Evenkis’ hunting rifles and banned hunting. 
For this reason, Weijia asserts that the 
Evenki hunter lifestyle is guilty before the 
law that confiscated their guns and evicted 
them from their land: ‘I heard about four 
young hunters who got arrested for hunting. 
That was the end of our culture. They put us 
on trial. Guilty! Just drink myself to death. 
We’ll just have to get used to it.’ Weijia’s 
life occupies the ambivalent no man’s land 
between dying and adaption. 
Not only are the Evenkis prohibited from 
hunting, there are no longer any moose to 
hunt. The local moose population has either 
been killed by illegal poachers (Weijia 
insinuates that the poachers are mainly 
Han Chinese) or migrated elsewhere due 
to de-forestation. In the movie, Weijia and 
his friend Mao Xia search the forest in vain 
for signs of moose. All they find are sun 
bleached moose bones and rusted poacher 
traps, but no trace of living presence.
Drawing by Gu Tao, charcoal pencil on 
bark, 2015.
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The disappearance of the moose means 
extinction for the Evenki. Uprooted from 
the forest, the Evenki culture is preserved 
only in the form of cultural representations 
and museum artefacts. In the movie, we see 
Weijia watching propaganda performances 
and television documentaries celebrating 
the vitality and economic development of 
the Evenki culture under Communist Party 
leadership. 
Blood Relatives
 
We can learn about the Evenki’s 
contemporary predicament by looking across 
the ocean at the history of genocide and 
sedenterisation of Native American nations 
in the United States. Despite a prevalent 
impulse among China watchers to blame 
China for all of the world’s human rights 
violations, the destruction of indigenous 
culture is not particularly Chinese, Maoist, 
or authoritarian. The Chinese Communist 
Party’s (CCP) tyranny of progress is only 
one variant of settler colonialism. In the 
United States, the genocide of the Native 
Americans was arguably more extensive, 
violent, and merciless than the complex and 
uneven histories of the CCP’s policies and 
treatment of its minority populations, which 
were at least formulated under the banner of 
socialist equality. 
The eradication of indigenous cultures also 
belongs to the histories of the moose in the 
forests of Hulunbuir and bison in the Dakota 
plains. In her book Dispatches from Dystopia: 
Histories of Places Not Yet Forgotten (2015), 
historian Kate Brown argues: ‘The story 
of Custer and his defeat by Crazy Horse at 
the battle of Little Big Horn is well known. 
So, too, are his infamous trips through 
the plains shooting bison and leaving the 
stench of rotting flesh . . . Custer was one 
of a number of Americans who felt that the 
extermination of the buffalo would inspire 
the Indians to settle down.’ For pastoral 
nations like the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Crow, 
the end of the buffalo meant the end of their 
way of life. In the haunting words of Plenty 
Coup, the leader of the Crow Nation at the 
end of nineteenth and turn of the twentieth 
centuries: ‘But when the buffalo went away 
the hearts of my people fell to the ground, 
and they could not lift them up again. After 
this nothing happened.’
In his book Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face 
of Cultural Devastation (2006), philosopher 
Jonathan Lear interprets Plenty Coup’s 
statement to mean that life for the Crow 
went on after the buffalo died, but there was 
no longer a world in which actions could 
be ascribed familiar meanings. As Lear 
explains, the same action that meant one 
thing in the past (display of martial valour 
and courage) meant an entirely different 
thing on the reservation (an illegal and 
barbaric practice). The only bridge between 
these two worlds is one of memory and loss. 
Similarly, life for the Evenki continues in 
the settlements, and Weijia’s life continued 
when he moved to Hainan to pursue a 
marriage based on an advertisement his 
mother placed in the newspaper, but it is life 
without a world. 
The end of the world does not mean the 
end of state violence because new and 
counter-worlds will always be born from 
the memories of the past. As I write this 
essay in February 2017, the United States 
federal government, US Army Corps of 
Engineers, in tandem with oil corporations 
are preparing to build an oil pipeline 
(Dakota Access Pipeline or DAPL) through 
the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation’s 
sacred burial grounds despite massive 
and ongoing protests and environmental 
concerns (NYC Stands with Standing Rock 
Collective 2016). At an earlier stage in the 
conflict in November 2016, militarised 
police deployed tear gas, rubber bullets, 
concussion grenades, and water cannons 
on peaceful protestors and encampments 
of ‘water protectors’ composed of over two 
207
MADE IN CHINA - WORK OF ARTS
hundred indigenous nations. In China, Inner 
Mongolian grasslands are being devastated 
in part due to extensive coal mining 
operations (Sorace 2016). Increasingly 
frequent protests by ethnic Mongolians 
over the loss of traditional grazing lands are 
inevitably greeted by riot police. 
Alcoholism
The possibility of rebuilding a new world 
requires political resistance, organisation, 
and hope, without which there is despair. 
Unable to maintain their traditional 
livelihoods, marooned in townships with 
bleak economic prospects, many Evenkis 
became alcoholics. In an interview, Gu Tao 
stated that drinking was ‘everywhere in 
the forest (Cunliffe 2015). Everybody was 
drinking, so much that alcohol seemed to 
permeate the air. I wanted to capture this 
aspect of their lives, and the accompanying 
loss of their traditional way of life. This loss 
caused suffering which is the reason they 
turned to alcohol.’
Weijia is an alcoholic because his world is 
over. In the film, he is clearly, and in his own 
words, ‘drinking himself to death’. Aware 
that he is destroying himself, he embraces 
the decision as the only one available to 
him in lieu of a world and out of fidelity 
to the past. ‘The guns were gone after we 
moved, we had nothing to do, so we started 
drinking. Drinking heavily. People started 
dying. Already eight of us have died. Eight of 
us have fucking died from drink. We’re lost. 
Our culture, our guns are gone. So we drink.’
Drinking in this context is not a response to 
boredom. Weijia is indeed busy throughout 
the film. He tends to reindeer, gets married, 
writes poetry, half-heartedly attends an 
English lesson. Although being busy keeps 
him alive, it does not relieve him from the 
knowledge, which is a permanent ache and 
void, that his world no longer exists. It is 
also clear from the film that drinking does 
not numb the pain but in fact heightens it. 
Weijia confesses that if he does not drink, he 
is unable to speak—which is to say, drinking 
immerses him in reverie about the past, 
where speech is meaningful. 
Weijia is not drinking to forget; he is 
drinking to remember. His drunkenness 
prevents him from being reconciled to 
the world being thrust upon him. He is 
frequently kicked out of the settlement 
for drinking; he is unable to sustain his 
marriage; because of drinking, his new 
projects are doomed to failure. In this light, 
Wei Jia and an elder hunter in a still from The Last 
Moose of Aoluguya.
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alcoholism becomes a self-conscious mode 
of sabotage and refusal of a world in which 
he is a stranger. ‘To be fucking honest, it’s 
like those Japanese samurai [author’s note: 
he makes a cutting sound to mimic the 
practice of seppuku] … Let me just say it 
straight, to lose your culture, it’s like losing 
everything and so we begin to wither away. 
Drink! Just drink yourself to death.’ These 
are not incoherent ramblings but clear-
sighted insights into the choices available 
to him (perhaps it is when we believe we 
are sober that we can trick ourselves more 
effectively into accepting the unacceptable). 
For Weijia, to stop drinking would betray 
the past. 
Weijia’s alcoholism is neither romantic 
nor pathological. As he puts it, ‘I’m not afraid 
of being poisoned, that’s what drinking is. 
If you don’t get poisoned, then what’s the 
point?’ Following Lear’s argument about 
the Crow, I suggest that Weijia’s self-
destructiveness is not psychological, but an 
objective assessment of his (non)place in 
the world: ‘We live in a modern society now, 
it’s swallowed us up. Our hunting culture 
is disappearing. The society is becoming 
industrialised, and turning the world into a 
miserable place. If the police of a civilised 
world, shot at me, then I’d say, “Go ahead, 
shoot!”’ The wish to die is not a rejection of 
himself but of the world on offer. It seems 
that Weijia is not only mourning the loss of 
his traditional lifestyle but is also cognizant 
of the violence of the world promised to 
replace it. What kind of world is he being 
asked to join? 
On Extinction and Being 
Human 
Why is the fate of nomadic, reindeer 
people in the remote regions of Inner 
Mongolia so haunting? When we watch 
Weijia’s self-destruction on the screen, we 
see people that we know, including our own 
future possibilities. Gu Tao rejects the label 
of being an ‘anthropological filmmaker’, I 
suspect in part because Weijia’s situation of 
living amidst cultural collapse belongs to the 
human condition. Undoubtedly, the world 
is full of cultural plurality, textures and 
contexts, meanings and misunderstandings, 
norms and transgressions, all of which 
require detailed attention to, and knowledge 
of, the local. But details are not discrete 
fortresses impervious to collapse—they are 
fragile dwellings built on the edge of a void.
No one expects that their world will 
disappear. The possibility that the world can 
collapse is probably the kind of knowledge 
that Nietzsche suggested we must forget 
to remain alive. The cultural extinction 
of the Evenki is an extreme example, but 
collapses of different scales and intensities 
are happening all the time. When a factory 
shutters in a remote town due to capital 
flight and takes people’s prospects at a 
better life along with it, is this not also a 
form of world collapse? When residents 
must permanently evacuate their villages in 
Alaska because of climate change, do their 
worlds remain intact apart from the place 
that held them together? When Weijia is 
living in China’s southern island of Hainan, 
he remarks, ‘I’m not interested in the sites 
here. The big hotels… that has nothing to do 
with me. I’m just interested in local villages’ 
and their customs and ways of life. Perhaps 
his motivation to research other villages 
was driven by a sensibility of camaraderie 
through the shared experience of loss and 
precarity. Perhaps he wanted to find other 
possibilities for coping with extinction. 
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The 2015 documentary The Chinese Mayor 
by Zhou Hao documents the story of Datong, 
Shanxi province, as its leaders embark on 
an ambitious plan to transform the city into 
a tourist destination. Still, although the 
filmmakers devote sustained attention to 
the relocated residents and their demolished 
homes, the film is no exposé: it is mostly 
intended to educate an international audience 
on the internal workings of the Chinese 
policy-making process.
Datong, Forever 
in Limbo
The history of the city of Datong, Shanxi 
province, plays a crucial role in The Chinese 
Mayor, a 2015 documentary by producer 
Zhao Qi and director Zhou Hao. The 
filmmakers explain at the outset that Datong 
was an imperial capital sixteen centuries ago, 
but at the turn of the twenty-first century it 
had become the most polluted city in China. 
Under his tenure as mayor of Datong from 
2008 to 2013, Geng Yanbo had an ambitious 
plan: transform the city into a destination 
for visitors and capital by rebuilding the 
ancient city wall, thereby restoring the 
city’s rich cultural and historical heritage. 
The only catch? As many as half a million 
people had to be relocated from their homes 
in order to complete the project. 
The Chinese Mayor documents the city, 
its leaders, and its residents as the project 
unfolds, and although the filmmakers devote 
sustained attention to the residents relocated 
and the homes demolished to make way for 
the mayor’s ambitions, the film is no exposé. 
According to Zhao, the film primarily aimed 
to educate an international audience on the 
internal workings of the Chinese policy-
Still from The Chinese Mayor, directed by Zhou Hao, 2015.
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making process and to stimulate new ways of 
thinking about China (McLaughlin 2015). In 
accomplishing these goals, the filmmakers 
embed themes of tradition, grievance, and 
desperation that colour contemporary 
China’s complex patterns of state-society 
relations. This approach provides rare 
glimpses into contemporary China’s political 
system—a fact to which their 2015 Sundance 
Special Jury Prize for Unparalleled Access 
attests—as well as into China’s distinct 
political-legal tradition. The filmmakers 
also strive to shape their rare footage into a 
coherent narrative with Mayor Geng at the 
center and the residents of Datong, who are 
ultimately left in limbo by larger political 
machinations, in supporting roles. 
Concession Via 
Confrontation
Unsurprisingly, the mayor’s grand plan 
to rebuild cultural Datong’s old city wall 
encounters fierce resistance from several 
residents faced with the demolition of their 
homes. Recounted using extensive footage 
of the mayor’s daily life and interactions 
with displaced citizens, the filmmakers 
tell a story of demolition and displacement 
familiar in many parts of the world, but 
which takes on a different hue in the context 
of China’s unique tradition of ruler-subject 
relations. Datong’s culturally themed land 
redevelopment is the mayor’s brainchild, and 
he supervises or intervenes when necessary 
in the distribution of new apartments built 
to replace the demolished ones. Assigning 
a new flat to this or that citizen becomes 
the mayor’s preferred method of gaining 
individual compliance with the forced 
relocations.  
The narrative hinges on the development 
of a series of characters who express 
direct grievances to the mayor in the 
street or at demolition sites. In tears, one 
woman confronts the mayor while falling 
repeatedly and explains that due to her 
medical problems, she needs an apartment 
near her daughter’s workplace. The mayor 
and his staff instruct her to wait ten days for 
a new apartment and assure her that they 
will address her concerns, on the condition 
that her medical situation can be confirmed. 
Another resident displaying facial injuries 
finds the mayor on the street and claims 
to have endured a beating from a deputy 
leader during the premature demolition of 
his home. After some squabbling, a member 
of the mayor’s staff promises the man an 
apartment in what sounds like an idyllic 
community, ‘Willow Garden’. An elderly 
resident, identified as ‘Hua’, confronts 
the mayor in separate scenes outside the 
mayoral residence (which, according to 
subtitles, is located in a military compound 
‘for safety reasons’). Instead of walking past 
her, the mayor listens to Hua’s requests for 
compensation for her destroyed house and 
her arguments that she cannot climb the 
stairs to the sixth-floor apartment provided 
by the government. Mayor Geng tells her 
that she is asking for too much, but once 
he is in his car with his staff, he discusses 
whether he can get her an apartment on a 
lower floor.  
Direct, impromptu interaction between 
citizens and government is not unique to 
Datong’s demolition, but is rooted in a 
tradition of grievance and dialogue that 
A citizen complains about official 
misbehaviour.
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has in some form mediated the relationship 
between ruler and subject in China for 
millennia. In the influential historical 
narrative Zuo’s Commentary (Zuozhuan), 
which dates back to the late fourth century 
BC, a politician reasons that it is better to 
learn from citizens’ grievances than to 
silence them: ‘I have heard of reducing 
grievances by means of loyalty and kindness; 
I have not heard of preventing grievances by 
exercising power… doing so would be like 
trying to prevent a river from overflowing 
with a dike… so I listen to criticism as a 
remedy’ (Knight 2012, 55).
The influence of this tradition was also 
explicitly recognised at the beginning of 
the Communist era, when ‘the right to 
make written or oral complaints’ (shumian 
konggao huozhe koutou konggao de quanli) to 
organs of the state was enshrined in Article 
97 of the original 1954 PRC Constitution 
(NPC 2000). Though far from justiciable, 
the right to confront the state in this manner 
embodies the uniqueness of the Chinese 
political-legal system—it is among the few 
sections of the original Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China that was not 
lifted directly from the 1936 Soviet version.
Desperation in the 
Narrative 
The tradition of citizens’ direct 
confrontation of government officials also 
survives in today’s China in part because 
official channels for legal grievances are 
either inaccessible or easily subject to elite 
manipulation. A prominent supporting 
character in the film is identified as Hui, 
who is distinguished by her extensive legal 
knowledge and litigious outlook (in one 
scene, she recites State Council decrees for 
the camera from memory). Hui questions 
whether the demolition of her family’s home 
exposes broader contradictions in Chinese 
society: ‘Should I tell [my son] to trust the 
law and the government, and stand up for 
his rights? Or should I just tell him to give 
up?’ When she confronts the mayor directly, 
Hui challenges his claim that her house 
was constructed illegally: ‘That’s a problem 
caused by the government. How come the 
government wasn’t supervising before but 
blames the fault on us now?’ The mayor 
replies feebly: ‘Who never made a mistake?’ 
Shortly thereafter, with Hui’s appeals to 
China’s Supreme People’s Court finally 
denied, the camera surveys the demolished 
ruins of her house.   
Scenes like these, in which citizens with 
seemingly legitimate claims cannot save 
their homes, build an aura of desperation 
that is carried forward as several characters 
in the film threaten suicide or indirectly 
reference death. One unidentified character 
resists the demolition of her brother’s house 
and describes her brother and their family’s 
forced relocation by saying: ‘He ripped his 
belly open with a knife... I’ll kill myself too... 
Let the corrupt rich guys live. We’re not 
living!’ The desperation of the mayor’s own 
family also renders palpable the anxieties of 
people affected by the mayor’s grand plans. 
For instance, Mayor Geng’s wife confronts 
him at meetings and phones him repeatedly 
to bemoan their diminished family life: 
‘Have you [the mayor] had enough of living? 
Look at you.’ In response, the mayor’s calm, 
Hui argues with mayor Geng.
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even affable demeanor comes off as ominous 
given the desperation of those surrounding 
him. When Mayor Geng tries to reassure his 
wife that he is not overworked, she replies: 
‘Are you trying to kill me?’
An Unfamiliar 
Resolution
As the mayor’s promises of new housing 
add up, and with desperation rising, 
an unanswered question looms in the 
background: what will happen if these 
pledges of new, alternative housing go 
unfulfilled? Near the end of the film, the 
central government ‘rotates’ (ganbu jiaoliu) 
Mayor Geng to a new post as Mayor of 
Taiyuan, before the completion of Datong’s 
massive relocation and construction project. 
For the Western audiences targeted by the 
film’s producers, rotation of mayors is most 
likely an unfamiliar concept. In China, 
however, the rotation of mayors and other 
local officials to several-year stints in 
different localities has long been a hallmark 
of China’s Communist nomenklatura system, 
a feature designed to prevent government 
officials from establishing parochial 
fiefdoms borne from close ties with local 
elites (Zeng 2016).
 
To convey the import of the mayor’s abrupt 
departure, the film employs a conversation 
between a young boy holding a golden toy 
machine gun and a woman (presumably 
the boy’s mother). Amid large street 
demonstrations blocking traffic in protest 
at the mayor’s transfer, the boy asks: ‘Why 
are they stopping the buses?’ She replies: 
‘They’re asking for housing. No one will give 
them housing after Mayor Geng leaves. So, 
they’re unhappy.’ This explanation injects 
ambiguity into the film’s resolution, as it is 
more cynical than the protesters’ seemingly 
sincere chants of ‘Come back, Mayor Geng!’
In these final scenes, where it is unclear 
whether Datong is furious over broken 
housing promises or distraught to lose a 
respected leader, the residents of Datong 
emerge as more sympathetic than the title 
character. Intriguingly, this tension is 
perhaps reflected in the alternative titles of 
the film—in some places the title is simply 
Datong instead of The Chinese Mayor. In 
contrast with the purgatory into which 
large, publicly financed reconstruction 
projects throw the relocated residents 
of cities like Datong—not to mention the 
three billion USD debt the mayor leaves 
behind—the rotation does not portend 
major consequences for Geng. In fact, 
the mayor ultimately plans to complete 
his political legacy in an even larger city, 
Shanxi’s provincial capital Taiyuan, with a 
chance to dislocate even more residents: ‘I 
wish I could have completed all my plans 
in Datong. But since I’ve been transferred, 
I’ll create a “Cultural Taiyuan”.’ In the end, 
while the filmmakers’ primary narrative 
intention might have been to capture the 
struggles faced by an idealistic mayor, they 
ultimately found greater success telling 
an historically infused story of affected 
residents, compelled to make sense of the 
debt-fuelled and politically engineered 
limbo thrust upon them.A young boy inquires about the protests that 
followed the mayor’s abrupt departure from 
Datong.
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Maris Boyd Gillette
Twenty years after the Chinese authorities 
decided to radically reform the country’s 
state industry, where does public memory 
of the nation’s socialist industrialisation 
reside? What aspects of the socialist path 
to modernity do officials or private citizens 
monumentalise, if any at all? To what 
extent does China’s contemporary heritage 
movement encompass its socialist industrial 
history? This essay offers an initial attempt 
to answer such questions.
China’s Industrial 
Heritage without 
History
In the late 1990s, thousands of factories 
across the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
closed down. Most had been created as part 
of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
programme to industrialise the nation after 
1949. Tens of millions of workers lost their 
jobs, and idle plants pockmarked thirty 
percent of the urban core of most cities 
(Frazier 2006; Hsing 2006). In Jingdezhen, 
the city that I have been studying since 
2003, state and collective sector workers 
constituted 94 percent of the total employed 
population when these ‘structural reforms’ 
began, and the city contained approximately 
two hundred state and collective enterprises 
(Wang and Yin 1994, 443; Ding 1996, 151–152). 
The closures and mass layoffs profoundly 
shocked local residents, who experienced 
the ‘death’ of the city’s porcelain factories as 
happening ‘almost overnight’ (Xiong 2012). 
When China’s Communist leadership 
decided to privatise the state and collective 
sector, the nation took a final step away 
from its socialist path to modernity. From 
the 1950s through to the early 1990s, the 
central government invested massive sums 
in industrial development—building new 
plants, inventing and purchasing new 
technologies, expanding the workforce, 
and manufacturing new products. In 
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Jingdezhen, ceramics manufacturing 
grew from one thousand workers doing 
handicraft production in eight operating 
wood-burning kilns in 1948, into a massive 
porcelain industry employing over one 
hundred and fifty thousand workers in 
fifty-two mechanised sites, covering all 
aspects of the production process from 
mining to finished wares (Gillette 2016). 
While some outside observers and Chinese 
citizens recall this period primarily in 
terms of its political campaigns, the 
central government’s policies nevertheless 
shrank income disparities between the 
countryside and city, provided high levels 
of employment and extensive job and social 
security, increased women’s participation in 
the paid workforce, and raised educational 
levels. The decision to allow the market 
to drive industrial development was also a 
decision to relinquish most of the goals that 
characterised a socialist vision of the future. 
Twenty years after the PRC committed 
China’s industrial sector to the path 
of neoliberal capitalism, where does 
public memory of the nation’s socialist 
industrialisation reside? What aspects of the 
socialist path to modernity do officials or 
private citizens monumentalise, if any at all? 
To what extent does China’s contemporary 
heritage movement encompass its socialist 
industrial history? I offer here a first 
attempt to answer such questions, drawing 
on published sources and my fieldwork in 
Jingdezhen.
Preserving Memories 
of Socialist 
Industrialisation
Laid-off workers’ narratives are the 
richest repository of public memory about 
socialist industrialisation. Former state 
and collective workers have repeated 
their stories to journalists, documentary 
filmmakers, and scholars—not only at the 
time that the state and collective sector 
collapsed, but for more than a decade 
afterwards (Williams et al. 2003; Hung 
and Chiu 2009; Yang 2010; Xiong 2012). In 
their accounts, laid-off workers testify to 
the meaningfulness of their membership 
in the socialist work unit (danwei) system 
in material and psychological terms. They 
reveal their sense of betrayal and injustice 
that ‘the promises of the socialist ideal 
simply vanished’ (Hung and Chiu 2009, 
113). Numerous testimonies show former 
state and collective employees’ insistent 
identification of themselves as ‘laid-off 
workers’ (xiagang gongren), even when 
they have found other work. By retaining 
this label, these citizens make a claim to 
the socialist path of modernity despite the 
government’s rejection of it. 
A more superficial form of socialist 
industrial history resides in the former 
state and collective enterprise buildings 
that have been preserved and adapted for 
new purposes. This type of architectural 
preservation can be said to have begun in the 
mid- to late 1990s, when artists in Beijing 
and Shanghai rented abandoned factories 
and warehouses to use as studios (Hee et 
al. 2008). In Beijing, some artists who had 
been evicted from the area around the old 
Summer Palace in 1995 moved to Dashanzi, 
a state enterprise built in the 1950s that was 
once Asia’s largest military electronics plant. 
Factory 798 became particularly well known 
as an artists’ community, so much so that 
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international art galleries and fashionable 
boutiques turned the site into an ‘art theme 
park’ by the mid-2000s (Hee et al 2008, 
253–256). In 2006, the State Administration 
of Cultural Heritage of China published 
its first official documents promoting the 
preservation and reuse of industrial heritage 
(Wang 2009). After this, Beijing’s municipal 
authorities began offering funding for 
private developers (Chen et al. 2016, 343). 
In Shanghai, private efforts to adapt 
socialist architecture received government 
support earlier than in Beijing, partly because 
the city had already begun preserving its 
semi-colonial industrial heritage in the early 
1990s (Zhang 2007b). One significant early 
development of a former socialist enterprise 
was the Chunming Roving Factory on Suzhou 
Creek. The Shanghai municipal government 
began redevelopment efforts here in 1992, 
spurred in part by water pollution (Hee et 
al. 2008, 251). In 1997, Taiwanese architect 
Teng Kun Yen rented or purchased a Suzhou 
Creek warehouse built in the 1930s and 
made it into a design studio (Hee et al. 2008, 
251; Wang 2009, 320). His redevelopment 
sparked other artists and designers to 
undertake similar renovations, leading to 
the preservation and adaptive reuse of not 
only the Chunming Roving Factory but 
also the socialist factories on Taikang Road 
that became known as Tianzifang (Yung et 
al. 2014). Shanghai municipal government 
officials quickly recognised the potential 
of rehabilitated socialist architecture to 
enhance city branding and generate revenue. 
In 2004, they established a policy to promote 
‘creative industry clusters’ which included 
tax concessions, special funding, and the 
ability to redevelop industrial land without 
applying for formal re-designation (Chen et 
al. 2016, 336, 343–344). As a result, dozens 
of socialist industrial sites were repurposed 
as creative industry clusters.
A Bulldozer Approach
Other cities were less inclined to 
abandon what Yung, Chan, and Xu (2014) 
call the ‘bulldozer approach’ to urban 
planning. In a 2016 study of twenty cities 
that received significant state investment 
for industrialisation during the 1950s 
and 1960s, Yang (2010) shows that most 
municipal governments have not seen 
industrial heritage as a marketable resource 
for redevelopment and have instead 
removed remnants of China’s socialist past. 
In Jingdezhen, the bulldozer approach to 
urban planning began in 2000, when the 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce bought 
the Jingxing Porcelain Factory, demolished 
it, and turned the area into a fruit and 
vegetable market. Other sites of socialist 
industry were torn down and replaced with 
retail storefronts and apartments.
The former ‘large collective’ (dajiti) 
Sculpture Factory is Jingdezhen’s primary 
example of adaptive reuse from the 
socialist period. While portions of today’s 
Sculpture Factory bear no resemblance to 
the enterprise that was built in 1956, other 
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parts have been preserved and adapted to 
serve the visiting artists and designers who 
participate in residencies at Carolyn Cheng’s 
Pottery Workshop. Cheng established her 
Jingdezhen branch of the Pottery Workshop 
in the Sculpture Factory in 2005. The facility 
now houses gallery space, an education 
centre, a café, and a shop, in addition to 
spaces where visiting artists can design and 
create ceramic works. 
Mine Parks
Mine parks are a third type of site that 
holds memories of socialist industrialisation. 
In 2009, the China Mining Task Force 
announced the government’s decision to 
establish national mine parks at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting. 
Seven years later, officials reported that 
China had created seventy-two national 
mine parks (Tenth Mining Task Force 2016). 
Among them were the Jinhuagong Coal Mine 
Park in northern Shanxi, the Huangshi Coal 
Mine Park in Hubei, the Wanshan Mercury 
Mine Park in Guizhou, and the Haizhou Coal 
Mine in Liaoning. While some of the mines 
were put to use prior to the founding of the 
PRC, all received significant state resources 
and saw major resource extraction through 
to the end of the twentieth century. These 
‘parks’ can include mine shafts, heavy 
machinery, historic photographs, socialist 
and contemporary art, and exhibits that 
describe the history of resource extraction 
and the ‘lifestyles of mining communities’ 
(China Daily 2016a). 
Researchers have just begun to investigate 
these new industrial heritage sites, with 
published masters theses from urban 
planning and architecture programmes (Liu 
2010; Meng 2011). A glimpse of how China’s 
mine parks communicate the socialist vision 
of modernity is available from the reviews 
of visitors to the Huangshi Coal Mine 
Park on Trip Advisor. Many describe the 
former mines as visually spectacular and 
educational. For some, the sites produce 
powerful experiences of identification 
with the former mine workers, a visceral 
sense of the forward pace of socialist 
modernisation (jianzhengle xiandai gongye 
fazhang qianjinde jiaobu), and an awareness 
of the economic decline suffered by cities 
dependent on extractible resources (ganjue 
zhege difang gen henduo ziyuankujie chengshi 
yiyang, you muoluo de ganjue).
A Façade of Socialist 
Modernity
China’s socialist industrial heritage is 
underdeveloped relative to its imperial 
and colonial pasts. Potential economic 
gains from tourism and commerce have 
driven the efforts made to date, which are 
almost exclusively focused on the built 
environment. For example, only two percent 
of China’s cultural relics relate to industry 
(Xu and Aoki 2016, 80). Since at least 
some of these eighty-three artefacts are 
from industry prior to 1949, the officially-
recognised cultural relics of socialist 
industrialisation represent an even smaller 
percentage of the total. At present, China’s 
restored socialist structures and their 
creative class inhabitants preserve merely 
the façade of socialist modernity. Today’s 
trendy new users largely overshadow the 
history of these sites’ industrial development 
and their rapid decline. The PRC has not yet 
created a national inventory of its socialist 
industrial heritage. Nor have authorities 
announced plans to collect oral histories 
of socialist modernisation. If such trends 
continue, what remains of the path that 
China travelled toward socialist modernity 
will vanish, leaving only a thin veneer of 
industrial heritage without its rich and 
colourful history.
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‘As a Nation, We Won Our Rights, Our Dream. 
Not So Where Capital Reigns Supreme,’ E. 
Maloletkov, Moscow 1957.
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Craig A. Smith
Although industrial landscapes today appear 
as one of the most alien of art forms, they were 
once fundamental as backgrounds of socialist 
realist paintings. This essay examines the 
legacies of two masters of the genre in China 
and North Korea—Song Wenzhi (1919–1999) 
and Chōng Yōngman (1938–1999)—and 
demonstrates how different revolutionary 
histories have led to a divergence in legacy 
and achievement.
To many in the twenty-first century, the 
industrial landscape appears as one of the 
most alien of art forms. Yet, the billowing 
fumes of endless smokestacks or the web 
of piping from a glistening petroleum 
plant once made the best representatives 
of socialist realist painting. Socialist 
realist art portrayed ideal life in socialist 
states—anchored in communism, class-
consciousness, and loyalty to the party and 
the people. While many Soviet works showed 
elements of the genre decades earlier, artists 
and theorists from the Soviet Union only 
began officially promoting socialist realism 
as a ‘true and historically concrete depiction 
of reality in its revolutionary development’ 
at the Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, 
leading to its spread around the world 
(Gorky et al. 1977). The genre then arrived in 
China and Korea as an already stylised form 
with a long history. While in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) it fell into oblivion 
during the reform period, it still continues 
to dominate in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) today. 
In the Soviet Union, artists included 
industrial landscapes in the background of 
propaganda and artwork. The backgrounds 
reflected the life, and idealised the 
ambitions, of the working class. There was a 
marked emphasis on klassovost, sometimes 
translated as class-consciousness. Exemplars 
of the genre also showed partinost, loyalty to 
the party and its principles, and norodnost, 
the ambitions of the people or nation. 
While socialist realist industrial landscapes 
remained at the margins of the socialist 
realist genre in the Soviet Union, in the PRC 
and the DPRK, both of which have a long 
artistic tradition of landscape painting, these 
industrial scenes became the focus of artists’ 
work for a short time in the mid-1970s. This 
essay examines the legacies of Song Wenzhi 
(1919–1999) and Chōng Yōngman (1938–
1999), the most accomplished artists of 
industrial landscapes in the two countries, 
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‘Taihu’s New Look’, Song Wenzhi (1979).
showing how different revolutionary 
histories have led to a divergence in legacy 
and achievement.
Song Wenzhi and 
Industrial China
In China, it was Song Wenzhi who produced 
the most popular examples of socialist 
realist industrial landscapes. Song was 
a classically trained artist with a strong 
background in landscape painting. Although 
he was forced to spend the first years of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in a factory, 
he resumed painting in 1972. In 1973, he 
was appointed deputy director of Nanjing’s 
Provincial Fine Arts Work Team. There, 
he continued to create beautiful landscape 
paintings. However, his art began to show 
elements of industrial modernity, sublimely 
sliding between traditional Chinese 
landscapes and socialist realist images of 
industry.
In many of Song’s paintings, he introduced 
modern elements as a subtle but dominating 
feature, such as in ‘Taihu’s New Look’ (taihu 
xinzhuang). Song only fully surrendered 
to the industrial landscape genre in a 
few paintings, producing images that not 
only stand out as excellent examples of 
traditional Chinese painting, but also remain 
iconic reminders of the time. Of these, the 
most memorable is his 1975 masterpiece 
‘Daqing Blossoms along the Yangzi River’ 
(yangzijiang pan daqing hua). Through 
Song’s reformed classical technique, 
mountains metamorphose into factories 
and flowers blossom as the billowing clouds 
from a forest of smokestacks. 
Song did not continue with the genre. 
Whatever compelled him to create these 
paintings—whether it was the watchful eye 
of his superiors, the pull of a revolutionary 
‘market’, or his own experiences at the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution—at 
the end of the Maoist era he turned back to 
traditional landscapes. While continuing to 
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‘Daqing Blossoms along the Yangzi River’, Song Wenzhi (1975).
sketch the occasional power line, he never 
returned to the subject of industrial beauty. 
The genre had no place in the opening up 
and reform period that China entered in 
1978. This was not the case in the DPRK, 
however, where the revolution never ended.
Chōng Yōngman’s 
Depiction of History and 
the Workers
In 1973, just two years before Song 
painted ‘Daqing Blossoms’, one of the 
most celebrated North Korean painters 
Chōng Yōngman produced an industrial 
landscape that captivated the country and 
led to a reconsideration of the genre of 
Chosōnhwa (Korean Painting) (Lee 2014b). 
Largely due to the historical, artistic, and 
ideological success of ‘Evening Glow over 
Kangsōn Steelworks’ (gangseon-ui-no-eul), 
Chōng later became vice-president of the 
Mansudae Studio and a chairman of the 
central committee of the Korean Artists 
Federation.
The Kangsōn Steel Mill was the birthplace 
of the Chollima Movement, an ideologically 
driven productivity campaign initiated by 
Kim Il-sung when he visited the mill in 
December 1956. Unlike China’s Great Leap 
Forward and the Stakhanovite Movement of 
the Soviet Union, North Korea’s Chollima 
Movement has remained at the centre of 
national identity. The chollima refers to a 
horse of unimaginable speed in East Asian 
legends, indicating the astounding potential 
of the North Korean worker. Images of the 
horse are still evident everywhere in North 
Korea today, but Chōng’s painting of the 
factory is just as much a symbol of this 
decisive period in DPRK history.
‘Kangsōn Steelworks’ was Chōng’s most 
important work, marking a departure from 
the simple and powerful ink Chosōnhwa and 
creating an iconic image that is still a common 
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 Ł(vening *Oow over .angsýn SteeOworksł Chýng <ýngman  2 Ł7he worker and the soOdier race 
forth on a chollima. A strong, great nation! Wishing everyone a Happy New Year, 2010.’ (3) The ten won 
bill of the DPRK.
(1)
(2) (3)
sight today. The image once featured on the 
ten won bill; it also serves as a backdrop for 
New Year’s posters, and greets visitors to 
the Korean Museum of Art in Pyongyang. 
Moreover, the use of ‘Kangsōn Steelworks’ 
in official media ensures that tourists to 
North Korea inevitably come across this 
mesmerising painting in either its original 
form, or as the background for numerous 
posters that have since incorporated the 
classic painting in their own imagery.
Real and Ideal Beauty
Socialist realist landscapes should 
concentrate upon the ideal reality—rather 
than the real reality—for the worker, the 
scientist, and the farmer. Nowhere is this 
better achieved than in the DPRK. The 
socialist realist industrial landscape has 
long fallen out of fashion in Russia, and no 
longer has a place in post-socialist China, 
where images of smokestacks are reminders 
of the problems of air pollution, rather 
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‘Once Again, Let’s Improve the Life of the People by Producing All Sorts of Things!’
than of the glorious worker. However, the 
landscape still holds its symbolic value in 
Pyongyang, where the state glorifies the 
role of the worker in the continued struggle 
to maintain and improve the nation and the 
Party.
Although Song Wenzhi adapted traditional 
Chinese art in an innovative and a compelling 
fashion to produce beautiful paintings of 
the country’s industrial accomplishments, 
Chōng Yōngman’s ‘Kangsōn Steelworks’ 
has stood the test of time. Up to this day, 
it continues to captivate the people due to 
its vivid portrayal of industrial beauty, and 
finds official support due to its ideological 
correctness in relation to the political 
discourse of the ruling Party. The piece’s 
relationship to the historical significance 
of the Chollima Movement cements it as 
an exemplar in socialist realist art—uniting 
the ambitions of the Party, the nation, and 
the working class in a way that could not 
be achieved in the context of China’s more 
contentious and complicated revolutionary 
history. 
But Chōng’s achievement is not only 
ideological. Even before global concerns 
with climate change, few found beauty in 
images of polluting gases billowing into the 
air. However, those of us who have stood on 
concrete rooftops and watched the sun set in 
a torrent of colours filtered through a wall of 
effluvia know that these paintings are more 
than markers of material development. They 
are beautiful works of art.
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Emily Williams
Since the 1980s the Chinese Communist Party 
has condemned the Cultural Revolution as 
‘ten years of chaos’. Nevertheless, so far there 
has been very little discussion on the topic in 
the public sphere in China. This essay looks 
into how private collections of red relics can 
be used to confront this void in China’s recent 
past. It argues that collected objects play a 
much more complex role in history production 
than we may think, as they contribute to the 
construction of narratives, put forth counter-
narratives, and fragment the very idea of 
historical narrative altogether.
The summer of 2017 saw the ninetieth 
anniversary of the founding of China’s 
People’s Liberation Army. The occasion was 
marked not only by a massive rally that was 
streamed live on television—an unequivocal 
display of military power overseen by 
President Xi Jinping (Phillips 2017)—but 
also by a number of exhibitions. This fact, in 
and of itself, is unsurprising, given the boom 
in museums and so-called ‘red tourism’ in 
China in recent years. One such exhibition 
was held at the Urban Planning Museum 
in Beijing’s Chaoyang Park, and was 
significant, less for its content and curation 
than for its organisers: it was a collaborative 
effort between the government of Chaoyang 
Collecting the Red Era 
in Contemporary China
Figure 1: View of the exhibition in Chaoyang Park Beijing, August 2017. Author’s photo. 
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district in Beijing, the well-known flea 
market of Panjiayuan, and the Red Collectors 
Committee of the China National Collectors 
Association.
The Red Collectors Association is a 
nationally approved body that brings 
together collectors of Maoist material 
culture. For this exhibition, they provided 
over 1,500 so-called ‘red relics’ (hongse 
wenwu), drawn from the private collections 
of association members from around the 
country. Somewhat peculiarly, the exhibition 
almost entirely excluded discussion of the 
objects themselves, using them as simple 
accessories for the broader narrative that 
was expounded in great detail on the walls 
of the exhibition. While it could be argued 
that in doing so the curators missed an 
opportunity to add an extra layer of interest 
to their exhibition, such a strategy is perhaps 
not surprising given the sensitivity that 
surrounds the writing of modern Chinese 
history. Indeed, while the curators worked 
hard to portray the red relics as an intrinsic 
part of China’s ‘red legacy’, in reality these 
relics occupy a somewhat contradictory 
place in contemporary China.
‘Red relics’ are objects from the ‘Red Era’, 
a term that can indicate any period after 
the founding of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 1921, but most often refers to 
the decades between 1949 and 1976. Many 
collections are strongest in objects from the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a highly 
controversial period that saw the production 
of abundant and hugely diverse material 
culture. Since the 1980s, the Cultural 
Revolution has been condemned by the 
CCP as ‘ten years of chaos’, but it continues 
to be the subject of both celebratory and 
condemnatory memories in China. These 
contradictory remembrances are well 
known, even if there is little discussion on 
the topic in the public sphere. For example, 
the Cultural Revolution was not mentioned 
at the Chaoyang Exhibition, except for 
brief mention of the country’s foreign 
policy at that time. If we want, therefore, to 
understand how collections can be used to 
confront China’s recent past, we need to look 
beyond public exhibitions, and consider the 
practices of China’s red collectors.
(left) Figure 2: A photograph of Chinese President Xi Jinping in the entrance hall of the exhibition. 
The second quote reads: ‘Utilise red resources, develop the red tradition, and pass on the red 
gene well.’ The exhibition tried to position the red relics on display as part of the ‘red resources’ 
Xi mentions. (right) Figure 3: Posters depicting some of the Ten Marshals and, below, a selection of 
military medals. Photos taken by the author.
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Fragmented Narratives: 
Li Jun
Collected objects play a much more 
complex role in constructing historical 
narratives than we may think. We might 
be tempted to think of a collection as a 
systematic accumulation of historical 
traces. By acquiring and then protecting 
these remains, the collector ensures the 
survival of these remnants of history, and 
thus ensures historical continuity. However, 
theorists, such as Susan Stewart (1992), 
problematise the relationship between 
history and a collection, and argue that the 
collected object, rather than preserving 
history, in fact destroys it. Indeed, the 
implicit search for an internal relationship 
between the present and the past that 
is embedded in the act of collecting is 
marked by an absolute disruption, whereby 
entering a collection, the object must be 
removed from the context from which it 
previously derived value and meaning. 
The relationship, then, is not rooted in 
historical reality, but rather represents an 
aesthetic denial of historical value. For this 
reason, Stewart calls a collection the ‘total 
aestheticisation of use value’ (1992, 151), 
and the place where history is transformed 
into space: a transformation that is marked 
most profoundly by the establishment of 
boundaries. According to Jean Baudrillard, 
a collection is defined by the establishment 
of a series—sets into which objects can be 
classified, defined by the collector, and with 
reference to the collector (1996, 96–97). In 
other words, in the classic manifestation 
of a collection, classification does not put 
forward an historical narrative, but rather 
fragments any such narrative through 
serialisation. 
Cultural Revolution objects, despite 
their origin in perhaps the most anti-
capitalist period in modern Chinese 
history, lend themselves remarkably easily 
to the commodification that serialisation 
necessitates. For instance, Li Jun, a 
collector from Ningbo, Zhejiang province, 
began collecting Mao badges five years ago, 
primarily as a hobby and as a way to relieve 
the stress of his high-level job in a fashion 
company. According to an interview that I 
had with him in June 2016, since then he has 
acquired over thirty thousand Mao badges, 
as well as military and labour medals. He 
stores them in immaculately organised 
stacks of shelves in his spacious modern flat, 
organised primarily by aesthetic similarity. 
There are trays of young Mao on his way 
to Anyuan, Mao in wheat fields, Mao in 
every imaginable pose and in front of every 
imaginable background, all neatly arranged. 
(Left) Figure 4: A selection of Li Jun’s Mao badges. (Right) Figure 5: 1950s military medals and the 
accompanying ‘meritorious medal certificate’, which contains details of their original owners. Images 
supplied by Li Jun, 2017
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Leading figures in the Collectors 
Association encourage members to do 
research on and through their objects. 
Li argues that the work units (danwei) 
and military units listed on the back of 
many badges can be a starting point for 
understanding cultural production during 
the Cultural Revolution. But, in fact, 
organising badges by appearance does not 
encourage their insertion into a historical 
narrative, but rather into an aesthetic 
series in which history is fragmented and 
objects gain their importance only from 
their appearance and their similarity (or 
dissimilarity) to their neighbours. 
Badges have been a popular collectible 
in China since the early 1990s, and to be 
considered a collector of any merit, one must 
have some ten thousand unique objects. But 
the real way to distinguish oneself in this 
highly competitive field is to complement 
bulk objects with more rare examples. In 
Li’s case, the pride of his collection is a 
small number of model worker medals and 
military medals, primarily from the 1950s. 
These are marked out by Li’s attempt to 
historicise them: he not only collects the 
medals, but also tries to acquire the personal 
documents of each medal’s former owner. 
In doing so, he is able to attach a personal 
narrative to the objects, but the process also 
highlights the historical distance between 
their original context and the present. 
Image-Driven Archiving: 
Dong Zhongchao
Other collectors deal with the problem 
of historicisation in different ways. Beijing 
collector Dong Zhongchao—whom I 
interviewed in 2016 and 2017—began trading 
and then collecting Mao-era posters in the 
1990s, but in the 2000s he started to expand 
the scope of his collection. It now includes 
all sorts of daily life objects, such as mugs, 
plates, basins, teapots and thermoses, 
textiles and clothing, mirrors, toys, and 
other items that similarly share the Maoist 
aesthetic of the time. Alongside this, he 
also collects things such as Mao busts and 
other sculptures, editions of the Little Red 
Book, and Mao badges, but Dong makes no 
discursive or practical distinction between 
(Left) Figure 6: Beijing collector Dong Zhongchao in front of his shelf of enamel mugs, which are 
organised thematically. (Right) Figure 7: While Dong started off collecting posters, he now collects 
anything that reflects the red aesthetic of the Mao years. Image supplied by Dong Zhongchao, 2016.
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these and those daily life objects, mixing 
them all together both on the shelves and in 
his conversations. 
Compared to Li’s ordered trays, Dong’s 
memorabilia are stacked and heaped in an 
overflowing storeroom, as well as scattered 
throughout his home. But his collection 
is also meticulously digitised, and it is in 
his digital collection that his conception 
of history becomes apparent. In addition 
to organising his objects thematically, by 
place, or by period as is common in many 
collections, Dong takes particular pleasure 
in matching up his items with correspondent 
visual depictions in propaganda posters (see 
images 9 and 10). 
It could be suggested that this type of 
archiving practice seeks to legitimise 
the imagery presented in the posters by 
demonstrating that the materiality of 
the life depicted in the posters can be 
recollected. Possessing the physical objects 
visible in posters seems to endorse the 
historicity of the poster image, suggesting 
the reality of the poster messages by virtue 
of the reality of the objects depicted in it. 
(Left) Figure 8: Dong’s storeroom, containing statues, mirrors, a television, a bicycle, and myriad other 
objects. (Right) Figure 9: Dong’s archival strategy: matching imagery from posters with objects from 
daily life. Photo provided by Dong Zhongchao, 2016.
But the strategy also works the other way 
around, as an attempt to heal the fissure in 
the relationship between past and present 
by using the poster imagery to provide the 
missing context for the collected objects. 
This strategy has a number of implications 
for the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between collected object and historical 
narrative. 
Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that 
modern historical consciousness is formed 
by taking objects that are contemporaneous 
with us and seeing them as ‘relics’ from the 
past (2008, 238–239). Doing this limits the 
historical object’s power because it denies 
the possibility of a lived relation with the 
present—any impact the object still has is 
just an effect of the past. Thus, the historical 
object is doubly denied agency: firstly, by 
its removal from the context in which it 
originally had meaning; and secondly, by 
its reconceptualisation as a ‘relic’. Dong’s 
approach attempts to restore an agency to 
the object: combining the actual objects 
with their visual portrayal in posters is an 
attempt to construct a new, more active 
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Figure 10: Dong’s efforts to match poster 
imagery with objects goes beyond just 
objects of ‘daily life’. Photo provided by Dong 
Zhongchao, 2016.
way of engaging with both posters and real 
objects, transporting the viewer back to the 
Mao era, and reaffirming the validity of the 
values of that time, a period that he sees as 
characterised by greater equality compared 
to the corruption and individualism of 
contemporary Chinese society. 
Total Recall?
Susan Stewart argues that the problem 
with trying to use relics to overcome the 
gap between past and present is that objects 
recall not the experience lived, but the 
experience voluntarily remembered (1992, 
145). However, in today’s China, where 
public discussion of memories of the Cultural 
Revolution remains limited, it is precisely 
memories, including those expressed 
through collecting practices, which are 
needed. While the Chaoyang Exhibition 
presented a clear narrative of the military’s 
smooth rise to power and prominence, other 
collecting practices hold the possibility 
of telling more complicated stories. That 
these stories lack coherence is not a bad 
thing. Indeed, what is needed are multiple, 
overlapping, even conflicting narratives. If 
we understand the archival practices of red 
collectors as exercises in historical memory 
and as forms of historical writing, we can 
appreciate them for their diversity. Objects 
and their collections construct narratives, 
put forth counter-narratives, and fragment 
the very idea of narratives altogether. When 
considered collectively, they represent one 
of the ways in which contemporary China is 
attempting to deal with its difficult recent 
past. 
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Ivan Franceschini
Lu Xun today lives a new life in his homeland 
as well as abroad. However, given the vastness 
and unevenness of his oeuvre, not all his works 
receive the same attention. In particular, one 
collection of short stories stands out for their 
neglect: Old Tales Retold, a series of comic 
sketches based on ancient Chinese myths and 
legends published shortly before his death. 
This essay focusses on this semi-forgotten 
pearl and its relevance for today’s readers.
Resurrecting the 
Dead
On several occasions during his lifetime, 
Lu Xun (1881–1936) expressed concern over 
what would happen to his legacy after his 
death. As Eileen J. Cheng has noted, ‘Lu Xun 
was acutely aware that after the death of the 
subject, texts representing the dead may 
take on lives of their own, as posthumous 
accounts can no longer be challenged by the 
deceased subject. Indeed, his writings self-
consciously deal with the ethics of narration 
and the limits of representation’ (Cheng 
2017, 433). Beyond the issue of people 
using his name for personal gain, Lu Xun 
worried that his writing would be distorted 
and manipulated to further factional and 
The real misfortune suffered by men of letters 
lies not in being ignored and attacked in their 
lifetime, but comes after death when their words 
and conduct cease to exist; idlers pass themselves 
off as their confidantes spreading gossip and 
rumour every which way for the sake of self-
promotion. For the sake of making a little money, 
even a corpse becomes a tool by which they seek to 
secure fame and fortune, and it is this that is truly 
lamentable.
(Lu Xun 2017, 186–187, 94, translated by 
Theodore Huters)
Lu Xun’s mortuary portrait, 1936.
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ideological battles. Sadly, his worst fears 
were to come true. In a eulogy written for the 
first anniversary of the writer’s death, Mao 
Zedong hailed him as ‘the sage of modern 
China’ (xiandai zhongguo de shengren), 
on par with Confucius, ‘the sage of feudal 
China’—an ironic fate for an intellectual 
who had spent his life attempting to break 
the ancient philosopher’s hold on Chinese 
society (Mao 1939). This was the first of 
several speeches and articles in which 
Mao would appropriate Lu Xun for his 
political cause. That he was successful in 
this manipulation can be seen from the fact 
that after 1949, while the writer’s former 
disciples and friends were falling victim 
to purges and violence, Lu Xun’s name and 
oeuvre were used to justify a ny kind of 
foulness (Goldman 1982). 
In spite of this, Lu Xun’s legacy managed 
to survive and today the writer lives a 
new life in his homeland as well as abroad 
(Davies 2013a and 2013b). In China, over 
the past decade citations and photos of 
Lu Xun have appeared frequently on the 
Internet as Chinese netizens mobilised to 
denounce the latest injustice perpetrated 
by officials—be it the suppression of land 
protests, the muffling of critical voices, or 
the hypocrisy and abuses of the ruling class 
(Pan 2005; Henochowicz 2016). Images and 
characters from Lu Xun’s work still appear 
in the conversations of ordinary people, 
from the ‘iron house’ (tiewu) where people 
are sleeping, unaware that they will soon 
be devoured by a fire raging outside, to 
the ‘cannibalistic ethic’ (chiren de lijiao) of 
Chinese society; from the scoundrel Ah Q, to 
the failed scholar Kong Yiji. I remember my 
surprise when, during a meeting at a women 
rights NGO in Beijing a few years ago, one 
activist referred to the ‘bloody mantou’ (xue 
mantou)—a trope from one of Lu Xun’s most 
famous short stories, which has come to 
indicate the gullibility of common people, 
always ready to believe in the existence 
of absurd miraculous remedies for their 
problems—to complain about the obtuseness 
of those who refused to follow her advice. 
Abroad, there has been a flourishing of 
new translations of Lu Xun into foreign 
languages (2010), with the latest—a 
collection of essays entitled Jottings under 
Lamplight (2017)—having been published 
only a few months ago. This has been 
accompanied by the appearance of several 
critical studies of remarkable breadth and 
profundity, such as Gloria Davies’s Lu Xun’s 
Revolution (2013), Eva Shan Chou’s Memory, 
Violence, Queues (2012), and Eileen J. 
Cheng’s Literary Remains (2013), to mention 
just a few. However, given the vastness and 
unevenness of the writer’s oeuvre, not all 
his works receive the same attention. In 
particular, one collection of short stories 
stands out for their neglect: Old Tales Retold 
(gushi xinbian) (Lu Xun 2014), a series of 
comic sketches based on ancient Chinese 
myths and legends that Lu Xun published 
shortly before his death. It is on this semi-
forgotten pearl—and its relevance for today’s 
readers—that this short essay will focus.
The Old Tales Retold  
Old Tales Retold includes eight, short 
comic stories based on episodes drawn from 
Chinese classics. In them, we find divinities 
depicted as ordinary human beings, such as 
the goddess Nüwa, who creates mankind 
out of sheer boredom only to get annoyed 
with her creation immediately thereafter. 
Legendary heroes face ordinary challenges, 
such as an aged Hou Yi, a mythical archer 
who had saved the world, who has to deal 
with a disgruntled wife and a backstabbing 
disciple; or Yu, the legendary tamer of 
the floods, who is confronted with the 
jeers of incompetent scholars and corrupt 
officials. Some figures come straight out 
of the historical annals, such as Bo Yi and 
Shuqi, two elders who met a tragic end 
because of their stubborn observance of 
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Confucian morality. Others are the stuff of 
legends, such as Mei Jianchi, a young boy 
who resorts to black magic to avenge his 
dead father. Obviously, there is no lack of 
philosophers. Laozi, Mozi, and Zhuangzi 
appear as main characters in three of the 
tales. Confucius features only in an ancillary 
role—an absence that is far from surprising 
if we consider what Lu Xun wrote in 1926 
in the afterword to his collection of essays 
Graves: ‘As for my thinking, I have often been 
poisoned by Zhuangzi and Hanfeizi, at times 
quite casually and at others quite vigorously. 
I read the Confucian books earliest and most 
thoroughly, but they for some reason seem 
to have little connection with me’ (Lu Xun 
2017, 34, translation by Theodore Huters). 
Since their publication in January 1936, 
Old Tales Retold never enjoyed particular 
renown among critics. Many were puzzled 
by a work so far from the realism of the 
writer’s earlier fiction. In his preface, 
Lu Xun himself expressed scepticism 
about the literary value of this oeuvre: 
‘Most of these tales have been written in a 
rush, and fall short of the name ‘story’ as 
defined by literary criticism…. Moreover, 
having less respect for the ancients than 
for contemporaries, on occasions I could 
not avoid facetiousness’ (Lu Xun 2014, 32, 
translation by Ivan Franceschini). Indeed, 
only a few months before drafting the bulk of 
those stories, the writer had been involved 
in a polemic with Lin Yutang and other 
proponents on the importance of ‘humour’ 
(youmo) in literature (Rea 2015, 39), going 
so far as to paraphrase Kierkegaard on the 
dangers of writing for the sheer amusement 
of the public:
A theatre catches fire. The clown steps to 
the front of the stage to announce the fact to 
the audience, who think it a joke and applaud. 
Then the clown announces again that there 
is a fire, but they roar with laughter and clap 
more loudly than ever. No doubt the world 
will end amid the general applause of these 
laughter-loving people who take everything 
as a joke. (Lu Xun 2003, 346–347, translated 
by Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang)
While the Chinese critical debate has 
featured endless theoretical arguments 
about narrative techniques and on whether 
this book should be considered satire or 
historical fiction, discussions among the 
few scholars based outside China who did 
not dismiss this work as irrelevant have 
been more sanguine. In 1961, in his ground-
breaking A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, 
C. T. Hsia described Old Tales Retold in these 
terms: ‘In his fear of searching his own mind 
and disclosing thereby his pessimistic and 
sombre view of China at complete variance 
with his professed Communist faith, Lu 
[Xun] could only repress his deep-seated 
personal emotions in the service of political 
satire. The resulting levity and chaos… mark 
the sad degeneration of a distinguished if 
narrow talent for fiction’ (1961, 46). The 
following year, another giant in the study 
of modern Chinese literature, Jaroslav 
Průšek, retorted: ‘[Lu Xun’s] pictures [in Old 
Tales Retold] have, namely, a multiplicity 
of meanings, every moment relating to a 
number of layers of reality, their changing 
hues reminiscent of a winding scarf of 
rainbow colours. In this many-facetted 
iridescence lies the individuality and 
originality of Lu [Xun]’s artistic technique, 
which C. T. Hsia is unable to grasp…’ (1962, 
382). This rebuttal did not convince Hsia, 
however, who penned another response 
reiterating his opinion, citing Lu Xun’s own 
self-deprecatory preface as evidence of the 
scarce value of the book (Hsia 1963). 
Why Read the Old Tales 
Retold Today?
If even Lu Xun himself supposedly did 
not believe in the artistic significance of 
his Old Tales Retold, why rediscover this 
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often overlooked book today? There are 
at least three reasons. First, these stories 
offer a glimpse into intellectual debates in 
Republican China that still bear relevance to 
China today—particularly with regard to the 
relationship between politics and tradition, 
individuals and society, and conservation 
and innovation. Second, by portraying 
ancient sages and legendary heroes not 
as hieratical semi-deities but as flawed 
human beings, Lu Xun undermines a certain 
kind of ‘orientalist’ discourse that to this 
day remains widespread in foreign media 
and academia (does this ring any Bell?). 
Although Ann Louise Huss (2000) has—
not without reason—associated the writer’s 
ridicule of these figures to the physical and 
psychological violence against intellectuals 
that would be carried out during the 
Cultural Revolution some four decades later, 
the humour of Old Tales Retold undeniably 
provides a powerful antidote against the 
tendency to take the classics too seriously 
and to read everything related to China 
through pseudo-Confucian lenses. Finally, 
and most importantly, these tales, in their 
minimalism, offer a corrosive critique of any 
attempt at manipulating Chinese tradition 
for political purpose. 
At its recently concluded Nineteenth 
Congress, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has amended its Constitution to 
include the ‘promotion of the creative 
transformation and innovative development 
of outstanding Chinese traditional culture’ 
in its mission (People’s Net 2017). And it 
is not a secret that ‘Chinese traditional 
culture’—or at least an emasculated version 
of it—is at the core of the CCP’s effort to 
promote China’s soft power abroad, not 
least through a network of more than five 
hundred Confucius Institutes. In a curious 
assonance, in 1927, in ‘The Old Tunes Are 
Finished’, one of his most pointed essays 
against Chinese tradition, Lu Xun wrote of 
the Chinese classics as a ‘soft knife’ (ruan 
daozi), saying that the reason they are so 
fearsome is that readers are not alert to their 
danger, as they see them as being harmless 
(Lu Xun 2017, 173–174). Towards the end of 
his life, in an essay entitled ‘Confucius in 
Modern China’ published in 1935, he further 
elaborated on why he felt the need to attack 
the ancient philosopher in his writings:
Revulsion for the monk leads to distaste 
for the habit, and the exploitation of 
Confucius as an instrument to gain a certain 
end becoming once more transparently 
obvious, the desire to dethrone him grew the 
more potent. Therefore, when Confucius is 
dressed in perfect dignity, articles and works 
exposing his flaws are bound to appear. 
Confucius though he be, he must have his 
flaws. In normal times no one would pay 
them any heed, because a sage is still a man, 
and as such they may be forgiven him. Yet 
if the disciples of the Sage come forth and 
start prating, telling us that the Sage was 
this and was that, and therefore you must 
be likewise, people will not be able to keep 
from laughing out loud. (Lu Xun 2017, 186–
187, translation by David Pollard)
In times like these, when Chinese tradition 
is once again resurrected to serve dubious 
political purposes, it is more important than 
ever to rediscover the irony and sarcasm of 
Old Tales Retold. This is necessary not only 
to remind ourselves to maintain an approach 
to Chinese tradition devoid of dogmatism, 
but also to undermine the hegemonic 
effort of the propaganda of the CCP and 
the shallow authoritativeness of today’s 
orientalists. While it is impossible to know 
whether by doing so we are betraying Lu 
Xun’s intentions, there is a good chance that 
he would not have minded this opportunity 
‘to make the ancients out as more dead than 
they already are’.
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